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M.C George Mirante v. State And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner purchased three cents of land in Sy. No. 1045/3, Ernakulam Village, from Sunny Nicholas Louis by sale deed Ext. P1 dated 30-5-1989. Respondents 3 to 5 occupy the adjoining three cents claiming kudikidappu rights originally obtained by the 4th respondent's father from Sunny Nicholas Louis. The original owner, Sunny Nicholas Louis, filed O.S. No. 668 of 1989 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam and obtained an ex parte temporary injunction (Ext. P2) restraining respondents 3 to 5 from trespass. Despite the injunction, respondents 3 to 5 allegedly threatened forcible occupation. The petitioner (who had purchased the property) sought police assistance and approached the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) for action; the RDO declined jurisdiction by proceedings Ext. R4, stating the dispute was pending in the civil court. The petitioner then filed the present original petition seeking a direction to the second respondent (Sub-Inspector of Police) to provide police protection to enable the petitioner to enter and enjoy the property.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the circumstances of this case, there is any duty on the police to act in aid of the petitioner and to afford protection to "enter and enjoy" the disputed property.
- Whether this court should, under Article 226 of the Constitution, direct police protection in a matter that is essentially a civil dispute over possession and title when the civil court proceedings (including objections to an ex parte interim injunction) are pending.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner relies on the Ext. P1 sale deed (30-5-1989) showing purchase of three cents of land and seeks police protection to enter and enjoy the property purchased.
- The petitioner contends respondents 3 to 5 threatened forcible occupation despite an ex parte injunction obtained in O.S. No. 668/1989 (Ext. P2), and therefore requires police assistance to protect his possession and enjoyment.
- The petitioner approached both the police and the Revenue Divisional Officer for help; in the absence of effective police action and with the RDO declining jurisdiction (Ext. R4), the petitioner sought this court's direction to the Sub-Inspector of Police for protection.
Respondents 3–5's Arguments
- Respondents assert that the 4th respondent's father Paramu was a kudikidappukaran and was granted kudikidappu rights over three cents by the Land Tribunal, Ernakulam in O.A. No. 594 of 1976; he also possessed an adjoining four cents.
- They claim there is no clear boundary between the three cents and the neighbouring four cents; Paramu had been in possession, planting trees and enjoying income for over twelve years, and thus (they allege) perfected title by prescription.
- After Paramu's death, his daughter (4th respondent) and others (3rd and 5th respondents) are in enjoyment; respondents have filed a written statement and objections to the petition for injunction in the civil suit, and they explained the position to the RDO, who declined to interfere (Ext. R4).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohammed v. Mohammed Ali, 1986 K.L.T 134 | That civil courts have power to enforce their orders under Order 39 Rule 2A or section 151 C.P.C. with police aid, if necessary. | The court invoked this authority to show that where effective civil remedies and enforcement mechanisms exist, parties should rely on civil courts rather than seeking police intervention from this court under Article 226. |
| Thomas v. Superintendent of Police, 1980 KLT 151 | The principle that questions of possession, easements and similar civil rights are for civil courts, not for the police to decide; police should refuse to interfere if a genuine dispute exists that requires adjudication by an appropriate court. | The court relied on this decision to emphasize that police must not be used to decide or enforce competing civil rights and that this court should be cautious in directing police assistance where civil adjudication is appropriate and pending. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court characterized the dispute as essentially civil, centrally concerning possession and title: respondents claim they are in possession of the subject land, and the petitioner claims entitlement by purchase (Ext. P1). The civil suit (O.S. No. 668/1989) and the interim ex parte injunction (Ext. P2) are already before the Munsiff's Court, and respondents have filed objections to that injunction and a written statement.
The court explained that police are not competent adjudicators of civil disputes over possession, boundaries, easements or title. Their proper role is to prevent breaches of the peace and cognisable offences and to preserve public order — not to decide contested civil rights or to use force to favor one party without adjudication. Directing police to determine or enforce such rights would be contrary to the rule of law and potentially open to abuse.
The court referred to established authority (Mohammed v. Mohammed Ali) that civil courts can enforce orders (Order 39 Rule 2A / Section 151 CPC) with police aid when necessary, and to Thomas v. Superintendent of Police emphasizing that policemen should not be asked to decide or execute contested civil rights in place of civil adjudication. Given that effective civil remedies and enforcement procedures are available and that the injunction in question is interlocutory and ex parte (whose continuance is opposed and therefore requires hearing both sides), it would be premature and dangerous to order police intervention at this stage.
Consequently, the court concluded that it should not, under Article 226, direct the police to afford the petitioner the requested protection to enter and enjoy the disputed property while the civil proceedings and challenges to the interim injunction are pending.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court dismissed the original petition and declined to direct police aid to enable the petitioner to enter and enjoy the property. The direct effect is that the petitioner is denied the relief of police protection from this court; the proper course is to pursue the matter in the civil proceedings already pending (including seeking enforcement of any civil orders by the civil court).
The opinion does not purport to lay down any new broad precedent beyond application of existing principles that police should not decide or enforce contested civil rights in place of civil courts; the decision adheres to earlier authorities cited and limits intervention to appropriate circumstances.
1. Petitioner has purchased three cents of land in Sy. No. 1045/3 of Ernakulam Village from one Sunny Nicholas Louis by the document Ext. P1 dated 30-5-1989. Respondents 3 to 5 are occupying the neighbouring 3 cents of land by virtue of kudikidappu right obtained by the 4th respondent's father from Sunny Nicholas Louis. Respondents 3 to 5 were allegedly attempting to trespass into the property now belonging to the petitioner, when the original owner Sunny Nicholas Louis filed suit O.S No. 668 of 1989 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam and obtained an exparte order of temporary injunction restraining respondents 3 to 5 from trespassing into the property. A copy of the order of injunction is Ext. P2. Despite the injunction, respondents 3 to 5 continued their alleged threat to forcibly occupy the property, whereupon the petitioner, who had purchased the property meanwhile, approached the police for necessary help to ward off the threat, as also the Revenue Divisional officer, Fort Cochin to take appropriate proceedings against respondents 3 to 5. The Revenue Divisional Officer, however, declined jurisdiction by his proceedings Ext. R4 on the ground that the dispute between the parties was pending adjudication in the civil court. In the absence of any response from the police, petitioner has moved this original petition for direction to the second respondent, Sub-Inspector of Police to afford adequate police protection to enter and enjoy the property purchased by him as per Ext. P1 sale deed.
2. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 3 to 5 points out that the 4th respondent's father Paramu was a kudikidappukaran, who had been granted kudikidappu rights over 3 cents of land as per the order of the Land Tribunal, Ernakulam in O.A No. 594 of 1976. Paramu had been in possession of the adjoining four cents as well. There is no boundary between the three cents purchased by him as kudikidappukaran and the neighbouring four cents, the latter being enclosed on the east and south by compound wall and on the north by a fence.
3. He had been in possession and enjoyment of the same, planting coconut and mango trees, and taking the income therefrom for over twelve years past, and therefore, irrespective of whether he had title originally or not, he had perfected title to the same by prescription. Neither the petitioner nor his vendor Sunny Nicholas Louis had any possession of this four cents of land which formed the subject matter of Ext. P1 sale deed, though for a lesser extent. After Paramu's death, his daughter the 4th respondent inherited the property, and she is in enjoyment along with her husband, the third respondent, and another, the 5th respondent. Respondents 3 to 5 have filed their written statement in the suit, and objections to the petition for injunction, which is posted for hearing. On the petitioners, approach to the Revenue Divisional Officer, respondents 3 to 5 explained the position to the latter, who thereupon declined to interfere in the matter by his, proceedings Ext. R4.
4. The question for consideration is whether in these circumstances, there is any duty cast on the police to act in aid of the petitioner, as requested by him, and to afford protection to “enter and enjoy” the disputed property.
5. The dispute in this case is essentially a civil dispute. The parties are at variance as to whether the petitioner has possession at all over the property. Respondents 3 to 5 are claiming that they are in possession of the property forming the subject matter of Ext. P1. The matter is now pending in the civil court. It is true that there is an order of interim injunction passed by the Munsiff, but the continuance of that order is opposed by respondents 3 to 5, who have already filed their objections to the petition for injunction.
6. In matters involving civil rights, or disputes regarding title and possession over property, it is not proper for this court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution with an order for police protection. Police cannot be made the adjudicators of such disputes inter se between the parties, either regarding possession of property or regarding boundaries or regarding easements or the like. These are matters essentially within the domain of the civil courts on which the parties should approach those courts and seek redress. Police does not have the right to decide on such disputes, nor is it proper or competent for them to do so. They do not also have the machinery for the purpose. It is outside the limits of the duties which are cast on them, which is to prevent breach of peace or commission of cognisable offences, and to preserve law and order. It will be totally against the rule of law if the might of the police is to be used in favour of one party against another without an adjudication by any appropriate authority of the rights of either side. In all such cases, the proper remedy, for a party feeling aggrieved, is to approach the civil court for the establishment of his rights, and seek appropriate injunctive reliefs against the offending party, and if any such orders are attempted to be violated to seek their enforcement by the civil court itself. The civil court has the power in such cases to enforce its orders under Order 39 Rule 2A or section 151 C.P.C with police aid, if necessary, as was held by this court in Mohammed v. Mohammed Ali, 1986 K.L.T 134 When such remedies are available, this court should be loathe to direct interference by the police or to afford protection, though this court is not powerless to act in appropriate cases to preserve the right to property. But such interference should be made sparingly, and not in cases where the parties have an effective remedy or relief by resort to the civil court itself.
7. This position was explained by this court in the decision in Thomas v. Superintendent of Police, 1980 KLT 151. It was observed:
“Quesrions of possession, right to enjoy property or easements, without obstruction, nuisances and similar other matters are best adjudged by a civil court. These are not certainly matters for the police to sit in judgment upon. The rule of law in this country is likely to be jeopardised if policemen are to decide whether they should recognise rights of easements, rights of possession and other similar civil rights and use their force to help one party or other in whose favour they reach a decision. Resort to this court seeking police assistance in matters where decisions on such questions are called for would certainly be ill-advised. To recognise policemen as competent to decide such disputes would be giving them powers which are capable of abuse. If there is a genuine dispute between the parties that has to be resolved by the civil courts. If the police feel that there is a genuine dispute which should normally call for decision by an appropriate court, they will be right in refusing to interfere. The long and short of it is that though this court is not without power to issue directions in a very appropriate case of inaction by the police in such matters the resort to this court as a matter of course would be unjustified.”
8. I am agreement with this view. As stated above the petitioner has already approached the civil court.
9. It is true that an order of interim injunction has been passed. It is also a fact that respondents 3 to 5 are contesting the continuance of that order. It will be premature and dangerous to enforce the exparte interim order of injunction when its continuance is opposed. It has to be remembered that such exparte orders are issued on the basis of the one sided averments made before court. The true picture will emerge only after hearing both sides. It is therefore imperative that police should not be allowed to intervene or interfere at this stage in matters of possession, which entail civil disputes, especially when the matter is one at the interlocutory stage of proceedings.
10. When there is dispute between the petitioner and respondents 3 to 5 and it is only an interim ex parte order passed by the Munsiff, that is now in force, this court shall not interfere in the matter with a direction for police aid. I decline to accede to the prayers of the petitioner. I dismiss the original petition.
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