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Gopala Menon v. Sivarama Menon And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation arose from a compromise partition of properties belonging to the tarwad (joint family). The first defendant (the appellant) originally filed O.S. No. 117 of 1955 seeking partition and separate possession of his share. During the pendency of that suit one brother died and on 29 August 1955 a compromise petition (Ex. D-3) was filed compromising the suit. The plaintiff alleged he was a minor in Ex. D-3 but claimed to have attained majority on 20 August 1956 and contended that the compromise decree did not bind him because he was not shown as a major and did not sign the compromise. The plaintiff additionally alleged inequity in the allotment (the first defendant received a larger share free of liabilities) and alleged that fraud was practised on his mother (the second defendant) when she signed the compromise petition.
The trial court and the lower appellate court found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit setting aside the earlier partition and directing re-partition. The first defendant appealed; meanwhile the plaintiff filed C.M.P. No. 539 of 1966 along with the appellant compromising and withdrawing the suit. The appellant also moved C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 seeking withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present opinion addresses the appellant's challenge to the lower courts' decrees and related procedural applications.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 (application to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(1) CPC) should be allowed in circumstances where the suit relates to setting aside a prior partition and re-partition and other defendants (who sailed with the plaintiff in earlier courts) are contesting respondents.
- Whether a compromise decree entered after a person attains majority is binding on that person when the compromise petition was signed by a guardian while the person was still a minor (i.e., what is the relevant point in time for competency — signing of the compromise petition or the passing of the compromise decree)?
- Whether the lower courts' finding that the plaintiff attained majority on 20 August 1956 (based on Ex. P-1 to P-3 documents) is correct and admissible.
- Whether the compromise partition should be set aside on merits for inequity and fraud in the compromise process.
- Whether, if the compromise decree is set aside, the original suit O.S. No. 117 of 1955 should be restored to the file and re-partition directed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant's counsel urged that C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 should be allowed relying on Order XXIII Rule 1(1) CPC, which permits the plaintiff to withdraw a suit or abandon part of a claim after institution.
- It was argued that what was prayed for in C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 was only a withdrawal of the suit and thus permissible.
- The appellant contended that the suit was not a "pure" partition suit but initially a suit to set aside an earlier partition and only subsequently for re-partition; this distinction was pressed to resist the principle that a defendant entitled to a share may continue a partition suit if the plaintiff withdraws.
- The appellant further argued that the compromise petition (Ex. D-3) was signed on 2 August 1956 by the guardian when the plaintiff was still a minor and that therefore the subsequent decree should be treated differently from precedents where petitions/decrees were after attainment of majority.
- It was also urged that the lower courts were wrong in finding majority on 20 August 1956 because Ex. P-2 came from a private school and Ex. P-3 was allegedly a reproduction of Ex. P-2.
Contesting Respondents' / Lower Courts' Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The other side pointed out that in partition suits a defendant entitled to a share is also in the position of a plaintiff, so that if the plaintiff withdraws, such defendants may continue the suit — a principle invoked to resist C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966.
- The lower courts found the plaintiff's contentions (that the compromise was not binding because he was a major, that allotment was inequitable, and that fraud was practised on the mother) to be correct and decreed the suit.
- The respondents relied on documentary evidence (Ex. P-1 to P-3) to establish the date of majority and on evidentiary findings (including DW-2's testimony) to support a finding of fraud and inequity in the compromise partition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lanka Sanyasi v. Lanka Yerran Naidu (AIR 1928 Mad. 294) | Where a minor who comes of age does not get himself impleaded, he may be presumed to have agreed to his guardian representing him so that a judgment after adjudication binds him; however, a compromise entered into after attainment of majority by a guardian is not binding on the once-minor. | The court accepted the reasoning of this Madras division bench: that adjudications on merits will bind absent fraud/collusion/gross negligence even if a major was wrongly shown as minor, but a compromise must consider capacity to contract and is not binding if a party was not competent to contract. The court applied this to hold that the relevant time is when the compromise decree was passed. |
| Nanjiah v. Marogowda (AIR 1952 Mys. 134) | Followed the Madras division bench principle referenced above regarding the binding effect of adjudication versus compromise where a guardian represents a person who has already attained majority. | The court noted that the Mysore division bench followed the Madras authority, and it treated that following as supportive of its application of the Madras reasoning to the present case. |
| Bodapati Rajeswararao v. Puligedda Satyanarayana (AIR 1946 Mad. 377) | Considered when the sanction of the court to a compromise should be taken — whether before signing the compromise petition or before the compromise decree is passed; it held the compromise is concluded when it is made a decree of the court. | The court relied on this ruling to conclude that the compromise petition is only a proposal and becomes effective only when the court passes a decree on it; thus the point of time to consider competency is the passing of the compromise decree, not the date of signing the petition. |
| Ghulam Nabi v. Banheshar Mal (AIR 1922 Lah. 407) | Held that a quondam minor cannot maintain a suit that a decree passed against him on a compromise accepted on his behalf by his guardian with the court's consent shall be of no effect on the ground that at the time of the compromise the plaintiff had become sui juris. | The court declined to follow this Lahore decision, noting the Madras bench had not followed it and stating that it was not convinced by the Lahore court's reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in discrete steps addressing procedural and substantive points raised by the appellant.
1. On C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 (withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1(1) CPC): the court observed that in partition-related litigation a defendant entitled to a share stands in the position of a plaintiff, and if the plaintiff withdraws, such defendants may continue the suit. The court also noted that contesting defendant-respondents (who were minors at the time of the compromise decree) could have brought a suit of the same nature; therefore, they must be allowed to continue the suit. On this basis the court dismissed C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966.
2. On the binding effect of the compromise decree when the compromise petition was signed while the plaintiff was a minor but the decree was passed after the plaintiff's alleged attainment of majority: the court adopted the reasoning of the Madras division bench (Lanka Sanyasi) and the Mysore division bench (Nanjiah v. Marogowda). That reasoning distinguishes between a judgment after adjudication on merits (which binds absent fraud/collusion/gross negligence even if a party was wrongly shown as a minor) and a compromise decree (whose binding effect depends on the parties' capacity to contract). The court emphasized that a compromise is concluded when it is made a decree of the court, not when the compromise petition is signed. It followed Bodapati Rajeswararao to the effect that the court's sanction and the passing of a decree are what conclude a compromise.
3. Consequently, the relevant time to assess competency to contract was the date of the compromise decree; because the plaintiff was a major at that time, the compromise decree could not bind him.
4. The court considered and rejected the Lahore decision (Ghulam Nabi) which had held otherwise, stating the Lahore ruling was not followed by the Madras bench and the court was inclined to disagree with the Lahore decision.
5. On the evidence of majority (Ex. P-1 to P-3): the court rejected the appellant's challenge to the lower courts' finding of majority on 20 August 1956. The court noted there was no pleading that the plaint date of birth was wrong and that even if Ex. P-2 (from a private school) were disregarded, Ex. P-1 and Ex. P-3 (from the government high school) were admissible and not shown to be reproductions of Ex. P-2. Hence the appellant’s evidentiary objection failed.
6. On merits (inequity and fraud): the court reviewed partition particulars and evidence. It observed that the appellant obtained 94 cents though he would be entitled to 48 cents on the tarwad basis, that the appellant's share was made free from debts despite the tarwad having debts, that Ex. D-11 (a list prepared at partition) indicated a disproportionate allocation even on mesne profits, and that undisclosed debts existed. The court accepted DW-2's evidence (the mother) that fraud was practised on her when she was in bereavement and found credible the evidence that the appellant wrote the compromise petition on previously signed paper and included clause 9 not present in the draft given by the lawyer. The lower courts believed the mother's evidence. The court held that these factors justified avoiding the compromise partition decree.
7. On the procedural request to restore O.S. No. 117 of 1955 for re-partition: although restoration would be the normal course if the compromise decree were set aside, the court found no such prayer had been made and that re-partition had almost been completed; thus the court refused this relief.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The decision of the lower courts is confirmed and the second appeal is dismissed. C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966 is dismissed. Costs are awarded in favour of the ninth respondent; the plaintiff-respondent, being a party to C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966, is not entitled to costs.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The lower courts' decree setting aside the compromise partition and granting relief to the plaintiff stands confirmed by this court.
- The appellant's application to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(1) CPC (C.M.P. No. 339 of 1966) was dismissed, because contesting defendants with like rights must be allowed to continue the suit.
- The court held that the relevant moment for determining competency to contract in relation to a compromise is when the compromise is made a decree of the court (not when the compromise petition was signed); accordingly, a compromise decree passed after the plaintiff attained majority could not bind him if the guardian had signed earlier.
- The court found sufficient factual grounds (inequity in allocation, exemption from debts, undisclosed debts, and credible evidence of fraud on the mother) to avoid the compromise partition decree.
- No order was made to restore O.S. No. 117 of 1955 for re-partition because such a prayer had not been made and re-partition was almost complete.
- No new legal principle was announced beyond the court's application and reaffirmation of the existing authorities cited; the decision operates as a confirmation of the lower courts' factual and legal findings in this case.
1. The first defendant in a suit for setting aside an earlier partition and for a re - partition is the appellant and some of the defendants the contesting respondents. The plaintiff, Whose suit was decreed by the trial court and who contested the appeal by the first defendant before the lower appellate court, Has filed c. M. P. No. 539 of 1966 along with the appellant compromising and withdrawing the suit. Therefore, The other defendants, Who sailed with the plaintiff before the lower courts, Are the contesting respondents before me.
2. The suit properties belonged to the tarwad of the parties. The second defendant is the mother, The first defendant her eldest son by the first marriage, Defendants 3 to. 8 her children by the second marriage and defendants 9 to 13 the children of the eighth defendant. The first defendant brought o. S. No. 117 of 1955 for partition and separate possession of his share. Pending suit one of his brothers by name narayanankutty died; and thereafter, A petition, Ex. D - 3, Was filed on 29th august 1955 compromising the suit. The plaintiff was shown as a minor in ex. D - 3. The plaintiff is said to have attained majority on 20th august 1956; and the case of the plaintiff was that since at the time of the compromise decree he was a major, The said decree would not bind him, As he was not shown as a major and he did not sign the compromise. The further contention of the plaintiff was that in the allotment of shares to the first defendant also there was inequity, Because the first defendant was given a larger share and that even free from any liability for paying the tarwad debts. There was yet another contention that in compromising the suit the first defendant played fraud on the second defendant, The mother of the plaintiff, Who was an illiterate woman, When she was in bereavement.
3. All these contentions were found by both the lower courts; and the lower courts decreed the suit.
4. The counsel of the appellant urges that c. M. P. No. 339 of 1966 might be allowed. He relies on o. Xxiii r. 1 (1) of the code of civil procedure and contends that at any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw it or abandon part of his claim. In c. M. P. No. 339 of 1966, According to the counsel of the appellant, What is prayed for is only such a withdrawal of the suit. It is pointed out by the other side that the suit being one for setting aside an earlier partition and for a re - partition, O. Xxiii r. 1 (1) will not apply. It is a well established rule that in a partition suit a defendant who is entitled to a share is also in the position of the plaintiff, So that, If the plaintiff withdraws the suit, Any such defendant may continue it. The counsel of the appellant then argues that this is not a pure suit for partition, But is a suit in the first instance for setting aside an earlier partition and only at the second instance a suit for re - partition. I do not think that even this can help the appellant, Because the contesting defendant - respondents, Who were themselves minors at the time of the compromise partition decree, Could have brought a suit of the same nature to set aside the compromise decree and for re - partition. In such a case if the plaintiff who brought the suit withdraws, The other parties who have the same right must be allowed to continue the suit. Therefore, C. M. P. No. 339 of 1966 has to be dismissed and is dismissed.
5. The main contention in the second appeal is that though the compromise decree was passed after the plaintiff attained majority, The compromise petition evidenced by ex. D. 3 was signed by the guardian of the plaintiff when the plaintiff was still a minor. Even according to the plaintiff, He attained majority only on 20th august 1956; and ex. D - 3 was signed on 2nd august 1956. The lower courts have followed two decisions, One of the madras high court and the other of the mysore high court. The division bench ruling of the madras high court is lanka sanyasi v. Lanka yerran naidu (air. 1928 mad. 294). The ruling has laid down that where a minor who comes of age, If he does not come before court and get himself impleaded in the suit, Will be presumed to have agreed to his guardian representing him, So that, If ultimately, The court passes a judgment after adjudication of the questions in the case the judgment will bind him. But, The decision has laid down further that where a minor defendant attains majority during the pendency of a suit, A decree on compromise entered into after his attaining majority by his guardian, Even if the compromise is sanctioned by the court, Is not binding on him. This ruling has been followed by a division bench of the mysore high court in nanjiah v. Marogowda (air. 1952 mys. 134). But, Mr. M. K. Narayana menon, The counsel of the appellant, Draws my attention to the fact that in both the above cases the compromise petitions and the decrees passed on them were after the minors attained majority. In other words, The counsel contends that in the above cases the guardians had no authority to compromise even at the time when the compromise petitions were signed, Because the minors were majors even on those dates. Basing on this distinction the counsel argues that in the case before me, At the time when the compromise petition was signed by the second defendant as guardian of the plaintiff, The plaintiff was still a minor, So that the subsequent passing of the decree by the court on the said compromise will not have the same result as laid down by the decisions of the madras and the mysore high courts.
6. I do not think i can accede to this line of argument. The reasoning of the madras high court, Which has been followed by the mysore high court, Is that when an adjudication by the court on the merits of the controversy takes place, In the absence of any fraud, Collusion or gross negligence, The adjudication should be binding on the parties to the suit, Even if one of them was a major wrongly shown as a minor represented by a guardian; but, If the decision is based on a compromise, The capacity of the parties to the compromise to contract should be taken into consideration, And if one of the parties was not competent to contract as he was a minor, The compromise decree cannot have the same effect as a decree on adjudication. If this reasoning is to be applied to this case (and i have no doubt regarding its application), The same result must follow. By the mere signing of the compromise by the guardian the compromise does not become effective. The compromise becomes effective only when the court accepts it after being satisfied that the formalities required by law like the certificate of the counsel and the sanction of the court are complied with. In other words, The compromise becomes concluded only when the court passes a decree on the compromise. On this question another division bench ruling of the madras high court in bodapati rajeswararao v. Puligedda satyanarayana (air. 1946 mad 377) will furnish some light. In that case the madras high court was considering the question as to when sanction of court to compromise should be taken whether before the compromise petition was signed or before the compromise decree was passed. Wadsworth j., Who spoke for the court, Observed that the conclusion of the compromise came about when the compromise was made a decree of court; and that the guardian need not obtain sanction of court even before the proposals of compromise were settled and agreed to. It is thus apparent that the compromise petition is only provisional or only a proposal; and it becomes concluded only when the decree is passed. Therefore, The point of time to be considered in a case like this is the time when the compromise decree is passed by the court and not when the compromise petition was signed. The result is that since the plaintiff was a major at the time of the compromise decree, The decree passed on the basis that he was still a minor cannot bind him.
7. I may now refer to a decision of the lahore high court which has also been brought to my notice by the counsel of the appellant. The decision is ghulam nabi v. Banheshar mal (air. 1922 lah. 407), Which lays down that a quondam minor cannot maintain a suit for a declaration that a decree passed against him on a compromise accepted on his behalf by his guardian ad litem with the consent of the court shall be of no effect on the ground that at the time of the compromise and decree the plaintiff had become sui juris and consequently was not represented before the court. No convincing reason is given by the learned judge for coming to this conclusion. I may also add that this decision was cited before the mysore high court; and the division bench of the madras high court did not follow this decision. It followed instead the division bench ruling of the madras high court already referred to. I am also inclined to disagree with the decision of the lahore high court.
8. Then it is urged by the counsel of the appellant that the finding of the lower courts that the minor attained majority on 20th august 1956 is not correct. The argument is that the lower courts have based their conclusion on ex. P. 1 to p. 3, Ex. P. 1 the transfer certificate issued by a government high school. Ex p. 2 the extract from the admission register of a private school and ex. P. 3 the secondary school leaving certificate from the same government high school; and that that conclusion is wrong for the reason that ex. P. 2 is from a private school. In support of this contention two decisions of this court have also been relied upon. I do not think that the position is correct. Firstly, There is no case for the appellant in his written statement that the date of birth mentioned by the plaintiff in his plaint was wrong. Secondly, Even if ex. P. 2 is eschewed from consideration, Ex. P. 3, The secondary school leaving certificate issued by a government school, And ex. P. 1, The transfer certificate issued by the same government high school, Are not liable to be rejected for the said reason. But, The counsel suggests that ex. P. 3 is merely a copy or a reproduction of ex. P. 2. There is no evidence that the date of birth mentioned in ex. P. 3 is based on the date of birth mentioned in ex. P. 2, The admission register of the private school. Therefore, This contention has also to be rejected.
9. Even if the partition is not liable to be set aside for the mere reason that the plaintiff was a major at the time of the compromise decree, The evidence in this case shows that the partition itself was not equitable. The appellant obtained 94 cents of land, Whereas he will be entitled only to 48 cents on the basis of the extent of the properties belonging to the tarwad. The appellant's share was free from debts, Though admittedly the tarwad had debts. Ex. D. 11 is a list prepared at the time of the partition on the basis of the compromise decree showing the mesne profits of the several items. That also shows that even on the basis of mesne profits the appellant obtained a larger share than he was entitled to. Again, It has come out in the evidence that there were other debts as well for the tarwad, Which were not included in o. S. No. 117 of 1955. Still further, The second defendant as dw. 2 has stated that fraud was practised on her by the first defendant, When she was in bereavement as a result of which she signed the compromise petition. It has also come out that the compromise petition was written up on a previously signed paper, With the result that the appellant who was a lawyer's clerk, Was able to incorporate recitals therein, Which, In all probability, Were not agreed to by the parties to the compromise. There is at least one provision in ex. D. 3, Clause. 9, Which was not in the draft prepared and given by the lawyer. Admittedly, The appellant wrote the compromise petition and he put in clause. 9 as well. It is pointed out by the counsel of the appellant that clause. 9 does not give any advantage to the appellant. May not: still the fact remains that the appellant wrote the compromise petition on a paper previously signed by the parties. I may also point out that the evidence of dw. 2, The mother, That fraud was practised on her has been believed by both the lower courts. Therefore, Even on merits the decree is liable to be set aside. I may add that i am aware that courts should not treat lightly a compromise accepted by court after satisfying the formalities required by law. But, There is no rule of law laying down that no compromise accepted by court can be avoided. The reasons enumerated by me in this paragraph are quite sufficient to avoid the compromise partition decree in this case.
10. Lastly it is urged that if the compromise decree is to be set aside, O. S. No. 117 of 1955 should be brought back to file and re - partition should be directed in that case. That is certainly the normal and proper course to have been followed. But, I find that no such prayer has been made till now; and that re - partition has almost been completed in this case. Therefore, This prayer cannot also be allowed.
11. The decision of the lower courts is thus correct; the same is confirmed; and the second appeal is dismissed with costs of the ninth respondent. I make it clear that since the plaintiff - respondent is a party to cmp. No. 339 of 1966, He is not entitled to costs.
dismissed.
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