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Kuriakose v. Varkey
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two petitioners, tenants of properties belonging to the first respondent (landlord) in Perumbavoor Municipality, challenged execution orders arising out of an earlier eviction dispute. The first petitioner (and family members) occupied Buildings No. XII/460 and 461 and ran a hotel; the second petitioner occupied Buildings XII/427, XII/431 and XIII/E and ran a retail ration shop.
The landlord filed R.C.P. Nos. 46 and 48 of 1980 seeking eviction on grounds of necessary reconstruction. The Rent Controller allowed eviction on 9-2-1984; that decision was reversed by the first Appellate Authority and the reversal was upheld by the District Court, disallowing eviction. This Court, by Ext. P 1 (CRP Nos. 1365/84 and 2500/85), allowed eviction on 5-3-1986. The petitioners filed Special Leave Petitions (SLP (C) Nos. 6727 and 6608 of 1986) in the Supreme Court, which were dismissed. The Supreme Court's dismissal included directions that, if vacant shops were available, they should be given to the tenants at the market rate fixed by the Rent Controller until reconstruction; after reconstruction tenants' rights would follow from the High Court's order.
Execution proceedings (EP Nos. 68 and 69 of 1986; Exts. P2 and P3) were initiated. The Execution Court (Munsiff, Perumbavoor) by order Ext. P 5 dated 2-1-1987 ordered delivery on 15-1-1987. Revisions before the District Court were dismissed by a common order (Ext. P 7 dated 23-1-1987). The petitioners challenged Exts. P5 and P7 by the present Original Petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order of this Court in CRP Nos. 1365/84 and 2500/85 (Ext. P 1) is void or a nullity because this Court was, allegedly, incompetent to entertain revisions under Section 115 CPC in light of the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai [1987 (1) KLT. 53].
- Whether the petitioners may mount a collateral attack on the High Court's revision order (Ext. P 1) during execution proceedings (i.e., whether the jurisdictional plea under S.115 CPC can be raised for the first time in execution and in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution).
- Whether the decree-holder (first respondent/landlord) failed to comply with the undertaking or submission made before the Supreme Court to provide alternate vacant shops to the petitioners, and whether that alleged failure made Exts. P5 and P7 illegal.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The order passed by this Court in CRP Nos. 1365/84 and 2500/85 (Ext. P 1) is void because, relying on Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai [1987 (1) KLT. 53], the High Court was incompetent to entertain second revisions under Section 115 CPC from a revisional order passed by the District Court.
- Because Ext. P 1 is void, the eviction order and consequential execution orders (Exts. P 5 and P 7) are also void and illegal.
- The first respondent (landlord) failed to adhere to submissions made before the Supreme Court that alternate vacant shops would be provided; therefore execution should not have proceeded without allotting rooms to the petitioners.
Respondent / Execution Court (as reflected in the opinion)
- The landlord denied being in actual possession of any vacant space in the shopping complex on the date of giving the undertaking before the Supreme Court and relied on Ext. CI report to rebut petitioners' reliance on other reports (Exts. Bl, B2, Ext. XI and a prior commissioner report).
- The second respondent (Execution Court) found, as a matter of fact, that neither the decree-holder nor his son was in actual possession of any vacant space to lease out to the judgment-debtors at the relevant time; that factual finding led to the order for delivery in Ext. P 5.
- The revisional court affirmed Ext. P 5, concluding there was no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the appreciation of evidence or the finding reached by the Execution Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai [1987 (1) KLT. 53] | Held that in proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act a second revision under Section 115 CPC does not lie to the High Court from a revisional order passed by the District Court (paras 19–22). | The petitioners relied on this decision to argue Ext. P 1 was void. The Court observed Ext. P 1 was passed before Aundal Ammal and that the petitioners had treated Ext. P 1 as valid by filing SLPs; the Court rejected the contention that Ext. P 1 was void on that basis. |
| Nallakoya's case (1968 KLT. 60) | Cited in the context that a petition under Article 226 will not lie to quash an order of a Court (i.e., limitations of Article 226 as a remedy against judicial orders). | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the petitioners could not use Article 226 as a vehicle for a collateral attack on Ext. P 7. |
| Trivandrum Co-operative District Wholesale Society v. Dy. Registrar of Co-op. Societies (1915 KLT. 589) | Authority for the proposition that the plea of want of jurisdiction cannot be first taken in proceedings under Article 227 (i.e., such pleas must ordinarily be taken earlier). | The Court referred to this case to support the conclusion that the jurisdictional plea could not be raised for the first time in the present proceeding. |
| Calvin v. Carr [1979 (2) All. ER 440] | Discusses the legal distinction between a decision being void and being voidable (whether a decision can be treated as legally non-existent). | The Court invoked this discussion to conclude that Ext. P 1 was not legally non-existent; it was voidable and subject to appeal, not a nullity to be ignored in collateral proceedings. |
| Kunjan v. Janaki (1980 KLT. 796-DB) | Holds that a decree made without jurisdiction still possesses qualities of a decree between the parties and that an appeal lies from such a decree; cites support from Gangadhar v. Shekharbasini and Section 99 CPC. | The Court quoted and relied on this authority to support the proposition that even if a decree is said to have been made without jurisdiction, it remains a decree open to appeal and is not immune to being enforced until set aside on appeal. |
| Gangadhar v. Shekharbasini (AIR 1917 Calcutta 320) | Used to support the proposition that appeals are available against decrees even if the decree was passed without jurisdiction. | Cited within the Kunjan v. Janaki discussion as supporting authority for appealability of decrees passed without jurisdiction. |
| Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1951 SC 217) | Affirms that if a court acts without jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same manner as if it had acted with jurisdiction; an appeal would lie to the appropriate appellate court. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that an order passed without jurisdiction remains susceptible to appeal and is not a nullity for purposes of execution proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a chronological and legal analysis focused on three related concerns: (1) the timing of Ext. P 1 relative to later precedent, (2) the petitioners' conduct in seeking appellate relief, and (3) factual findings about possession of vacant shops and compliance with the Supreme Court undertaking.
First, the Court noted Ext. P 1 was rendered on 5-3-1986, which pre-dated the Supreme Court decision in Aundal Ammal (reported 1987). While the petitioners argued Aundal Ammal rendered Ext. P 1 void, the Court observed that the petitioners themselves treated Ext. P 1 as a valid order by filing Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) in the Supreme Court. Thus, the petitioners had accepted, at least for the purpose of appeal, that the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC when it passed Ext. P 1.
Second, the Court held that the question of jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC was not raised before the High Court nor in the Supreme Court appeals (SLPs). Raising the jurisdictional objection for the first time in execution proceedings would constitute a collateral attack. The Court relied on authorities (including Nallakoya's case and Trivandrum Co-operative) to underline that such jurisdictional pleas cannot be taken up for the first time in execution or in collateral proceedings, and that Article 226 is not the proper vehicle to quash an order of a Court in these circumstances.
Third, the Court addressed the factual contention that the landlord did not comply with the Supreme Court submission to provide alternate vacant shops. The Execution Court (second respondent) had examined documentary and testimonial evidence (Exts. Bl, B2, XI, earlier commissioner reports and Ext. CI) and concluded as a matter of fact that neither the decree-holder nor his son was in actual possession of any vacant space at the relevant date. That factual finding led to the delivery order (Ext. P 5). The revisional court affirmed these factual conclusions, finding no illegality in the appreciation of evidence.
Synthesizing the legal and factual threads, the Court concluded that Ext. P 1 was not a nullity; it was at most voidable and open to direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Because the petitioners had pursued a direct appeal route (SLPs) and had not raised the jurisdictional plea earlier, they were precluded from challenging Ext. P 1 collaterally in execution proceedings. Furthermore, given the concurrent factual findings that the landlord lacked vacant shop possession at the relevant time, the petitioners' compliance argument failed on the merits as well.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED IN LIMINE.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The Original Petition challenging Exts. P 5 and P 7 is dismissed; the execution order (Ext. P 5) and the revisional dismissal (Ext. P 7) stand.
- The Court held that the High Court's order in CRP Nos. 1365/84 and 2500/85 (Ext. P 1) is not a legal nullity; it was voidable and open to direct appeal (as the petitioners themselves pursued), and cannot be collaterally impugned in execution proceedings.
Broader implications:
The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applies existing authorities to the facts to reject a collateral attack on a High Court revision order and to affirm concurrent factual findings of the execution and revisional courts.
JUDGMENT
1. There are two petitioners in this Original Petition. They are tenants of the first respondent. The first petitioner, his brother and mother are tenants of Building No. XII/460 and 461 of Perurobavoor Municipality. The first petitioner is conducting hotel business in the building. The second petitioner is the tenant of Building Nos. XII/427, XII/431 and XIII/E of Perurobavoor Municipality. He is conducting a retail ration shop. The first respondent—Landlord filed R.C.P Nos. 46 and 48 of 1980 claiming eviction on the ground that the building needs reconstruction. The petitions were allowed by the Rent Controller on 9-2-1984. The said judgments were reversed by the first Appellate Authority and upheld by the District Court, disallowing eviction. By Ext. P 1 judgment in CRP. Nos. 1365/84 and 2500 of 1985 dated 5-3-1986, this Court allowed eviction. The petitioners filed SLP (Civil) Nos. 6727 and 6608 of 1986 before the Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, execution proceedings were initiated by way of EP. Nos. 68 and 69 of 1986, evidenced by Exts. P 2 and P 3. The Supreme Court dismissed the Soecial Leave Petitions. The orders were substantially similar in the two cases. It was held that if there is existing vacant shops which can be given to the petitioners/tenants until the building is reconstructed, such shops will be given to the petitioners at the market rate fixed by the Rent Controller. After reconstruction, the tenants/petitioners would be entitled for their rights as per the order of the High Court. The petitioners state that the first respondent is bound to provide rooms to them till the new building is constructed. But, in violation of the submissions made before the Supreme Court, the landlord is proceeding with execution without allotting rooms to the petitioners. The Rent Controller posted the matter for enquiry. By Ext. P 5 order dated 2-1-1987, the Execution Court (Muosiff, Perumbavopr) ordered delivery on 15-1-1987. The revisions filed before the District Court were dismissed by a common order, Ext. P 7 dated 23-1-1987. The challenge in this Original Petition is against Exts. P 5 and P 7 orders.
2. I beard counsel for the petitioners, Mr. M.M Abdul Aziz. Counsel contended that the order passed by this Court in CRP. Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 (Ext. P 1) is void. This Court was incompetent to entertain the revisions under S. 115 CPC, as held recently by the Supreme Court of India in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai. [1987 (1) KLT. 53]. As a consequence, the order of eviction passed against the petitioners and the consequential orders passed in execution (Exts. P 5 and P 7) are also void. The decision rendered by this Court in CRP. Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 should Be ignored. It is a nullity. The first respondent-Landlord has failed to adhere to the submissions made before the Supreme Court. He should have allotted alternate rooms to the petitioners which he had. Exts. P 5 and P 7 orders are illegal and improper.
3. The order of eviction was passed by this Court in CRP. Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 (Ext. P 1) on 5-3-1986, at the instance of the first respondent. This was long before the Supreme Court rendered the decision in Aundal Ammal's case (1987 (1) KLT. 53). In the said decision, the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 19 to 22 of the judgment, held that in proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, a second revision under S. 115 CPC. does not lie to the High Court from a revisiocal order passed by the District Court. It should be remembered that the petitioners filed Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court as SLP (Civil) Nos. 6608 and 6727 of 1986 from the order passed by this Court in Ext. P 1. For the purpose of further appeal to the Supreme Court the petitioners themselves treated Ext. P 1 order (order passed by the High Court in revision) as valid and needs to be annulled. At least to that extent, the petitioners had and did accept that this Court had jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC. when it passed the common order in two Civil Revision Petitions. The question of jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115 CPC. was not raised either before this Court or before the Supreme Court of India in S.L.P Nos. 6608 and 6727 of 1986. The question of jurisdiction of this Court to render the judgment in two Civil Revision Petitions (Ext. P 1) was raised for the first time only in execution. Having failed to take up the plea of want of juris-r diction of this Court under S. 115 CPC. to entertain the revision petitions, it is not open to the petitioners to urge the said plea for the first time in collateral proceedings and at this stage, in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for more reasons than one. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not lie to quasb an order of Court. The petitioners seek to quash Ext. P 7 order passed by the District Court. (Nallakoya's case, 1968 KLT. 60). Even treating this Original Petition as one filed under Article 227 of the Constituion, the plea of want of jurisdiction cannot be taken up for the first time in this proceeding (Trivandrum Co-operative District Wholesale Society v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 1915 KLT. 589).
4. The plea is taken up for the first time in execution, a proceeding to enforce judgment. It is a collateral attack. Apparently, the order of this Court in CRP. Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 (Ext. P 1) is valid To ignore it, or to say, that it is void and so a nullity, at this belated stage, would be to blow it off by a side wind. The petitioners had a right to appeal directly from the judgment of this Court in CRP Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 by obtaining special leave from the Supreme Court. They did so. Having failed to obtain special leave from the Supreme Court, enabling them to attack the judgment of this Court directly, it is incompetent for the petitioners to put forward the plea that the judgment of this Court in the revisions apparently valid, should be ignored on the basis of a subsequent decision rendered in Aundal Arnmal's case (1987 (1) KLT 53). It cannot be said that the order passed by this Court in the two Civil Revision Petitions is ultra vires, outside jurisdiction and so null and void. The order passed by this Court in two revisions was liable to be avoided in direct appeal to the Supreme Court on the merits. Unless and until it is so reversed in appeal, it is a valid order. (See Wade Administrative Law, Fifth Edition, Pages 310 and 311).
5. The decision of this Court rendered in CRP. No. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 attacked as totally void and a nullity, cannot be considered as to be legally non-existent. An appeal would lie from the aforesaid order to the Supreme Court. To that extent, it cannot be doubted that the order passed by this Court in the revisions, is valid. If it is so, bow could it be said that it is totally void or legally non-existent? The plea of the petitioners, being at least in a limited sense, that an appeal will lie from the judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Revision Petitions-the said decision cannot be said to be totally nonest or a nullity: To accept the contrary position would lead to an illogical and unreal state of affairs, The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Calvin v. Carr (1979 (2) All. ER 440) at pp. 445 to 447 contains a very useful discussion on this aspect of the matter.
6. In Kunjan v. Janaki (1980 KLT. 796-DB.) at page 798, Viswanatha Iyer, J. held as follows:
“A decree made without jurisdiction possesses nonetheless the qualities of a decree as between the parties thereto and if there is a statutory appeal from the decree made in suits of that character, the decree does not become unassailable by appeal. If a jurisdiction is usurped by a court in passing a decree against which an appeal would lie if it had been passed with jurisdiction, that appeal eannot be defeated on the ground that the decree was made without jurisdiction—see Gangadhar v. Shekharbasini (AIR 1917 Calcutta 320 at page 325). S 99 CPC indicates that an appeal is maintainable against the decree which has been passed without jurisdiction. Further this positian is not now open to doubt in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1951 SC 217) At page 225 it is observed thus—
“It is well settled that if a Court acts without jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i.e, an appeal would lie to the Court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction”.
7. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the view that the decision rendered by this Court in CRP Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 cannot be said to be a nullity. It was only voidable in the sense that it could be appealed against to Supreme Court directly. The said judgment could not be attacked collaterally in execution proceedings. The conduct of the petitioners in having filed SLP Nos. 6608 and 6727 before the Supreme Court from the order of this Court in CRP Nos. 1365 of 1984 and 2500 of 1985 is also in accord with the above legal position. By their own conduct, the petitioners are precluded from contending that the order of this Court in the above two Revisions is a nullity.
8. It was next contended that the first respondent—Landlord did not comply with the submission or undertaking made before the Supreme Court. This aspect of the matter has been misunderstood by the second respondent in Ext. P 5 order in ordering delivery. There is no substance in this plea. The second respondent adverted to the submission made by the Landlord in the Supreme Court and found that there is no evidence to show that the decree holder (Landlord) nor his son is in actual possession of any vacant space in the shopping complex on the date of giving the undertaking before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this connection, the second respondent adverted to Exts. Bl, B 2 and Ext. XI and the previous commission report submitted by the Commissioner in the trial stage relied on by the petitioners to substantiate that the decree holder is in possession of the vacant shop-rooms. This was denied by the Landlord (decree-holder), who relied on Ext. CI report. Considering the above evidence, the second respondent came to the conclusion that the Landlord (decree-holder) nor his son is in actual possession of any vacant space in the shopping complex on the date of giving the undertaking before the Supreme Court. The contradictory version given by Rw 1 and Rw 2 were, also adverted to. The finding that the decree-holder is not in possession of any vacant space with him so as to lease out the same to the judgment-debtors, is a pure finding of fact. It was after entering the said express finding, the second respondent ordered that the decree-holder is entitled to get delivery of the buildings. The above said finding of the second respondent in Ext. P 5 was adverted to and it was held by the re-visional court that on a perusal of Ext. P 5 it can never be said that even in the appreciation of evidence, the lower court committed any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. The findings in Ext. P 5 were confirmed. In view of the above concurrent findings of fact, I see no merit in the plea of the petitioners that the Landlord (1st resnondent) has not conformed to the submission or undertaking made before the Supreme Court in Ext. P 4 proceedings. So. even on the merits, the petitioners have no case.
9. No other ground was urged, assailing Exts. P 5 and P 7 orders, at the time of hearing. The Original Petition is without merit. It is dismissed in limine.
10. Dismissed.
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