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Mary v. Cherchi & Others

Kerala High Court
Mar 19, 1980
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — G. Viswanatha Iyer, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) married the second defendant on 29-1-1963. Prior to the marriage, on 10-1-1963, the plaintiff's father entrusted Rs. 6,001 to Lazar (the second defendant's father) as Streedhanam for the plaintiff's benefit. Of this amount Rs. 2,226 was used for making ornaments for the plaintiff, leaving a balance of Rs. 3,775.

The plaintiff's case was that Lazar promised on 8-2-1963 to pay the balance sum of Rs. 3,775 to her on demand after three years. Lazar subsequently died on 17-9-1966. On 30-4-1967 the children of Lazar entered into a karar (Ext. A-5) which specifically mentioned the sum of Rs. 3,775 as an item to be paid to the plaintiff, but payment was not made.

The plaintiff filed suit in 1968 for recovery of Rs. 3,775 with interest. Defendants (including the second defendant's brothers) denied the entrustment and the promise, alleged fraud, misrepresentation and coercion in relation to the karar, contended that the plaintiff (not being a party to the karar) could not rely on it, argued that payment and receipt of Streedhanam are prohibited under law, and asserted that the suit was barred by limitation.

The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed this Second Appeal. When the matter came before a Single Judge, the correctness of the decision in Thoma v. Sarakutty (1975 KLT. 386) was questioned and the matter was adjourned for hearing by a Division Bench. The Division Bench restored the trial court decree and allowed the second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 3,775 as the balance of Streedhanam entrusted to Lazar (i.e., whether the amount is a trust obligation enforceable against Lazar's estate).
  2. Whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by the Dowry Prohibition Act because the payment could be characterized as dowry rather than Streedhanam.
  3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation and, if so, from which date the limitation period runs (date of marriage, date of demand/repudiation, or another date).
  4. Whether the karar (Ext. A-5) executed by Lazar's children is valid and can be relied upon by the plaintiff despite her not being a party to it, in particular when defendants alleged fraud and withdrawal from its provisions.
  5. Whether the plaintiff's pleadings as to alternate bases of claim (trust/Streedhanam versus loan) were sufficient and whether amendment of the plaint was wrongly refused by the lower appellate court.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Rs. 6,001 was entrusted to Lazar as Streedhanam for the plaintiff; Rs. 2,226 was used for ornaments and Rs. 3,775 remains due to the plaintiff.
  • Lazar promised on 8-2-1963 to return the balance Rs. 3,775 after three years; thereafter he repeatedly promised to pay but died before payment.
  • The karar (Ext. A-5) executed by Lazar's children records the Rs. 3,775 as payable to the plaintiff and treats it as a liability on Lazar's estate; this supports her claim.
  • The plaint pleads alternate bases (entrustment/Streedhanam and loan) and, if necessary, should have been permitted to be amended to clarify those bases.

Defendants' Arguments

  • They denied that any amount was entrusted to Lazar or that Lazar made the promise on 8-2-1963.
  • They alleged that the specific mention of Rs. 3,775 in the karar dated 30-4-1967 was the result of fraud, misrepresentation and coercion by the second defendant, and that the plaintiff (not being a party to the karar) cannot rely on it; they further asserted that executants withdrew from the karar's provisions.
  • They contended that payment and receipt of Streedhanam are prohibited under law (invoking the Dowry Prohibition Act), so the plaintiff cannot recover the amount.
  • They argued that the suit is barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thoma v. Sarakutty (1975 KLT. 386) Whether a suit for recovery of an amount described as Streedhanam can be barred by the Dowry Prohibition Act; the earlier decision (Khalid, J.) took a view the bench considered questionable. The court expressed the view that Khalid, J.'s decision in Thoma v. Sarakutty was not correct because S. 6 of the Cochin Christian Succession Act was not noticed there; the present court held that a suit for recovery of Streedhanam is not hit by the Dowry Prohibition Act and therefore rejected the reasoning in Thoma to that extent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by (i) accepting the concurrent finding of fact by the two courts below that Rs. 6,001 had been entrusted to Lazar and that Rs. 2,226 was applied for the plaintiff's benefit, leaving Rs. 3,775; and (ii) treating Ext. A-5 (the karar of 30-4-1967) as evidence recording that Rs. 3,775 was a liability of the deceased Lazar to the plaintiff. The court found no evidence to support defendants' allegations that Ext. A-5 was procured by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion.

On the nature of the claim, the court emphasized that the plaint pleaded both a promise by Lazar (an express undertaking to return the sum) and, alternatively, that the sum constituted Streedhanam entrusted to him and therefore held in trust for the plaintiff. The court observed that even if the plaintiff failed to prove the loan/agreement (promise) in the strict sense, the alternate basis — that the amount was Streedhanam entrusted to Lazar and thus a trust obligation enforceable against his estate — was adequately pleaded and supported by the evidence.

The court analyzed the relevant statutory scheme under the Cochin Christian Succession Act. It set out the definition of Streedhanam and provisions (Ss. 21 and 22 of the Act) showing that Streedhanam may be brought into hotchpot for purposes of calculating shares at intestacy and that a contracted Streedhanam is a charge on the estate. The court concluded that Streedhanam, wherever custody is given to husband, parent or guardian, remains the property of the woman and is held in trust.

The court then examined the interaction with the Dowry Prohibition Act, noting the statutory definition of 'dowry' and Explanation I which clarifies that presents at the time of marriage are not dowry unless they are consideration for the marriage. The court found no evidence that the Rs. 6,001 was paid as consideration for marriage; therefore, on the facts of this case, it was Streedhanam in the ordinary sense. The court further reasoned that even if a payment could be characterized as dowry, both the Cochin Act and the Dowry Prohibition Act require that the amount received by the husband (or his parent/guardian) be kept in trust for the woman. Accordingly, a suit to enforce return of such an amount is not barred by the Dowry Prohibition Act.

On limitation, the court treated the action as governed by the residuary article of the Limitation Act (Article 120 of the old Act, Article 113 of the new Act). The court explained that the cause of action arises when there is demand and a clear denial or unequivocal threat to the right. During Lazar's lifetime there was no clear refusal; instead, he made promises to pay. The repudiation in the defendants' reply dated 26-4-1968 was the relevant denial causing the cause of action to accrue, and the suit was filed immediately thereafter. Even on the alternative view that the right accrued on the date of marriage (29-1-1963), the suit was within six years under Article 120 (old) and thus saved by S.30 of the new Limitation Act. Therefore the court concluded the suit was not barred by limitation.

Synthesizing the factual findings, statutory framework, and limitations analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the Rs. 3,775 from the estate of the deceased Lazar and that the lower appellate court's dismissal of the suit was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed the Second Appeal. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court were set aside and the decree of the trial court was restored. The parties were ordered to bear their respective costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's decree for recovery of Rs. 3,775 (with interest as claimed) as a liability of the deceased Lazar's estate is reinstated; the lower appellate court's dismissal is overturned.
  • On legal questions of wider application, the court expressed the view that a suit to recover an amount held as Streedhanam (or received and held in trust by husband/parent/guardian) is not barred by the Dowry Prohibition Act, and criticized the contrary approach in Thoma v. Sarakutty to the extent that it failed to notice S.6 of the Cochin Christian Succession Act. The court treated Streedhanam as the property of the woman and enforceable against the custodian or the custodian's estate.
  • No express new rule of law beyond the court's application to the statutory provisions and facts was formulated; the direct practical consequence is restoration of the trial court decree and recognition of the plaintiff's trust/right to recover the Streedhanam balance.

Outcome: Second Appeal Allowed. Trial court decree restored; costs to be borne by the parties.

Show all summary ...

G. Viswanatha Iyer, J.:— The plaintiff is the appellant. The facts leading to this appeal are the following: The second defendant is her husband. Their marriage took place on 29-1-1963. Previous to that on 10-1-1963 there was a marriage engagement and at that time the plaintiff's father entrusted to Lazar, the second defendant's father, Rs. 6,001/- as Sreedhanam amount for plaintiff's benefit. Out of that a sum of Rs. 2,226/- had been utilised for making ornaments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case is the balance sum of Rs. 3,775/- was agreed to be paid to her on demand after three years and this promise was made by the second defendant's father on 8-2-1963. Though the plaintiff asked for the payment of the amount the second defendant's father promised to pay the same without delay. But he could not fulfil the promise as he died on 17-9-1966. Thereafter there was a karar entered into between the children of this Lazar regarding the partition of his assets and liabilities. This sum of Rs. 3,775/- was specifically mentioned as an item to be paid to her. But even thereafter the amount was not paid and alleging these the plaintiff filed the suit in 1968 for recovery of this amount with interest. The brothers of the second defendant, namely, defendants 1, 3, 4 and 5 denied the entrustment and the promise said to have been made by Lazar on 8-2-1963 They alleged that mention in the karar dated 30-4-1967 of this sum of Rs. 3.775/- was as a result of fraud, mis-representation and coercion on the part of the second defendant. Further the plaintiff is not a party to the karar and all the executants have withdrawn from the provisions of the karar and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the same. The payment and receipt of Streedhanam are prohibited under law and hence even if any amount is paid as Streedhanam the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the same. In any event it was contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the lower court has dismissed the suit and hence this Second Appeal.

2. When the Second Appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge the correctness of the decision in Thoma v. Sarakutty (1975 KLT. 386) was questioned and hence this was adjourned for hearing by a Division Bench. That is how this case is being considered by us. Though the contesting defendants denied that any amount was paid as Streedhanam to the plaintiff at the time of her marriage, the concurrent finding entered into by the two courts that Rs. 6,001/- was entrusted to Lazar and that out of that only a sum of Rs. 2,226/- had been utilised for the plaintiff's benefit is justified by the evidence in this case. The karar that was entered into by the children of Lazar after his death is marked Ext. A-5. Though the contesting respondents dispute its validity there is no evidence to prove that the case was entered into as a result of any fraud or mis-representation. Ext. A-5 clearly mentions that a sum of Rs. 3,775/- being the balance of Streedhanam amount has to be returned to the plaintiff. This is treated as a liability to be discharged from the assets of the deceased Lazar. This clearly proves the plaintiff's case that Rs. 3,775/- is the balance of the Streedhanam amount to be accounted for from the estate of the deceased Lazar.

3. After stating that this amount is due to her from the deceased Lazar in the plaint she pleaded that Lazar had on 8-2-1963 promised to return this amount with interest after three years. It is wrong to read it as a claim based on loan alone. Even if there was any doubt in the trial court regarding the basis of the claim, the plaintiff made the alternate position clear and the lower appellate court was wrong in rejecting the application for amending the plaint. As rightly pointed out by the lower courts, the loan part of the case has not been proved by the plaintiff. But the fact remains that all the averments for the alternate claim have been set out, that is, that at the time of her marriage Rs. 6,001/- was paid as Streedhanam and this amount was entrusted with the deceased Lazar. That this is an entrustment and the person who received it has to account the same to the plaintiff is not open to challenge. Parties are governed by the Cochin Christian Succession Act. Linder that Act the nature of the Streedhanam paid to a female at the time of her marriage and the extent of the share which she is entitled to inherit from her father's or mother's estate are clearly stated.

4. S. 3 of Act 6 of 1097 (Cochin) defines Streedhanam as follows:—

““Streedhanam” means any property given to a woman, or in trust for her to her husband, his parent, or guardian, in connection with her marriage, and in fulfilment of a term of the marriage treaty in that behalf.”

5. Ss. 21 and 22 read as follows:—

“21(a) For the purposes of determining the share of a woman or her lineal descendants, as the case may be, at the intestacy of her father, mother or paternal grandfather when a Streedhanam had been given or contracted to be given, to or in trust for her, by any of her said ascendants whomsoever, the amount for her Streedhanam, or its value at the date of its intestacv, if it was not money, shall be brought into hotchpot.

Proviso (1): Nothing in this section shall be construed to make a woman or her lineal descendant liable to refund any portion of her Streedhanam or its value.

Proviso (2): When the Streedhanam of a woman has been once brought into hotchpot, and a share given or become due as provided in this section, it shall not be brought into hotchpot again at any subsequent intestacy.

(b) The Streedhanam which an intestate contracted to give shall be a charge on his estate.”

“22. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Act, when a Streedhanam has been given or contracted to be given by the father, mother, paternal grand father or the paternal grand-mother, of a woman, to or in trust for her, neither the said woman nor any lineal descendant of her as such shall be entitled to a distributive share in the property of any of them dying intestate, if (1) a brother of the said woman being a lineal descendant of the intestate, or (2) the lineal descendants of such brother, survive the intestate.”

6. In the Cochin Act Streedhanam is defined as property given to a woman in connection with her marriage and in fulfilment of a marriage treaty in that behalf. This has given room for a criticism that this will partake the character of ‘dowry’ as defined in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In the latter ‘Dowry’ is defined as follows:—

“In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly…

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any presents made at the time of marriage to either party to the marriage in the form of cash, ornaments, clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed to be dowry within the meaning of this section, unless they are made as consideration for the marriage of the said parties.

Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in S. 30 of the Indian Penal Code.”

7. If any property is given or agreed to be given by either party or their parents to the other party as consideration for the marriage of the said parties that will constitute dowry. The explanation mattes it clear that any gift made to either party to a marriage shall not be deemed to be a dowry unless they are made as consideration for the marriage of the said parties. Reading the two Acts together where payment is made or property is given on the occasion of the marriage to a female, entitled to a share under the Succession Act this happens only on intestacy—that may be capable of being understood only as handing over of her share in the estate at the time of marriage and as such is not a consideration for the marriage. In other cases it is a question of fact according to the circumstance of each case whether the payment made or property given is in consideration of the marriage hit by the Dowry Prohibition Act. Among the people of this community, like other communities, payment made or property given at the time of the marriage to a female by her relations is on the increase in spite of Dowry Prohibition Act and social reformers. In an arranged marriage the father or guardian of the girl always would like to choose prosperous or would be prosperous bride-groom and everything thereafter is reckoned in terms of money. Now-a-days the rate is proportional to the qualification or status of the bride-groom. An I.A.S, I.P.S or Class I Service man a Doctor, an Engineer, a Scientist or Foreign returned man, an Estate Manager is offered easily an amount going to one or two six digit figures. Unless the younger generation takes up this matter this social evil will remain a bane of society. In such cases the payment made or property given becomes nothing but a consideration for the marriage. Call it by Streedhanam or any name, it is dowry as per the definition in the Dowry Prohibition Act. In this case there is no evidence regarding the circumstances under which the plaintiff's father gave Rs. 6,001/- to Lazar. There is no evidence to show that this was a consideration for the marriage. So it is only a Streedhanam in the ordinary sense, i.e a gift of money or property given to a female before, at or after carriage. It is unnecessary to dialate more into this aspect of the matter because whether the amount is treated as Streedhanam within the meaning of the Cochin Christian Succession Act or ‘dowry’ within the meaning of the Dowry Prohibition Act both these enactments clearly state that the amount received by her husband, his parent or guardian shall be kept by him in trust for her. In other words Streedhanam is always the property of the woman whoever is given custody of the same. Woman can always claim it back and enforce the return of it. In this view the decision of Khalid, J. in Thoma v. Sarakutty (1975 KLT. 386) cannot be said to be correct. S. 6 of that Act is not noticed there A suit for recovering this amount will not be hit by the Dowry Prohibition Act.

8. It follows that even if the plaintiff fails to prove the specific agreement pleaded, since the suit is not framed purely as a suit for return of the amount on the basis of the loan, the alternative basis of claim can be sustained.

9. Then the question will be whether the suit is barred by limitation. The amount is seen to have been paid on 10-1-1963. The character of the Streedhanam being in the nature of a payment in trust, and a suit for recovery of that amount is not governed by any specific article of the Limitation Act, the residuary Article 120 (old) or 113 (new) will apply. The period starts from the time the right to sue accrues. A right to sue in this case is equivalent to the cause of action. The cause of action will arise only when there is a demand and a clear denial of the right or unequivocal threat to that right During the life-time of Lazar there was no refusal to pay. On the contrary the allegation is that he was making promises to pay although he failed to keep up those promises. The mere failure to pay when the defendants were always promising to pay cannot be regarded as an infringement of the plaintiff's right or any clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. In the present suit when the defendants in their reply dated 26-4-1968 repudiated their liability the cause of action arose. The suit is filed immediately thereafter and hence is in time. Even if the right to sue accrued on the date of the marriage—29-1-1963—the plaintiff has six years under Art. 120 (old) of the Limitation Act. The suit is filed before the expiry of that period and hence under S. 30 of the new Act the suit is within time. It follows that there is no bar of limitation for the suit. In the result this second appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court restored to file. In the circumstances of this case the parties shall bear their costs.

10. Allowed.