Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sudarsana Babu v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Mar 25, 1983
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the denial of a press pass to Sudarsana Babu, staff correspondent of the newspaper "Desabhimani", for a session of the Kerala Legislative Assembly beginning in the last week of February (year indicated as 1983 in the text). The longstanding practice was to issue passes to accredited correspondents; Babu had received this facility for three years prior to the challenged session. When the current session commenced, Babu alone was denied the usual pass — while the other 74 accredited correspondents were issued passes — allegedly without any reason, notice or hearing.

The respondents were: (1) The State of Kerala (accrediting agency); (2) The Speaker of the Kerala Legislative Assembly; and (3) The Secretary of the Assembly (responsible for signing the pass). The petition advanced several grounds, including discrimination under Article 14, violation of Article 361A, incompatibility of Rule 309 (Rules of Procedure framed under Article 208) with constitutional guarantees, and that Article 212(2) did not apply to admission to the Visitors' or Press Gallery.

Procedurally, the petition was posted for admission on 7-3-1983 and admitted. Rule 149 of the High Court Rules (requiring notice to respondents on admission) was noted. Before notice could be issued, on 10-3-1983 the Advocate General filed a statement on behalf of the State requesting that the Speaker and the Secretary be removed from the array of parties, on the ground that the correct constitutional provision precluded issuance of notice to them. The Court examined whether Article 212 or other constitutional provisions precluded issuing notice to the Speaker and Secretary and ultimately directed that notice be issued, directing the office to proceed under Rule 149.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether any constitutional provision (notably Article 212(2)) precludes the High Court from issuing notice to the Speaker and the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly in proceedings under Article 226.
  2. Whether powers exercised by the Speaker/Secretary under rules made under Article 208 (including Rule 309 regulating admission of strangers) are immune from judicial scrutiny when alleged to infringe fundamental or other constitutional rights.
  3. Whether denial of a press pass to the petitioner involves violations of specific constitutional provisions invoked by the petitioner — notably Article 14 (equal protection), Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression / freedom of press), and Article 361A — and whether those rights can be enforced against the legislature or its officers.
  4. Whether Article 212(2) (immunity of officers/members of the legislature in respect of exercise of powers regulating procedure and conduct of business) applies to bar jurisdiction in matters concerning admission of strangers to the Press/Visitors' Gallery.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Sudarsana Babu was singled out for discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Denial of necessary facility to report Assembly proceedings violated rights recognized by Article 361A.
  • Rule 309 (made under Article 208) is subject to the Constitution; rules or action under them cannot infringe fundamental rights, and therefore the Rule and the Speaker/Secretary's action cannot affect petitioner's constitutional rights.
  • Article 212(2) is not attracted because admission to the Visitors' Gallery or Press Gallery is not a matter solely pertaining to regulation of procedure and conduct of business in the Legislature.

Respondents' / State's Arguments (as presented by the Advocate General)

  • The Advocate General filed a statement seeking removal of the Speaker and Secretary from the party array on the basis that the "correct constitutional provision" precludes issuance of notice to them — essentially asserting that the Court should not issue notice or confront the Legislative Assembly in the matter.
  • Implicit in the statement and other respondent contentions is the contention that where powers are vested by or under the Constitution (such as under Article 212 and rules under Article 208), officers/members are immune from the jurisdiction of courts in respect of the exercise of those powers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G.K. Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan, AIR 1954 S.C. 636 Authority showing that fundamental rights (Article 22(2) in that case) can operate against privileges of the Assembly; Speaker may be subject to writ jurisdiction in a proper case. The Court cited it to support the proposition that fundamental rights do not disappear when the Assembly or its officers act, and that the Speaker may be subject to writ jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances.
M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 S.C. 395 Majority held Article 19(1)(a) must be reconciled with legislative privileges under Article 194(3); discussed limits of privileges vs fundamental rights (majority and dissenting views recorded). The Court analysed Sharma to show that it did not establish that all fundamental rights yield to legislative privileges; the opinion used Sharma to explain tensions and to note that subsequent decisions clarified limits to the majority's broad inferences.
In re (Presidential Reference) under Article 143, AIR 1965 S.C. 745 Advisory opinion clarifying that fundamental rights are not generally subordinate to legislative privileges under Art. 194(3); affirmed that High Courts retain power under Article 226 (and Supreme Court under Article 32) even in matters involving legislatures. Relied upon heavily: used to support the proposition that Article 226/32 powers cannot be made subject to legislative privileges, that courts may scrutinise alleged illegality inside legislatures, and that the judiciary can act where fundamental rights are alleged to be violated by legislative actions.
State of Punjab v. Satyapal, AIR 1969 S.C. 903 Supreme Court refused to accept finality of Speaker's ruling on adjourning the Assembly; Speaker was subject to an Ordinance under Articles 213/209 and could act contrary to law. Cited to show that the Speaker's rulings are not necessarily immune from judicial scrutiny and that the Speaker can be subject to other constitutional constraints and to judicial review.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (U.S. Supreme Court) U.S. case holding that a legislative chamber's exclusion of a duly-qualified member is reviewable by the courts; adjudicatory powers of legislatures are subject to judicially manageable standards. Invoked by analogy to argue that adjudicatory or regulatory powers conferred by a constitution may be reviewable by courts; used to support the proposition that regulatory powers are not necessarily immune from judicial oversight.
Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 A & E. 1 English case rejecting an absolute plea of parliamentary privilege and holding courts retain authority to interpret law in matters affecting rights of subjects. Used to illustrate historical judicial reluctance to accept absolute legislative immunity and to show that courts can and have refused to accept claims of exclusive parliamentary jurisdiction where individual rights are affected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the Advocate General's contention (that the Speaker and Secretary should not receive notice) by asking whether Article 212(2) or any constitutional provision absolutely precludes the High Court from issuing notice or exercising jurisdiction in a case where a citizen alleges infringement of fundamental or other constitutional rights.

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal propositions and inferences, distilled as follows:

  • For present purposes the Court assumed (for argument) that immunity from jurisdiction includes immunity from notice under Rule 149, and also assumed (momentarily) that respondents acted only under powers conferred by the Constitution in matters covered by Article 212.
  • It then asked whether such powers or their exercise could transcend or violate other provisions of the Constitution (notably Part III). The Court observed that Article 12 makes the legislature a 'State' for Part III and Article 13 applies to the State; therefore legislative action, including rules, must conform to fundamental rights.
  • Article 208 expressly makes rules of procedure subject to the Constitution; therefore rules or actions under them cannot be contrary to constitutional guarantees. Consequently, officers/members cannot claim immunity where they exercise powers in a manner opposed to the Constitution.
  • Article 212(2) provides immunity only in respect of exercise of powers for regulating procedure and conduct of business; it does not and cannot be read to permit actions that contravene constitutional limits.
  • Article 226 vests the High Court with power to enforce fundamental and other rights; that power is not made subject to Article 212. Therefore, where a citizen alleges invasion of constitutional rights, the High Court has jurisdiction to look into the claim even if the complaint pertains to matters covered by Article 212.
  • The Court reviewed precedents: it accepted G.K. Reddy as authority for the proposition that fundamental rights can operate against legislative privileges and that the Speaker may be subject to writ jurisdiction; it critically examined Sharma (1959) and noted subsequent clarifications (notably the Advisory Opinion in the Presidential Reference, AIR 1965 SC 745) which limited the inference that all fundamental rights yield to legislative privileges.
  • The advisory opinion in the Presidential Reference was treated as especially instructive: the Court emphasized its holdings that courts retain the power to act under Articles 226/32 and that legislative privileges do not confer total immunity from judicial review where constitutional rights are implicated.
  • Comparative and English authorities (Powell v. McCormack, Stockdale v. Hansard) were invoked for analogous support that adjudicatory/regulatory legislative powers can be subject to judicial review and that courts have historically resisted claims of absolute parliamentary privilege.
  • Given these principles, the Court concluded that the petitioner's contentions — that denial of a press pass implicated Articles 14, 19 and 361A and that the matter may not be merely a procedural regulation of admission — required further examination on notice to the respondents. The Court was not prepared at the admission stage to accept the Advocate General's contention that constitutional propriety precluded issuing notice to the Speaker and Secretary.

The Court emphasized that its decision at this stage was not a final adjudication on merits: it ordered issuance of notice so that the respondents could be heard and the substantive constitutional questions could be examined.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was admitted and the Court directed that notice be issued to the respondents (including the Speaker and the Secretary). The Court held that Article 212(2) does not provide absolute immunity preventing the High Court from issuing notice or exercising jurisdiction in a matter where a citizen alleges infringement of fundamental or other constitutional rights; rules made under Article 208 are subject to the Constitution; and Article 226 powers to enforce rights are not made subject to Article 212.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence: Notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents and the petition will proceed to substantive consideration with opportunity for respondents to be heard. The Court instructed its office to take immediate steps under Rule 149 (High Court Rules) to serve notice.
  • Legal implication emphasized in the opinion: legislative rules and the exercise of powers by legislative officers are subject to constitutional limits (including Part III fundamental rights). The Court reaffirmed the principle that where an action of the legislature or its officers is alleged to transgress constitutional limits, judicial scrutiny under Article 226 (and Article 32) is available.
  • Scope of the decision: At this procedural (admission) stage the Court did not decide the merits on whether the denial of the pass violated specific rights; it only held that the questions raised are sufficiently serious to require notice and further examination. The opinion does not purport to set aside final decisions on the substantive merits in this order; it primarily addresses jurisdiction and procedure.
Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, complainiog about the denial of press pass to the staff correspondent of the “Desabhimani”, for the session of the Kerala Legislative Assembly which commenced from the last week of February. It is alleged that the practice has been to issue passes to accredited correspondents, that Sudarsana Babu, the correspondent concerned, has been enjoying this facility for three years, and that when the current session commenced, the usual pass was denied to him on the directions of the Speaker, though passes were issued to all the other 74 accredited correspondents. The facility was denied to Babu alone, without assigning any reason, without even informing him, and without a bearing also. The first respondent is the State of Kerala, which is said to be the accrediting agency. The 2nd respondent is the Speaker. The 3rd respondent is the Secretary of the Assembly, responsible for signing the pass. The action is challenged on the following, among other groundsill:—

[i] Babu has been singled out for discriminatory treatment, in a manner violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;

[ii] denial of the necessary facility to report the proceedings of the Assembly amounts to a violation of the rights recognised by Article 361A of the Constitution;

[iii] Rule 309 of the Rules of Procedure made under Article 208 of the Constitution can only be subject to the provision of the Constitution, and therefore the Rule and the action taken in exercise of power thereunder cannot affect the fundamental and other constitutional rights of the petitioner;

and [iv] Article 212[2] is not attracted, because admission of strangers to the Visitors' Gallery or the Press Gallery is not a matter pertaining to regulation of procedure and conduct of business in the Legislature.

2. When the petition was posted for admission before me on 7-3-1983, I felt that if raised important questions about the scope of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 208, 212 and 361A of the Constitution, and admitted it. Rule 149 of the High Court Rules reads:—

“Every petition shall, soon after it is numbered, be posted for orders of Court for admission. The Court may upon hearing the petitioner or his advocate, either admit the same or reject it. On admission notice shall be ordered to the respondents and along with the notice copies of the application, affidavit and annexures shall be served on the respondents.”

3. But on 10-3-83, before office could issue notice, the Advocate General filed a “statement” in court on behalf of the 1st respondent, suggesting that the Speaker and the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly be removed from the party array. The relevant part of the statement reads:—

“I have been instructed by the State Government to apprise this Hon'ble Court of the correct constitutional provision regarding the issuance of notice to the Speaker and the Secretary of the Kerala Legislative Assembly so that the names of respondents 2 and 3 may be removed from the party array in the above Original Petition.”

4. That is bow the matter has come up again; and the question is whether any constitutional provision precludes this Court from issuing notice to the Speaker and the Secretary of the Assembly, in a matter like the present. The proper method for reviewing an order passed by a Court, or for striking off parties improperly joined, is not the filing of a statement; but considering the importance of the question raised, and having due regard to the impassioned plea of the Advocate General that this Court shall not embark on a course of confrontation with the Legislative Assembly, I shall proceed to examine it.

5. The short point raised is this. Article 208 of the Constitution empowers the legislature of a State to make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business; and in exercise of this power, the Kerala legislature has framed certain rules. Rule 309 of these rules provides that admission of strangers to portions of the Assembly chamber not exclusively reserved for members shall be regulated in accordance with orders of the Speaker. A discretion has thus been conferred on the Speaker in the matter of granting or denying admission to strangers; and Article 212(2) provides that an officer or member of the Assembly in whom such regulatory powers are vested, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. In so far as Babu has been denied admission to the Assembly in exercise of powers “vested by or under the Constitution” on respondents 2 and 3, it is contended that no notice at all could issue to them in proceedings under Article 226, in respect of the alleged action.

6. I shall assume that immunity from jurisdiction of courts means immunity from notice under Rule 149 also. I shall further assume for a moment (and a moment only) that the respondents have only exercised powers conferred on them under the Constitution in a matter covered by Article 212 Even so, the question arises whether the said powers or the exercise thereof can transcend the provisions of the Constitution, including those in Part III.

7. Under Article 12 every authority, includingtbe legislature, is a ‘State’ for the purposes of Part III of the Constituion, When Article 13(2) provides that the State shall not make any law abridging fundamental rights, the prohibition applies to the legislature as well; and “law”, in the context, includes rules and regulations. Article 14 lays down that the State shall not deny equality or the equal protection of the laws; and without anything more, therefore, the legislature or its instrumentalities cannot claim immunity from Article 14. Article 208 specifically provides that the rules made by a legislature for regulating procedure and conduct of business shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution; the rules will be invalid, if they are opposed to Part III or any other provisions of the Constitution. Article 212(2) provides immunity only as regards exercise of powers for regulating procedure and conduct of business; and it is only reasonable to think that if the rules of procedure are themselves subject to the Constitution, exercise of powers there under must also be subject to the same limitation. In other words, the officers and members of a legislature cannot claim immunity when they exercise their powers in a manner opposed to the Constitution. And who is to decide whether they have transgressed the limits of their power? Article 226 of the Constitution confers power on the High Court to enforce fundamental and other rights; this power is not subject to Article 212. To my mind, therefore, when a citizen approaches the court with a complaint that his fundamental or other constitutional rights are being invaded, this Court has the power to look into it even if the complaint pertains to a matter covered by Art. 212.

8. It was conceded that there are no direct authorities to support the proposition that notice could not go from this Court, under any circumstances, to the Speaker or the Secretary of the Assembly. In fact some of the decisions cited were themselves instances where such notices had actually gone, and the actions of the Assembly had been struck down.

9. G.K Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan (AIR. 1954 SC. 636) was a case where one Homi Oinshaw Mistry was arrested in Bombay and taken to Lucknow to be produced before the Speaker of the U.P Legislative Assembly to answer a charge of breach of privilege. He was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, but was kept under the Speaker's custody. In a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights of Mistry under Article 22(2) had been violated. The court ordered his release. This decision is clear authority to show that all fundamental rights do not disappear the moment the Legislative Assembly or its officers and members enter the scene. It is also authority for holding that the Speaker is subject to the writ jurisdiction of courts in a proper case.

10. Reference was made to M.S.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (AIR 1959 S.C 395) to point out that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) was held to be subject to the powers, privileges and immunities of the legislatures under Article 194(3), and to contend that all fundamental rights must likewise be treated as subject to Article 212. The decision did not examine the scope of Article 212, and no such general principle could be deduced therefrom, in view of subsequent decisions clarifying the position. Sharma was the editor of a newspaper, responsible for publishing the speech of a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, portions of which had been ordered to be expunged by the Speaker. A show cause notice was accordingly issued to him why he should not be proceeded against for breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly itself, and it was that notice which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The petitioner's case was that the proposed action amounted Co. violation of his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. For our present purpose, it is enough to notice that the majority of the Constitution Bench reached the following conclusions on the points raised:—

[i] Article 194[3] of the Constitution, as it then stood, laid down that the powers and privileges of an Assembly and its members shall be the same as those of the House of Commons in England. At the commencement of the Constitution in India, the House of Commons in England had the power or privilege of prohioiting the publication of even a true report of the debates and proceedings. Therefore the power of the Bihar Assembly to proceed against Sharma for publishing expunged portions of a speech had to be conceded.

[ii] The fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19[1][a] had to be reconciled with the above privilege of the Assembly, and the only way of doing so was to read Article 19[1][a] as subject to Article 194[3].

[iii] The earlier decision of the Court in G.K Reddy's case [AIR 1954 S.C 636] rested on a concession, and was no authority to hold that the privileges of a legislature could be subjected to fundamental rights like those embodied in Article 22[2];

and [iv] Even if Sharma's right to liberty was being threatened, that was being done in accordance with law, and therefore, no violation of Article 21 was involved.

11. Subba Rao J. (as he then was) dissented. According to His Lordship,

[i] the House of Commons in England had no privilege in 1950 to prevent publication of correct and faithful reports save those in the case of secret sessions held under exceptional circumstances; it had only a limited privilege to prevent mala fide publication of garbled unfaithful or expunged reports of proceedings;

[ii] there was really no conflict between Article 19[1][a] and Article 194[3] but if there was a conflict, the privilege should “yield to the extent it affects the fundamental right”;

and [iii] the decision in G.K Reddy's case [1954 S.C 636] could not be explained away as attempted by the majority.

12. Pausing here for a minute, it is interesting to notice that Article 361A of the Constitution, introduced in 1978, affords protection to bona fide publication of true reports of Assembly proceedings, except as regards proceedings of secret sittings. The protection is available against civil and criminal proceedings only, but it is significant that the new provision is more in tone with the views of Subba Rao J, than those of the majority in Sharma's case.

13. It is also significant that even the majority in Sharma's case did not say that the fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution should yield to the privileges of the House under Art. 194(3). The majority recognised the availability of the fundamental right under Art. 21, but thought that on the facts of the case, that right was not being infringed upon.

14. Some of the questions considered in Sharma (1959 SC. 395) came up for further examination by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in its advisory opinion in In re. under Article 143, Constitution of India (AIR. 1965 SC. 745), under the following circumstances. On a warrant issued by the Speaker of the U.P Legislative Assembly, one Kesav Singh was detained in prison for committing contempt of the Assembly, An advocate moved a habeas corpus petition before the Allahabad High Court, and a Division Bench ordered the release of Kesav Singh on bail. On receiving information of the release, the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution holding the Judges of the Division Bench (and the advocate also) guilty of contempt of the House, and directed that they be brought in custody before the Assembly. The Judges tnereupoo filed a petition under Art. 226 before the Allababad High Court contending that the Assembly's resolution was without jurisdiction and amounted to contempt of Court. A full court consisting of 28 Judges considered the matter and passed orders restraining the Speaker from issuing the warrant in pursuance of the Assembly resolution. The President of India interfered in the controversy at this stage, and sought the Supreme Court's opinion on certain points; and Gajendragadkar C.J, speaking for six out of seven Judges who constituted the Bench, expressed the following views:—

[i] There is really no conflict between the freedom of speech guaranteed to citizens under Art. 19(1)(a), and the freedom of speech guaranteed to members of a legislature under Art. 194(1); the two are distinct, and operate in different areas;

[ii] Any law made by a legislature under Art. 194(3) will have to satisfy the test prescribed by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution;

[iii] The majority decision in Sharma's case (AIR. 1959 SC. 395) cannot be understood as laying down the general proposition that the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution should yield to the provisions of Art. 194(3);

[iv] The said majority decision is itself authority to show that the fundamental right of a citizen under Art. 21 cannot yield to Art. 194(3);

[v] The decision in G.K Reddy's case (AIR. 1954 SC. 6361 cannot be brushed aside as merely resting on consent; it is a binding decision which holds that the fundamental right under Article 22[2] can operate against the privileges and immunities of Article 194(3).

and [vi] India is a federal State with a written Constitution, and the Constitution is supreme. Since legislative assemblies are also “State” within the meaning of Article 12, the power of the High Courts to issue writs under Article 226 even against legislative bodies have to be recognised and upheld. “The right of the Judicature to deal with matters brought before them under Article 226 or Article 32 cannot be subjected to the powers and privileges of the House of Legislature under Art. 194(3)”

15. And in the light of the above formulations, the court furnished the following answers to the questions referred to it:—

[i] it was competent for the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court to entertain Kesav Singh's petition and release bail on bail pending its disposal;

[ii] the two judges had not committed contempt of the U.P Assembly by entertaining the petition and ordering bail;

[iii] it was not competent for the Assembly to direct production of the two Judges before it, in custody;

[iv] it was competent for the Full Bench of the High Court to entertain the petitions of the two Judges and to restrain the Speaker of Assembly from giving effect to the aforesaid direction;

and [v] the legislature is not competent to take proceedings against a Judge for entertaining or dealing with a petition filed by a citizen, challenging a decision imposing penalty on him or issuing any process for contempt.

16. It is true that the Supreme Court was here also mainly concerned with Article 194, and not with Article 212; but clearly, some of the broad inferences sought to be drawn from Sharma's case were not approved. More particularly, the court scotched in ??? uncertain terms the belief that all the fundamental rights in Part 111 are subject to the privileges in Article 194(3). It was also emphatically held that in a proper case, the High Court had power, under Article 226, to release a person ordered to be imprisoned by the Speaker, and also to restrain the Speaker from enforcing his warrant. No total immunity was recognised, and the power of the courts to act under Articles 226 and 32 even against the Assembly and its officers, was asserted. I shall close this part of the discussion with extracting some more passages from the advisory opinion of the court, as they have a bearing on the sweeping assertions made in support of the theory of “the correct constitutional provisions”:—

“Our Legislatures have undoubtedly plenary powers, but these powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh Schedule; but beyond the Lists, the Legislatures cannot travel. They can no doubt exercise their plenary legislative authority and discharge their legislative functions by virtue of the powers conferred on them by the relevant provisions of the Constitution; but the basis of the power is the Constitution itself. Besides, the legislative supremacy of our Legislatures including the Parliament is normally controlled by the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. If the Legislatures step beyond the Legislative fields assigned to them, or acting within their respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the relevant articles dealing with the said fundamental rights, their legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in India. Therefore, it is necessary to emember that though our Legislatures have plenary powers, they function within the limits prescribed by the material and relevant provisions of the Constitution.”

“Art. 212(1) seems to make it possible for a citizen to call in question in the appropriate court of law the validity of any proceedings inside the Legislative Chamber if his case is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to be scrutinised in a court of law, though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more than this, that the procedure was irregular.”

“If the power of the High Courts under Art. 226 and the authority of this Court under Art. 32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would be futile to contend that, a citizen cannot move the High Courts or this Court to invoke their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated. The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf; otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts and this Court would be rendered virtually meaningless. Let it not be forgotten that the judicial power conferred on the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection of the citizens' fundamental rights, and so, in the existence of the said judicial power itself is necessarily involved the right of the citizen to appeal to the said power in a proper case.”

“In this connection, we ought to add that there is no substance in the grievance ………that Keshav Siogh acted illegally in impleading the House to the habeas corpus petition filed by him before the Lucknow Bench. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the House was impropery joined by Keshav Singh, because it was open to him to join the House on the ground that his commitment was based on the order passed by the House, and in that sense the House was responsible for, and had control over, his commitment.’

17. Turning now to Article 212 and taking a closer look at its provisions, what clause (I) says is that the validity of the proceedings in an Assembly shall not be called in question on grounds of irregularity of procedure. That means that the validity can be challenged on grounds other than irregularity of procedure. The principle behind clause (I) is only that the legislature is not like a local body or a company or a registered society absolutely bound by its own rules of procedure; it can depart from its own rules if found necessary. “Irregularity of procedure” means irregularity in the matter of observing the rules of procedure; it has nothing to do with violation of the provisions of the Constitution as to the powers of the legislature. Clause (1) has no Application when the question is not merely one of procedure, but of overstepping the limits of the Constitution itself. As for clause (2), it merely says that officers and members of the legislature shall not be answerable to the courts in the exercise of powers vested in them, if those powers pertain to regulation of procedure or conduct of business in the House, and are conferred by or under the Constitution. It is elementary that powers conferred by the Constitution or under the Constitution have to be exercised subject to all the provisions of the Constitution, and not in opposition thereto. It should have been far from the mind of the framers of the Constitution to clothe the officers and members of a legislature with power to flout the mandates of the Constitution itself. And they have not left it to inference alone: they have said it to so many words in Article 208, where it is stipulated that the rules for regulating procedure and business shall be “subject to the provisions of this Constitution”. They have said it again in Article 12, with special reference to fundamental rights, when they included legislatures also within the definition of ‘State’. Article 188 of the Constitution requires every member of an assembly to make an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution; and this is another indication that legislators cannot claim any exemption from the provisions of the Constitution when they function as representatatives of the electorate. Dicey has emphasised the distinction between parliamentary sovereignity and the system of federalism in the following terms: (An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution.)

“A federal state derives its existence from the Constitution, just as a corporation derives its existence from the grant by which it is created. Hence, every power, executive, legislative, or judicial, whether it belong to the nation or the individual states, is subor dinate to and controlled by the Constitution. Neither the President of the United States nor the House of Congress, nor the Governor of Massacbusatts, nor the Legislature or General Court of Massacbusatts, can legally exercise a single power which is inconsistent with the articles of the Constitution. This doctrine of the supramacy of the Constitution is familiar to every American, but in England even trained lawyers find a difficulty in following it out to its legitimate consequences. The difficulty arises from the fact that under the English Constitution no principle is recognised which bears any real resemblance to the doctrine [essential to federalism] that the Constitution constitutes the supreme law of the land”.

“Every legislative assembly existing under a federal constitution is merely a subordinate law-making body, whose laws are of the nature of bye-laws, valid whilst within the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, but invalid or unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority”.

“There is an apparent absurdity in comparing the legislature of the United States to an English railway company or a municipal corporation, but the comparison is just”

18. It may be that Article 212(I) of our Constitution places the legislative assemblies on a slightly different footing, but that is only in respect of rules of procedure; and but for the said provision, it could probably have been said that our legislatures also could not depart from the rules made under article 208. Even in England, where parliamentary supremacy is a constitutional fundamental, and parliamentary privileges are not ordinarily subordinate to any higher or paramount law, the courts have been reluctant to recognise the claims of the two Houses that they are the sole Judges of the extent of the privilege. In Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 9 A & E. 1, the Court of Queen's Bench rejected the plea of privilege and held that no resolution of the House could deprive the courts of their authority to interpret and apply the laws of the land in a matter affecting the rights of subjects. No doubt, habeas corpus was denied to the Sheriff of Middlesex when execution was levied and the House committed him for breach of privilege and contempt; but the decision has not received universal approval. Kier and Lawson (“Cases in Constitutional Law”) comments upon it as “yielding the key of the fortress”; the authors also notice that for all practical purposes, some measure of tacit agreement was reached between the Courts and the Parliament thereafter, in regard to recurrence of similar controversies:

‘Never in fact since Stockdale v. Hansard has the House of Commons refused to admit the jurisdiction of the Courts when matters of privilege arose. It has thus by implication recognised that the nature and extent of parliamentary privilege are only such as the law allows”.

19. S.A de Smith notes that the attitude of the courts in the Sheriff's case “is obviously open to criticism”; he contrasts it with the bold approach of Gajendragadkar C.J in the Presidential Reference case (AIR. 1965 SC. 745) See “Constitutional and Administrative Law”; See also “Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law for 1965”.

20. State of Punjab v. Satyapal (AIR. 1969 SC. 903) was another case where our Supreme Court refused to recognise the finality of the Speaker's ruling on a question of adjourning the Assembly. It may not be necessary to set out the facts of the case, but the Court firmly held that the Speaker was also subject to an Ordinance issued by the Governor under Article 213, read with Article 209 of the Constitution. Speaking for a unanimous Constitution bench, Hidayathulla C.J said:—

“One is tempted to think that the Speaker was not sure of his own position in a House in which he had probably lost a sustaining majority. But even if the most liberal view of the action of the Speaker is taken, one is forced to the conclusion that be acted contrary to law and the injunction of the Constitution that the law made under Article 209(7) is to prevail over the rules of procedure. We regret to record this conclusion which we would have willingly avoided but for some arguments advanced on the lines indicated although somewhat hesitatingly by the counsel representating the Speaker. Before tall claims are made which cannot stand against law and the Constitution, those that make them should reasonably be sure that they are right.”

21. The decision of the Supreme Court of America in Powell v. Me Cormack (395 U.S 486) is also instructive. Powell was duly elected and he satisfied the requirements of age, citizenship and residence as laid down in the Constitution. The House of Representatives however passed a resolution excluding him from the House in purported exercise of power under Article I, S. 5 of the Constitution, providing that “each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualification of its own members”; but the Supreme Court found no difficulty in holding that the provision was not designed to confer on the House the sole adjudicatory power to determine a member's qualification, to the exclusion of the federal court. The court thought that the case required an interpretation of the Constitution on judicially manageable standards, and set aside the impugned resolution. If adjudicatory powers conferred by the Constitution on elected representatives of the people are thus reviewable by the courts, the position cannot be different when purely regulatory powers are likewise conferred, for being exercised in accordance with the Constitution. It can readily be conceded that if the exercise of power in the present case is strictly confined to Article 212(2), this Court will have no jurisdiction to interfere. But the petitioners have a definite case that something more is involved. According to them, the matter does not pertain to regulating procedure “in the legislature”, if the term ‘legislature’ is understood in the light of Article 168. They have a further case that the regulatory process cannot trench upon Babu's rights under Articles 14, 19 and 36IA. Should not these questions be examined, particularly when Article 361A happens to be a provision newly introduced in 1978? And how can they be examined except by giving an opportunity to the respondents to have their say? It is difficult to accept the Advocate General's contention, at least at this stage, that nothing more than denial of a pass to a stranger is involved. Whether Sudarsana Babu is a mere stranger, when he relies on the freedom of the press based on Articles 19 and 361A, is itself a question of considerable importance. I am not disturbed by the forebodings of a possible confrontation between the Court and the legislature; the confrontation, if any, is between Babu and the legislature, the former asserting some constitutional rights and the latter declining to recognise the same. Under our federal scheme, it is the duty of the court to police the boundaries of the Constitution. In discharging that function, the court may allow some latitude to the chosen representatives of the people and their agencies, in a matter pertaining exclusively to their jurisdiction, and writ nothing else is at stake. But that is something to be decided with notice to the parties, and not at the admission stage. On the avernments made and the grounds raised in the writ petition. I was satisfied that the petitioners' case required further examination, and that was why notice was ordered on 7-3-1983. Despite the persuasive arguments of the learned Advocate General, I am unable to bold, as at present advised, that constitutional propriety precludes this Court from enforcing its own rules Office will therefore take immediate steps under Rule 149.