JUDGMENT

1. The petitioner joined the Shertallai Taluk Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank, Ltd. No. A. 327 (the bank) as a clerk on 15 April, 1974, pursuant to resolution No. 17 dated 14 April, 1974, passed by the first respondent, the Board of Directors of the bank. According to Resolution No. 69, dated 27 December, 1974, the petitioner was appointed to the newly created post of secretary by promotion. In January, 1979, the petitioner was chargesheeted alleging that she did not place before the Board of Directors a covering letter sent by the Central Land Mortgage Bank which had some bearing to the norms governing the grant of loans; and that as against the sanction of a loan for Rs. 10,000 made by the Board, only a sum of Rs. 7,500 was paid to a particular applicant; and that was done behind the back of the Board by the petitioner. Ultimately, the enquiry officer appointed found the charges to have been proved against the petitioner; and the Board of Directors having accepted the finding at the enquiry, and having tentatively come to the conclusion that the petitioner was to be reverted to the post of senior supervisor, issued exhibit P-1 show-cause notice, dated 4 February, 1981, to which the petitioner sent exhibit P2 explanation, dated 13 February, 1981. The Board, however, rejected the plea put forward by the petitioner in exhibit P2 representation, and passed exhibit P3 order reverting the petitioner to the rank of senior supervisor. It is the correctness of exhibit P3 order that is being challenged in this writ petition.

2. In the writ petition several legal points are seen to have been raised to attack the validity of exhibit P3 order. The points pressed before me are:

(i) the Board of Directors was not competent to pass an order inflicting a punishment of reduction of the petitioner to a lower rank;

(ii) the punishment of reversion was not warranted under the provisions of rule 198 (f) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (the rules); and

(iii) by the Board of Directors passing the impugned order, exhibit P3, the petitioner was deprived of her valuable right for preferring an appeal from the order of the disciplinary authority.

On behalf of the first respondent it was contended, inter alia, that the writ petition was itself not maintainable inasmuch as the first respondent was not State whithin the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution; and there was no relief sought against the second respondent, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies. It was also submitted that the Board of Directors was competent to pass exhibit P3 order; and the order of reversion was perfectly valid, and no interference from this Court was called for in exercise of the limited jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was further submitted that if the petitioner was aggrieved by exhibit P3 order, the petitioner ought to have either resorted to arbitration proceedings under S. 69 of the Act or approached the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court for appropriate relief, if any, to which she felt she was entitled.

3. The scope of the term “other authorites” under Art. 12 of the Constitution has been considerably enlarged by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1981 — II L.L.N 613] and Som Prakash v. Union of India, [1981 — I L.L.N 322]. Cataloguing the characteristics of the “other authorities” under Art. 12 of the Constitution, though not exhaustively, the Supreme Court said in Para. 9, at pages 621 and 622 of 1981 — II L.L.N

“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.

(2) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.

(3) It may also be a relevant factor — whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.

(4) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and, closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.

(5) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government”.

4. It is interesting to note that both the petitioner and the first respondent have chosen to rely on the very same decisions. The main objects of the bank, as could be gathered from the bye-law mentioned below, are to arrange funds for the members and to enable them to improve their agricultural operations:

“2. (a) to promote the economic interests of its members and more particularly to arrange for funds to be lent to its members on mortgage security and on the security of documents executed in its favour by statutory corporations carrying Government guarantee—

(i) the redumption of mortgages on agricultural land;

(ii) the improvement of agricultural land and of methods of cultivations;

(iii) the discharge of other debts; and

(iv) the purchase of land in special cases so as to enable the ryot to round off his holding and work it more economically; and

(b) to encourage the members, the spirit and practice of thrift, mutual help and self help in such ways as may be decided upon from time to time.

(c) to promote rubber plantation and issue of loans for the same”.

The shares are to be raised in the following way (vide bye-law 4):

“The share capital of the bank shall for the present be Rs. 5,00,000 made up of 49,000 A class shares of Rs. 10 each and 10,000 B class shares of” Re. 1 each. B class shares are not transferable and non-refundable and their value shall be transferred to the reserve fund on the clearance of the relative loans. B class shareholders are not entitled to vote”.

Relying on these provisions in the bye-laws, it was contended by the counsel for the first respondent that it could not be said that judged by the characteristics laid down by the Supreme Court, the bank in this case answers the description of “other authorities” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that substantial portion of the working capital was made available to the bank by the Reserve Bank of India through the Central Land Mortgage bank, and the Government was having effective control regarding the financial transaction, and as a matter of fact, the valuation officer used to scrutinize the grant and check utilization of the loans:

5. It was also pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that in Original Petition No. 4207 of 1979, which related to the termination of service of a probationer, a Division Bench of this Court had quashed the order passed in that behalf by the Board of Directors. I am afraid, the decision of the Division Bench in that case, has hardly anything to do with the present case. Going through the judgment, I find, the question whether “the Kerala Land Mortgage Bank” would fall within the ambit of “other authorities” in Art. 12 of the Constitution has been left open without being decided by the Division Bench. That writ petition was allowed and the order for the termination of the service of the probationer was quashed for the reason that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies who, undisputedly, fell within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution, exercised the power vested in him arbitrarily without applying his mind and in a manner opposed to the principles of natural justice. We have noticed, at the very outset, that no relief is sought against the second respondent in this writ petition; and no relief against the second respondent with respect exhibit P3 order impugned in this writ petition could also be granted in the writ petition. If the bye-laws give any indications of the functions of the first respondent, the first respondent-bank does not answer the essential characteristics of an instrumentality of the State to fall within the ambit of “other authorities” as used in Art. 12 of the Constitution.

6. The writ petition ought to fail on the sole ground that no writ could issue against the first respondent who is not State within the meaning of Art 12 of the Constitution. All the same, I would briefly deal with the other points raised also, inasmuch as the counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the first respondent have taken considerable pains to stress their points on the merits of the case with reference to rule 198 (4) of the rules. In the first place, the question is whether the first respondent was competent to pass exhibit P3 order. It was submitted that in terms of rule 198 (4) of the rules it was only the sub-committee that was competent to inflict a punishment of reduction to a lower rank, ???de Cl. (f) of the said rule, and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the first respondent was invalid. I am not in a position to accept this argument. After all, this is a case where the Board has passed exhibit P3 order after going through the finding of the enquiry officer. The argument that instead of the sub-committee it was the Board of Directors itself that had inflicted the punishment, and that had deprived the petitioner of her right to appeal against the order of punishment, does not appeal to reason. For one thing, neither the petitioner nor the first respondent, has a case that a sub-committee had already been constituted in the bank. Would that mean that the management of the bank is bereft of powers to take disciplinary action against erring employees? The rule-framing authority could not have meant that. The clause in sub-rule (1) of rule 198 to be meaningful, has to be understood to lay down that where a sub-committee exists, it is the sub-committee that would be competent to inflict the punishment of reduction to a lower rank. For another thing, the very body which was competent to take a final decision is seen to have gone through the entire records and taken a decision in the light of the finding of the enquiry officer. If the authority to order the punishment was the Board of Directors, but the order was passed by the sub-committee or any other lower authority, it could have been said that the order is without jurisdiction. The worst that probably could be said would be that in not having constituted a sub-committee and the Board of Directors itself having assumed the functions of the sub-committee, there was irregularity; it could not, however, be said that the Board of Directors acted without jurisdiction or the order passed by the Board is invalid, especially because it has not been shown that it resulted in any miscarriage of justice. At any rate, this could not be a ground for interference by this Court with exhibit P3 order in exercise of the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution

7. Last of the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner is that rule 198 provides only for the reduction in rank, not for reversion to a lower rank. He has a two-fold argument:

(1) Reduction in rank could only mean reduction in the list of seniority in the same cadre without being reduced to a lower rank; and

(2) the rule permits only reduction, not reversion to a lower rank.

In support of this argument on the factual questions, it was submitted that the petitioner was appoined to be secretary; and there was, therefore, no question of reverting her to any other lower post. It is seen that on 15 April, 1974, pursuant to Resolution No. 17, dated 14 April, 1974, the petitioner joined the bank as a clerk. I am not in a position to know in which words and on what terms the order of appointment was made. Neither the petitioner nor the first respondent has produced the order of appointment. Assuming that the order simply stated that the petitioner was appointed to the post of secretary by virtue of the resolution, dated 27 December, 1974, the question is whether the order to revert the petitioner (word in Malayalam omitted) to be senior supervisor (which is the next rank available in the bank), is tainted with illegality. It is conceded on all hands that the bank had no post of assistant secretary, and, therefore, there was no other post between the secretary and that of the senior supervisor. It could not be said that exhibit P3 order is bad in law. After all, the terminology by itself is not of great moment; it is the intention of the Legislature that matters. Whether it is termed as “reversion” or “reduction”, in either case a reduction in rank is inevitable.

8. As far as the contention that rule 198 contemplates the reduction to a lower position in the seniority list in the same cadre is concerned, there is no rationale behind it. Reduction in rank does not import the idea of reducing the rank in the seniority list in the same cadre. In this particular case, it would be a little absurd to conceive any such idea, as there was only one secretary and there could never arise the reduction in seniority in the same cadre. For my view that reduction in rank does not indicate mere loss of place in the same cadre, I find support in the decision of the Supreme Court in High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar, [A.I.R 1962 S.C 1704], wherein Sinha, C.J, in Para. 8 has stated as follows:

“In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention because losing places in the same cadre, namely, of Subordinate Judges does not amount to reduction in rank, within the meaning of Art. 311(2). The plaintiff sought to argue that ‘rank,’ in accordance with dictionary meaning, signifies ‘relative position or status or place,’ according to Oxford English Dictionary. The word ‘rank’ in Art 311(2) has reference to a person's classification and not his particular place in the same cadre in the hierarchy of the service to which he belongs. Hence in the context of the Judicial Service of West Bengal, ‘reduction in rank’ would imply that a person who is already holding the post of a Subordinate Judge has been reduced to the position of a Munsiff, the rank of a Subordinate Judge being higher than that of a Munsiff. But Subordinate Judges in the same cadre hold the same rank, though they have to be listed in order of seniority in the civil list. Therefore, losing some places in the seniority list is not tantamount to reduction in rank”.

Similar was the view expressed by Ray, C.J, in Baradakanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court, [1976 — II L.L.N 312] and Hidayatulla, C.J, who in Debesh Chandra v. Union of India, [(1969) 2 SCC 158 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 77], observed:

“reversion to a lower post does not per se amount to stigma”.

Whether it is called “reversion”. or “reduction” there is little that matters in it. The petitioner cannot feel aggrieved because the expression used is “reverted” instead of “reduced”; he should feel aggrieved when it is accompanied by stigma, by whatever name it is called. Where the reversion or reduction is a penalty, it would be accompanied by stigma, call it reversion or reduction.

9. The counsel for the first respondent submitted that the writ petition in any event was premature inasmuch as the petitioner had rushed to this Court with the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution without reporting to the arbitration provisions under S. 69 of the Act or to the provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that this being a case falling within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, the arbitration clause under S. 69 of the Act was not attracted to it. He also submitted that the fact that in appropriate cases the Government might make a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act would not necessarily mean that it should be treated as an alternate remedy which would prohibit the aggrieved person approaching this Court for redressal of his grievances. The question is whether the other remedies provided for would prove to be effective and efficacious or merely illusory. In this connexion, the counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Assistant Personnel Officer, Asstt. Personnel Officer v. K.T Antony, [1978 — II L.L.J 254]. I am in agreement with the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that even if in certain circumstances, on the same set of facts, the aggrieved party could have approached the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, that by itself would not deprive the right of such a person to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of justice; and the writ petition having been admitted to the file, it would be quite unfair to the petitioner if in the final hearing this Court declines to go into the merits of the case on the ground that he has an alternate remedy.

10. The question as to the relief, if any, on the question of arrears of wages to which the petitioner might make claim is left open without being decided, as that question cannot be gone into in this writ petition which I propose to dismiss on the ground that it is not maintainable against the first respondent. The dismissal of the writ petition, however, would not preclude the petitioner from pursuing her remedies, if any, she is legitimately entitled, in other appropriate proceedings.

11. For the foregoing reasons the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

12. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to the counsel for the petitioner and to the counsel for the respondents on usual terms, if applied for in that behalf.