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Varkey & Another v. Govindan & Others
Concise Analytical Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
On 28-3-1979 the Executive Sub Divisional Magistrate (Trichur) issued a conditional order under S.133(1)(d) CrPC directing respondents 1 to 3 to cut and remove three poola trees and one jack tree standing on the petitioners' northern boundary because they were dangerously situated and liable to fall on the petitioners' house. That order was founded on reports by the Tahsildar, Trichur and the Sub Inspector of Police, Trichur, Town West, and the respondents were directed to comply and to show cause why the order should not be enforced and made absolute.
The respondents filed objections to the preliminary order, contending, inter alia, that the matter was a private/civil dispute and not a public nuisance within the scope of S.133 CrPC. While the proceedings were pending, the respondents filed a revision petition under S.397 CrPC before the Sessions Court, Trichur and obtained a stay of the conditional order. The petitioners objected in the Sessions Court that S.397(2) CrPC barred revision against interlocutory and conditional orders under S.133, but the Sessions Court dismissed that preliminary objection and directed that the revision petition be taken on file (Crl. R.P. 19/80). The petitioners challenged that direction by filing the present revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a conditional/interlocutory order passed under S.133(1)(d) CrPC (directing show cause and remedial action) is amenable to revision under S.397 CrPC, despite the bar in S.397(2).
- Whether the existence or mere possibility of a preliminary objection to such an order transforms a preliminary/conditional order into an "intermediate" order (tertium quid) that is revisable under S.397 CrPC.
- Whether the Sessions Court erred in entertaining the revision petition and staying the S.133 order.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- No revision lies against an interlocutory/conditional order under S.133 CrPC by reason of the bar in S.397(2) CrPC; the respondents should raise their objections before the Magistrate as part of the cause shown to the preliminary order.
- Allowing revision at the interlocutory stage would defeat the procedure established by S.133 which enables the opposite party to show cause before the Magistrate.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents contended in their objections that the dispute was essentially civil (private) and not a public nuisance appropriate for S.133 proceedings.
- The respondents (in the Sessions Court) relied on Supreme Court decisions holding that revision may lie against certain types of interlocutory orders — specifically where an order is intermediate (not purely interlocutory) or where an order on a point, if accepted, would terminate the proceedings — and argued the S.133 order was of that type; hence the Sessions Court properly entertained the revision and granted a stay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 SC 2185) | Referenced as one of the decisions holding that revision may lie against certain interlocutory orders (general support for the intermediate-order concept). | Used as part of the demonstrative group of authorities establishing that not all interlocutory orders are immune from revision; contributed to the Court's review of the intermediate-order doctrine. |
| Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47) | Elucidates that some orders fall between "interlocutory" and "final" (intermediate/tertium quid); an order rejecting a plea that, if accepted, would conclude proceedings is not "interlocutory" for the purposes of S.397(2). | The Court relied on the principle that only certain intermediate orders (those which if decided favourably would terminate proceedings) may be revisable; it read this decision as not authorising revision against every preliminary order. |
| V.C. Shukla v. State (1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR 1980 SC 962) | Holds that "interlocutory order" must be construed liberally in favour of the accused; revisional power attaches where the order is intermediate or quasi-final. | The Court noted this authority to underline that the category of revisable orders includes intermediate orders but rejected the contention that the mere possibility of a preliminary objection converts a pure interlocutory order into an intermediate one. |
| Raj Kapoor v. State ((1980) 1 SCC 43) | Describes policy: pure interlocutory orders should not be taken up unnecessarily; there exists a middle category of orders between interlocutory and final. | The Court invoked this articulation to support the balanced approach that preserves Magistrate-stage objections while permitting revision only where a determination would terminate proceedings. |
| Kuppuswami's case (AIR 1949 FC 1) — cited in text as a point of reference | Referenced as illustrating one sense of "final" order used in comparative discussion of interlocutory v. final orders. | Cited as background authority in the Court's discussion of what constitutes "final" in contrast to interlocutory; used only as a comparator in the reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reviewing the line of Supreme Court decisions (including Madhu Limaye, V.C. Shukla, Amar Nath and Raj Kapoor) which recognize three conceptual categories of orders: (a) pure and simple interlocutory orders (not revisable under S.397(2)), (b) final orders (revisable), and (c) intermediate or quasi-final orders (some orders falling between the two that may be revisable). The cited authorities establish that an order rejecting a plea which, if accepted, would conclude the proceeding may be treated as intermediate and thus amenable to revision.
The Court rejected the broad submission — apparently advanced by the Sessions Court's approach and pressed on behalf of the respondents — that the mere possibility of any preliminary objection automatically converts a preliminary/conditional order into an intermediate order revisable under S.397. The Court reasoned that such an approach would nullify the procedural mechanism of S.133 CrPC that enables an opposite party to show cause before the Magistrate and would effectively render S.397(2)'s bar meaningless. In short, the Court held the correct interpretation of the authorities is narrower: where an order is made on a preliminary objection and that order, if decided in the object's favour, would terminate the proceedings, that order (although not final in a narrow sense) may be regarded as intermediate and revisable. By contrast, a preliminary conditional order under S.133 — which merely requires the opposite party to show cause and does not itself decide the preliminary objection — remains a pure interlocutory order and is not open to revision under S.397.
Applying this analysis to the facts, the Court concluded that the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate under S.133 was a preliminary conditional/interlocutory order. The Sessions Court therefore erred in treating the preliminary S.133 order itself as amenable to revision and in taking the revision on file and granting stay. The Court emphasised that the appropriate course is for the respondents to press their preliminary objections before the Magistrate; if and when the Magistrate issues a substantive order accepting or rejecting those objections, that subsequent order (particularly if it terminates the proceedings) may be subject to revisional scrutiny under S.397.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition filed by the petitioners is allowed; the Order of the Court of Session, Trichur in Crl. R.P. 19/80 is set aside. The preliminary conditional order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate under S.133(1)(d) CrPC is a pure interlocutory order and not itself revisable under S.397(2) CrPC. The proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate are directed to continue.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The Sessions Court's action in taking the revision on file and staying enforcement of the S.133 order has been revoked; the S.133 proceedings continue before the Sub Divisional Magistrate.
- The respondents remain free to press their preliminary objections before the Magistrate; any subsequent order by the Magistrate accepting or rejecting those objections (in particular an order which, if accepted, would terminate the proceedings) may be susceptible to revision under S.397 as an intermediate order.
- The Court articulated a limiting principle: mere possibility of a preliminary objection does not convert every preliminary order into an intermediate order amenable to revision; only an order disposing of an objection in a way that would conclude the proceedings can be treated as intermediate for revisional purposes. This preserves the procedure under S.133 while accommodating revision in the specific class of cases recognised by the precedents cited.
Disposition: Allowed. (The Sessions Court's order in Crl. R.P. 19/80 was set aside and the S.133 proceedings were to continue.)
1. The Executive Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trichur had passed a conditional order dated 28-3-1979 under S. 133(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing respondents 1 to 3 to cut and remove three poola trees and one jack tree standing on the northern boundary of the petitioners' compound dangerously situated and liable to fall on the house of the petitioners. That order was passed on the basis of the reports submitted by the Tahsildar, Trichur and Sub Inspector of Police, Trichur, Town West and directed the respondents to cut and remove the said trees on receipt of the order and also called upon them to show cause why that order should not be enforced and made absolute. The respondents filed their objections in answer to the preliminary order, inter alia contending that this is a civil dispute and not a public nuisance, in relation to which alone, the power under S. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised. During the course of the proceedings, the respondents herein filed a revision petition before the Court of Sessions, Trichur under S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also obtained an order of stay against the conditional order. The petitioners, who raised a preliminary objection before the Court of Session submitted that in view of S. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petition would not lie against the interlocutory and conditional order under S. 133 of the Code. Sessions Court dismissed this objection for the reason that if on acceptance of the objection, the proceedings would have ended the order rejecting that objection would be revisable under S. 133 of the Code since that would be a final order and not an interlocutory order. The Court of Session therefore directed that the revision petition might be taken on file and numbered. The petitioners have come up in revision against that order of the Sessions Court.
2. The counsel for the petitioners reiterated that no revision could have been entertained against an interlocutory order passed under S. 133 of the Code, directing the respondents to show cause on a specified date. It is submitted that the respondents could raise their objections in answer to the order directing cause to be shown, if they would not comply with the direction contained in the order. It is submitted that the order enabling the party to show cause cannot be treated as a final order for the only reason that if the objection which they propose to take were to be upheld, there would have been a finality in the proceedings.
3. Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions reported in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR. 1977 SC. 2185), Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR. 1978 SC. 47) and V.C Shukla v. State (1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR. 1980 SC. 962). It is decided in all these cases that revision petition would lie against certain types of interlocutory orders. In Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR. 1978 SC. 47) it is observed:
“It appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words “final Order”. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (AIR. 1949 FC 1 (Supra)), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-sec. (2) of S. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders and for the purposes of Art. 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S. 397(2). It is neither advisable nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-sec. (2) of S. 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.”
4. It was further held:
“Yet for the reasons already alluded to we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of S. 397(2).”
5. In V.C Shukla v. State (1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR. 1980 SC. 962) also it was held that:
“We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term ‘interlocutory order’ used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in S. 397(3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final.”
6. In his separate, but concurrent opinion Desai, J. held that “Till this situation is reached, a number of orders may have to be made, during the progress of adjudication of main dispute, such order can appropriately and legally be styled as “interlocutory orders”. In the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State ((1980) 1 SCC 43) Krishna Iyer, J. while considering the same question with reference to the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR. 1978 SC. 47), observed:
“The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal.”
7. It was assumed that revision may lie against such an order and the inherent power of the Court under S. 482 would be available to safeguard the interests of justice at the instance of the person complaining of harassment by abuse of the process of court.
8. The decisions referred to above indicate that from interlocutory orders, pure and simple, no revision could be entertained. They also seem to suggest that from intermediate orders which is a category of orders in between interlocutory orders on the one hand and final orders on the other, revisions could be entertained. An order “rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, if accepted will conclude the proceeding”, has been held to be an intermediate order which “will surely not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of S. 397(2) of the Code. The counsel for the respondent submits that an order under S. 133 in the instant case was such an intermediate order and hence the Sessions Court was correct in entertaining the revision. To accept this submission I should hold that all orders against which any preliminary objection could be taken are intermediate orders. This will render nugatory the provisions of S. 133 of the Code where under a party is enabled to show cause against a preliminary order. In showing cause, an opposite party can as well say that the proceedings are devoid of jurisdiction in the sense that the matter relates to a private dispute and not a public right. If such an objection is taken as part of the cause shown by an opposite party the Magistrate before whom that objection is taken cannot but decide that question. If the decision goes against the opposite party, he may seek to revise it by invoking the revisional jurisdiction under S. 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. None of the decisions have laid down the proposition that mere possibility of a preliminary objection to an order would transform that order from an interlocutory to an intermediate order amenable to correction under S. 397 of the Code, notwithstanding the bar under sub-sec. (2) thereof. I still understand the observations in the above decisions only to mean that an order on a preliminary objection which if considered favourably would terminate the proceedings, would be amenable to revision notwithstanding the fact that order does not in fact qualify as a final order. Any other understanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court would have the effect of practically nullifying S. 397(2) of the Code. The purport of the Supreme Court decisions, according to me, is that even orders on preliminary objections during interim stages of the proceedings would be revisable, if the objections are such as would terminate the proceedings, if accepted. This according to me, obliges and does not obviate, the preliminary objection being taken before the Magistrate himself, acceptance of which would terminate the proceedings by an order, which being a final order, will be revisable at the instance of one party and rejection of which by an order which is neither interlocutory nor final, will also be revisable at the instance of the other party, notwithstanding the bar contained in S. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This seems to me to be the reasonable approach which should commend itself for acceptance, rather than the approach made by the Sessions Court that whether objections were taken or not, the mere possibility of such objection should render the preliminary order itself amenable to revision under S. 397 of the Code. The only order liable to be revised in this case would therefore be either an order upholding the objection raised by the opposite party or an order rejecting the objections. The preliminary conditional order does not cease to be one such, and therefore revisable only because the respondents had filed objections including those to the jurisdiction or competence of the Sub Divisional Magistrate to act under S. 133 of the Code. The revision, if at all, would be not against the preliminary order, but only against a subsequent order either accepting or rejecting the objections. That order may be an intermediate and not interlocutory order. But the order under S. 133 is only an interlocutory order, pure and simple. In this view of the matter, the order of the Sessions Court has to be set aside.
9. This course has the merit of expediting the proceedings, without in the least causing any prejudice to the parties or affecting the interests of justice. The preliminary order against which cause has already been shown cannot be effective until after the inquiry is over. The revision petition is therefore allowed and the Order of the Court-of Session, Trichur in Crl. R.P 19/80 is set aside. The proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate will continue. The respondents can, if so advised, move for orders on their preliminary objections, so that the proceedings may be terminated expeditiously.
10. Allowed.
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