Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Executive Officer, Chlakudy Panchayat v. Devassy And Another

Kerala High Court
Oct 13, 1970
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The trial magistrate found that the accused had constructed a stone-and-cement structure across and obstructing a drain that formed part of a public road vested in a panchayat. The magistrate held that this conduct breached clause (a) of section 84 of the Kerala Panchayats Act (construction/obstruction in or over a public road) and, being not permitted by rules under the Act, was punishable under section 132 read with the first item in Schedule III. The trial court convicted the accused and imposed a fine of Rs. 25 (with default simple imprisonment for one week).

The accused appealed to the District Magistrate, who acquitted him on three grounds: (1) the prosecution had not proved that sections 84 and 132 of the Act had been brought into force by notification; (2) the prosecution was defective for want of authorisation by the panchayat under section 119 of the Act; and (3) the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused effected the construction.

The executive officer of the panchayat (the complainant) brought this appeal under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellate court was asked to reconsider the acquittal and certain earlier local decisions in light of other authorities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution was required to tender and prove the government notification bringing sections 84 and 132 (and Schedule III) of the Kerala Panchayats Act into force, or whether the court could take judicial notice (and consult official reference works such as the Gazette) that those provisions were in force.
  2. Whether the prosecution was defective for want of authorisation by the panchayat under section 119 of the Act when the complaint was made by the executive authority.
  3. Whether the prosecution had proved that the accused was the person who erected the offending structure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 689 Held that a notification bringing a statute into force must be proved in the ordinary course and that the court could not take judicial notice that the law had been brought into force. The court expressly disagreed with this decision, describing it as "directly in point but ... contrary to that we have taken" and stating that it "does not think that this decision is correct."
Pyli v. State of Kerala, 1966 KLT 102 Deals with a notification under section 19 of the Kerala Forests Act, 1961, declaring an area a reserved forest (a notification of a different kind). Noted as dealing with a different kind of notification; the court said these decisions concern notifications of a different character and did not decide whether such notifications are legislative or executive in character.
Chandrasekharan v. State, (1965/1966) KLT 638 Concerns a notification fixing a maximum price under the Essential Commodities Act (another different type of notification). Observed as another instance of a different kind of notification; the court declined to pronounce on the legislative/executive character for such notifications in this case.
Executive Officer v. Bharathan, 1967 KLT 161 Involves a notification including a trade within a schedule of dangerous trades in the Madras Village Panchayats Act (also a different kind of notification). Considered alongside other local decisions of a different kind; the court noted the distinction and did not treat those cases as determinative of the present question.
State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 Referenced as a decision involving notifications, but of a different kind from the notification at issue in this case. The court stated this and related Supreme Court decisions were "not of the same kind" as the present notification and were of no great assistance here; two of the Supreme Court decisions were noted as not being concerned with the question whether judicial notice should be taken.
Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1955 SC 25 Another Supreme Court decision involving notifications (different kind). The court observed it was not concerned with the specific judicial-notice question now before the court and therefore not greatly helpful.
State v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1956 M.B. 138 Referred to among authorities on notifications; not the same kind as the present notification. The court noted the decision but found it not of direct assistance to the present question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, confined to the content of the opinion:

  1. The court accepted the trial magistrate's factual finding that the accused erected a stone-and-cement structure obstructing a drain that was part of a public road vested in the panchayat. The trial court had therefore properly applied section 84(a) of the Kerala Panchayats Act (prohibition against obstructions in or over public roads) and the penalty provisions in section 132 read with Schedule III.
  2. The first ground of acquittal (failure to prove the notification bringing relevant provisions into force) turned on sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act, which provides that the Act "shall come into force on such date as the government may, by notification in the gazette, appoint" and allows different dates for different areas and provisions. The District Magistrate had relied on absence of the notification in evidence to acquit.
  3. The court considered section 57(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, which binds the court to take judicial notice of laws in force in India and permits the court to resort to appropriate books or documents of reference. The court reasoned that where a court is bound to take judicial notice it also has a duty to consult the necessary reference documents (for example, the Gazette) to ascertain whether a law has been brought into force.
  4. The court found that there existed a state government notification dated 1 December 1961, published in the Kerala Gazette on 12 December 1961, appointing 1 January 1962 as the date on which sections 84 and 132 and Schedule III would come into force. A copy of that notification had been produced before the appellate court. Both sides had proceeded at trial on the basis that the provisions were in force and there was no contention to the contrary. Given these facts, the appellate court held the District Magistrate was wrong to allow the acquittal on the ground that the notification had not been tendered or proved at trial.
  5. The court also stated it was inclined to the view that a notification bringing a law into force is itself a legislative (rather than purely executive) act and that the court is bound to take judicial notice of such a notification just as it is bound to take judicial notice of a statute or rule made under it. The court declined to finally decide ancillary questions about the precise character of other types of notifications, noting that the other local decisions referred to different sorts of notifications.
  6. On the second ground (section 119 authorisation), the court explained that section 119 requires that "no person shall be tried for any offence against this act ... unless complaint is made by the police, the executive authority or a person expressly authorised in that behalf by the panchayat or executive authority within three months of the commission of the offence." Here the complaint was made by the executive authority on 9-6-1969, within three months of the alleged offence (3-5-1969). The court therefore held the District Magistrate misread section 119; that ground was unsustainable (and counsel for the accused had conceded it).
  7. On the third ground (identity of the offender), the court reviewed the trial magistrate's acceptance of evidence of PW3 (a panchayat peon) and PW4 (a person operating a press near the site). PW3 testified that the accused put up the structure with the help of a mason and two workmen and reported the matter orally to the executive officer; PW4 gave evidence that the accused had brought the workmen and had the structure put up. The appellate court rejected the District Magistrate's reasons for disbelieving those witnesses (that PW3 was a peon, or that PW4 lacked a licence and could not have seen the work from inside his press) as unconvincing. The appellate court accepted PW3 and PW4 and held that the accused put up the offending structure.
  8. The court noted both courts below had found the drain was part of the public road and not on the accused's private land; that factual finding was not challenged on appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The appellate court convicted the accused under section 132 read with item 1 of Schedule III of the Kerala Panchayats Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 100, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week.

Direct consequences: The previous acquittal by the District Magistrate was set aside; the accused was convicted and sentenced to the stated fine and default imprisonment.

Legal implications identified in the opinion: The court held that (i) where a court is bound to take judicial notice of laws in force (per section 57 of the Evidence Act), it may consult appropriate reference documents such as the Gazette to ascertain whether a statutory provision has been brought into force, and (ii) a notification bringing an Act (or specified provisions of an Act) into force is, in the court's view, a matter of which the court should take judicial notice (the court expressed the view that such notifications are legislative in character). The court rejected the contrary approach taken in Sreedharan v. State (1969 KLT 689).

The opinion does not purport to make final pronouncements on the character of every kind of government notification discussed in other authorities; it confined its ruling to the facts before it and to the judicial-notice principle as applied to the notification bringing the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act into force.

This summary is a faithful extract and organization of the legal opinion provided and does not introduce information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The learned trial magistrate found that the accused in this case had put up a stone and cement structure across, And obstructing, A drain forming part of a public road situate and vested' in a panchayat. If that be so, The accused was guilty of a breach of clause (a) of s. 84 of the kerala panchayats act, The construction not being permitted by the rules made under the act. That section, So far as is material, Says:

"84. Prohibition against obstruction in or over public roads, Etc. - no person shall except as permitted by rules made under this act and except in accordance with the conditions imposed by any licence made requisite by such rules

(a) build any wall or erect any fence or other obstruction or projection or make any encroachment whatsoever whether permanent or temporary, In or over any public road;

a breach of s. 84 (a) is punishable under s. 132 of the act, Read with the first item in schedule iii thereto, With a fine of rs. 100/ -. And the learned magistrate finding the accused guilty accordingly sentenced him to pay a fine of rs. 25/ -, In default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week. On appeal by the accused to the district magistrate the latter acquitted him on three grounds:

(1) that the prosecution had not proved that s. 84 and 132 of the act had come into force;

(2) that the prosecution was bad for want of authorisation by the panchayat under s. 119 of the act; and

(3) that the prosecution had failed to prove that it was the accused that had effected the construction.

this appeal against the acquittal brought under sub - section (3) of s. 417 of the criminal procedure code by the complainant, The executive officer of the panchayat concerned, Has come before us since it was thought that the decisions in sreedharan v. State of kerala 1969 klt. 689, Pyli v. State of kerala 1966 klt. 102, Chandrasekharan v. State 1965 klt. 638 and executee officer v. Bharathan 1967 klt. 161 required reconsideration in the light of the decisions in state of bombay v. F. N. Balsara air. 1951 sc. 318, Edward mills co. V. State of ajmer air. 1955 sc. 25 and state v. Gopal singh air. 1956 m. B. 138.

2. It is the first of the grounds stated by the learned district magistrate that has been responsible for this case coming before us and we shall deal with it first. Sub - section (3) of s. 1 of the act provides that the act "shall come into force on such date as the government may, By notification in the gazette, Appoint". Also that "different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provisions" of the act. It is because the notification bringing the relevant provisions of the act into force had not been tendered in evidence and duly proved at the trial that the learned district magistrate held that the prosecution must fail.

3. The offence is alleged to have been committed on 3 - 5 - 1969. There is, In fact, A notification by the state government dated the 1st december 1961 and published in the kerala gazette of the 12th december 1961 appointing the first day of january 1962 as the date on which s. 84 and 132 and schedule iii among other provisions of the act shall come into force. That notification is extracted in the publication of the act commonly used in the courts, And a copy of the notification has been produced before us. The short question is whether a court which under clause (1) of s. 57 of the indian evidence act is bound to take judicial notice of all laws in force in the territory of india should insist on a notification like the present bringing a law into force being produced and proved in the ordinary course, Or should itself find out whether, Or not the law has been brought into force by resort to the appropriate books or documents of reference.

4. It is to be noticed that the trial magistrate did apparently take judicial notice of the fact that the provisions of the kerala panchayats act were a law in force, Something which everybody concerned obviously knew no contention to the contrary was (or could have been) taken before him, Or, Indeed, Before the learned district magistrate. That being so, And the provisions concerned being in fact a law in force, It was not for the district magistrate in appeal to hold the contrary on the ground that the notification bad not been tendered and proved in evidence. That apart, It is clear from s. 57 of the evidence act that in all cases where the court is bound to take judicial notice, The court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference. There is thus a duty cast on the court to refer to the necessary documents for the purpose of taking judicial notice of something of which it is bound to take judicial notice. Therefore, If that were necessary, The court should have looked into the gazettee or other book or document of reference for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the law here in question had been brought into force. It is only where a document of reference for the purpose of deciding such a question is not readily available that the question of the court calling upon the party concerned to produce it would arise. Here both sides proceeded before the learned magistrate on the basis that the provisions in question were in force. They were, In fact, In force; the court apparently knew they were in force; and, Therefore, No question arose of the court calling upon anybody to produce the necessary document, Namely, The notification, Much less prove it.

5. There has been some discussion at the bar as to whether the notification itself is a law in force of which the court was bound to take judicial notice. Although it is really not necessary to decide that question here, We are inclined to the view that it is. Bringing a law into force seems to us to be a legislative rather than an executive function, Whether you call that conditional or delegated legislation when it is done by somebody other than the legislature. That being so, We are inclined to the view that a court is bound to take judicial notice of a notification like the present just as much as it is bound to take judicial notice of a statute or a rule made thereunder.

6. Sreedharan v. State of kerala 1969 k. L. T. 689, A decision of a learned single judge of this court, Is directly in point but takes a view contrary to that we have taken. There it was held that a notification bringing the statute there concerned, Namely, The travancore - cochin medical practitioners act, Into force would have to be proved in the ordinary course by tendering the notification in evidence and that the court could not take judicial notice of the fact that the law had been brought into force. With respect we do not think that this decision is correct.

7. The other decisions of this court, Namely, Pyli v. State of kerala 1966 klt. 102, Chandrasekharan v. State 1966 k. L. T. 638 and executive officer v. Bharathan (1967 k. L. T 161) deal with notifications of a different kind. The first of these deals with a notification under s. 19 of the kerala forests act, 1961, Declaring a particular area to be a reserved forest; the second deals with a notification fixing a maximum price under the essential commodities act; and the third with a notification including a trade within the schedule of dangerous trades in the madras village panchayats act. Whether notifications like these are legislative, Or albeit statutory, Essentially executive in character is a matter on which two views seem possible and on which we do not feel called upon to pronounce, Although it would appear that there is much to be said for the view that the second and third are legislative in character.

8. The notifications considered in state of bombay v. F. N. Balsara a. I. R. 1951 s. C. 318, Edward mills co. V. State of ajmer a. I. R. 1955 s. C. 25 and state v. Gopal singh a. I. R. 1956 m. B. 138 are not of the same kind as the notification we are here considering, And these decisions are of no great assistance in deciding the present case. Indeed, The two decisions of the supreme court were not concerned at all with the question whether judicial notice should be taken of the notifications concerned.

9. The first ground on which the learned district magistrate acquitted the accused was clearly mistaken.

10. The remaining two grounds do not seem to us to stand on any better footing. Regarding the second, We might say that it seems to have proceeded on a complete misreading of s. 119 of the act as if under that section an authorisation by the panchayat were necessary even when the complaint is, As here, By the executive authority. That is not so. What the section says is that

"no person shall be tried for any offence against this act or any rule or bye - law made thereunder unless complaint is made by the police, The executive authority or a person expressly authorised in that behalf by the panchayat or executive authority within three months of the commision of the offence"
. Here, The complaint was by the executive authority and it was made on 9 - 6 - 1969 within three months of the commision of the offence. Indeed, Even counsel for the accused has submitted that this ground is unsustainable.

11. With regard to the third ground, Namely, Whether it was the accused that had put up the structure, The learned trial magistrate accepted the evidence of p. Ws. 3 and 4 in holding that it was. Pw. 3, A peon of the panchayat, Said in his evidence that it was the accused that put up the structure with the help of a mason and two workmen and that he orally reported this fact to the executive officer without delay. Pw. 4, A person running a press in the immediate vicinity, Also gave evidence to the same effect. In fact, His evidence was more specific in that he said that the accused brought the workmen and had the structure put up. The structure, We may mention, Is immediately adjoining the accused's land just north of the drain, And it would appear that there were disputes between the panchayat and the accused regarding this drain, The accused's case being that it was an encroachment on his land. We do not think that the learned trial magistrate erred in any way in accepting the evidence of pws. 3 and 4, And the grounds on which the learned district magistrate rejected their evidence seem to us unsustainable. That pw. 3 is a peon of the panchayat and that pw. 4 was running a press without the licence required for the purpose and further that he could not have seen the construction sitting inside his press, When it was not his case that he saw it from there, Which are the reasons put forward by the learned district magistrate, Seem to us unconvincing. We accept the evidence of pws. 3 and 4 and hold that it was the accused that put up the offending structure encroaching on and obstructing the public road vested in the panchayat.

12. We might add that both the courts below have found that the drain in question is part of the public road and is not in the accused's private land. That finding has not been assailed before us.

13. In the result we allow this appeal, Convict the accused under s. 132 read with item 1 of schedule iii of the kerala panchayats act and sentence him to pay a fine of rs. 100/ -, In default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week.

allowed.