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Haneefa v. Subhalakshmi Ammal
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This civil revision petition arises from eviction proceedings under S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, where the landlord sought to evict the tenant on the ground that the landlord needed the building bona fide for her own occupation. The Rent Control Court dismissed the landlord's eviction petition. The landlord appealed to the Sub Court, Trivandrum (B.R.C.A No. 119 of 1976), which reversed the Rent Control Court and allowed the eviction. The tenant (revision petitioner) then filed a revision petition before the District Court under the Act (R.C.R.P No. 82 of 1978).
On the return date (12-10-1978) neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present, and the respondent was also absent; the District Court dismissed the revision petition for default. The revision petitioner applied to the District Court for setting aside the ex parte order and for restoration of the revision petition, explaining the absence. The revisional court rejected this application, holding that S. 23 of the Rent Control Act does not provide for restoration of petitions dismissed for default and that Order 9 Rule 4 CPC or S.151 CPC are not applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act; consequently the revisional court held it had no power to restore such petitions and declared the revision not maintainable.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Court (acting under S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act) has the power, when exercising revisional jurisdiction, to apply the ordinary powers and procedures of a civil court (including the power to restore petitions dismissed for default) under the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether S. 23 of the Rent Control Act excludes or limits the application of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (such as Order 9 Rule 4 C.P.C. or S.151 C.P.C.) to proceedings before the revisional forum constituted by the District Court under the Act.
- Whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under S. 115 C.P.C. to interfere with an order of the District Judge that refused to restore a petition dismissed for default, where that order is alleged to be erroneous.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
The opinion does record that learned counsel for the respondent (Shri M. Krishnan Nair) relied on the decision in SJS Fernandes v. V. Ranganayakulu Chetty (AIR 1953 Madras 236) to support the revisional court's refusal to restore the petition, but the opinion does not set out an extended adversarial argumentation beyond this reference.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583) | Illustrates that decisions rendered by the District Court are liable to be revised by the High Court under S.115 C.P.C.; the District Judge is not acting as persona designata and the matter comes to the District Court in the hierarchy of civil courts. | The court relied on this to support the proposition that when the District Court exercises revisional jurisdiction under the Act it does so as a civil court and can therefore exercise the ordinary powers conferred on civil courts by the CPC. |
| National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General (1913) AC 546 (Viscount Haldane L.C.) | Where a question is referred to an established court "without more", it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court attach, including the ordinary right of appeal. | Quoted to support the general principle that ordinary procedural incidents and remedies of a court attach when that court is seized of jurisdiction under a special statute. |
| Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR 1948 P.C. 12) | Where ordinary Courts are seized of disputes arising under a special statute they are governed by ordinary procedural rules and appeals lie according to those rules even if the special statute does not expressly confer such rights. | Used to reinforce the proposition that ordinary procedural rules of courts apply even when the legal right arises under a special statute. |
| Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21) | The Privy Council held that when proceedings reach the District Court it is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country and the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply. | Cited as further authority for the view that the ordinary rules of civil procedure apply to proceedings before established courts, even when the subject matter arises under special legislation. |
| National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Chidambaram James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 357) | Where a statute confers a right of appeal to the High Court but says nothing about procedure, the High Court must exercise that appellate jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction (and such judgments may be subject to Letters Patent appeal where applicable). | The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to show that established procedural incidents of appellate courts apply when a statute confers appellate jurisdiction without prescribing procedure. |
| SJS Fernandes v. V. Ranganayakulu Chetty (AIR 1953 Madras 236) | Addresses whether there could be a right to review in respect of an order passed in revision by the High Court under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act; emphasizes that review is not an inherent power and must be statutorily conferred; and that the Madras Act might be self-contained such that CPC provisions do not apply. | The respondent relied on this decision to support the revisional court's position. The court in the present opinion noted the decision but expressly declined to examine in detail its correctness, treating it as a contrasting authority. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in several analytical steps, based strictly on the material in the opinion:
- Statutory framework: The court examined S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which permits the District Court (where the appellate authority under S. 18 is a Subordinate Judge) to call for and examine records of orders passed under the Act and "pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." The court read this as vesting the District Court with revisional power exercisable in the capacity of a District Court.
- Applicability of civil procedure: Relying on Vareed v. Mary and several Privy Council and Supreme Court authorities (National Telephone Co.; Adaikappa Chettiar; Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao; National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd.), the court concluded that when an established civil court is seized of jurisdiction under a special statute, the ordinary incidents of procedure and the ordinary powers of that court under the Code of Civil Procedure attach. Thus the revisional jurisdiction conferred by S. 20 is to be exercised with the ordinary powers of the District Court as a civil court.
- Response to the revisional court's reasoning: The District Judge had held that S. 23 (which makes certain provisions of the CPC applicable) did not permit restoration of petitions dismissed for default and that Order 9 Rule 4 CPC or S.151 CPC did not apply. The High Court found this view "clearly wrong" for the reasons just mentioned: the revisional power under S. 20 is exercised by the District Court in its character as a civil court, and therefore the court has the necessary powers it would otherwise possess under the CPC.
- Consideration of contrary authority: The opinion recognized the SJS Fernandes decision (which suggested the Madras Buildings Act might be self-contained and limit CPC applicability) but explicitly stated the court did not wish to examine the correctness of that principle in detail for the present Act. The court distinguished the present Act on the basis that S. 20 manifests that the revisional power is exercised by the District Court as a District Court, and that the Act does not seek to enumerate or limit revisional powers of the District Court.
- Exercise of High Court's supervisory jurisdiction: Even though the District Judge's order was held to be erroneous in principle, the court considered whether it should exercise its extraordinary revisional powers under S.115 C.P.C. The court explained that S.115 C.P.C. is to be exercised to subserve, not defeat, the ends of justice. If setting aside an erroneous order would serve no useful purpose or would not remedy an injustice, the High Court will refrain from interfering. Here, because the appellate authority had already considered the matter at length on evidence and the appellate court's order appeared reasonable and correct, there was no justification for remitting the matter back to the revisional court merely because the revisional court made an error about its powers.
- Conclusion flowing from analysis: As the appellate authority's decision was more likely correct on the merits and the revisional court's mistake did not produce an injustice that warranted High Court interference, the High Court declined to quash the District Court's order and remit the matter for reconsideration.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED.
Direct consequences recorded in the opinion:
- No relief was granted to the tenant-revision petitioner — the Civil Revision Petition was dismissed.
- No order as to costs was made.
- The tenant-revision petitioner was given three months from the date of the order to vacate the building.
Broader implications: The court indicated that although the District Judge's legal conclusion (that there was no power to restore petitions dismissed for default) was erroneous, there was no useful purpose in exercising the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. to correct that error because the appellate authority's order on the merits appeared reasonable. The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond its application to the facts; instead it applied established principles (from cited authorities) to the circumstances and declined interference on grounds of futility and absence of resulting injustice.
1. This civil revision petition arises in proceedings under S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, (Act 2 of 1965) hereinafter called the Act, for evicting the revision petitioner tenant from the petition schedule building on the ground that the landlord needs the building bona fide for her own occupation. The Rent Control Court dismissed the landlord's petition for eviction. Thereupon, the landlord filed an appeal before the Sub Court, Trivandrum as B.R.C.A No. 119 of 1976. The appellate court, going into the merits of the controversy in detail, did not agree with the order of the Rent Control Court. The appeal was allowed and the landlord's prayer for eviction was granted. This led to the revision petitioner filing a revision petition before the District Court under the Act as R.C.R.P No. 82 of 1978. The revision was posted to 12-10-1978 for return of notice and for hearing. On that day, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present, The respondent was also absent. The District Court dismissed the petition for default. The revision petitioner therefore filed an application before that Court for setting aside the ex parte order and for restoring the revision to file explaining the reason for the absence of himself and the counsel at the time of hearing. This application was rejected by the revisional court stating that it has no power for restoring the application dismissed for default. The Court said:—
“S. 23 of the Rent Control Act alone need be-looked into here. S. 23(h) does not deal with restoration of petitions dismissed for default. It deals with setting aside ex parte orders. A provision similar to that contained in Order 9 Rule 4 C.P.C does not find a place in S. 23. Nor is S. 151 of the C.P.C made applicable to a proceeding under the Rent Control Act. Hence, since there is no provision to restore an application dismissed for default, I hold that this petition is not maintainable.”
2. I have no hesitation in holding that this order is clearly wrong. Under S. 20 of the Act, in cases where the appellate authority empowered under S. 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. This Court has held in Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583) that the decision rendered by the District Court is liable to be revised by the High Court under S. 115 C.P.C The District Judge is acting not as a persona designata. The matter comes to the District Court in the hierarchy of the civil courts. If that be so, then all the powers of the District Court as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, could be exercised by that court in hearing the revision. This will be in accordance with the well settled principle of law succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General (1913) AC 546 in these terms:—
“When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from, its decision likewise attaches.”
3. The same view was expressed by the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR. 1948 PC. 12) where it was said:—
“Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.”
4. The observations in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (A.I.R 1916 P.C 21) to the following effect is also of relevance here.
“It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well-founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply.”
5. These decisions were relied on by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Chidambaram James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (A.I.R 1953 S.C 357). In that case the question that arose was where a matter comes to the High Court under S. 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, which Act does not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the High Court, can there be a Letters Patent appeal. S. 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act reads as follows:—
“Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act an appeal shall lie, within the period prescribed by the Central Government, from any decision of the Registrar under this Act or the rules made thereunder to the High Court having the jurisdiction,”
6. Relying on the Privy Council decisions already referred to the Supreme Court said:
“Though the facts of the case laying down the above rule were not exactly similar, to the facts of the present case, the principle enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite application to the facts and circumstances of the present case S. 76, Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by S. 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its Other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act.”
7. In trying to sustain the order of the learned District Judge, Shri M. Krishnan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, referred to the decision reported in AIR. 1953 Madras 236 - SJS Fernandes v. V. Ranganayakulu Chetty. The question that arose there was whether there could be a right to review in respect of an order passed in a revision by the High Court under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. After pointing out that so far as the invocation of the inherent powers of court is concerned, it has been held repeatedly and has now become well settled law that the power to review is not an inherent power of a judicial officer but such a right must be conferred by Statute, Ramaswami J. went on to point out that S. 141 Civil Procedure Code is indicative of general enunciation of the principle by the Legislature that to all judicial proceedings the Code is applicable. But this arises only where the proceedings reach the Court appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the rules of the Code are applicable. The learned Judge was of further opinion that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is itself a self-contained one and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to a proceeding under that Act by reason of S. 141.
8. In the light of the Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions earlier referred to, I do not want to examine in detail the correctness or otherwise of the principle enunciated by Ramaswami, J. in the Madras decision. As far as the Act with which we are concerned, namely the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it is apparent from S. 20 that rsvisional power is exercised by the District Court as District Court. S. 23 of the Act by which only certain provisions of the C.P.C are made applicable, has reference only to the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority. Regarding the powers of the revisional court under the Act, namely the District Court and in some cases the High Court, such powers are not enunciated in the Act, because even otherwise they have got the necessary powers, being established courts under the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. However, while I am of the view that the order of the District Judge is wrong, I do not think that there is any necessity for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under S. 115 C.P.C in the matter. The powers under S. 115 C.P.C are intended to be exercised with a view to subserve and not to defeat the ends of justice. Therefore, if the order of the lower court even if erroaeous, does not impose any injustice, High Court will not interfere in revision notwithstanding the apparent mistake in the order. If there be no useful purpose served by setting aside the order and remitting it back to the revisional court under the Act, there is no question of allowing this revision petition. In this case the revision to the District Court was taken from the order of the appellate authority who has considered the matter in extenso on the evidence. I have gone through the appellate authority's order as well as that of the Rent Control Court. I find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the appellate authority's order is more correct. The jurisdiction of a revisional court under the Act though wider than under S. 115 is not as wide as that in appeal. Therefore, if the view taken by the appellate authority is a reasonable one, I find no justification for sending back the case to the revisional authority, though the revisional authority might have committed mistake in holding that he is helpless in the matter of restoring the petition dismissed for default. In this view, I dismiss this Civil Revision Petition. However in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. I think it will be proper that the tenant-revision petitioner is given three months' time from today to vacate the building.
10. Dismissed.
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