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Janardhanan v. State Of Kerala
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment was delivered by George Vadakkel, J. The appellant had been convicted of the murder of his wife, Devaki, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution case alleged that Devaki had suffered from mental derangement for three to four years and that on 9-9-1977, after refusing to fetch water, the appellant had threatened her with a stick and later, at about 4 P.M., cut her throat with a kitchen knife (exhibit M.O.3), causing her instantaneous death in the eastern courtyard of their house in Ezhalloor Kara (within Thodupuzha Police Station jurisdiction). Pw.1 (the appellant's brother) gave the first information report (Ext. P1) at 8 P.M. the same day; Ext. P2 is the inquest report. The appellant was arrested on 11-9-1977 and denied involvement when questioned under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code.
Autopsy evidence (Pw.7 and Ext. P3) established violent death with four injuries, none self-inflicted; two injuries (Nos. 1 and 4 in Ext. P3) were separately fatal and would have caused death within about five minutes. Several prosecution witnesses (Pws. 1 to 5) did not support the prosecution narrative in court; the prosecution thus relied on circumstantial evidence. The lower court convicted the appellant based on a set of circumstances listed in paragraph 20 of its judgment. The High Court examined the sufficiency and admissibility of those circumstantial facts and also addressed the lower court's conclusion that certain witnesses had committed perjury and had been 'declared hostile'.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the lower court was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant alone could have committed the murder of Devaki.
- Whether factual circumstances such as the appellant's failure to report the death, alleged absconding, and recovery of blood-stained items from the house and scene (M.O.10 and M.O.3) reliably implicated the appellant when considered individually and cumulatively.
- Whether the lower court was justified in treating certain prosecution witnesses as 'hostile', permitting the prosecution to cross-examine them, and issuing notices under Section 344 CrPC accusing them of wilful false swearing based on statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC.
- What is the proper legal effect and limitation on using unsworn statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC (and related provisions of the Evidence Act) for forming an opinion of perjury under Section 344 CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecution's Case
- The prosecution alleged that the appellant attacked and cut Devaki's throat with a kitchen-knife (M.O.3) on 9-9-1977 in the courtyard, causing instantaneous death.
- Prosecution relied on circumstantial facts compiled by the lower court (enumerated in paragraph 20): cohabitation, deceased's mental illness, the children being away at school, presence of fatal injuries that could not be self-inflicted, absence of complaint or reporting by the accused, alleged absconding by the accused until 11-9-1977, recovery of a blood-stained cloth (M.O.10) from inside the house, and recovery of the blood-stained weapon (M.O.3) from the scene.
- The lower court also proceeded on the view that certain witnesses (Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5) had given false evidence and issued notices under Section 344 CrPC to prosecute them for perjury.
Appellant's Defence
- The appellant, when questioned under Section 313 CrPC, denied having anything to do with Devaki's death.
- In the High Court's account, the appellant either did not provide explanations on certain circumstantial matters (the record shows he was not specifically questioned on some points) or explanations were absent in the trial record; the High Court emphasised the absence of direct proof connecting the appellant to the act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kunharu… v. State of Kerala (1963 KLT 325) | Cited for the proposition that absconding by itself is not sufficient to fasten guilt on the accused. | The Court relied on this authority to reject the lower court's inference that alleged absconding (which itself was not established) supported guilt. |
| S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1976) 2 SCC 819 : AIR 1976 SC 2140 [2146] | Failure to question the accused 'specifically, distinctly and separately' about material circumstances is a serious irregularity vitiating the trial if it prejudiced the accused. | The Court cited this case to criticise the trial court for not putting material circumstances to the accused in the required manner, noting the significance of that irregularity. |
| Profulla Kumar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 Calcutta 401 (F.B.)] | Unsworn statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC, where not confirmed in court, cannot be used against the accused as proof of the truth of their contents. | The Court invoked this principle to explain that statements under Section 161 cannot be treated as substantive proof and cannot be used to form the basis for a perjury opinion in the absence of other supporting material. |
| Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration ((1976) 1 SCC 727 : AIR 1976 SC 294) | Permission under Section 154 Evidence Act to put cross-examination-type questions in examination-in-chief does not amount to a declaration that the witness is hostile; the court should avoid using labels like 'declared hostile'. | The Court relied on this authority to explain that allowing such questions does not adjudicate the veracity of the witness and that the witness' evidence must be assessed on its merits. |
| Basil Ranger Lawrence v. Emperor (AIR 1933 PC 218) | Defines 'trial' to mean the whole proceedings up to judgment; relevant to the interpretation of Section 162 CrPC's prohibition. | Used to support the proposition that Section 162 CrPC's prohibition on using statements under Section 161 extends until judgment, limiting the court's ability to rely on such statements to form an opinion under Section 344 CrPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) assessment of the sufficiency of the circumstantial case against the appellant; and (B) the correctness of the lower court's treatment of certain witnesses as 'hostile' and its initiation of perjury proceedings under Section 344 CrPC.
(A) Assessment of Circumstantial Evidence
- The medical evidence (Pw.7 and Ext. P3) established that Devaki died a violent death from multiple neck injuries, two of which were independently fatal and not self-inflicted.
- Several prosecution witnesses (Pws. 1–5) did not support the prosecution's version in court; the prosecution therefore relied principally on circumstantial evidence summarized by the trial court in paragraph 20 (thirteen enumerated circumstances).
- The High Court scrutinised those circumstances: it noted that circumstances numbered 1–7 (e.g., marriage, cohabitation, deceased's illness, absence of children during the day, location of the body, medical impossibility of self-infliction, general finding that the act was intentional) were not in dispute but, singly or together, did not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the appellant was the assailant.
- The High Court observed that circumstances 8 and 9 (failure to inform police and absence of complaint by the accused) were asserted but the appellant had not been asked about them under Section 313 CrPC. The court further found no evidence that the appellant had absconded; it cited authority that absconding alone does not establish guilt.
- Recoveries of the blood-stained cloth (M.O.10) and the weapon (M.O.3) were not shown to have been made pursuant to any information from the appellant, and the appellant was not specifically cross-examined on these matters; the court emphasised the importance of questioning the accused specifically on material circumstances and cited S. Harnam Singh for the rule that failure to do so can vitiate the trial if prejudicial.
- Overall the court concluded that the circumstances could be reconciled with the possibility that someone other than the appellant committed the offence; they did not exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with the appellant's innocence. Consequently, the prosecution had not proved that the appellant alone was guilty of the murder beyond reasonable doubt.
(B) Treatment of Witnesses and Perjury Proceedings
- The lower court had 'declared' Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 hostile, permitted the Public Prosecutor to cross-examine them, and issued notices under Section 344 CrPC alleging wilful false swearing based on contradictions between their court testimony and earlier statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC.
- The High Court explained the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act: Section 137 definitions (examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re-examination); Section 142 barring leading questions in examination-in-chief; and Section 154 which permits the court to allow questions akin to cross-examination to be put by the party who called the witness but does not render the witness 'hostile' or prove falsity.
- The court relied on Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration to stress that granting permission under Section 154 does not amount to an adjudication on veracity and that labels like 'declared hostile' are historically confusing and best avoided.
- On the admissibility and use of prior unsworn statements, the court expounded Sections 145, 146, 155, 157 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, highlighting that statements under Section 161 CrPC are limited in use and, under Section 162 CrPC, are not admissible for the purpose of the trial except for contradiction with court testimony (and even then subject to safeguards and court permission where the prosecution seeks to contradict its own witness).
- The High Court emphasized Profulla Kumar's principle that unsworn statements under Section 161 cannot be used against the accused as proof of the truth of their contents and Basil Ranger Lawrence to show that Section 162's prohibition applies through the whole of trial up to judgment.
- The court warned against forming an opinion of perjury under Section 344 CrPC solely on the basis of a Section 161 statement; it held that a court should have independent material sufficient to sustain a perjury charge and that invoking Section 344 without adequate material would be unwise and potentially futile.
- On this basis the High Court set aside the lower court's direction to issue notices to Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 under Section 344 CrPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the appellant's conviction and sentence, and acquitted him of the offence of murdering his wife, Devaki. The Court also set aside the lower court's direction to issue notices under Section 344 CrPC to Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's conviction and life sentence were quashed and he was acquitted; the intended perjury proceedings against the listed witnesses (Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5) were set aside.
- The Court's decision emphasised evidentiary limits: circumstantial facts must exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence before sustaining a conviction; unsworn statements under Section 161 CrPC cannot be treated as substantive proof for perjury proceedings under Section 344 CrPC without other supporting material. The judgment instructs caution in 'declaring' witnesses hostile and in using Section 154 powers.
- No statement in the opinion purports to set a new binding precedent beyond the reasoning applied to the facts of this case; the decision resolves the appeal and addresses correctness of trial procedure and evidentiary use in this matter.
Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; accused acquitted; notices under Section 344 CrPC set aside.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
George Vadakkel, J.:— The appellant has been convicted of the offenc: of murder of his wife, Devaki and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The case against him is that she was suffering from some mental derangement for the past 3 or 4 years prior to the incident, on account of that she used to disobey the appellant resulting in frequent quarrels between them, on 9-9-77 she refused to go and draw water from a well in the near-by compound of Pw. 1, the appellant made her go and fetch water therefrom by threatening her with a stick and subsequently at about 4 P.M that day cut her throat with M.O 3 kitchen-knife causing her instantaneous death. The scene of occurrence is alleged to be the eastern court-yard of their house in Ezhalloor Kara within the jurisdiction of the Thodupuzha Police Station. Pw. 1, the brother of the appellant gave Ext. PI first information statement at 8 P.M the same day before the Thodupuzha Police Station situate 12 K.Ms north-east of the scene of occurrence. Ext. P2 is the inquest report. The appellant was arrested on 11-9-1977. When questioned under S. 313, Criminal Procedure Code he denied that he had anything to do with the death of Devaki.
2. The evidence of Pw. 7 who conducted the autopsy on Devaki's dead body and Ext. P3 post-mortem certificate issued by Pw. 7 establish that Devaki met with violent death at the hands of an assailant. There were four injuries on her body and none of them was self-inflicted. Two of the injuries, Nos. 1 and 4 in Ext. P3, were fatal, each by itself and according to Pw. 7, Devaki would nnt have survived more than 5 minutes after she sustained those injuries. The said injuries are:—
“(1) A horizontal incised wound 16 cms × 2 cm × 8 cm directed medially and forwards over the upper part of right side of neck tailing off forwards to a point 2 cm below the root of right ear. On exploration, it is seen, that the underlying Caseia muscles, the carotid artery, jugular veins etc. are cut horizontally and the injury is going deep into the atlante occipital joint by cutting the atlante oceipital ligaments on the right side.
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(4) A horizontal gaping wound 28 cm × 7 × cm 16 cm over the right side of root of neck starting from the middle of the posterior aspect of left shoulder web and tailing off to a point just above the medial end of left collar bone. The injury is directed medially and forwards cutting horizontally the underlying fasciae, muscles, carotid artery, the jugular veins, the intervening nerves, the trachea, oesephagus the intervertebral disc between the fifth and sixth cervical vertebras and the spinal cord the neck remains attached to the trunk only through a thin part of skin and soft tissues on the leit side and this connecting soft tissues is only 11 cm in length and 2.5 cm in thickness.”
3. There can be no doubt that the assailant's intention was to kill Devaki. Pws. 1 to 5—brother of the appellant, that brother's wife, appellant's son aged 12, a person residing a furlong and a half away from the appellant's house, and Devaki's brother respectively—examined to prove the prosecution case do not support the case against the appellant. Though the lower court permitted the prosecution to put such questions to them as might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party and the Public Prosecutor did put such questions to them, nothing in support of the prosecution has been elicited from their evidence. The prosecution therefore relied upon certain circumstances brought out in evidence to bring home the guilt of the appellant, and according to the lower court the prosecution has thereby succeeded in establishing that the appellant is the assailant.
4. Appellant's conviction is based, as stated above, solely on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied on by the lower court as enumerated in paragraph 20 of its judgment are:—
“20. The evidence discussed above proves beyond reasonable doubt the following facts and circumstances:
(1) The accused married deceased Devaky and after their marriage till the date and time of the incident in question, they were living together with their children, under the same roof in the house bearing No. 274 in Ward 2 of Kumaramangalm Panchayat, Ezhalloor Kara.
(2) The deceased Devaky, at the time of her third delivery contracted a mental illness, which Pw. 5, her brother, called peripheral mania.
(3) On 9-9-1977 as usual, the two children went to School and returned only at about 5 p.m
(4) Deceased Devaky was found with bleeding injuries on her neck described in Ext. P3 in the courtyard of the residential house of the accused and Devaky died immediately on the spot, as a result of these injuries.
(5) The evidence of Pw. 7 shows, that none of these injuries could be self-inflicted.
(6) The said injuries, which resulted in the iastant death of Devaky, were inflicted by a person other than deceased Devaky?
(7) It is an intentional act of brutal murder of Devaky, by which, the accused was deprived of a wife and the two children mother;
(8) Even under such circumstances, the accused has no complaint against the said murder of Devaky.
(9) The accused neither informed. The matter to the Police nor initiated appropriate action, nor had he complained before any other authorities.
(10) The accused absconded after the incident till on the 11th, when he surrendered before the police;
(11) A kailey, M.O 10, containing human blood was recovered from inside the room of the house, where the accused and deceased were residing and no other dress of the accused was found there;
(12) The blood-stained weapon, M.O 3, was recovered from the seen of incident and Ext. P4 shows, that it contains human blood, and
(13) The accused has no explanation to say against all these circumstances;”
5. Circumstances serialised as Nos. 1 to 7 are not in dispute but anyone of them separately or all of them cumulatively will not lead to an inevitable inference that it was the appellant who killed Devaki. Circumstances mentioned as 8 and 9 go together, and the fact relied on is that the appellant failed to inform the police of the violent death of Devaki. He was not asked about it when he was questioned under S. 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code the next fact relied on by the lower court is that the appellant absconded till 11-9-1977 when he surrendered. There is no evidence that the appellant absconded nor was any question put to him under S. 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code when he was questioned thereunder. Besides absconding by itself is not sufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused. See Kunharu…* v. State Of Kerala…. (1963 KLT 325). Two other circumstances relied on by the lower court are the recovery of M.O 10 kail (cloth) stained with human blood from inside the appellant's house and on M.O 3 blood-stained kitchen-knife from his courtyard. These M.Os were found not even pursuant to any information received from the appellant. Here again it is necessary to state that the appellant was not questioned about these matters. He was asked only as to what he has to say about Pw. 12 [the Crime Branch Detective Inspector] deposing that he recovered M.Os 3 and 10 as per the inquest report. It is hardly necessary to state that failure to question. The accused ‘sprcifically, distinctly and separately’ as regards each material circumstances appearing in evidence against him is a serious irregularity vitiating the trial if the same has prejudiced the accused. See S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1976) 2 SCC 819 : AIR. 1976 SC. 2140 [2146].
6. The circumstances relied on by the lower court, individually and cumulatively are compatible also with the guilt of any person other than the appellant. The circumstances are not such as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the appellant. On these facts and circumstances it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that the prosecution has established that Devaki could have been murdered only by the appellant and that none else could be responsible for it—it could only be said that it might be he who committed the crime fir it could as well be said that it might have been committed by some one other than the appellant. The prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant is guilty of the murder of his wife, Devaki
7. The lower court is of the opinion that Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 have committed the offence of perjury. That court has therefore issued notices to these witnesses as contemplated by S. 344 of the C de of Criminal Procedure, 1973. While being examined the lower court ‘declared’ each of them ‘hostile’ and allowed the Public Prosecutor to ‘cross-examine’ them. According to the lower court their sworn statements in court so far as they are contrary to what they said when examined under S. 161 of the Code are false.
8. The Evidence Act, 1872, nowhere provides for ‘declaring a witness hostile nor allows a person to ‘cross-examine’ his own witness. Chapter X of the Act contains the provisions concerning the examination of witnesses. S. 137 defines the expressions: ‘examination-in-chief’, ‘cross-examination’ and ‘reexamination’. Whatever be the form and nature of the questions put to the witness, examination of a witness by the person who calls him is ‘examination-in-chief’ if it is before the examination of that witness by the adversary, and ‘reexamination’ if the same is after the adversary examines him. ‘Cross-examination’ means examination of the witness by the adverse party. To say that one may cross-examine his own witness is, in the face of the definition of the word ‘cross-examination’ as aforesaid, a contradiction in terms, as stated by Rankin, C.J in Profulla Kumar v. Emperor (AIR. 1931 Calcutta 401 (F.B)). S. 142 of the Act bars leading questions or questions suggestive of answers in examination-in-chief and re-examination. Under S. 154, however, the court may allow a person to put to his own witness such questions as might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. But, note that grant of such permission does not mean that the witness is ‘hostile’ or ‘unfavourable’ or ‘adverse witness’ and therefore, a liar. In Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration . ((1976) 1 SCC 727 : AIR. 1976 S.C 294, 305) the Supreme Court has highlighted this aspect when it said:—
“The grant of such permission does not amount to an adjudication by the court as to the veracity of the witness. Therefore, in the order granting such permission, it is preferable to avoid the use of such expressions, such as “declared hostile”, “declared unfavourable”, the significance of which is still not free from the historical cobwebs which, in their wake bring a misleading legacy of confusion, and conflict that had so long vexed the English Court”.
9. Under S. 146 of the Evidence Act, 1872 when a witness is cross-examined questions which tend to test his veracity, to discover who he is and what is his position in life, and to shake his credit may be asked. With permission granted under S. 154, such questions can be put in examination-in-chief also. Again, under S. 155 of the Act, with the consent of the court one may impeach the credit of his own witness in the manner provided therein one of which is by the proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted. S. 145 of the Act says that if a previous statement in writing or reduced to writing is intended to contradict a witness, before the writing is proved, his attention is to be called to the portions intended to be used for that purpose. However, it should be remembered that the only object of cross-examination of a witness or putting in examination-in-chief with the permission of the court questions of the kind allowed only in cross-examination, is not to discredit the witness but also to bring out evidence which would advance the case of the cross-examiner or the person calling the witness, as the case may be.
10. It is by now well settled that merely because a witness has been dealt with under S. 154 of the Evidence Act, 1872, his evidence does not become unreliable or unacceptable. The court will have to assess his evidence as any other witness's evidence. Thereupon, the court may accept it in whole or in part. See Sart Paul v. Delhi Administration ((1976) 1 SCC 727 : AIR. 1976 SC. 294 ) and the cases mentioned in paragraph 47 thereof Acceptance of his evidence or portion or portions thereof would mean that the court considers that the witness has deposed truthfully on those matters on which his evidence is relied on, but rejection of his evidence or portion or portions thereof would not indicate that he swore falsely concerning the matters on which his evidence is rejected as unreliable or undependable, and this is so even if it be that his credit has been successfully impeached and shaken and his veracity doubted.
11. Though under S. 157 of the Evidence Act, 1872 former statements of a witness made by him relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact is admissible to corroborate his testimony, where such statement is one made by him when examined under S. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S. 162 of that Code prohibits the use of that statement for any purpose other than contradicting a prosecution witness; and the prosecution can contradict its own witness only with the permission of the court. In Profulla Kumar v. Emperor [AIR. 1931 Calcutta 401] at page 408 Rankin, C.J said of such statements under S. 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code as follows:—
“……the unsworn statement, so far as the maker in his evidence does not confirm and repeat it, cannot be used at all against the accused as proof of the truth of what it asserts. This means not merely that it is in itself insufficient proof, but that it cannot be so used at all. It cannot be occupied with probabilities which suggest that the witness was more likely to tell the truth on the former occasion than in the witness box so as to go to the jury as part of the proof that what was then stated is true”.
12. The court can take note of only the fact that the witness had been contradicted by his former statement, and cannot assume what is contained in the statement recorded under S. 161 depicts the true state of affairs Because of the contradiction, the court may, as it deems fit reject his evidence wholly or so much of it as has been contradicted as unreliable, but this will not be a ground to assume that the witness has spoken falsely in court.
13. The prohibition contained in S. 162 of the Code is absolute. The said provision says that the statement recorded under S. 161 shall not be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made. Though the word ‘trial’ is not defined in the Code there can be no doubt that it means so far as trial before a Court of Session is concerned the judicial proceedings before Court of Session which ends in a judgment of acquittal or conviction of the prisoner as contemplated by S. 235 of the Code. ‘Trial’ means the whole of proceedings including the sentence. See Basil Ranger Lawrence v. Emperor (AIR. 1933 PC. 218). Necessarily therefore, trial continues till the judgment is delivered and the ultimate result of the judicial proceeding is pronounced. S. 344 of the Code can be invoked only ‘at the time of delivery of judgment’ or in other words, before the judicial proceedings comes to an end. If that be so, S. 162 would stand in the way of the court using the statement recorded under S. 161 for the purpose of forming an opinion that a witness examined in the case in which the judgment is being delivered has committed the offence of giving false evidence.
14. Even otherwise caution requires that the court may not form such an opinion solely on the basis of the witness's statement recorded under S. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 for under the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, a former statement which does not amount to a statement sworn as evidence, unless it falls under S. 32, can be proved only for two purposes, firstly, under S. 155 read with S. 145 of that Act, to contradict and thus to discredit the witness, and secondly, under S. 157 of that Act, to corroborate his testimony and thus to reinforce his evidence. Hardly can it is expected that a witness hauled up for trial for the offence of giving false evidence would take the witness stand to be contradicted by his former statement; and even if be does, and he is contradicted in that manner, that will take the prosecution neither here nor there, since contradiction by itself, though sufficient to discredit the witness, is no proof of the truth of the facts stated in his former statement. Therefore, where there is no material other than a statement recorded under S. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it will be unwise to initiate proceedings under S. 344 of that Code in that the same would only be an exercise in futility. The opinion that the court expresses at the time of delivery of judgment or final order disposing off the judicial proceeding before it that a witness examined therein has knowingly or wilfully given false evidence should not be a fanciful or capricious opinion but a discreet one founded on materials sufficient to sustain the charge of perjury. It should be remembered that a court ought not get itself into such a plight as would make it a laughing stock which will be the result of an unsuccessful prosecution for perjury at its instance. We also wish to point out that power under S. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is something like a rod which should be sparingly used, as otherwise it is likely to defeat the very purpose of making false swearing an offence (that purpose being that no one shall thwart the endeavour of the court to find out the truth in the matter of dispensation of justice) by making people averse to get involved in achieving that object.
15. In view of what is stated above the direction given by the lower court by the judgment under appeal to issue notices to Pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 to show cause as to why they should not be punished for wilfully giving false evidence in this case has to be set aside and we do so. The presecution has not succeeded in proving that the appellant is guilty of the offence of murder of Devaki, his wife. We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside his conviction and sentence and acquit him of the said offence.
16. Allowed.
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