1. S. 20 of the Kerala Agricultural Workers Act provides that agricultural workers entitled to claim arrears of wages can apply to the Conciliation Officer, and that Officer can “direct” the landowner to pay the arrears found due, after such enquiry as be considers necessary and after hearing the parties. S. 23 provides for an appeal to the Agricultural Tribunal, against the “order passed by Conciliation Officer”, and prescribes that such appeal shall be preferred

“within a period of thirty days from the date of the order appealed against.”

2. Three orders adverse to the common petitioner herein were passed by the Conciliation Officer on 31-5-80, and they were served on him on 27-6-80. He filed appeals on 9-7-80, but the Tribunal dismissed them as time-barred, proceeding on the basis that time had started to run from the date of the orders. The question is whether the above view of the Tribunal is correct or not. The contention of the petitioner is that no one can file an appeal against an order, until he comes to know that such an order is passed, and that it is adverse to him. Limitation can start only from the date of knowledge, and not from the date of the order itself, unless it is pronounced in his presence, it is urged.

3. The question is not free from doubt, as can be seen from decided cases to be presently referred to. But one or two aspects have to be noticed before turning to these cases. The first is that S. 20 does not provide for pronouncement of orders in the presence of parties or with notice to them. There is also no provision for communicating the orders or their substance, to the parties. Even Rules 10 and 11 are silent on these aspects; in fact, Rule 11 reiterates that the appeal shall be filed “within 30 days from the date on which the order appealed against is passed”. The second aspect to be noticed is that there are no other provisions for appeals against decisions rendered under the Act, for the purpose of comparing their language with the phraseology of S. 23. And the third is that while S. 20 speaks of a direction by the Conciliation Officer, S. 23 speaks of an “order passed” by him.

4. Turning to reported cases, the question in Harish Chandra v. Dy. L.A Officer (AIR. 1961 SC. 1500) was about the scope of the proviso to S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894 which prescribed that a person who had not accepted the land acquisition award was to apply for reference to Court “within six months from the date of the Collector's award”. The award in that case was made on 25-3-51, but no notice was given to the party, as required by S. 12(2) The party came to know of the award in January, 1953 and made the reference application on 24-2-53. This was beyond the six-month period from the date of the award, and the High Court held that the application was time-barred. The Supreme Court disagreed with “this literal and mechanical way of construing the relevant clause”, for two reasons:—

(i) the award of the Collector was truly a tender or offer made on behalf of the Government, and under the normal law of contract, it could take effect only from the date of communication;

and (ii) the decision of the Collector affected the rights of owners of property, and knowledge of the parties affected thereby, actual or constructive, was an essential element of fairplay and natural justice.

5. Their Lordships (Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo JJ.) observed:—

“……where the rights of a person are affected by any order, and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual, constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned.”

6. The same view was expressed by another Bench of the Court (S.K Das, Sarkar and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) in Punjab v. Qaisar Johan Begum (AIR. 1963 SC. 1604) when the scope of the proviso to S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act again arose for consideration.

7. Boola Mal v. Union of India (AIR. 1962 SC. 1716) had raised the question of limitation under Art. 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The article provided that a suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of goods was to be filed within one year from the point of time “when the goods ought to be delivered”. Some of the High Courts had taken the view that depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the starting point for limitation under this Article could be taken as the time when the carrier had finally refused to deliver the goods. The Supreme Court rejected that approach, holding that it would amount to re-writing the words “ought to be delivered” as “refused to be delivered”; and it was held that time would start to run on the expiry of the time fixed between the parties and in the absence of such arrangement, from the expiry of reasonable time to be decided according to the circumstances of each case. What is important to notice, however, is the disapproval by their Lordships (Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo JJ.) of attempts to re-write the words of the statute on considerations of equity and hardship. It was categorically held that in the construction of provisions relating to limitation,

“equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.”

8. The question again cropped up, before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar JJ.) in Municipal Board v. S.T.A, Rajasthan (AIR. 1965 SC. 458), in connection with a revision under S. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The facts were these. The Regional Transport Authority passed a resolution on 4th December, 1954 refixing the location of a bus stand. The resolution provided that the they existing bus stand would “cease to be a bus stand” and that the buses would “shift to the new bus stand” when the Municipal Board provided the necessary facilities at the new location. But the resolution was notified under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules only on 28th June, 1960. Revisions under S. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act were filed by interested parties in April, 1960 against the decision of the R.T.A; and the question arose whether they were time-barred. S. 64A provided that no revision shall be entertained from a person aggrieved by an order of the R.T.A unless the application was made within 30 days from the date of the order. On the one side, it was contended that the R.T.A's decision was on 4-12-59 and that the revisions filed in April, 1960 were beyond the period of 30 days from the date of the order. The contention on the other side was that there could be no question of filing any revision unless the aggrieved party had knowledge of the order sought to be revised. The Supreme Court reiterated the view taken in Boota Mal's Case (AIR. 1962 SC. 1716) that equitable considerations were out of place in interpreting provisions relating to limitation, and that the strict grammatical meaning of the words was the only safe guide. In this view, their Lordships observed that:

“The words ‘date of order’ should not be read as ‘from the date of knowledge of the order’, in the absence of clear indication to that effect.”

9. It was also noticed that in some other sections of the Motor Vehicles Act providing for appeals or revisions, the prescription regarding limitation was from “date of receipt of the order or notice”. Having thus held that where a statute provided for limitation from the date of an order, time would start to run from the making of the order irrespective of knowledge of parties, their Lordships further held that the decision of the RTA. in the bus stand matter had actually taken effect only in June, 1960 when the notification under Rule 134 was issued, and that the date of the notified order was the starting point of limitation in that case.

10. S. 15 of the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (5 of 1935) provided that an operator whose application for exemption from payment of tax was rejected, could file an appeal within 30 days from the date of rejection; and in A.T Commissioner v. Nand Singh ((1979) 4 SCC 19 : AIR. 1980 SC. 15), the Supreme Court held that it was enough if the appeal was filed within 30 days of the receipt of order rejecting the application for exemption. The principles laid down in Harish Chandra's Case (AIR. 1961 SC. 1500) were followed, and it was added:—

“Apart from the reasons given by this Court in the earlier judgment to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order, in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the Office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively otherwise not. On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of S. 15 of the L.T.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, that was the date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date”.

11. The case law thus shows that three or four theories were competing for supremacy, in the interpretation of provisions relating to limitation. One approach was to go by the literal or grammatical construction, ignoring considerations of equity and hardship Another was to emphasise the purpose of the remedy, where a person's rights were affected, and to hold that knowledge, constructive or actual, was necessary. The third was to fix up the point of time when it could be held that the order was effectively made, as distinct from the date of its mere making. And the fourth was to postulate that an order was no order at all for the purposes of limitation, unless the party against whom it was passed had some means of knowing about it. The question here is which of the above approaches should prevail in the interpretation of S. 23 of our Act.

12. When the legislature provided for an appeal under Section 23, against the decision of the Conciliation Officer, it is reasonable to think that it was aware that the Conciliation Officer was likely to commit mistake and that it wanted to provide a machinery for correction by way of appeal. Viewed from this angle, what S. 23 really provides for is a remedy; the provision is not merely a part of a statute of limitation. In General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corporation Ltd. v. Abdul Rahim (AIR. 1941 PC. 6), the Privy Council had no doubt observed that:

“A Limitation Act ought to receive such a construction as the language of its plain meaning imports…………Great hardship may occasionally be caused by statutes of limitation in cases of poverty, distress and ignorance of rights, yet the statutory rules must be enforced according to their ordinary meaning in these and other like cases.”

13. But the observations related to statutes of limitation as such, and prescription of time thereunder, and not to composite provisions of other kinds of statutes providing for remedies and incidentally prescribing the time within which such remedy was to be resorted to. In my opinion, a distinction can be drawn between statutory provisions merely dealing with limitation, and provisions designed to confer a right of appeal or of revision, with an added prescription of time. The approach in the latter types of cases is to find out and give effect to the true legislative intent. When S. 23 of the Agricultural Workers Act provides for an appeal to be filed within 30 days, the intention is basically to provide for a remedy, and not to provide for a remedy by the left hand and make it illusory by the right, which will be the result of holding that the appeal should be filed within 30 days from the date of the order, even if the aggrieved party were to remain ignorant about the passing of the order during the whole of the period. Rules of interpretation should not strive to frustrate the legislative intent; they should be geared to the fulfilment of the legislative aim. If the purpose of S. 23 is to provide the aggrieved party with a right of appear and if it is held that the mere making and signing of the order and keeping it in the files will be sufficient for time to start running, the very purpose of the provision will be defeated. Alternatively, it can beheld that the very concept of an appeal involves a right to complain about some mistake committed by the original authority, and that the party concerned cannot be expected to make such a complaint till he comes to know about the commission of the mistake. With respect, that appears to have been the reason why their Lordships of the Supreme Court thought of making some additional observations in Nand Singh's Case ((1979) 4 SCC 19 : AIR. 1980 SC. 15), over and above those made in Harish Chandra (AIR. 1961 SC. 1500).

14. Rule 11 of the Kerala Agricultural Workers' Rules, 1975 provides that appeals filed under S. 23 of the Act have to be accompanied by “copies of the order appealed against”; and this, in my opinion, is another indication that the appeals are to be filed only after the appellants come to know of the order and are in a position to secure their copies. A rule made under a statute may not be a safe guide for construing the provisions of the statute, but it is possible to think that the rule-making authority, as a delegate of the legislature, was also of the view that the remedy provided under S. 23 should be proper and effective. S. 47(3) of the Act provides for the laying of the Rules before the Legislative Assembly and their modification by the assembly; and in so far as Rule 11 has not been so modified, it is legitimate to assume that the legislature itself was of the view that a party could wait till getting a copy of the order, before filing an appeal against it. My conclusion therefore is that time cannot start to run under S. 23 till the party concerned has constructive or actual knowledge of the passing of the order. The orders marked as Ext. P3 in the three Original Petitions cannot therefore be sustained. They are quashed, and the appellate authority is directed to take up the appeals and dispose them of afresh, in accordance with law, and on the merits.

15. No costs.