N. Raghavan (Petitioner) v. The Executive Officer, Tripunithura Panchayat ().

V. Khalid, J.:— The petitioner seeks to quash Exts. P.-3 and P-4 orders passed by the Executive Officer of Tripunithura Panchayat and the Deputy Director of Panchayats, Ernakulam. The petitioner was working as a Bill Collector in the Tripunithura Panchayat. He was originally appointed as a Peon. At that time, he had not passed S.S.L.C examination. There were two permanent posts of Bill Collectors in the said Panchayat. On 20-3-1963, the Director of Panchayats sanctioned one temporary post of Bill Collector and the petitioner was posted to that post with effect from 1-4-1963. Since then, he has been working in the Panchayat for various periods mentioned in para 4 of the petition. According to him, he has been continuously working as Bill Collector from 27-5-1968.

2. The 4th respondent was appointed as a Sweeper (contingent) in the same Panchayat. He passed the S.S.L.C examination and was subsequently promoted as Bill Collector, after the petitioner's promotion as Bill Collector. The petitioner submits that he is senior to the 4th respondent in the category of Bill Collector. The minimum general educational qualification prescribed for the post of Panchayat Assistant is S.S.L.C The petitioner failed in the S.S.L.C examination though he appeared for the same. However, he appeared for the eligibility test prescribed for the Bill Collectors who did not pass S.S.L.C examination conducted by the Director of Panchayats and passed the same. The result of the examination was published in the Kerala Gazette dated 27-2-1973. He thus became qualified fully to hold the post of Panchayat Assistant from 27-2-1973.

3. A maternity leave vacancy of Panchayat Assistant arose in the said Panchayat on 20-11-1972. At that time the petitioner was not qualified, and therefore, the 4th respondent was promoted provisionally, who continued in that post till 19-2-1973. Thereafter, he was reverted to the post of Bill Collector. Regarding qualifications for the Panchayat Assistants, there was a circular by the District Panchayat Officer dated 22-3-1973, evidenced by Ext. P-1, that Panchayat employees who have passed S.S.L.C standard test should not be denied promotion for which they are eligible. An additional post of Panchayat Assistant was sanctioned to Tripunithura Panchayat with with effect from 1-7-1973. By then the petitioner became fully qualified, the was entitled to be promoted under rule 16 of the Kerala Panchayat (Establishment) Rules, 1967, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. However, the first respondent promoted the 4th respondent to the said post with effect from 1-7-1973. The petitioner filed a representation before the first respondent on 9-7-1973 claiming his due promotion. This was returned with the endorsement that he could not be promoted. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Panchayat. This was rejected by Ext. P-3. A further appeal was filed before the Deputy Director of Panchayats, Ernakulam. This was also rejected holding that the 4th respondent had a preferential claim under rule 21(5) of the rules. It was stated that the petitioner did not possess the general educational qualification, namely, the S.S.L.C pass. The order rejecting the appeal is Ext. P-4. This writ petition challenges these orders as being against law.

4. It is contended that Ext. P-4 order and the orders passed earlier are bad in law. These orders did not take into consideration the fact that the passing of eligibility lest is equivalent to the passing of the S.S.L.C examination. It was further contended that rule 21(5) of the rules did not apply in this case since the 4th respondent was not holding the post substantively on the date of his discharge. He was only promoted in the maternity leave vacancy that arose. The petitioner's counsel took me through the rules in support of his contention that occupying the post during maternity leave is not occupying the post substantively.

5. I do not think it necessary to go into the merits of the contentions of the parties in this case in view of the preliminary objection raised by the respondent's counsel that this writ petition abates as there is a revision provided against Ext. P-4 under section 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act. In view of this objection, I will have to deal with it before deciding the case on merits. If I agree with the respondents that this writ petition has to be dismissed on that ground, to decide it on merits will be to pre-judge the matter thus preventing the revisional authority from considering it, unfettered by any observations of this Court.

6. It cannot be disputed that section 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act provides for a revision to the Government. Whether this remedy available under section 144(3) can be considered as “any other remedy for such redress as is provided for by of under any other law for the time being in force” is the question for consideration here.

7. The Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution structurally altered Art. 226 of the Constitution. Whether the amended Article restricted the jurisdiction of this Court or widened it is a matter not free from doubt. Whether the amended Article can achieve its object is again a matter not relevant for consideration at this stage. The only question that falls for consideration is whether the existence of any other remedy completely ousts the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining and deciding petitions under Art. 226.

8. The petitioner's counsel forcefully contended that the remedy contemplated under Art. 226(3) should be an open and effective remedy. In support of this contention, strong reliance was placed upon a Full Bench ruling of the Gujarat High Court rendered by five Judges reported in A'bad Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India(1), which appears in the July part of the A.I.R The judgment is not complete. However, from the portion available, I can more or less see how the learned Judges dealt with this question.

9. The facts in those writ petitions, as I could make out, are as follows: The petitioners were cotton textile units manufacturing blended yarn which became dutiable for the first time under Tariff Item 18=E, which was added on March 16, 1972 in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. According to the petitioners, blended yarn that they manufactured was coated with sizing materials to impart strength to the yarn in the weaving process in all these composite mills and in doing so, the weight of the blended yarn increased by some 12 to 14 percent. Even so, the blended yarn remained blended yarn, even after the sizing process. Excise duty was paid on the sizing materials. Excise duty was charged by the authorities under Tariff item 18-E on weight basis per kilogram on unsized yarn at the spindle point. By the trade notice issued by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise dated August 9, 1976, a change of basis had been made, it was this notice that was the subject-matter of attack in those writ petitions, in the counter-affidavit filed by the authorities, it was stated that yarn manufactured at the spindle stage was not completely manufactured unless it was would on cones, bobbins and beams as per their requirements and that it was so wound only after the process of sizing was carried out on such warp yarn. The yarn even after sizing continued to be yarn and, therefore, the point of removal for payment of duty would be the point at which the sized yarn was removed for the manufacture of fabrics which was another excisable commodity. It was denied by the authorities that the yarn produced or manufactured by the petitioners at the spindle stage was sold or was capable of being used or sold in the market. It was further contended that the general principles as to how the duty was to be levied under Tariff Item No. 18-E as seen in the Trade Notice were not binding on the assessing authority and that it was for the assessing authority to determine the question of assessment, and hence the trade notice did not give any cause of action to the petitioners. It was further contended that the petitions were premature and that they should exhaust the remedy available to them before the assessing authority. Not having exhausted the remedies available under the Act, the bar under Art. 226(3) would apply and that the petitions have abated under section 58(2) of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976.

10. The question posed in that case was whether the jurisdiction of the High Court to act under Art. 226 is completely taken away by the Amended Article 226 read with section 58(2) of the Amending Act. In a detailed analysis of the various aspects of the case, the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the petitions were for enforcement of the fundamental right to hold property under Art. 31(1) and the Excise authorities were seeking to enforce the demand of excise duty arrogating a jurisdiction to themselves to change the settled basis of excise duty levy for the blended yarn for all these years by acting on the aforesaid trade notice issued by the Deputy Collector. The Court considered the question whether the amended Article took away the jurisdiction of the Court. She levy in that case was held to be in contravention of Art. 265 and ex facie without jurisdiction and also against the principles of natural justice. In para 11 of the judgment, the Court held that a bare perusal of the new Article shows that the fetter imposed is not one against an action for enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 226(1)(a), but the restriction related to sub-clauses (b) and (c) only. I shall read para 11 of the judgment to correctly appreciate the contentions and how the Court met the same. Para 11 reads:

“A bare perusal shows that this fetter is not attracted to a petition for enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 226(1)(a) as it is restricted to sub-cls. (b) and (c) only. The second feature which must be borne in mind is that this is a fetter to the entertainment of the petition itself because now the writ jurisdiction for the specified purpose in cls. (b) and (c) of Art. 226(1) has to be exercised if there is no other remedy for such redress provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. Formerly, by a self-limitation the discretion was exercised not to entertain writ petitions when alternative remedy existed but now when a constitutional fetter is created, the Court would have no jurisdiction if alternative remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law. This being a fetter on the jurisdiction of the Court, it will have to be interpreted strictly. Even though the words “any other remedy” had been used, it is obvious that “any other remedy” has to be for redress of the injury for which this writ jurisdiction is conferred and, therefore, it must be equally adequate or efficacious so that qualitatively and quantitatively the same relief would be given for redress of the injury to the petitioner. Therefore, the adequate efficacious remedy is always implicit if the remedy is to be for redressing the injury as effectively as could be done in the writ petition. The third important feature is that such a remedy must have been provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force which makes it implicit that this must be a direct remedy specifically provided by or under the specific law in force under which the impugned action is taken or order is made.”

11. In paragraph 27 the matter is further clarified by the learned Judges and it would be useful to lead it for understanding the reasoning of the Full Bench. Paragraph 27 reads:

“The aforesaid discussion clearly reveals that every Act would have to be examined when such a question of the existence of alternative remedy arises and it would have to be found out as to what is the amplitude of the normal Act remedies for appeal or revision so that the question of real or purported order would be decisive. If the Act remedy is so wide as to cover even purported orders so that no part of the activity of the authority is a collateral activity, the Act having provided for direct remedies to such a wide extent, that remedy would have to be first exhausted. On the other hand, where the Act remedies are not of such wide amplitude but only for orders under the Act, in cases of such purported orders, the appeal remedy could not come in the way of the petitioner as it could not be said to have been provided for such purported orders which are null and void and which it would not be obligatory for the petitioner to exhaust for the simple reason that such an appeal would not be able to cure the defect even if the appeal confirms the original order bearing this indelible mark of nullity.”

12. The Full Bench repelled the plea put forward by the State that in the context of the amendment to Art. 226(3) any distinction between a real and purported order could not exist because the fetter is all comprehensive. The contention by the State was that ones any kind of remedy was shown to exist, whether by way of statutory appeal, revision or even by collateral attack in a civil Court, the said remedy has to be exhausted.

13. Before the new amendment, the High Courts in India were not slow in interfering with orders which were ex facie null or void. Even before the amendment, the Courts were slow in disturbing or interfering with orders where the party had an alternative remedy. That was a self imposed limitation on the exercise of power under Article 226. The object of the amendment can be gleaned from the following extract of the speech of the then Law Minister, which is seen extracted at page 123 of the aforesaid decision:

“But, of course, if there is an alternative remedy which is provided in the law under which a particular action is taken or an order is made, it is necessary that first that alternative remedy should be exhausted……”

14. In paragraph 11 of the judgment in that decision, after extracting the above portion, the learned Judges held that the amplitude of the fetter imposed by Art. 226(3) is made dependent on the existence of the other effective alternative remedy and not any remedy that is available to an aggrieved party. The Court has indicated its mind in observing that the amplitude of the fetter would depend upon the amplitude of such alternative remedy which is provided for direct attack by or under the other law in question and not on any general remedy of a civil suit by way of a collateral attack.

15. In that case, the Court was dealing with an order, which suffered from want of jurisdiction and was characterised as a nulliy. It is also seen that the alternative remedy available there was the remedy of a civil suit by way of collateral attack. Whether the provisions of Art. 226(3) could be interpreted to mean that the “any remedy” mentioned therein should be an open or effective remedy and not a remedy available to an aggrieved party, is the question that has to be decided here. From a reading of Art. 226(3), it appears to me that the expression ‘any other remedy for’ such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force, means a remedy provided. A distinction between an open or effective remedy and remedies which are not effective cannot be earily delineated. To do so would be to defeat the object of the Article itself. The question which remedy is an open or effective one and which remedy is not, will always remain a vexed question if Art. 226(3) is to be so construed. To construe Art. 226(3) in such manner would be to give little or no meaning to the expression “any other remedy”.

16. The petitioner's counsel would contend that the remedy provided in section 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act is neither open nor effective. He rested his contentions with reference to section 144(1) and (2). These two sub-sections clearly indicate the type of the orders that the appellate authority could pass in an appeal by the aggrieved party. Section 144(3) provides for a revision before Government who can decide the case after consulting, if they deem fit, the Collector, the Director, the Deputy Director, or such other officer or authority, either suo motu or on application by the party. All provisions in kindred enactments and other statutes which provide for revisions are more or less similarly worded. The right of a party to move a Court or Tribunal in revision is not so wide as the right of appeal. It may even be not correct to say that the party has a right to move a Tribunal or Court in revision, since it lies within the discretion of the Tribunal or Court as the case may be to reject the revision even at the threshold. But where a statute provides for a revision, it must be held that the aggrieved party has a right to approach the revisional authority. While considering the revisional remedy available to a party in the context of Art. 226(3), I do not think that a further consideration whether such a remedy is effective or open, is permissible.

17. I shall for a proper appreciation of the contentions raised in this case refer to certain other provisions available in other statutes, where revisions are provided. I shall first read section 144(3):

“3(i) The Government may in their discretion after cousulting if they deem fit, the Collector, the Director, the Deputy Director or such other officer or authority, at any time, either suo motu or on application call for and examine the record of any order patsed or proceedings recorded under the provisions of this Act by—

(a) the Collector, Director, Deputy Director or any officer authorised by the Collector, Director or Duputy Director under S. 143 or

(b) any officer, authority or person authortsed by the Government under sub-section (1) of section 143, or any officer empowered by them under that section or

(c) any authority or officer.

For the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or to the propriety of such order, or as to the regularity of such proceeding and pass such order in reference thereto as they think fit.

(ii) the powers of the nature referred to in clause (i) may also be exercised by such authority or officer as may be empowered in this behalf by the Government.”

18. Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for revision, which reads:

(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court sub-ordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such sub-ordinate Court appears—

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested.

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,

the High Court may make such of order in the case as it thinks fit:

Provided that the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where

(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding; or

(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court sub-ordinate thereto.”

19. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the powers of revision of the High Court and the Sessions Courts. I shall read section 397(1):

(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings, of such inferior Court, and may when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on ball or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.”

20. Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, which deals with revision by Tribunal, reads thus:

“The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to the Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, or revised, the Tribunal may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit.

Provided that the Tribunal shall not take any action under this section if—

(a) the time for appeal against the decision or order has not expired; or

(b) the decision or order has been made the subject matter of an appeal:

Provided further that no order shall be made under this section unless notice has been given to all interested parties and they have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

21. Section 34 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, ??? reads as follows:

“(1) The Commissioner may, of his own motion or on application by an assessee, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act which has been taken by any authority sub-ordinate to him and may make such enquiry of cause such enquiry to be made and subject to the provisions of this Act, may pass such orders thereon as he thinks fit:

Provided that he shall not pass any order prejudicial to an assessee without hearing him or giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard:

Provided further that an order passed declining to interfere shall not be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assessee.

(2) any order passed under sub-section (1) shall be final subject to any reference that may be made to the High Court under section 60.”

22. Section 92 of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules which provides for revision, reads as follows:

Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, the Government may, on their own motion or otherwise, after calling for the records of the case, revise any order passed by a sub-ordinate authority which is made or is appealable under these rules—

(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order;

(b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order;

(c) remit the case to the authority, which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or

(d) pass such other order as they deem fit; Provided that:—

(i) an order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry.”

(ii) If the Government propose to impose any of the penalties specified in items (iv) to (viii) of rule 65 on a case where an enquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such enquiry and after giving the person concerned an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such penalty, pass such orders as they deem fit.”

23. Rule 21(8) of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules reads thus:

“The Board of Revenue shall be competent to revise, cancel or alter on its own motion or otherwise any decision made or order passed by the Tahsildar, Revenue Divisional Officer or District Collector, under these rules.

Provided that no proceedings in this behalf shall be initiated by the Board after the expiry of two years from the date of such decision or order and no such decision or order shall be set aside or modified by it without giving the party affected thereby, a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”

24. Section 16(4) of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act is to the following effect:

“The Board of Revenue may either suo motu or on application revise any order passed by the Collector on appeal.”

25. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act reads thus:

“(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.”

(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion.”

26. Sections 130 and 131 of the Customs Act, 1952 corresponding to section 190 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act are also extracted, which may be usefully referred to:

“130.(1) The Board may of its own motion or on the application of any aggrieved person call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an officer of customs has passed any decision or order under this Act (not being an order passed in appeal under section 128) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit:

Provided that no order enhancing any penalty or fine in lieu of confiscation or confiscating goods of greater value shall be passed under this section unless the person affected by the proposed order has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against it:

Provided further that where the Board is of opinion that any duty of customs has not been levied or has been short-levied, no order levying or enhancing the duty shall be made unless the person affected by the proposed order is given notice to show cause against it within the time-limit specified in section 28.

(2) No decision or order passed by an officer of customs shall be revised under this section by the Board of its own motion and no application for the revision of any such decision or order shall be entertained, after the expiry of two years from the date of such decision or order.

131.(1) The Central Government may, on the application of any person aggrieved by—

(a) any order passed under section 128, or

(b) any order passed under section 130 otherwise than on the application of any aggrieved person, or

(c) any order passed on the application of any aggrieved person under section 130 where the order is of the nature referred to in either of the provisos to sub-section (1) of that section, annul or modify such order.

(2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be made within six months from the date of the communication to the applicant of the order against which the application is being made:

Provided that the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application with the aforesaid period of six months, allow it to be presented within a further period of six months.

(3) The Central Government may of its own motion annul or modify any order passed under section 128 or section 130.

(4) No order enhancing any penalty or fine in lieu of confiscation or confiscating goods of greater value shall be passed under this section—

(a) in any case in which an order passed under section 128 or section 130 has enhanced any penalty or fine in lieu of confiscation or has confiscated goods of greater value; and

(b) in any other case, unless the person affected by the proposed order has been given notice to show cause against it, within one year from the date of the order sought to be annulled or modified.

(5) Where the Central Government is of opinion that any duty of customs has not been levied or has been short-levied, no order levying or enhancing the duty shall be made under this section, unless the person affected by the proposed order is given notice to show cause against it within the time limit specified in section 28.”

27. To say that the revisions in all these cases are not other remedy contemplated in Art. 226(3) will be to completely destroy the effect of the amended Article. It is true that in most of these cases the revisional authority has the power to call for the records suo motu and examine the irregularity of the action taken by the sub-ordinate authority. But all these provisions give to the aggrieved party a right to move the revisional authority by filing an application in that behalf. All these sections lay down the scope of the jurisdiction exerciable and the nature of the order to be passed. The revisional authority under this provision can in appropriate cases, pass effective orders in favour of the aggrieved party.

28. In Kallara Panchayat v. State of Kerala (2) Govindan Nair, J., as he then was although held that the Government could not, under section 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act, take additional evidence at the revisional stage, observed that the revisional power given under that section is so wide as to examine the legality or propriety or regularity of the order passed by the sub-ordinate authority.

29. In B.I.S Navigation Co. v. Collector of Customs (3) the Supreme Court considered the scope of sections 190 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act and held the revision contemplated by those sections to be alternative remedy available to a party.

30. In the context of the wording of these sections and against the background of the principles enunciated in the judgments mentioned above, the conclusion is irresistible that the revisional remedy provided for by the sections mentioned above including S. 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act is an alternative remedy available to a party and comes within the expression “any remedy” provided in Art. 226(3).

31. In the Full Bench case, the Gujarat High Court was dealing with a case where notice under attack was contended to be a nullity, if the learned Judges of the Full Bench have laid down that the provision under Art. 226(3) does not take away the jurisdiction of the Courts where the order under challenge is a nullity. I am in respectful agreement with that conclusion. Mathew, J., as he then was in Ponkunnam Traders v. Additional Income Tax Officer (4) held that where a decision is null and void, it could not be cured by any alternate or appellate proceedings and therefore the failure to take advantage of a futile remedy cannot affect the nullity inherent in the challenged decision. When an order under challenge is a nullity or an order is void, to direct the party seeking to quash the same to resort to the alternative remedy is only to adopt a hollow formality. When the order is a nullity, neither an appellate nor a revisional remedy can improve the situation Nullity is a nullity and to direct a party to resort to a futile remedy will only be to delay justice. It is settled law that where an order under challenge is a nullity or when an order is void, the Court will not insist upon the party to seek alternative remedy available to him under the statute. Therefore in my opinion in construing Art. 226(3), it is not the nature of the alternative remedy provided that should be looked into but it is the nature of the order that is under challenge. If the order is not a nullity, then the alternative remedy provided can invariably be invoked and necessary relief given to an aggrieved party by the exercise of such remedy. It cannot be said that a revision is not an effective remedy. A Court or an authority exercising revisional jurisdiction can set aside, alter or modify the order under revision. Viewed thus, I am constrained to observe that if the Gujarat High Court case proceeded on the basis that the remedy provided as contemplated in Art. 226(3) should be an open or effective remedy, when alone the bar under Art. 226(3) operates, then, with great respect, I have to disagree with that conclusion. In all the provisions extracted above, it can be seen that the revisional authority can exercise its jurisdiction to give relief to a party if the order challenge suffers from any legal infirmity or other defects. The order before me is not a void order, therefore hold that the preliminary objection taken by the respondents on the maintainability of the writ petition has to be sustained. As indicated above, I do not say anything on merits. The petitioner will be at liberty to move the revisional authority under section 144(3) of the Kerala Panchayats Act, with an application for condonation of delay and I am sure that the Government will entertain the revision since there is no limitation prescribed under the rules.

32. The writ petition is disposed of as above. The parties will bear their costs.

33. Petition dismissed.