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Ponnan v. Kuttipennu

Kerala High Court
Mar 30, 1987
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Factual and Procedural Background

The first respondent filed O.S No. 46/76 seeking partition of certain properties, resulting in a preliminary decree dividing the properties into seven equal shares and allotting one share to the plaintiff. The 4th defendant was ex parte and the first defendant had died. When the plaintiff applied for a final decree, defendants 2, 3, 5, and 6 resisted, contending that after the preliminary decree, the plaintiff and the 4th defendant had surrendered their shares by a registered surrender deed (Ext. B1) in favor of the other sharers. The plaintiff denied executing or registering such a deed. The lower court was tasked with determining the genuineness and validity of the surrender deed. The plaintiff (PW. 1) testified that the thumb impression on Ext. B1 was not hers and that she had no knowledge of the registration. Defendants produced witnesses including a finger print expert (RW. 3) who opined the thumb impression was that of the plaintiff. The lower court found the expert’s examination incomplete and insufficiently corroborated, and held there was evidence suggesting the plaintiff might not have executed or registered Ext. B1.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the registered surrender deed (Ext. B1) was genuinely executed by the plaintiff despite her categorical denial.
  2. The evidentiary value and reliability of fingerprint expert opinion in proving execution of a document.
  3. The extent to which registration of a document under the Registration Act constitutes conclusive proof of execution.
  4. Whether the lower court’s findings rejecting the genuineness of Ext. B1 warrant interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The surrender deed Ext. B1 was duly registered and therefore presumed genuine.
  • The opinion of the fingerprint expert (RW. 3), who identified the thumb impression as that of the plaintiff, should be accepted as conclusive proof of execution.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The thumb impression on Ext. B1 was not hers and she had no knowledge of the document's registration.
  • The registration of Ext. B1 alone does not amount to conclusive proof of execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hussenaiah v. Yerraiah, AIR 1954 Andhra 39 Expert evidence is to be weighed along with other evidence; court decides probative value. Used to emphasize that fingerprint expert opinion is not binding and must be assessed in context.
Bhaluka Behera v. State, AIR 1957 Orissa 172 Fingerprint science is advanced but expert opinion must be scrutinized for thoroughness and completeness. Court applied this to assess the adequacy of expert’s examination and found it lacking.
R.J Gounder v. Elalya Pttlai, AIR 1972 Madras 336 Onus is on party relying on document to prove it was properly explained to illiterate executant before mark. Referenced regarding burden of proof when executant is illiterate and mark is affixed.
Vareed Kunju Kunju v. Chelhppan, 1983 KLT 281 Facts and circumstances supporting or inconsistent with expert opinion are relevant under Ss. 45 and 46 Evidence Act. Used to highlight the need to consider all corroborative or contradictory circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that registration under the Registration Act creates a presumption of genuineness but is not conclusive proof of execution, especially when execution is denied by the alleged executant. The court analyzed the expert fingerprint evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, recognizing it as important but not binding. It found the expert’s examination incomplete because he failed to mark critical points (such as the bifurcating delta) and the thumb impression was blurred. Additionally, the court noted that fingerprint impressions can be forged. The court examined other facts and discrepancies: the consideration stated in Ext. B1 was less than what was actually paid; the real value of the surrendered share was significantly higher; inconsistencies existed in witnesses’ accounts of the registration process; the plaintiff and 4th defendant were absent from the locality; the attesting witness did not see the plaintiff affixing her thumb impression; and Ext. B1 made no mention of the suit or preliminary decree. These inconsistencies and lack of corroboration diminished the reliability of the expert’s opinion and the validity of the surrender deed. The court further questioned the competency of the attesting witness under Section 68 of the Evidence Act. On this basis, the court upheld the lower court’s conclusion rejecting the genuineness of Ext. B1 and found no grounds for interference under Section 115 CPC.

Holding and Implications

The court dismissed the revision petition, thereby affirming the lower court's finding that the registered surrender deed (Ext. B1) was not conclusively proved to have been executed by the plaintiff. The direct effect is that the plaintiff’s claim to her share in the partitioned property stands protected against the alleged surrender. No new precedent was established; the decision reinforces the principle that registration alone does not conclusively prove execution when denied, and that expert evidence must be carefully scrutinized in conjunction with other facts.

Show all summary ...

1. In O.S No. 46/76 filed by the first respondent for partition, a preliminary decree was passed directing division of the plaint schedule properties into seven equal shares, and allotment of one share to the plaintiff. The 4th defendant was ex parte. The first defendant passed away. W???sn the plaintiff applied for final decree, defendents 2, 3, 5 and 6 resisted the attempt of the ground that after the preliminary decree dated 3-12-1976, the plaintiff and the 4th defendant had, as a result of mediation, surrendered their shares, by registered surrender deed No. 417/77 of the Chittur Sub Registry, in favour of the other sharers. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder denying execution and registration of any such deed by her, and the court below was thus called upon to find out whether the deed in question was genuine and valid. The plaintiff gave evidence as PW. 1 asserting that the thumb impression on the surrender deed (Ext. B1) was not hers, and that she had had no knowledge about the alleged registration. RW. 1 was the Sth defendant, and RW. 2, an attesting witness to Ext. B1. RW. 3 was a finger print expert who opined that the disputed thumb impression (in Ext. B1) was really that of the plaintiff. On a consideration of the evidence before it, the court below felt that the examination of the thumb impression by RW. 3 was not thorough and complete, that his opinion was not sufficiently corroborated, and that there was evidence to suggest that PW. 1 might not have been a party to the execution and registration of Ext. B1.

2. It is the above view of the court below which is now being challenged by defendants 2, 3. S and 6, in this revision.

3. If I have understood Mr. N. Viswanatha Iyer for the revision petitioners correctly, it has not been his contention that since Ext. B1 was registered, it should have been presumed to be genuine and acted upon.

4. There are no doubt decisions which observe that in view of Ss. 34 and 35 of the Registration Act which empower or cast a duty on the Sub-Registrar to enquire about the identity of the executant and the factum of execution, due registration could be treated as some evidence of execution by the person figuring as executant in the document; but this is only a presumption attaching to official acts, which could be rebutted. There is enough authority to’ show that the decision of the Sub-Registrar is not binding on a court bsfore which execution is denied; in such a case, the court can give due weight to the factum of registration. But the final decision should rest on the court's own assessment of the facts and circumstances placed before it. For exmaple, one of the executants of a document might have claimed in it that he was a major at the time; but the Sub-Registrar was not required to enquire into the truth of such a claim, in such a manner as to give a binding decision. His opinion as to the age of the executant at the time of registration cannot be treated as evidence, much less conclusive evidence, by a court of law. Sub-s. (2) of S. 60 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of a certificate of registration, and there is no provision in the Registration Act to the effect that registration should be deemed to be conclusive proof of even execution. Oa the other hand, the proviso to S. 68 of the Evidence Act shows that so far as proof of execution of a document is concerned, the calling of an attestirg witness can be dispensed with, where the document is registered and execution is not specifically denied, suggesting thereby that the factum of registration cannot by itself amount to proof of execution, where the executant denies it. There are also authorities which suggest that desjial of execution includes denial of attestation also.

5. In the present case Ext. B1 appeared to be a registered document; but that by itself was not conclusive proof of its due execution by the plaintiff, once such execution was categorically denied by her. The petitioners themselves were apparently aware of thia legal position, otherwise they would not have sought the aid of the finger-print expert (RW. 3) and the attesting witness (RW. 2) to establish their case.

6. What is contended is that according to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the science of finger-prints is now an exact science, and that therefore, in view of the opinion givea by the expert (RW. 3) based on similarity of ridges, the court below should have accepted the genuineness of the thumb impression in Ext. BL Under S. 45 of the Evidence Act, a finger print expert is just another expert. His opinion may be entitled to great weight, but She court is not bound by it. As pointed out by Subba Rao C.J, io Hussenaiah v. Yerraiah (AIR 1954 Andhra 39 the expert's evidence will have to be aken into account along with other evidence and it will be for the court to decide, depending upon the facts of each case, what probative value is to be attached to each such piece of evidence Though the science has “developed to a stage of exactitude”, it is still for the court to decide how far the examination by the finger-print expert has been thorough, complete and scientific. (Bhaluka Behera v. State : AIR 1957 Orissa 172). According to R.J Gounder v. Elalya Pttlai (AIR 1972 Madras 336) where the executant is an illiterate person, the onus of proving that the document was properly explained and interpreted to such person before affixing the mark, is on the party relying on the document. And going by Vareed Kunju Kunju v. Chelhppan (1983 KLT 281) and Ss. 45 and 46 of the Evidence Act, facts and circumstances which either support or are inconsistent with the opinion of experts are also relevant.

7. If the above be the proper approach to the matter of evaluating the evidence of & finger print expert, who like any other expert, cannot always be assumed to be infallible, however developed his branch of the science is, the only question that remains for consideration is whether the court below has so completely strayed from it as to justify interference under S. 115 C.P.C

8. RW. 3 the expert had stated that on comparing the disputed thumb impression with those in the admitted ones, after taking their photographic enlargements, he had found that the ridge formations had identical characteristics, end that this in his opinion, was sufficient to conclude that the thumb impression found in Ext. B1 was that of the plaintiff. But RW. 3 had not marked the fixed point in the cere to find out the bifurcating delta; and according to some text-books on the subject, these are also prominent or important characteristics requiring comparison. Taking into account the circumstance that the thumb impression in Ext. B1 was somewhat blurred, and also the opinion of text-book writers that thumb impressions are also capable of being forged, the court below thought that it would not be safe to proceed entirely on the opinion of RW. 3, snd that the safer course would be to examine other relevant circumsfarces also to see whether they could corroborate or cast doubts en the said opinion. And the court then noticed she following:—

(i) the consideration (for the surrender) shown in Ext. B1 was Rs. 3000/- wheress according to RW. 1 what was actually paid was Rs. 6500/-;

(ii) The real value of the share surrendered, according to RW. 1 himself, would have been around Rs. 22,000/-;

(iii) There were discripancies between the versions of RW. 1 and RW. 2 as to how the parties had proceeded to the Registrar's office;

(iv) The plaintiff and the 4th defendant were married sisters of RW. 1 and were staying away from the place for long; it was RW. 1 who told RW. 2 that they were his sisters;

(v) RW. 2 had seen them signing Ext. B1, not affixing thumb impression.

and (vi) He had stepped into the Registrar's office when called upon, and had come out without delay, not caring to see what was happening inside, to others.

9. Evidently, the above were not facts or circumstances fully supporting the opinion formed by RW. 3; on the other hand, some of them were inconsistent with its correcteess. It is interesting to notice that the attesting witness (RW. 2) had not seen the plaintiff affixing her impression oa Ext. B1. In law, an attesting witaess must have seen the executant affixing his or her mark to the instrument, and he himself must have signed it in his or her presence; and in this sense, it is extremely doubtful whether RW. 2 could have been treated as an attesting witness at all, competent to prove execution under S. 68 of the Evidence Act. What is equally significant is that Ext. 81 had made so mention at all of the suit or the preliminary decree passed therein, and of surrender of the rights recognised by a court.

10. I am therefore of the view that no interference is called for in the present proceedings, with the conclusion reached by the court below. The revision is accordingly dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

M.C.MDismissed.