Kochu Thommen, J.:— The petitioner is a High School Assi???t???nt. She challenges Ext. P-4 order of the Deputy Director, Education, ???nakulam (the. 1st res???dent) stating: “The higher scale or pay sanctioned to the teache??? may be revised accordingly and the excess pay drawn may be got refunded”. The higher scale of pay was sanctioned by the District Educational Officer, Muvattupuzha (the 2nd respondent) in f???our of the petitioner by Ext. P-1 order which came into effect on 28-1-1973. The scale was granted with reference to Rule 2 of Chapter XXVI of the Kerala Education Rules on the basis of the total service rendered by the petitioner. By, Ext. P-3 dated 27-10-1980 the 2nd respondent forwarded to the petitioner's Headmaster a copy of Ext. P-4 letter in which there was a direction to recover the excess payment said to have been made to the petitioner. On the basis of Ext. P-3 and P-4 the Headmaster sent Ext. P-2 letter dated 8-12-1980 to the petitioner calling upon her to refund the excess amounts received by her on the basis of the fixation of her pay in (he higher grade as per Ext. P-1 with effect from 28-1-1973. In other words it has been found by Ext. P-4 that Ext. P-1 was wrongly made by the 2nd respondent insofar as the petitioner was given credit for certain periods of broken service on the basis of which she was placed on the higher scale of pay. The question is whether the petitioner is liable to be compelled to refund the amounts received by her in terms of Ext. P-1.

2. Certain dates are relevant for the consideration of the question. The petitioner was appointed by the St. Paul's High School, Veliyanad as a High School Assistant on 5-10-1960. When the school closed for su???r vacation on 29-3-1961 she was relieved from the service of the schco??? In terms of Rule 49 of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules She was re-appointed when the school reopened on 5-6-1961.

3. According to the petitioner she left the school on 29-7-1961 to join the Training College on her selection by the University authorities for training. However it is seen in the service record that she had actually resigned. The petitioner states in the O.P that that entry was wrongly made and that she had not resigned (This is a co???troversy which it is unnecessary for me to consider in the present proceeding) The training commenced en 1-8-1961 and ended on 18-4-1962 which was during the summer vacation. When the schools reo???ned shs was appointed in St. Mary's High School, Pothanicad, with effect from 6-6-1962 Shortly thereafter the result of the training course was published on 18-6-1962. The petitioner had passed and obtained the degree of BEd Ext. P1 was made with reference to these dates. The relevant portion of that order reads:—

“13. Remarks : Broken periods of service from 5-10-1960 to 29-3-1961 and from 5-6-1961 to 29-7-1961 and the B.Ed training, period from 1-8-1961 to 18-4-1962 have also been counted for calculation of twelve years service for sanction of Higher Scale as per G.O (MS) 62/73.S Edn dated 2-5-1973.

Certified that the details of continuous service reckoned for fixation of pay of the teacher in the Higher scale of pay have been personally verified by me with reference to relevant records including the service book and found correct.

Service From To Y. M. D. 5-10-60 29-3-61 0 5 25 5-6-61 29-7-61 0 1 25 Trg. period 1-8-61 18-4-62 0 8 18 Cont. service 6-6-62 27-1-73 10 7 22 12 0 00

Eligible for Higher scale of pay from 28-1-1973 fn.”

4. It is on the basis of Ext. P-1 that the petitioner received the higher scale of pay. It is the amount received by her on that basis that she is suddenly called upon to refund by Ext. P-4 which was made after the lapse of 7 years and 10 months. Ext. P-1 refers to G.O (MS) 62/73.S. Edn-dated 15-5-1973. That order refers to various matters including reckoning of service te grant higher grade. Para (viii) of that order reads:—”

(viii) Reckoning of service for grant of higher grade:

In lieu of continuous teaching service insisted on for the purposes of sanction of higher grade to teachers, total teaching service will count for higher grade to teachers. The concession shall take effect only from 1-1-1973. Arrears will also be given with effect from 1-1-1973.

All types of service which are even now considered for highr grade will continue to be considered for the purpose. Howeve, break in service exceeding 5 years will be reported to the Director of Public Instruction for consideration of the service before the break. Requests for condonation of break under the existing rules to enable teachers to get the higher grade earlier than the 1-1-1973 which are pending with the Department and Government will continue to be considered and sanctioned under the existing rules. Future requests for condonation will not however be entertained.

The question of counting the training period for increment to teaekers is under examination of Government.”

5. Two things seem to emerge from that order. It says that in lieu ©f continuous teaching service, total teaching service can count for higher grade to teachers. It further says that the Government was considering the question of counting training period for increment to teachers. The order therefore permits the concerned authority to compute the total service of teachers, even when there are breaks in service, for the purpose of graatiag them higher grade. The order also presumes that training period is part of the period of service although the question of increment in relation to that portion of the service was not decided. Whether that reading of tke order is unquestionably correct is unnecessary for me to consider. The only question that needs to be considered is whether the order could have been reasonably relied on for making Ext. P-1. In my view the officer was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the order of 2-5-73 for doing what he did in Ext. P-1. He understood the order to mean that the broken periods of service can be computed to ascertain the total length of service and that there was no objection in principle to treating the period of training as part of service. Assuming that on mature consideration that was not the correct interpretation, the officer cannot be found fault with for relying upon that order, for that interpretation was not, on the face of it, an unreasonable or irrational construction.

6. The Government Pleader submits that if certain earlier orders of the Govern nent had been taken into account by the Officer he would not have interpreted the order of 1973 in the matter in which he has done. May be that is an arguable ???oint. May be different interpretation could have been or would have been put on this order had the earlier orders been taken into account. But the question is whether the Officer prima facie made a mistake in not having considered the earlier orders. I do not think so, for, none of the earlier orders is referred to in the order dated 2-5-1973. The officer could not therefore be said to have irrationally thought that this order had independent force and operated in terms thereof that is how I would have thought of this order by looking at it had I not been told that other orders existed. Even if other orders existed, a point which I need not pursue any further—I doubt whether the effect of this order can be cut down by reference to earlier orders which are not mentioned in this order. I Should have thought that the latest order prevails over the earlier orders unless specifically stated otherwise. The latest order is presumably the latest will of the Government on the matter under consideration. In the c???rcumstances I am of the view that Ext. P-1 was reasonably and rationally based on Government order dated 2-5-1973. In terms of the Government order, the total service of the petitioner was not incorrectly computed. In the circumstances no mistake can be said to have vitiated. Ext. P-1 order so as to affect its validity I use the expression “mistake” in the technical sense, meaning that a mistake which could have vitiated an order. See : 1982 K.L.T 100. This is de hors the question whether on mature consideration a difterent interpretation would have been adopted by the Officer. All that I need to say is that Ext. P-1 cannot be said to have been vitiated by any reason so as to compel the recipient of the amounts to refund the same.

7. To be called upon to refund amounts paid in terms of an order made by a competent officer, particularly after the lapse of several years, not only causes hardship, but it is in principle unjust and wrong. Every person has a right to place his trust in orders made by a competent authority in the normal exercise of his jurisdiction, unless, of course, the order is vitiated by fraud o. interests in favour of third parties are adversely ffected. Ext. P-1 was bona fide made by a competent officer. The Government have no case that it was not so made. The petitioner did not supply any wrong information on the basis of which the Officer was misled. The Government have no such case. Both parties have acted bona fide at all material terms. The order was passed on the basis of a Government order which, as I stated earlier, was on the face of it rationally and reasonably relied upon by the Officer.

8. The Government Pleader refers to Rule 1-A of Chapter XXVT of the Kerala Education Rules, which reads:—

“1-A. (1) The Government or the Director or Deputy Director (Education) concerned shall have the power to order refund in appropriate cases of salary paid to teachers in excess of the amount legally due or payment made irregularly,

(2) The refund referred to in sub-rule (1) may be effected either by adjustment in pay bills or in any other manner as the Government or the Director or Deputy Director (Education) concerned may deem fit.”

9. The Government Pleader submits that the Government or the Director or the Deputy Director has the power to order refund. It is true that there is such a power, but it can be exercised only in appropriate cases where amounts have been paid in excess of what is legally due or have been irregularly paid. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the amount was paid irregularly. I do not see how payment made to the petitioner on the, basis of Ext. P-1 can be said to be irregular. Even if it is possible to construe Ext. P-1 as having been based on a wrong understanding of the relevant G. Os., as I stated earlier, Ext. P-1 was made by a competent,: cfficer in good faith and on reliane upon the relevant G. Os. Assuming that Ext. P-1 is liable to be impeached in proper proceedings by competent higher authorities, amounts paid and received in terms of Ext. P-1 cannot be said to have been made irregularly. Moreover, an amount which was ordertd to be paid as early as 1973 was never called into question by any authority until Ext. P-4. Presumably audits had taken place in the mean time. Accounts had been scrutinised. But none had believed that any mistake had been made until a sudden discovery was made of what is called an irregular payment as late as August, 1980. This by no means can be said to be an appropriate case for recovery of amounts in terms of Rule 1-A of Chapter XXVI. Ext. P-4, in the circun stances, has been made without jurisdiction It is unjust. It is therefore of no effect. It is so declared. The O.P is allowed in the above terms. No costs.

10. Petition allowed.