- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Corporation Of Trivandrum v. K. Narayana Pillai
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, the Trivandrum Corporation, filed a second appeal against a decree dismissing their suit for recovery of entertainments tax amounting to Rs. 1318.60. The defendant was the honorary treasurer of the Travancore-Cochin Football Association, which conducted the Santosh Trophy tournament in Trivandrum from 17-01-1959 to 28-01-1959. The tax was alleged to be due from the association for this event. Both lower courts dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by the three-year limitation period prescribed under Section 413 of the Trivandrum City Municipal Act (Act IV of 1116) read with Section 8(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act (Act VI of 1951).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the three-year limitation period under Section 413 of Act IV of 1116 applies to suits for recovery of entertainments tax under Act VI of 1951.
- If not, what limitation period under the Limitation Act governs suits for recovery of entertainments tax.
- Whether the honorary treasurer or the secretary of the unincorporated football association can be impleaded as a defendant to bind the association in the suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 8(1) of Act VI of 1951, which states that amounts due on account of entertainments tax may be recovered "in the same manner" as other taxes under Act IV of 1116, refers only to the mode of recovery and not to the limitation period applicable for filing suits.
- The phrase "in the same manner" does not extend the limitation period of three years under Section 413 of Act IV of 1116 to entertainments tax recovery suits.
- Relied on the ruling in Abraham v. Sales Tax Officer (1964 KLT 21) and the Supreme Court decision in Ponkunnam v. K.I. Abraham, which held that expressions like "in the prescribed manner" relate only to procedural aspects, not to limitation periods.
- Argued that the limitation period for the suit should be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes six years for suits based on statutory liabilities where no specific limitation is provided.
- Requested that the court order impleading the football association as an additional defendant, as the trial court had dismissed such an application, to ensure any decree binds the association.
- Suggested impleading the secretary of the association as the authorized representative, relying on the association's rules allowing the secretary to represent it in suits.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abraham v. Sales Tax Officer, 1964 KLT 21 (FB) | Interpretation of "in the prescribed manner" as referring only to mode of procedure, not limitation period. | Supported the view that Section 8(1) of Act VI of 1951 does not incorporate the limitation period of Act IV of 1116 for entertainments tax suits. |
| Ponkunnam v. K.I. Abraham, Supreme Court, C.A. No. 404 of 1966 | Upheld the interpretation that procedural expressions do not affect limitation periods. | Reinforced the court's conclusion on the limited scope of "in the same manner" in Section 8(1) of Act VI of 1951. |
| Secretary of State for India in Council v. Guru Proshad Dhur, ILR 20 Calcutta 51 at 57 | Where no limitation period is prescribed for statutory liabilities, Article 120 of the Limitation Act (six years) applies. | Guided the court to apply Article 120 for the limitation period in this case. |
| Dip Narain v. Addl. District Magistrate, AIR 1933 Patna 65 at 67 | Suit under statutory tax provisions governed by Article 120 of Limitation Act. | Supported the application of Article 120 for entertainments tax recovery suits. |
| Masand Motiram v. Shikarpur Municipality, AIR 1936 Sind 184 | Limitation for tax recovery suits under statute is six years under Article 120. | Reinforced the six-year limitation rule for such suits. |
| Ram-Kumari Devi v. Hari Das, AIR 1952 Patna 239 | Same principle as Masand Motiram regarding limitation period. | Supported the court's limitation analysis. |
| Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Thammanna, AIR 1937 Madras 217 (FB) | Suit to enforce statutory liability governed by Article 120, not three-year limitation. | Rejected application of three-year limitation for tax recovery suits, influencing the court's holding. |
| Mohammadan Association v. Bakshi, (1884) ILR 6 Allahabad 284 | Secretary of an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued alone to bind the association without proper authorization. | Informed the court's view on impleading the association's secretary and the need to implead all members or follow procedural rules. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the interplay between Section 413 of Act IV of 1116 and Section 8(1) of Act VI of 1951. It noted that Section 413 prescribes a three-year limitation for suits under Act IV of 1116, but Section 8(1) only states that entertainments tax may be recovered "in the same manner" as other taxes under Act IV of 1116. The court held that "in the same manner" refers solely to the mode of recovery, not to the limitation period. This interpretation was supported by precedent interpreting similar language in tax statutes.
Consequently, the court rejected the application of the three-year limitation period under Section 413 to entertainments tax recovery suits. Instead, the court examined relevant case law and concluded that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, which provides a six-year limitation period for suits based on statutory liabilities where no specific limitation is prescribed, governs the present suit.
Since the suit was filed within six years of the cause of action, it was not barred by limitation. Therefore, the decrees of the lower courts were set aside, and the case was remanded for consideration of other issues.
Regarding the impleading of the football association, the court observed that the association is an unincorporated body and that impleading it directly is problematic. The court expressed doubt that impleading the secretary alone would bind the association, referencing precedent that requires suits involving unincorporated associations to be brought by or against all members or through proper procedural rules. The trial court was directed to consider any application for impleading the members or following the appropriate procedure.
Holding and Implications
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of the lower courts, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits.
The court held that the three-year limitation under Section 413 of Act IV of 1116 does not apply to suits for recovery of entertainments tax under Act VI of 1951. Instead, Article 120 of the Limitation Act (six years) governs such suits. This decision directly affects the parties by permitting the suit to proceed, but does not establish any new precedent beyond clarifying the applicable limitation period.
On the question of impleading the football association, the court did not make a final ruling but indicated the necessity of proper procedural compliance to ensure any decree binds the association.
1. The trivandrum corporation, The plaintiff, Has filed this second appeal from a decree in a suit for recovery of entertainments tax. The defendant in the case is the honorary treasurer of the travancore - cochin foot ball association. The association was conducting the santosh trophy tournament in trivandrum from 17 - 1 - 1959 to 28 - 1 - 1959 and entertainments tax was due from the association on that account. The amount alleged to be due by way of tax is rs. 1318 - 60.
2. Both the lower courts held that under s 413 of the trivandrum city municipal act, Act iv of 1116, Read with s. 8 (1) of the travancore - cochin local authorities entertainments tax act, Act vi of 1951, The period of limitation for the suit was three years, And the suit having been brought more than three years from 28 - 1 - 1959 was barred by limitation and dismissed it.
3. S. 413 of act iv 1116 reads as follows:
"no distraint shall be made, No suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to the corporation under this act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made, A suit might first have been instituted or prosecution might first have been commenced as the case may be, In respect of such sum".
s. 8 (1) of act vi of 1951 reads as follows:
"any amount due on account of the entertainments tax may be recovered by the local authority in the same manner as any tax payable to the local authority."
s. 2 (7) of the act defines "local authority" thus: "'local authority' means (a) in the city of trivandrum, The corporation of trivandrum.
xx x xii
the argument of the courts below was that since s. 8 (1) of act vi of 1951 pro - vided that any amount due on account of entertainments tax may be recovered by the local authority in the same manner as any tax payable to it under act iv of 1116, S. 413 of act iv of 1116 would be attracted and the period of limitation for the suit is three years from the date when the tax became due.
4. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that s. 8 (1) of the act vi of 1951 does not mean that the provisions of s. 413 of act iv of 1116 would apply for deciding the question of limitation for a suit to recover entertainments tax, But only that the manner in which the entertainments tax can be recovered is the same as that provided in act iv of 1116. It was urged that the expression "in the same manner" occurring in s. 8 (1) of act vi of 1951 has reference only to the manner in which the tax may be recovered and has nothing to do with the time within which it may be recovered by a suit. Counsel referred to the ruling in abraham v. Sales tax officer 1964 klt. 21 (fb). In that case, The expression "in the prescribed manner" in s. 8 (4) of the sales tax act came up for consideration and the court said:
"the decision of the question depends on the construction of the expression "in the prescribed manner" in s. 8 (4) of the act. The words "in the manner" refer only to the mode in which the thing is to be done and do not introduce anything from the act referred to as to the thing which is to be done or the time for doing it. S. 8 thus provided only that the manner of filing the declaration in form c could be prescribed by the rules and not the time within which the same was to be filed. Non - compliance with the time prescribed by r. 6 may entail other penalties but not forfeiture of the benefit conferred by the section. " (see the head note). This view was upheld by the supreme court in sales - tax officer, Ponkunnam v. K. I. Abaham c. A. No. 404 of 1966. Therefore, I think, The expression "in the same manner" occurring in s. 8 (1) has no reference to the time within which a suit for recovery of entertainments tax can be filed. I hold that the period of limitation prescribed in s. 413 of act iv of 1116 will not apply to the case.
5. Then, The question is what is the article in the limitation act which would apply to a suit for recovery of entertainments tax. In the secretary of state for india in council v. Guru proshad dhur ilr 20 calcutta 51 at 57 the calcutta high court observed:
"the limitation act does not prescribe any period of limitation for money due under a statutory liability to pay it, So the suit is, I think, Within art. 120; in other words, The period of limitation is six years, Which begin to run from the time when a demand for the money is made by persons who could give the receipts required by the section."
6. In dip narain v. Addl. District magistrate, Air. 1933 patna 65 at 67 the patna high court held:
"as regards the objection on the point of limitation, It appears that a suit under s. 130, Bihar and orissa municipal act, Is governed by art. 120, Limitation act, There being no other limitation provided for in the other articles of the schedule and the suits were brought within six years from the alleged accrual of the cause of action and as such were not barred by limitation ii
7. In masand motiram v. Shikarpur municipality, Air. 1936 sind. 184 the same view was taken, Namely, That the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of tax due under a statute is that provided in art. 120 of the limitation act as there is no other article in the limitation act, Which prescribes the period of limitation for such a suit. To the same effect is the decision in ram - kumari devi v. Hari das air. 1952 patna 239.
8. In rajah of vizianagaram v. Thammanna air. 1937 madras 217 (fb.) at 218. The madras high court observed:
the other question dealt with in the judgment of the district munsiff is one of limitation. He has held the suits to be barred in respect of certain items on the footing that such a suit is governed by the three years' rule of limitation. We see no warrant for applying the three years rule. The suit is not one for rent nor is it based on any contract express or implied. It is to enforce a liability created by statute. In such a case the course of decisions in this presidency has been to the effect that the suit will be governed by art. 120. In this view no portion of the suit claim will be barred by limitation"
9. I hold that art. 120 of the limitation act will apply to the suit and that the suit having been filed within six years of the accrual of the cause of action was not barred by limitation. The decrees passed by the lower courts are set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for a consideration of the other issues in the case and for passing the proper decree.
10. It was argued by mr. N. R. K. Nair for the appellant that an application to implead the foot ball association has been made in the trial court but that the application was dismissed, And therefore, Even if a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff - corporation that may not bind the association and therefore this court should pass an order impleading the foot ball association as an additional defendant. The foot ball association is an un - incorporated body. I do not know how i can pass an order for impleading such an association. In this case, It may be noted, Only the honorary treasurer of the association has been impleaded. Appellant's counsel submitted that as the rules of the foot ball association provide that the secretary of the association can represent the association in suits, It would be enough if the secretary is impleaded in his capacity as secretary, As a decree obtained with him on the party array would bind the association, And therefore this court may direct the impleading of the secretary of the association. I am not sure whether by impleading the secretary of the association the appellant will be able to set a decree binding on the foot ball association. Even if rules of the association provide that the secretary can represent the association in suits by or against it, I do not know whether a decree obtained against the secretary in his capacity as secretary would bind the association. The secretary of a club or other association cannot sue alone in respect of a matter in which the association is interested even if he is authorised so to do by a resolution of the members of the association. The suit must be brought by all the members of the association, Or by the secretary on his own behalf and on behalf of the other members under 0. 1 r. B. (see mohammadan association v. Bakshi ((1884) ilr. 6 allahabad 284)). I think, The same would be the result if a suit is brought against the secretary as representing the association. The trial court would consider any application that may be filed by the appellant for impleading the members of the foot ball association or for resorting to the procedure prescribed in 0. 1 r. 8 oh its merits and pass the proper order.
the decree of the courts below are set aside and the appeal is allowed and the case remanded to the trial court, But in the circumstances without any order so to costs.
allowed.
Alert