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Chinnan v. Gopinathan
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from S. A. No. 479 of 1971, an appeal brought by defendants 3 and 4 (the appellants). The respondent is the plaintiff in an original suit seeking a declaration of title to the plaint schedule item 2 building and its site and for the eviction of the defendants from that building. The appellants were impleaded into the suit by order dated 10-6-1961. The trial court found all four defendants were trespassers, negatived the first appellant's claim to be a "kudikidappukaran", and decreed the suit as prayed for. On appeal the finding of trespass was not challenged; instead, the appeal raised a point based on the proviso to section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (as amended up to Act 35 of 1969).
After the appellate court dismissed the appeal, a second appeal was filed (on 14-6-1971). While that second appeal was pending, section 2(25) was amended by Act 17 of 1972 (published 2-11-1972, stated to take effect from 1-1-1970). The case was referred to a Division Bench. The respondent sought and filed, on 6-6-1974, Original Petition No. 2470 of 1974 under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of the explanation (explanation iia) introduced into clause (25) of section 2 by Act 17 of 1972. The petition was heard together with the second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the explanation (termed "explanation iia") introduced into clause (25) of section 2 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act by Act 17 of 1972 can validly deem a person who was in occupation on 16 August 1968 and continued in occupation till 1 January 1970 to be a "kudikidappukaran", including where that person is a rank trespasser.
- Whether explanation iia must be read down (or read subject to constitutional limitations) so as not to confer statutory rights on persons who entered and occupy land unlawfully (i.e., rank trespassers), having regard to constitutional protections (notably Articles 31A and 19(1)(f)) and earlier judicial interpretations.
- Whether, as a matter of statutory construction and constitutional law, the court should apply the principle in the Supreme Court's decision in Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (AIR 1972 SC 2027) in interpreting explanation iia.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Position
- The appellants (defendants 3 and 4) relied on the amended statutory definition (including explanation iia) to contend that persons who were in occupation on 16 August 1968 and who continued in occupation until 1 January 1970 are to be deemed "kudikidappukarans" and thus protected—an argument that underlay their challenge in the appellate proceedings and in the second appeal.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The respondent argued that explanation iia, by its plain wording, leaves no scope for a limiting construction: if the conditions of explanation iia are satisfied, a person shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran. The respondent emphasised that this is a statutory legal fiction and that the words impose deeming — making such persons kudikidappukarans irrespective of whether they were in fact trespassers.
- On that basis the respondent maintained that persons satisfying the temporal conditions are entitled to the status created by explanation iia, and that prior decisions which read permission into the definition cannot be used to avoid this new deeming provision.
Advocate General's Submissions
- The Advocate General contended that the legislature could not have intended to create rights in favour of persons committing illegal acts or obtaining possession unlawfully. Therefore, the explanation should be read to refer only to those who were in lawful occupation (i.e., with permission), and not to rank trespassers.
- He further submitted that, if the explanation as worded were given its widest meaning (thereby including trespassers), the provision would be constitutionally invalid because it would confer fixity of tenure on rank trespassers and could not be justified as agrarian reform under Article 31A and would offend Article 19(1)(f).
Additional Contentions Noted by the Court
- Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the offensive and the salutary parts of explanation iia are inseverably linked (i.e., persons in lawful occupation and rank trespassers are intrinsically linked by the wording), and relied on prior observations (including those in Chami Chettiar v. Thirumandham Kunnu Bhagavathi Devaswom) to contend that it is not possible to separate the beneficial from the offensive parts so as to save the provision by severance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gopalan v. Chellamma, 1966 KLT 673 | Held that to be a "kudikidappukaran" erection of the homestead or occupation of the hut must commence with the permission of the landlord; a trespasser who made forcible entry is not within the definition even if in occupation before the relevant date. | The court cited this decision as authority for the proposition that prior judicial construction required permission; it informed the court's view of the meaning of earlier explanations and the permissive requirement. |
| Karunakaran Nair v. Ramakrishnan Nair, 1966 KLT 351 | Earlier decision taking the same view as Gopalan v. Chellamma on the necessity of permission for claimants to be "kudikidappukarans". | Used as supporting precedent showing consistent earlier high court authority that trespassers were not within the definition. |
| Markose Peter v. Chacko Ittivcheria, 1971 KLT 481 | Decision aligned with earlier authorities that required permission for the status of kudikidappukaran. | Relied on by parties and noted by the court as part of the chain of earlier decisions that read permission into the definition. |
| Vareeth George v. Achuthan Sivadasan, 1972 KLT 107 | Another decision to same effect — earlier construction requiring lawful occupation/permission. | Noted by the court as part of consistent earlier jurisprudence on the matter. |
| Narayanan Asari Thankappan Asari v. Ammukutty Bai, 1973 KLT 443 (Full Bench) | Full Bench concluded that if initial occupation was by trespass, explanation/proviso would not make the occupier a kudikidappukaran merely by continued occupation on the relevant date; reading of proviso did not protect trespassers. | The court relied on the full bench's construction of the proviso and its conclusion that rank trespassers were excluded; this decision formed a key antecedent to the court's analysis of explanation iia. |
| Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 | Principle that when the legislature uses an expression like "held", it must be taken to mean "lawfully held" (i.e., a word like "held" should be read as "lawfully held"). | The court noted that the full bench applied this Supreme Court principle in construing the proviso; that principle underpinned the earlier view that "occupation" implied lawful occupation. |
| K.K. Handique v. Member, Board of Agricultural Income-tax, Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1191 | Earlier Supreme Court decision adopting a similar view on the meaning of expressions like "held" (i.e., to be read as "lawfully held"). | Cited by the court as earlier Supreme Court authority relied upon in the full bench decision to require lawful holding. |
| Chami Chettiar v. Thirumandham Kunnu Bhagavathi Devaswom, 1970 KLT 897 | Observed that where a provision benefits both rightful occupants and rank wrong-doers and the field is inseverable, it may not be possible to salvage the provision by excluding the wrong-doers. | The respondent relied on this observation to argue inseverability; the court recorded the submission but analysed it against wider constitutional and precedent-based considerations. |
| V. M. Narayanan Nair & Others v. State of Kerala & Others, 1970 KLT 659 | Construction of "public purpose" in the context of section 96 was held to be limited to public purposes relating to agriculture (i.e., within agrarian reform) so as to attract Article 31A protection. | The court described this decision to explain the background to the Supreme Court's later ruling in Malankara Rubber and to show how reading-down was used to preserve constitutionality in the agrarian context. |
| Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Others, AIR 1972 SC 2027 | Supreme Court applied the canon that, where possible, an impugned provision should be read down to mean only what falls within constitutionally protected parameters (here, reserving land for "agrarian reform" public purposes), rather than striking it down wholly. | The court treated this decision as directly binding and decisive on the method of construction to be applied to explanation iia: the provision had to be read so as not to infringe constitutional guarantees, and accordingly read so as to exclude rank trespassers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence grounded in statutory construction and constitutional limits, informed by precedent:
- The court first reviewed the statutory definition of "kudikidappukaran" in s. 2(25) as amended by Act 35 of 1969 and then focused on explanation iia added by Act 17 of 1972, which on its face creates a deeming fiction: persons in occupation on 16 August 1968 who continued in occupation until 1 January 1970 "shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran."
- The court noted earlier high court decisions (including Gopalan v. Chellamma and others, and the full bench in Narayanan Asari Thankappan Asari v. Ammukutty Bai) that had read the definition to require that occupation or erection of a homestead commence with the landlord's permission and had therefore excluded rank trespassers from protection.
- The court acknowledged the respondent's argument that explanation iia, by its plain words, created a legal fiction that left no scope for reading in a requirement of prior permission and thus would protect persons who were in reality trespassers.
- The court then turned to constitutional considerations. It observed that giving explanation iia its literal, widest effect (thereby protecting rank trespassers) would conflict with constitutional guarantees — specifically the protection available under Article 31A (and the need to satisfy Article 19(1)(f) where Article 31A protection is not available) — and that conferring fixity of tenure on rank trespassers could not be justified as agrarian reform or public purpose that attracts Article 31A.
- Faced with the apparent conflict between the literal statutory wording and constitutional protections, the court applied the principle from Malankara Rubber (AIR 1972 SC 2027): when a later legislature re-enacts or amends a provision despite prior judicial constructions, the court should, wherever possible, read the provision down to render it constitutionally permissible rather than strike it down wholly.
- Applying that canon, the court concluded that explanation iia must be read as inapplicable to rank trespassers. In other words, where the initial occupation was by trespass, the deeming fiction of explanation iia could not be applied to confer the status of kudikidappukaran.
- On that basis the court allowed the original petition (the constitutional challenge) to the limited extent of declaring explanation iia inapplicable to trespassers, and, in consequence, held that the appellants in the second appeal — who were concurrently found to be rank trespassers by both courts below — could not rely on explanation iia.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court declared that explanation iia is inapplicable to trespassers.
Immediate consequences and direct effect on the parties:
- The court allowed Original Petition No. 2470 of 1974 and declared that explanation iia (inserted by Act 17 of 1972 into clause (25) of section 2) does not operate to confer the status of "kudikidappukaran" on rank trespassers.
- As a result, the appellants in the second appeal (S. A. No. 479 of 1971), who had been concurrently found by both lower courts to be rank trespassers, cannot rely on explanation iia; the second appeal was dismissed with costs.
- There was no order as to costs in the original petition.
Broader implications: The opinion does not elaborate on any wider policy consequences beyond the immediate parties. The court's disposition rests on applying established principles of statutory construction and constitutional protections (including the approach in Malankara Rubber). The court did not purport to create or announce any broader rule beyond the application of explanation iia to the facts at hand.
1. S. A. No. 479 of 1971 is an appeal by defendants 3 and 4. The respondent is the plaintiff in the suit which was for a declaration of the title of the plaintiff to the plaint schedule item 2 building and its site and also for eviction of defendants from the building. The appellants were impleaded in the suit by order dated 10 - 61961 on c. M. P. No. 4019 of 1961. The trial court found that the defendants in the suit, Four in number, Were trespassers. The case of the first appellant that he was a kudikidappukaran was negatived and it was held that the defendants had no right over item 2 building and that they were liable to be evicted. The suit was therefore decreed as prayed for. In appeal the finding that the defendants were trespassers was not even challenged and only one point was urged before the appellate court and this argument was based on the proviso to s. 2 (25) of act 1 of 1964 as amended by act 35 of 1969. S. 2 (25) of the kerala land reforms act, 1963 (act 1 of 1964). For short the act as amended by act 35 of 1969 was in these terms:
"2 (25) "kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, In possession either as owner or as tenant, On which he could erect a homestead and
(a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay - rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or
(b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, With or without an obligation to pay rent, A but belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and "kudikidappu" means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto:
provided that a person who, On the 16th august, 1968, Was in occupation of any land and the homestead thereon, Or in occupation of a but belonging to any other person, And who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of the kerala land reforms (amendment) act. 1969, Shall be deemed to be in occupation of such land and homestead, Or hut, As the case may be, With permission as required under this clause".
2. The contention raised before the appellate court was based on the wording of the proviso to s. 2 (25) that a person who was in occupation of a but belonging to any other person on the 16th august, 1968 and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of act 35 of 1969 must be deemed to be in occupation with the required permission even if he was a rank trespasser. This contention was negatived by the appellate court. It was held that the legislature could not have intended to confer statutory right on trespassers. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
3. After the second appeal was filed against the appellate decision on the 14th june, 1971, S. 2 (25) was amended by act 17 of 1972 which came into force on 1 - 11 - 1972. This amendment was to take effect from 1 11970. When the case came up for hearing before gopalan nambiyar j. The learned judge referred the case to be heard by a division bench,
4. When the case came up before a division bench on 4 - 6 - 74 counsel for the respondent prayed for time to file a petition under art. 226 of the constitution challenging the validity of the explanation introduced into the act by act 17 of 1972. Accordingly the ease was adjourned to the 6th of june, 1974 and on that day original petition 2470 of 1974 was filed by the respondent and his daughter seeking the issue of a writ in the nature of a declaration that explanation ii a introduced in the definition of "kudikidappukaran" in s. 2 (25) of the act by s. 2 of the kerala land reforms (amendment) act, 17 of 1972 is unconstitutional and null and void. That petition was also heard along with the second appeal.
5. In gopalan v. Chellamma 1966 klt 673 this court had to construe explanation ii to clause (25) of s. 2 of act 1 of 1964 as it stood at that time. That explanation was in these terms:
"explanation ii: any person who was in occupation of a kudikidappu on the 11th day of april, 1957, And who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of this act, Shall be deemed to be in occupation of such kudikidappu with permission as required under this clause."
after discussing the relevant provision madhavan nair j. Observed:
"to be a kudikidappukaran either the erection of the homestead or the occupation of the but must commence with permission of the landlord. A trespasser who made forcible entry into the land of another and put up a homestead thereon, In the teeth of opposition by the landlord, Even though he might have occupied the same before the 11th day of april, 1957 and continued that occupation to the date of commencement of the land reforms act, Will not be within the definition of a kudikidappukaran."
the same view had been taken earlier by the same judge in karunakaran nair v. Ramakrishnan nair 1966 klt 351. To the same effects is the decision in markose peter v. Chacko ittivcheria 1971 klt 481 and that in vareeth george v. Achuthan sivadasan 1972 klt 107. The whole matter was again considered by a full bench of this court in narayanan asari thankappan asari v. Ammukutty bai 1973 klt 443. After considering all the decisions on the subject the full bench came to the following conclusion with reference to the proviso to s. 2 (25) introduced by the amending act, Act 35 of 1969 which we have already extracted:
" if the appellant was found to be in occupation on 16th august, 1968 and was also found to have continued in occupation on the date of commencement of act 35 of 1969 (nothing more appearing), Then he would be deemed to be in occupation with permission. But, In this case, Since the initial occupation of the but by the appellant is now found to be by trespass, It cannot be held that he is a kudikidappukaran under s. 2 (25) (b), Though he continued to be in such occupation on the date of commencement of the kerala land reforms (amendment) act."
this decision was rendered on the 6th october, 1972. The kerala land reforms (amendment) act, 1972 (act 17 of 1972) received the assent of the president on 111 1972 and was published in the kerala gazette on the 2nd november, 1972. One of the amendments introduced by that act was the introduction of explanation iia to clause (25) of s. 2 of the kerala land reforms act, 1963 and that explanation is in these terms:
"explanation iia: notwithstanding any judgment, Decree or order of any court, Person, Who on the 16th day of august, 1968, Was in occupation of any land and the dwell in house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessor - in - interest or be longing to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of january, 1970, Shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran:"
the proviso to that explanation is immaterial for the purpose of these cases.
6. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the new explanation, Explanation iia, There is no scope for reading down the section so as to imply from the wording of the explanation any kind of permission which has been held to be necessary by the decision in gopalan v. Chellamma 1966 klt 673, Markose peter v. Chacko ittycheria 1971 klt 481, Vareeth george v. Achuthan sivadasan 1972 klt 107 and by the full bench decision in narayanan asari thankappan asari v. Ammukutty bai 1973 klt 443. It was argued that if a person was on the 16th august, 1968 in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon, (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessors - in - interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of january, 1970, He shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran.
7. In the full bench decision, 1973 klt 443, (narayanan asari thankappan asari v. Ammukutty bai) reference was made to the decision of the supreme court in budhan singh v. Babi bux air 1970 s. C. 1880 wherein it was held that though "held" can mean "lawfully held" as well as "'unlawfully held" when the legislature uses the expression the word must be taken to mean "lawfully held". The earlier decision of the supreme court in k. K. Handique v. Member, Board of agricultural income - tax, Assam air. 1966 s. C. 1191 wherein a similar view was taken was also noticed by the full bench. It was the principle of this decision that was applied by this court in the full bench decision nerayanan asari thankappan asari v. Ammukutty bai 1973 klt 443.
8. It was contended by the advocate general to whom notice had been given that it could never the presumed that the legislature intended to create rights in favour of persons committing illegal acts or getting into possession of property unlawfully. So it was urged that we must understand the explanation only as referring to those who were in lawful occupation. It was submitted that the same conclusion will have to be reached for another reason as well. The wider meaning that can be given to the explanation would make the provision valid due to the incompetence of the legislature to make such a provision.
9. The correct principle in such cases is to find out the real intention of the legislature. But it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that the explanation cannot be given a limited meaning considering the circumstances in which the explanation was introduced. The intention of the legislature in enacting explanation iia, It was submitted, Was clear. It was to get over the effect of successive rulings interpreting the earlier explanation and the proviso to which we have already adverted to. This court had consistently read down the provisions. It is notwithstanding those judgments that explanation iia has now been brought into the statute book and the wording leaves no ambiguity that if the conditions of the explanation iia are satisfied a kudikidappukaran comes into existence. It was emphasised that the words used in the explanation are that the persons satisfying the terms of the definition shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran. This expression implies the introduction of a legal fiction: and a person who though in reality was not a kudikidappukaran but satisfied the conditions of the explanation shall nevertheless be taken to be a kudikidappukaran. There is therefore no scope for understanding the explanation as inapplicable to trespassers. If this argument of the plaintiff respondent is accepted the explanation cannot stand. No doubt the act - has been included in the ninth schedule to the constitution. This was by the twentyninth amendment to the constitution which came into force on 9 - 7 - 1972. As was noticed already, Act 17 of 1972 which introduced the amendment received the assent of the president only on 1 - 11 - 72. The provision introduced by the amendment cannot get the protection of art. 31b was not disputed. The law enacted was bound therefore to satisfy not only the requirement of art. 31a but of art. 19 (1) (f) of the constitution. To confer fixity of tenure on a rank trespasser is not an agrarian reform. Such a provision would violate the guarantee of right to property under act. 19 (1) (f) and by no stretch of imagination would it be possible to conclude that the interest of the general public would be served by such a provision conferring rights on those who commit unlawful acts and indulge in land grabbing or forcible occupation of homesteads or huts.
10. Explanation iia will be applicable not only to rank trespassers like the appellant before us, But also to persons who had occupied a but with permission or who had erected a homestead on land in the possession of another with that person's permission. And a trespasser as well as a person in lawful occupation have been so intrinsically linked together. It was contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that there is no way of separating the two so that the offensive part can be declared to be void and the good saved. Strong reliance was placed by him on the following observations of raman nayar j. In chami chettiar v. Thirumandham kunnu bhagavathi devaswom 1970 klt 897 in para. 11 at page 903.
"we do recognise that that there might be persons (perhaps a large number of persons) entitled to the benefit of the impugned provisions who cannot properly be described as rank trespassers or grabbers, And the conferments of tenancy rights on whom might be a measure of agrarian reform. But there is no denying that the provisions do extend their favour to rank wrong - doers, The rewarding of whose wrongs cannot be in the interests of the general public and, Therefore, Cannot be a reform. The subject - matter or the field being inseverable, And the separation of the sheep from the goats depending on circumstances in their very nature variable, We do not think it possible to so construe the provisions as to exclude the latter from their ambit with a view to their salvage."
this is the principle that we might have applied. But our attention has been invited by the learned advocate general to the decision of the supreme court in the malankara rubber and produce co. Ltd. V. State of kerala and others etc. Air. 1972 s. C. 2027. To understand this decision we have to consider the decision of this court in v. M. Narayanan nair and others v. State of kerala and others 1970 klt 659. The meaning of the expression'public purpose' as it occurred in s. 96 of the kerala land reforms act at the time the decision was rendered was considered therein. This court held that
"despite the wide language of sub - section (1) of s. 96, Having regard to the context in which it appears, The reservation for public purposes under that sub - section can only be for public purposes relating to agriculture, Such as, For example, The provision of thrashing floors or the construction of irrigation or drainage channels, Or the housing of agricultural labourers. That being so, Both the imposition of a ceiling and the acquisition of excess lands come within the protection of art. 31a."
the relevant part of sub - section (1) of s, 96 that was construed read as follows:
"96 (1). Subject to the provisions of s. 94, The land board shall, After reserving in each village the lands necessary for public purposes, Assign on registry the remaining lands vested in the government under s. 86 or s. 87"
after the decision was rendered a new sub - section (1a) was introduced by act 25 of 1971. That sub - section is in these terms:
" (1a) notwithstanding anything contained in sub - section (1), The land board may, If it considers that any land vested in the government under s. 86 or s. 87 is required for any public purpose, Reserve such land for such purpose."
the effect of this amendment was considered by the supreme court in the judgment in para. 37 and 38 of the malankara rubber and produce co. Ltd. V. State of kerala and others etc, Air. 1972 s. C. 2027.
"37. It was argued that although the kerala high court in narayanan nair's case, Air. 1971 kerala 98 turned down the contention that under the wide language of s. 96 (1) "the reservation for public purpose could be for any purpose whatever including one entirely unconnected with agriculture such as for example, An "industrial undertaking" on the ground that "having regard to the context in which it appears the reservation for public purposes under that sub - section can only be for public purposes relating to agriculture, Such as the provisions for thrashing floors or the construction of irrigation or drainage channels or the construction of houses for agricultural labourers", The new sub - sec, (1a) shows that the state did not intend to be bound by the construction placed upon s. 96 by the high court and made it clean that the section was not to be so read down thereby keeping in its hand the matter of reservation of land for public purpose of any kind not limited to agrarian reform.
38. The argument though forcefully put cannot be accepted. The object,of both the 1964 act and the present act was to effect agrarian reform, Which only can give to the statute the protection of art. 31 - a. This was made clear by the high court in its judgment and in our view rightly, By reading down the said provision as to reservation for public purposes to reservation for purposes falling within the expression "agrarian reform by enacting sub - s. (1 - a) despite the said construction by the high court it appears that the intention of the state legislature was to overrule legislatively the view expressed by the high court and not to be bound by the interpretation placed by the high court. By so doing, The new sub - section has once again been made prone to the same constitutional challenge. We have no doubt that the sub - section is couched in too general and wider language capable of including public purposes which would not be those falling within the expression 'agrarian reform'. There was therefore considerable force in the contention of counsel for the petitioners. The fact however that the legislature has once again used the same general language in spite of the aforesaid interpretation given by the high court need not lead us to strike down wholly the sub - section. In accordance with the well recognised canon of construction adopted in a number of cases decided by this court we read the subsection to mean only reservation of the land for such public purposes as would bring about agrarian reform inasmuch as any acquisition under art. 31 - a for any public purpose other than that falling under the expression "agrarian reform" cannot be considered as having the protection of that article. "
11. This is a clear any direct authority binding on us. We have already observed that if we give to the explanation its literal grammatical meaning, The explanation cannot stand in view of the guarantees under art. 31a and 19 (1) (f) of the constitution. To bring it within such guarantees it is necessary to read the explanation as inapplicable to the cases of trespassers like the appellants before us. And notwithstanding the prior history and the apparent intention of the legislature to get over the decision of this court we must apply the rule in the, Malankara rubber and produce co. Ltd. V. State of kerala and others etc. Air. 1972 s. C. 2027.
12. We therefore allow the original petition, 2470 of 1974 and declare that explanation iia is inapplicable to trespassers.
13. In the light of our decision in the original petition the appellants in the second appeal have no leg to stand as they would not get the protection of explanation iia as they are rank trespassers, Concurrently found to be so by both the courts below. We dismiss the second appeal with costs. There will be no order as to costs in the original petition.
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