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Janaki Amma v. Krishnan
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision arises from a suit for partition concerning properties originally belonging to Velayudhan Pillai. The 1st defendant, his wife, died during the trial. The plaintiffs (respondents) and the 2nd defendant (1st revision petitioner) are their children. The 3rd defendant (2nd revision petitioner) is the widow of another son, Parameswaran Pillai, and the 4th defendant (3rd revision petitioner) is their son. An assignment deed (Ext. A1) from 1922 assigned the suit properties in favor of the 1st defendant and Parameswaran Pillai alone. In 1972, the 1st defendant gifted her rights in these properties to the 2nd defendant by Ext. A4.
The plaintiffs claimed that Ext. A1 should benefit all children and thus they are entitled to a share, which was rejected by the lower court's preliminary judgment and decree dated 22-10-1975. The court held the 1st defendant entitled to ⅔ share and Parameswaran Pillai's heirs to the remaining ⅓ share. However, the plaintiffs’ contention that Ext. A4 was vitiated by undue influence was upheld, entitling plaintiffs to 4/9 share as heirs of the 1st defendant.
The plaintiffs had not paid court fee for the relief of setting aside Ext. A4. Defendants 2 to 4 contended that the plaintiffs had not paid proper court fee, but no issue was raised or decided before evidence. The preliminary judgment ordered the plaintiffs to pay balance court fee on the market value of the ⅔ share gifted under Ext. A4 within one month, failing which the suit would stand dismissed.
The plaintiffs paid Rs. 24/- as balance court fee based on their valuation of Rs. 700/- for the ⅔ rights, while defendants argued the market value should be Rs. 1,000/-, requiring a higher court fee. The plaintiffs filed an application to extend the time for payment and to delete the dismissal clause, which was allowed by the trial court. Defendants challenged this order by filing the present revision petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the balance court fee after the expiry of the original period fixed by the preliminary judgment.
- Whether the trial court could dismiss the suit on the ground of non-payment of deficit court fee after entering findings and a preliminary decree in favor of the plaintiffs.
- The correct interpretation and application of provisions under the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, particularly Sections 7, 12, 13, and 18, and the Code of Civil Procedure provisions relating to rejection of plaint and dismissal of suits.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The plaintiffs had not paid the correct court fee as directed by the preliminary judgment.
- The market value of the ⅔ share was Rs. 1,000/-, requiring a higher court fee payment than made by the plaintiffs.
- The lower court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the balance court fee beyond the one-month period fixed, and the suit should have been dismissed on default.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs paid the balance court fee as per their valuation, which was justified since the preliminary judgment did not specify the market value or exact amount of court fee payable.
- The trial court had jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time for payment of the balance court fee.
- The dismissal clause in the preliminary judgment was an error apparent on the face of the record and ought to be deleted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 | On the undesirability of fixing peremptory time limits that leave courts powerless; power to extend time under inherent jurisdiction. | Supported the view that courts have inherent power to extend time even after expiry of the period fixed and after consequences have arisen. |
| Shamrao Janrao v. Amolak Chimnirn, AIR 1949 Nagpur 373 | Dismissal of suit for non-payment of additional court fee construed as rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. | Clarified that dismissal in such context is procedural and does not preclude fresh suit on same cause of action. |
| Bibbas Mohan v. Hari Charan, AIR 1961 Cal 491 | Interpretation of S. 8B of Court Fees Act (Bengal Amendment) regarding dismissal of suit for non-payment of deficit court fee. | Held dismissal under statute equivalent to rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, emphasizing procedural nature. |
| Tarapada v. Nepal Gazi, AIR 1965 Cal. 354 | Limitations on extension of time under S. 148 CPC after expiry of period fixed by court. | Referred to in discussing limits of extending time after conditional order has worked itself out. |
| Buta Singh v. State of M.P, AIR 1962 MP 205 | Same as above, limiting application of S. 148 CPC for extension of time after expiry of fixed period. | Supported view that extension of time after expiry of period fixed by court is limited under S. 148 CPC. |
| S.M Bhatta v. A. Beary, AIR 1973 Kerala 185 | Application of S. 148 and S. 151 CPC in context of conditional orders and extension of time. | Confirmed that S. 151 CPC may be invoked for extension of time even after expiry of original period fixed by court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the procedural history and the statutory framework under the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It noted that the trial court did not address the insufficiency of court fee as a preliminary issue as required under Section 12(2) of the Act, and improperly relegated the question to the final hearing stage.
The court clarified that the trial court could at most reject the plaint or strike off issues on non-payment of deficit court fee but could not dismiss the suit after entering findings and a preliminary decree in favor of the plaintiffs. The dismissal clause in the preliminary judgment was thus erroneous and amounted to a procedural intimidation rather than a substantive conditional decree.
Regarding the extension of time for payment of court fee, the court relied on the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and relevant Supreme Court precedents (notably Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das) to hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time even after the expiry of the original period fixed for payment. The court emphasized that such extension does not cause miscarriage of justice but prevents it.
The court also explained the procedural nature of rejection of plaint for non-payment of court fees and distinguished it from dismissal on merits, highlighting the right of plaintiffs to file a fresh suit if plaint is rejected. It concluded that the plaintiffs complied with the preliminary judgment’s direction in good faith by paying court fee based on their valuation and that the trial court's extension of time was within jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
The court held that the trial court did not err in extending the time for payment of balance court fee under Section 151 CPC. The dismissal clause in the preliminary judgment was an error apparent on the face of the record and could not operate to dismiss the suit after findings in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ payment of court fee based on their valuation was justified under the circumstances.
This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the trial court’s order allowing extension of time for court fee payment and dismissing the revision petition. No new legal precedent beyond application of existing principles was established.
1. This revision arises out of a suit for partition. The suit properties belonged to one Velayudhan Pillai. The 1st defendant who died pending trial of the suit is his wife. Plaintiffs who are respondents here and the 2nd defendant, the 1st revision petitioner, are their children. They had another son, Parameswaran Pillai 3rd defendant, the 2nd revision petitioner, is his widow and the 4th defendant, the 3rd revision petitioner, their son. As per Ext. A1 Velayudhan Pillai in 1122 assigned the suit properties in favour of the 1st defendant and Parameswaran Pillai alone. As per Ext. A4 in 1972 the 1st defendant gifted her rights in these properties to the 2nd defendant. Plaintiff's claim that Ext. A1 assignment would ensure to the benefit of all the children of Velayudhan Pillai and that therefore they are etnitled to a share in the suit properties was repelled by the lower court by the preliminary judgment and decree dated 22-10-1975 by holding that the 1st defendant is entitled to ⅔ share and Parameswaran Pillai's heirs, defendants 3 and 4, as a group are entitled to the remaining ⅓ share. However the plaintiff's case that Ext. A4 is vitiated by undue influence exercised by the 2nd defendant and her husband and therefore, it was liable to be set aside, was upheld, and on that basis, plaintiffs were held entitled to 4/9 share of the suit properties as heirs of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs had not paid court fee for the relief of setting aside Ext. A4. Defendants 2 to 4 had in their additional written statements contended that the plaintiffs had not paid proper court fee. No issue was raised thereon nor was it decided before evidence was taken. By the preliminary judgment the lower court holding that the plaintiffs are therefore liable to pay court, fee on the market value of the ⅔ share that was gifted out to the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant under Ext. A4 and that ‘the balance court fee due from the plaintiffs will be recovered from them’ passed the following preliminary decree:
“In the result, a preliminary decree is passed in favour of the plaintiffs declaring their rights to 4/9 shares in the plaint schedule property and for partition and separate possession of the same. They are also entitled to get their share of mesne profits from 20-3-1972 the quantum of which will be decided in the final decree proceedings. Ext. A4 gift deed will stand set aside. Parties will suffer their costs. The plaintiffs will take out a commission to get their shares partitioned by metes and bounds. Balance Court fee will be paid one month from the data of decree which the suit will stand dismissed.”
2. The preliminary judgment was pronounced on 22-10-1975. On 7-14-1975, the plaintiffs paid Rs. 24/- as balance court fee payable by them pursuant to the direction contained in the preliminary judgment. They, as per a memo filed on 7-11-1975, valued the ⅔rd rights in the gifted properties at Rs. 700/- and on that basis paid a court-fee of Rs. 24/- being the balance payable by them on Rs. 700/- which they reckoned as Rs. 56/- minus Rs. 32-/already paid on the plaint. Note that the preliminary judgment did not specify the amount but said that the plaintiffs are to pay the balance court fee on the market value of the ⅔rd shares that was gifted out to the 2nd defendant, without specifying what that market value is and what the balance court fee is. The plaintiffs were, therefore, perfectly justified in putting their valuation on the aforesaid ⅔rd rights, the correctness of which, no doubt the court is entitled to investigate under the provisions of S. 7 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959. On 22-11-1975, that is to say exactly on the 30th day after the preliminary judgment, defendants 2 to 4 raised the question as per I.A No. 18802, of 1975 filed in court on that date that the calculation of market value as per the memo filed by the plaintiffs on 7-11-1975 is not correct. According to the defendants as seen from that petition the market value of the properties had to be fixed at Rs. 1,000/- and the plaintiffs had also to pay the court fee on the market value of the ⅔rd share of the gifted properties, namely, on Rs. 660.67 besides the court fee already paid on the plaint. According to the defendants, therefore, the court fee paid on both occasions together, namely, on the plaint (Rs. 34/-) and along with the memo dated 7-1-1975 (Rs. 24/-) would not be the court fee payable as directed in the preliminary judgment. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed I.A No. 19016 of 1975 on 26-11-1975 praying that the period of one month fixed for payment of balance court fee as per the preliminary judgment be extended by one week and to delete the consequence clause on the basis that the consequence ordered on default was so ordered erroneously and the said clause is an error apparent on the face of the record. This petition was allowed by the trial court and hence this revision by defendants 2 to 4. Along with I.A No. 19016 of 1975 the plaintiffs paid another sum of Rs. 29.34 This payment according to the revision petitioners is out of time and the lower court had no jurisdiction to extend the time since the lower court by the preliminary judgment said that the balance court fee was payable within one month from the date of the decree and that on default the suit will stand dismissed.
3. This case is a glaring illustration of what the Supreme Court said in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das (AIR. 1961 SC. 882) which is as follows:
“How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily form future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be in expedient such procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are in essence, in terrorism, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay”.
4. In the first instance the trial court failed to countenance the contention raised by defendants 2 to 4 that the court fee paid is insufficient; that court ought to have tried that as a preliminary question and if that court was satisfied that the court fee paid was insufficient ought to have in accordance with the provisions of S. 12(2) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 proceeded to reject the plaint after giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to pay the deficit court fee. That court did not even raise an issue on this point. The matter was relegated to the final hearing stage. It was by the preliminary judgment and after passing a preliminary decree declaring the plaintiffs share, and awarding them mesne profits that the court finally said that the suit will stand dismissed in certain eventuality, namely, on failure of the plaintiffs to pay the balance court fee even which that court did not quantify leaving the matter to be determined by the plaintiffs. To say the least the trial court has not acted properly which has caused confusion so far as the parties are concerned and embarrassment to the court itself.
5. I am of the view that the plaintiffs have complied with the direction contained in the preliminary judgment in that they have paid the court fee which according to them is payable as balance court fee along with the memo dated 7-11-1975, though, perhaps, the quantum thereof was not correct-but then, that matter was left by the court to be determined by the plaintiffs themselves, inviting and anticipating another adjudication on the question of sufficiency of court fee paid within the time allowed and affording a further opportunity to the plaintiffs to pay deficit court fee, if any, as so determined.
6. The court's power to decide the question of sufficiency of court fee paid on a plaint is, under the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, well defined. Firstly, the court has to decide that question before ordering registration of the plaint, and at this stage the court cannot travel outside the materials and allegations contained in the plaint and the materials contained in the statement, if any, filed under S. 10 of the Act—S. 12(1). Secondly, thereafter the court can take up this question for decision only if a defendant raises the same by his written statement filed before the first hearing or before evidence is recorded on the ‘merits of the claim’ (as defined in the Explanation to S. 12) and when so raised, the court has to give a decision thereon before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant—S. 12(2). Thirdly, a person added as a defendant after framing of issues (but not as a successor or representative in interest of one already on record and who had opportunity to raise the question) may, with the permission of the court, raise it again, and if so raised, the court can determine the sufficiency of the court fees paid before recording of evidence affecting such defendant on the merits of the claim—S. 12.(3). Fourthly, whenever a party becomes liable to pay ‘additional fee’ by reason of an issue framed in the suit, the court can determine and levy such ‘additional fee’ (S. 13) in accordance with the provisions of S. 12. In all these cases the court will have to allow time to the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee, if any, as determined by the court. If the plaintiff does not remit the deficit fee within the time allowed by the court, the court shall reject the plaint in cases coming under S. 12, and strike off the issue and proceed to hear and decide the other issues, in those cases arising under S. 13. In fact, S. 12(1) does not say about granting time to pay the deficit court fee nor about rejection of plaint on default but I suppose that Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is attracted to those cases falling under S. 12(1). Fifthly, further review of the decision on the question of deficiency of court fee paid is possible only on receipt of report from a court fee examiner deputed by the High Court under S. 18(1) of the Act. When such a report is received all questions raised by such a report shall be heard and decided by the court, and in such cases, the court can review an earlier decision rendered by it on the same question. Presumably, depending upon the provision under which the earlier order determining the sufficiency of court fee paid was passed, S. 12 and/or 13,—the court's power in this regard is to be found, as already seen, only in one or the other or both of them—the court can reject the plaint or strike off the issue as the case may be, if the plaintiff does not pay the deficit court tee, if any, as determined under S. 18(2) within the time allowed for, the same as required by S. 12 and/or 13, though S. 18(2) does not provide for allowing time to pay deficit court fee nor for rejection of the plaint or striking off the issue in default of payment. Note that in no event can the court dismiss the suit for non-payment of deficit court fee and at the most it can only reject the plaint, and that rejection of plaint, as stated in Order VII Rule 13 CPC., does not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.
7. In the instant case, the court could have, before recording of evidence began, perhaps, invoked S. 12(2) but it did not. It appears that neither S. 13 nor S. 18 is attracted to this case. It may be that the court could have framed an issue as to whether Ext. A4 gift deed is liable to be set aside, but no such issue was framed. Issue 3 under which the lower court entered the finding that Ext. A4 gift deed, ‘is invalid and is liable to be set aside’ is:— ‘Whether the gift deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is invalid’. Assuming that by reason of this issue the plaintiff was liable to pay ‘additional fee’ and that the direction in the judgment to pay balance court fee within a month is really a direction to pay such ‘additional fee’, the lower court could have, in the event of non-payment within the time allowed, only struck off this issue and therefore, had no power or jurisdiction even to reject the plaint much less to dismiss the suit (as purportedly done) either dependently or non-dependently of a condition regarding payment of any court tees. Neither the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 nor the Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, enables the Court to ‘dismis’ a suit on merits for non-payment of court fees, and certainly not to dismiss a suit, after entering findings on the merits in favour of the plaintiffs and in fact, decreeing the suit on the basis of these findings in such cases, even it the court uses the would ‘dismiss’ and purports to ‘dismiss’ the suit itself, the same would in fact amount only to ‘rejection of the plaint’ to which the court can have resort at any stage of the suit provided it has power to decide the question of sufficiency of court fee at that stage. In Shamrao Janrao v. Amolak Chimnirn (AIR 1949 Nagpur 373) the dismissal of the suit after completion of the trial for non-payment of additional court tee was construed and held to be only rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. To the same effect is the Full Bench decision in Bibbas Mohan v. Hari Charan (AIR 1961 Cal 491). The provision construed in this case, S. 8B of the Court Fees Act, 1876 as amended in West Bengal required the Court to record a finding whether sufficient court fee has been paid, on the first hearing date or as soon as may be thereafter, and ‘in every case before proceeding to deliver judgment’ and enabled the court to ‘dismiss’ the suit in case of default to pay the deficit fee or to furnish security there for within the time allowed Despite the statutory expression that ‘the suit shall be dismissed’, the Full Bench said (para 18 at p. 494) that ‘the dismissal of the suit under S. 8B(3) of the Court Fees Act (Bengal Amendment) would, therefore, obviously come within rejection of the plaint, as contemplated in Order VII Rule II of the Code’ (empasis of underlined words by me). Though under S. 2(2) of the Code, a decree shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint, which, therefore, is appealable under S. 96 of the Code, can it be said that rejection of plaint conditionally on non-payment of deficit court fee within the time allowed, is a ‘conditional decree’ which, in essence, is not in terrorem but one adjudicating rights of parties and under which the opposite party acquires some inviolable right or rights on the happening or non-happening as the case may be of the condition. In view of Rule 13 Order VII which enables the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action, if otherwise he is entitled to, and which expressly provides that the rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 shall not of its own force stand in the way of the plaintiff in so bringing a fresh suit, it appears to me, that a conditional rejection of a plaint dependent upon non-payment of deficit court fees within the time limit can only be characterized as a ‘procedural order’ intended to frighten and intimidate the plaintiff and not as a ‘conditional decree’ which as stated by the Supreme Court in the Mahanath Ram Das case stands on a different footing altogether. In such cases of conditional rejection of the plaint, can the court enlarge the time for payment of deficit court fees, after the expiry of the original period fixed by the conditional order on a petition filed (also after the period) in that behalf is the question that is debated at the bar.
8. Even assuming that it was only by the payment of further court fee on 26-11-1975 that the plaintiffs complied with the direction as aforesaid contained in the preliminary judgment, it appears tome that under the provisions of S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if not under any other, the lower court has jurisdiction to extend time for payment of balance court fee. I may refer to the decision of Krishna Iyer J. of this Court as he then was in CRP. No. 1287 of 1969 a short note report of which is to be found in 1970 KLT. Short Notes 28. The learned Judge held therein as follows:—
“A delay of a day in making a deposit has been condoned by the court which passed a conditional order. The legal question mooted is whether there is jurisdiction for the court to do to. AIR. 1965 Cal. 354 and 1962 M.P 205 would limit the scope of the principle laid down in 1961 SC. 882 to cases where the application for extension of time has been applied for before the expiry of the period fixed in the original order. While I am inclined to the view, more compassionate and correct, that the court is not powerless to extend time [at least under S. 151 CPC.] even if the motion is made after the date for deposit has passed, I need not finally decide the point here where I am called upon to interfere with the exercise of a discretion which, far from causing miscarriage of justice, prevents it. S. 115 CPC; vests a power to be exercised aparingly—to intervene where illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction occasions failure of justice and not to inflict injustice in the name of law”.
9. I am in full agreement with the aforesaid statement of law and this, I suppose, is also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court already referred to, Mahanath Ram Das v. Ganga Das (AIR 1961 SC 822). In the said decision that court said as follows:—
“But we are of opinion that in this case the Court could have exercised its powers first on July 13, 1954, when the petition filed within time was before it, and again under the exercise of its inherent powers, when the two petitions under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed”.
10. Time for payment was to expire on 8-7-1954 on which date the appellant filed an application for extension of time, but this application was dismissed on 13-7-1954, when it came up for hearing on the ground that the appeal already stood dismissed as the amount was not paid within the time given. Thereupon the appellant filed an application under S. 151 of the Code on 2-9-1954, obviously after the expiry of the original period fixed for payment of deficit court fee. This too was dismissed since the High Court took the view that the proper remedy was review. The appellant then filed an application under S. 151 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. This application was heard on 27-9-1955. The High Court ruling out Order 47 Rule 1 also held that Ss. 148, 149 and 151 could be ‘applied only to cases which were not finally disposed of, and that time under them could be extended only before the final order was actually made’. It is with reference to the two applications under S. (5) filed after the period has expired and the conditional order has worked itself out that the Supreme Court said that the High Court could have exercised its inherent powers and extended the time as originally fixed.
11. It is necessary to mention that the same view as in Tarapada v. Nepal Gazi (AIR 1965 Cal. 354) and in Buta Singh v. State of M.P (AIR 1962 MP. 205) referred to by Krishna Iyer J., limiting the scope of the principle laid down in Mahanath Ram Das v. Ganga Das (AIR 1961 SC 882) has been taken by this Court in S.M Bhatta v. A. Beary (AIR 1973 Kerala 185). This case concerned a conditional order allowing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 on payment of costs within a certain time and dismissing the same if costs were not paid within that time. The day after the period expired a petition was filed to enlarge the time and to receive the costs ordered. This court said that for two reasons S. 148 cannot be applied, namely:—
“(1) In as much as the extension of time prayed for does not relate to any act prescribed or allowed by the CPC. in the case of the impugned orders S. 148 has no application; and [2] the petition has been filed after the expiry of the period granted by the court and that order has already worked itself out from the date on which the condition was imposed by the Court”.
12. However, this Court in that case also said that ‘S. 151 may in proper cases be available for seeking extension of time for compliance of an order’, though on the facts of that case, this Court was of the view that it was not a proper case for exercise of inherent power and held that the lower court was not, for that reason, justified in resorting to S. 151, of the Code. This decision again, supports the view stated above that, at any rate, Court has inherent powers to extend the time fixed for payment of deficit court fees even after a conditional order in that behalf has worked itself out by expiry of time granted for that, and such power can be exercised on a petition filed for that purpose after the expiry of the period originally fixed. It remains to be stated that so far as I am concerned, I do not comprehend how there can be a distinction between a petition filed before the expiry of the time fixed in a conditional order and one filed after the expiry of the period. In my view either S. 148 is attracted or is not attracted, and if attracted the section itself is authority for the position that the court has in its discretion power to enlarge the period fixed or granted by the Court from time to time even though the period originally fixed or granted would have expired. If power there be to extend the period even after expiry of the period fixed originally, cannot that power be invoked so long as that power exists and no rule of law of limitation bars such invocation, even if it be that under the original order fixing time certain consequences are to follow where fore on the expiry of the period fixed without compliance with that order those consequences have automatically followed—exercise of the power which exists (statute says it exists) in favour of extension, would necessarily undo the consequences that might have befallen for the consequences are purely the result of fixation of an outer date in the original order for doing certain thing and the court has power to fix another date beyond the outer date already fixed. That the court does not lose this power even after the consequences have happened by the expiry of the last date fixed in the order is clear from the Supreme Court decision referred to above where that court held that the power could be exercised and the period could be extended even after the expiry of the period which means after the consequences have arisen by expiry of the period. Therefore that the consequences stated in the order have resulted is no impediment for the court to exercise its power under S. 148 of the Code is clear. If power exists and there is no impediment in the matter of exercise thereof could not a litigant before court invoke that power so long as that power exists, be it before the consequences have followed or after. It appears to me that existence of power in the court where fore one could invoke it so long as it exists and exercise thereof by the court which is purely in its discretion depending upon the facts and circumstances in a given case cannot be mixed up. Whatever that may be, it is not necessary for me to finally decide that point so far as the case on hand is concerned since I am resting this decision on Ss. 151 and 115 of the Code and not on S. 148—otherwise I would have referred this case form decision by a larger bench. I make it clear that I have not decided the point but only indicated another possible line of approach to the question.
13. It appears to me that, in so far as IA. No. 19016 of 1975 is one invoking S. 151 of the Code also, the lower court had jurisdiction to enlarge the time as it did and that the jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code would not be attracted to the case on hand since in my view interference with the said order would only occasion failure or justice and inflict injustice. There is no merit, in view of what is stated, in this Civil Revision Petition. The same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
14. Dismissed.
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