- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ammini Pandarathy And Others v. Leelamma And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion arises from multiple civil revision petitions concerning eviction of tenants of ten separately numbered rooms in a residential building in Trichur town under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 ("the Act"). Landlords had filed eviction petitions before the Rent Control Court on grounds including arrears of rent (s.11(2)) and reconstruction (s.11(4)(iv)); in one petition (RCP No.69 of 1969) a subletting ground under s.11(4)(i) was also urged. The Rent Control Court issued a common order allowing eviction petitions under s.11(2)(b), rejecting other grounds. Landlords appealed to the Subordinate Judge (appellate authority under s.18), which authority found that the landlords bona fide required reconstruction and allowed eviction under s.11(4)(iv) (and in RCP No.69 also under s.11(4)(i) for subletting). The tenants filed revisions under s.20 before the District Judge, Trichur. The district judge dismissed the revisions but directed the landlords to re-submit a fresh plan to enable reconstruction into a building with 10 rooms (so that the ten evicted tenants could exercise their option under the third proviso to s.11(4)(iv)). The plan previously approved provided for only eight rooms. The tenants challenged the district judge's orders in the present civil revision petitions before the court that produced this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a tenant of a residential building can be evicted for reconstructing the same into a non-residential building given the tenant's right of option under the third proviso to s.11(4)(iv) of the Act.
- Whether reconstruction of a residential building into a non-residential one is prohibited by the conversion prohibition in s.17(1) of the Act.
- Whether the plan and licence for reconstruction must be in existence at the time of filing the eviction petition or whether it suffices that they are available by the time evidence is taken in the petition.
- Whether, in a revision against an eviction order under s.11(4)(iv), the revisional authority can direct the landlord to submit a fresh plan for reconstruction and uphold the eviction on that basis.
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioners (Tenants) — Main Arguments
- Under s.11(4)(iv) a tenant of a residential building cannot be evicted if the landlord intends to reconstruct the building as a non-residential building because the provisos — in particular the third proviso — give the evicted tenant a first option to be allotted the reconstructed building.
- If a landlord were permitted to reconstruct into non-residential use, the provisos would be rendered meaningless and the tenant's chances of reoccupation would be defeated.
- Reliance on Mohanbhai v. M s u Mandir (AIR 1975 SC 2128) to contend that a landlord should not be permitted to circumvent statutory protections by seeking eviction to change user from residential to non-residential.
- Reconstruction into non-residential use would amount to conversion prohibited by s.17(1) of the Act; that provision prohibits conversion by the tenant and (the tenants argue) should prevent such conversion arising from reconstruction following eviction.
- The plan and licence for reconstruction must be available at the time of filing the eviction petition; as in Hameed v. Ittoop (1970 KLT 501) (a full bench decision under the third proviso to s.11(3)), lack of plan/licence at filing should have led to dismissal.
- The district judge erred in directing landlords to submit a revised plan: directions under the second proviso to s.11(4)(iv) cannot relate to approving or changing the reconstruction plan before eviction has taken place.
Respondent Landlords — Main Arguments
- If the court is satisfied that the landlord bona fide requires reconstruction, s.11(4)(iv) does not restrict the landlord to reconstructing a residential building only as residential; reconstruction into non-residential use is permissible.
- The third proviso only gives priority to the tenant to have the reconstructed building allotted to him if he wants it; it does not mandate the user of the reconstructed building to remain residential.
- Authorities such as Kailiani v. Madhavi (1970 KLT 257) and Porinchu v. Ouseph (1971 KLT 571) support the social policy favouring reconstruction and allow considerations like putting property to more profitable use to be relevant to bona fides.
- S.17(1) (prohibition on conversion) applies to conversion by a tenant in occupation; it does not apply to reconstruction by the landlord under s.11(4)(iv).
- S.11(4)(iv) requires the landlord to satisfy the court that he has the plan and licence required, but it does not insist they be produced at the time of filing; it suffices if they are available by the time evidence is taken, and in this case they were produced at evidence stage.
- The district judge's direction for submission of a fresh plan was within the court's power under the second proviso to s.11(4)(iv), which allows directions regarding reconstruction to be issued at any time; and the revisional court should not disturb factual findings on bona fide requirement (a question of fact) except on limited jurisdictional grounds.
- Reliance on Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 KLT 133) and Mattulal v. Radhelal ((1974) US C.W.R. 215) to argue that bona fide requirement is a question of fact and that revisional interference is limited.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohanbhai v. M s u Mandir (AIR 1975 SC 2128) | Cited to show that allowing eviction to effect conversion from residential to non-residential can amount to circumventing statutory protections (example given under a different statute, the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947). | The tenants relied on this case to support the proposition that a landlord should not be allowed to use eviction under s.11(4)(iv) to circumvent rights protecting residential use; the opinion records this reliance as part of the tenants' submissions and treats the principle as supporting scrutiny of attempts to defeat tenants' reoccupation rights. |
| Hameed v. Ittoop (1970 KLT 501) | Full Bench decision under the third proviso to s.11(3) cited for timing/availability of plan and licence in reconstruction contexts. | Tenants relied on the decision to argue that plan/licence must exist at filing; the court noted the existence of this authority but distinguished the statutory wording of s.11(4)(iv), holding that s.11(4)(iv) requires the landlord to satisfy the court that he has the plan and licence but does not mandate they exist at filing — they must, however, be available by the time of evidence. |
| Kailiani v. Madhavi (1970 KLT 257) | Supports a social purpose of the provision: facilitating modern reconstruction and renewal, provided existing tenants are protected from being thrown into the streets; discusses bona fides of landlord's reconstruction claim. | Respondent-landlords relied on this authority to argue the social policy favouring reconstruction; the court noted the case in the landlords' submissions and considered its statement on bona fides in the broader analysis of legitimate reconstruction needs. |
| Porinchu v. Ouseph (1971 KLT 571) | Holds that a landlord's desire to put property to a more profitable use after demolition/reconstruction is a factor in favour of bona fides; it is not necessary to show immediate need for demolition. | The landlords cited the case to support the view that bona fide requirement may include plans to use property more profitably; the court recorded this authority in considering the factual nature of bona fides but ultimately addressed statutory provisos limiting tenant displacement by conversion. |
| Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 KLT 133) | Explains that decision about applicability of s.11(3) is a question within the jurisdiction of the rent control court and not a jurisdictional question under s.115 CPC — relevant to limits of revisional interference. | The landlords relied on this to argue limited revisional scope; the court recorded the authority but found that the district judge had failed to exercise revisional jurisdiction in the present case when faced with a conversion issue affecting tenants' statutory option rights. |
| Mattulal v. Radhelal ((1974) US C.W.R. 215) | Stated (per Bhagwati J.) that bona fide requirement is a question of fact and not a mixed question of law and fact. | Invoked by landlords to contend that factual findings on bona fides are not lightly interfered with in revision; the court acknowledged this principle but concluded that the appellate authority's allowance of eviction to effect conversion was impermissible as a matter of statutory interpretation of the provisos. |
| Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ((1963) 1 All E.R. 545) — cited via Mitra's legal and commercial dictionary | Used as an authority for the meaning of the word "option" — distinguishing a wide sense (choice) and a narrow sense (a right of choice specially granted to holder for his own benefit). | The court records the tenants' reliance on this definition (via Mitra's dictionary) to characterise the third proviso's "first option" as a real, valuable right conferring a genuine preference to the evicted tenant regarding allotment of the reconstructed building. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeds by close textual and purposive interpretation of s.11(4)(iv) together with its three provisos and s.17(1) of the Act. The reasoning unfolds in the following steps as recorded in the opinion:
- Statutory context: The Act governs landlord-tenant relations in areas where it applies (here Trichur municipal town) and eviction must be in accordance with the Act. S.11(4)(iv) permits eviction where the building needs reconstruction and the landlord bona fide requires to reconstruct and satisfies the court that he has the plan and licence (if any) and ability to rebuild, and that the proposal is not a pretext for eviction.
- Interpretation of s.11(4)(iv) and provisos: The section, without provisos, does not expressly restrict the use (residential/non-residential) of reconstructed building. However, the provisos must be read with the main provision. The court analyses each proviso:
- Third proviso: confers on the evicted tenant the "first option" to have the reconstructed building allotted to him at fair rent — a valuable right of choice which the court treats as a real right.
- First proviso: requires reconstruction to be completed within the time fixed/extended by the rent control court.
- Second proviso: empowers the rent control court at any time to issue directions regarding reconstruction, and on landlord's failure to comply the court may give effect to the order in any manner it deems fit — including putting the tenant back in possession or awarding damages for excess rent.
- Application of the provisos to reconstruction into non-residential use: The court reasons that what an evicted tenant expects to regain is a residential building. Because the third proviso gives the tenant the first option to take the reconstructed building, that right would be defeated if the landlord were allowed to reconstruct into a non-residential building. Therefore, the rent control court cannot put the landlord in possession under s.11(4)(iv) where, according to the landlord's plan and licence, the reconstructed building will be non-residential.
- On s.17(1): The court holds s.17(1), which prohibits conversion of residential to non-residential and vice versa, is aimed at preventing conversion by a tenant in occupation; the proviso to s.17(1) indicates the section's focus on tenant conversions. The court therefore finds s.17(1) does not apply to reconstruction by the landlord under s.11(4)(iv).
- On timing of plan and licence: The court reads s.11(4)(iv) as requiring the landlord to satisfy the court that he has the plan and licence, if any, but not that these must exist at the time of filing the eviction petition. It suffices that the plan and licence are produced by the time evidence is taken. The fact that the landlord obtained the plan and licence after filing is not alone a ground to deny eviction under s.11(4)(iv).
- On authority to give directions and revisional jurisdiction: The second proviso's power to issue directions comes into play only after eviction has occurred and when the landlord fails to reconstruct within the time fixed; the competent forum to give those directions is the rent control court (the court which made the eviction order). A revisional court hearing a revision against an eviction order does not have the power to give directions under the second proviso in place of the rent control court. Therefore the district judge's direction to the landlords to re-submit a fresh plan (in the course of disposing revisions) was without jurisdiction.
- On revisional interference with factual findings: While the court acknowledges that bona fide requirement is a question of fact and ordinarily a revisional court should be cautious in interfering with such findings, it concludes that the appellate authority could not lawfully order eviction where the landlord's plan established reconstruction into non-residential use because that would defeat the tenant's statutory option. The district judge's failure to set aside the appellate eviction order (i.e., his non-exercise of jurisdiction) and his unrelated direction on the plan are both held to be susceptible to interference by this court.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court set aside the eviction orders made by the appellate authority under s.11(4)(iv) of the Act in all the cases before it.
More specifically:
- The eviction ordered under s.11(4)(iv) by the appellate authority is set aside in all the cases considered by this opinion.
- In RCP No.69 of 1969, the eviction ordered under s.11(4)(i) (subletting) by the appellate authority was not interfered with and therefore remains valid.
- The civil revision petitions nos. 2294, 2310, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339 and 2345 of 1976 are allowed and the eviction orders against those petitioners (tenants) are vacated. Civil revision petition no. 2333 of 1976 (RCP No.69) remains with the eviction under s.11(4)(i) standing. There is no order as to costs.
Implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The decision prevents a landlord from using s.11(4)(iv) eviction to defeat the tenant's statutory right under the third proviso to be allotted the reconstructed building in its residential character; a landlord cannot be put into possession under s.11(4)(iv) if the landlord's plan/licence shows the reconstructed building will be non-residential, because that would deprive the evicted tenant of the real right of option conferred by the third proviso.
- The court clarifies that s.17(1) is directed at conversion by a tenant in occupation and does not apply to reconstruction under s.11(4)(iv) by a landlord; nevertheless, the protections in the provisos to s.11(4)(iv) limit the landlord's ability to effect conversion that would defeat tenants' rights.
- The timing requirement for plan and licence under s.11(4)(iv) is interpreted as necessitating production by the time of evidence rather than at the moment of filing the eviction petition.
- The second proviso's power to issue directions regarding reconstruction is exercisable by the rent control court and comes into play after eviction — a revisional court cannot exercise that power in the course of a revision against an eviction order. Consequently, the district judge's direction to re-submit a fresh plan in revision proceedings was without jurisdiction and therefore ineffective.
- No broader precedential innovation beyond these interpretations is expressly claimed; the court's rulings are applied to the facts before it and the direct effect is to vacate certain eviction orders and to leave one eviction for subletting intact.
Note: The summary above is limited to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. Sections reflect only matters explicitly discussed in that text.
Questions of some importance in the matter of eviction of a tenant for reconstruction of the building under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act, 1965, For short the act, Arise for consideration in these civil revision petitions. The questions are:
(i) whether the tenant of a residential building can be evicted for reconstructing the same into a non - residential building in view of the right of option for allotment of the reconstructed building the tenant has under the third proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act.
(ii) whether the reconstruction of a residential building into a non - residential one will be hit by the prohibition against conversion of buildings contained in s. 17 (1) of the act.
(iii) whether the plan and licence for reconstruction of the building should be thereat the time of filing the petition for eviction itself or it need be made available by the time evidence is taken in the petition, And
(iv) whether in a revision filed against an order for eviction under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act the revisional authority can give a direction to the landlord to submit a fresh plan for the reconstruction of the building and uphold the order of eviction on the basis of that direction.
the tenants of ten rooms of a residential building bearing separate door numbers situated in the trichur town who were respondents in rcp. Nos 69, 93, 94, 95,96,97,98,99,100 and 151 of 1969 on the file of the rent control court, Trichur are the petitioners in these civil revision petitions and the respondents the landlords in all the rent control petitions eviction was sought under s. 11 (2) and (4) (iv) of the act on the grounds of arrears of rent and reconstruction respectively. In rcp. No. 69 of 1969 a ground of sub - letting under s. 11 (4) (i) was also taken as, According to the landlord, The tenant to whom the room was originally let out sublet the same and the sub - lessee is residing there and running a tea shop in it. The rent control court by a common order allowed the eviction petitions under s 11 (2) (b) of the act rejecting the other grounds for eviction taken by the landlords. From the above order of the rent control court the landlord filed appeals before the subordinate judge, Trichur who is the appellate authority under s. 18 of the act. The appellate authority found that the landlords bona fide require to reconstruct the building and allowed all the eviction petitions under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act. In rcp. 69 of 1969 eviction was allowed on the ground of subletting under s. 11 (4) (i) also. Thereupon, The tenants filed revisions before the district court, Trichur under s. 20 of the act. The learned district judge by separate orders dismissed all the revisions by giving a direction to the landlords to re - submit a fresh plan to enable the reconstruction of the building into one with 10 rooms to enable the ten evicted tenants to exercise their option under the third proviso to s 11 (4) (iv) of the act. As per the approved plan the building was to be reconstructed into one with eight rooms only. The tenants challenge the above orders in revision passed by the learned district judge in these civil revision petitions.
2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners contends that under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act a tenant of a residential building cannot be evicted for reconstructing the same into a non - residential building. According to the learned counsel, If that is possible, Provisos 1 to 3 of s. 11 (4) (iv) will become meaningless. Learned counsel points out that the clear indication in the above provisos is that the evicted tenant should have the first option for the allotment of the reconstructed building and that the reconstruction should be completed within the time fixed for the same and the tenant should be put back in possession with the least possible delay. Learned counsel contends that the chances of reoccupation of the tenant cannot be defeated by the landlord by reconstructing the building into a non - residential one. Learned counsel relies on b. Mohanbhai v. M s u mandir (air. 1975 sc. 2128) and contends that a landlord should not be allowed to circumvent the provisions of the act by getting an order of eviction. In the above case, A landlord wanted the eviction of a tenant of a residential building on the ground that he wanted the same for certain non - residential purposes. The court said that allowing the eviction will, In effect, Be allowing the landlord to circumvent the provisions of s. 25 of the bombay rents, Hotel and lodging house rates control act, 1947 under which a landlord cannot convert the user of the premises from a residential to a non - residential purpose. Learned counsel points out that in the case of an eviction under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act even though the tenant is dispossessed, His right to get back into possession is kept in tact and the landlord can let it out to another only if the tenant does not want to reoccupy the building. Learn d counsel then contends that the reconstruction of a residential building into a non - residential one will be a conversion which is prohibited under s. 17 (1) of the act. According to the learned counsel, Under s. 17 (1) not only the tenant but the landlord is also prohibited from converting a residential building into a non - residential one or vice - versa. It is pointed out that the result of the orders of the courts below will be that a non - residential building will come into existence in the place where there existed a residential building the next contention of the learned counsel is that as per s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act the plan and licence for the reconstruction of the building must be there when the landlord files the petition for eviction and, In this case, Since they were obtained by the landlord only at the time of evidence in the case the eviction petitions ought to have been dismissed on that ground alone. In this connection, Reference is made to hameed v. Ittoop (1970 klt 501) a full bench decision of this court under the third proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act. Learned counsel then points out that the revisional authority went wrong in giving a direction to the landlord to submit a revised plan providing 10 rooms in the building to be reconstructed. According to the learned counsel, The directions that can be issued under the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act have nothing to do with the plan of the building to be put up. Learned counsel points out that the proviso itself comes into play only after the eviction of the tenant under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act and when the landlord does not complete the reconstruction within the time fixed in the order of eviction or the extension of time given by the rent control court thereafter,
3. Learned counsel fair the respondent - landlords contends that under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act, If the court finds that the landlord bona fide requires to reconstruct the building it cannot be insisted that a residential building can be reconstructed only as a residential building and a non - residential building can be
reconstructed only as a non - residential one according to the learned counsel, It is immaterial whether after reconstruction the building is suitable for occupation for the tenant who was evicted under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act. Learned counsel points out that what the third proviso to s 11 (4) (iv) insists is that if the tenant wants the reconstructed building, He will have the first priority for allotment. Learned counsel refers to kailiani versus madhavi (1970 klt. 257) and contends that the social purpose of the provisions is to remove the roadblocks in the way of progress in building programmes, In the above decision it is further said that replacement and renewal of obsolescent and unsightly buildings to make room for larger, Modern constructions is a social necessity, Provided existing tenants are not thrown into the streets. Learned counsel also points out that in the above decision it is said:
"the clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, But says on the other hand that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re - erection must be bona fide, That is to say, Honest in the circumstances. It is impossible, Therefore, To hold that the investigation by the controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances."
in this connection, Reference is also made to porinchu v. Ouseph (1971 klt. 571) wherein it is said:
"so also the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition."
according to the learned counsel, Reconstruction contemplated in s. 11 (4) (iv) can be by demolishing the old building and putting up a new one in its place or demolishing the old building in part and making additions to the same. It is then pointed out that, At any rate, In a case like this where the reconstruction is to be by demolishing the existing building no restriction that the new construction should also be a residential one can be there. Learned counsel then refers to s. 17 of the act and contends that the restriction imposed by s. 17 (1) against conversion of the buildings is on the tenants and the section has no application in the case of a reconstruction under s. 11 (4) (iv) by the landlord. According to the learned counsel, The proviso to s. 17 (i) makes it clear that the section applies only to a conversion by the tenant inoccupation. As far as the plan and licence for the reconstruction are concerned, Learned counsel points out that s 11 (4) (iv) does not insist thai they should be ready at the time of filing the application for eviction. According to the counsel, What clause (iv) insists is that the landlord should satisfy the court that be has the plan and licence, If any, Required. So, It is enough if the plan and licence are there at the time when evidence is taken and, In this case, Admittedly, They were ready when evidence was taken. It is further pointed out that the decision in hemeed v. Ittoop (1970 klt. 501) on the third proviso to s 11 (3) of the act is not applicable because of the difference in the wording of the above proviso and s. 11 (4) (iv). Referring to the direction for the submission of a fresh plan by the learned district judge in revision under s. 20 of the act learned counsel submits that under the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) the court has power to issue directions regarding the reconstruction at any time. So, The revisional authority has not in any way acted without jurisdiction in issuing the above direction. Learned counsel then contends that, At any rate, This court cannot interfere with the eviction ordered by the learned district judge in revision under s. 115 of the code of civil procedure because the finding on the question of bona fide requirement in a finding on a question of fact. In support of this contention, Learned counsel refers to sarada v. Kumaran (1969 klt. 133) wherein it is said:
"the decision of the district judge about the applicability of s. 11 (3) of the buildings (lease and rent) control act 2 of 1965, Is a question within its jurisdiction and not on a question pertaining to the exercise of jurisdiction to try a petition for eviction. A decision on the applicability of s h (3) has therefore no relation to the question of jurisdiction contemplated by s. 115, C p c."
learned counsel also relies on mattulal v. Radhelal ((1974) us c. W. R. 215) wherein bhagwati j. Speaking for the court has said:
"the question of bona fide requirement is purely a question of fact and not a mixed question of fact and law."
learned counsel further points out that a question of law which has a nexus to the jurisdiction only can be raised in a civil revision petition filed under s. 115 of the code of civil procedure.
4. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners in his reply points out that the option provided for the tenant in the third proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) is a real right conferred upon him to get an allotment of the reconstructed house for the reconstruction of which he was evicted under s. 11 (4) (iv). Learned counsel refers to mitra's legal and commercial dictionary wherein rely ing on the house of lords' decision in reardon smith line ltd. V. Ministry of agriculture, Fisheries and food ((1963) i all. E. R 545) it is said:
"option in its widest interpretation means simply choice or freedom of choice. An obligation in a contract can frequently be performed in a large number of ways and the party under obligation can choose any one of the ways he likes. There is, However, A narrower sense in which the word can be used and that is to confer a right of choice specially granted to the holder of the option and to be used solely for his own benefit. It is in this sense that the word is generally used in the business world."
learned counsel refers to the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) which provides for the award of damages to the evicted tenant for the excess rent he has to pay for another building he is occupying because of the delay of the landlord to complete the reconstruction and contends that the clear intention in s. 11 (4) (iv) is that the evicted tenant should be put back into possession of the reconstructed building. According to the learned counsel, This is possible only if by reconstruction a residential or a non - residential building does not undergo a conversion learned counsel then contends that this court has jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the learned district judge because the learned district judge has gone wrong in not exercising his jurisdiction to interfere with a wrong and illegal order passed by the appellate authority under s. 17 of the act which resulted in the eviction of the petitioners tenants. It is further pointed out that if s. 11 (4) (iv) is read as a whole in the case of a residential building, Eviction cannot be ordered for the reconstruction of the same into a non - residential one. The appellate authority went wrong in overlooking this aspect of the matter and the learned district judge who heard the revisions was bound to interfere in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction to vacate the eviction order passed by the appellate authority. Referring to the direction made by the learned district judge for the re - submission of the plan, Learned counsel contends that as the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) can only apply to a case where the tenant has been evicted under s. 11 (4) (iv) and the landlord fails to carry out the reconstruction the above direction is clearly without jurisdiction.
5. S. 11 (4) (iv) of the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act, 2 2 of 1965 reads:
"11 (4). A landlord may apply to the rent control court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building:
(i).
(ii).
(iii).
(iv) if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the court that he has the plan and license, If any required, And the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction:
provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the rent control court, Shall on a petition before that court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, If it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time:
provided further that the court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, To give effect to the order in any manner the court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction:
provided further that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent; or
(v). S. 17 (1) of the act reads:
"17. (1) no residential building shall be converted into a non - residential building or vice versa and no such building shall be divided into separate portions for letting on rent or for other purposes except with the permission in writing of the accommodation controller:
provided that where such conversion involves structural alteration of the building, The consent of the landlord shall also be necessary. "
a citizen who owns a building becomes a landlord when he lets out the same to another and the latter becomes the tenant. Thereafter, The rights and liabilities of the landlord and the tenant are governed by the statute which is applicable. If the building is situated in an area where the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act 2 of 1965 is made applicable and it the building is one which is not exempted under s. 2 (25) of the act, The parties are governed by that act. In other cases, It is the transfer of property act, 1882 under which the rights and liabilities of the landlord and the tenant are to be worked out. The landlord can evict the tenant only in accordance with the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act as, In this case, Admittedly the building is situated in the trichur municipal town where the act has been brought into force. S. 11 (4) (iv) of the act provides for eviction of the tenant when the landlord bona fide requires to reconstruct the same. S 11 (4) (iv), Without the provisos, Does not give any indication that the landlord who evicts the tenant of a residential building should reconstruct the same only as a residential building. But the three provisos to s. 11 (4) (iv) are also to be read along with s. Ii (4) (iv). It cannot be said that the provisos are silent on this matter. The third proviso says that the evicted tenant shall have the first option for the allotment of the reconstructed building. The first proviso insists that the landlord should reconstruct the building within the time fixed or extended by the rent control court. The second proviso empowers the rent control court to give a direction to the landlord to complete the reconstruction and to put the tenant back in possession this proviso also empowers the rent control court to award damages to the tenant who has to suffer the payment of excess rent for occupying another building because of the delay caused by the landlord to reconstruct the building and make it available to the tenant. What a tenant who has been evicted from a residential building wants to get back is a residential building. Under the provisos to s. 11 (4) (iv) he has got a right to get back the same on payment of its fair rent with the least possible delay. Of course, If the tenant does not want the reconstructed building nobody can compel him to take it. The right guaranteed by the provisos to the tenants of the residential building who suffered eviction under s. 11 (4) (iv) for reconstruction of the same, To get the reconstructed building is a valuable right and it cannot be defeated by the landlord by reconstructing the building into a non - residential one. By the option provided for by the third proviso, A real right of choice is conferred upon the tenant. So, If, As per the plan and licence produced by the landlord, The residential building from which the tenant is sought to be evicted is going to be reconstructed as a non - residential one as in this case, The rent control court cannot under s. 11 (4) (iv) put the landlord in possession of the building it cannot be forgotten that under s 11 (4) (iv) the landlord cannot say good by to the tenant once for all if the tenant wants to have him as his landlord after the reconstruction of the building. S. 17 (1) does not have anything to do with the reconstruction of a building by the landlord. S. 17 (1) only provides for certain safeguards against conversion of a residential building into a non - residential one or vice - versa by a tenant. This is also clear from the proviso to s. 17 (1). Under s 1 (4) (iv), As far as the plan and licence of the reconstruction, The landlord has got a liability to satisfy the rent control court that he has already obtained the same. Then the question is whether at the time of filing the petition for eviction itself he should have them ready with him. Going by the section this is not necessary. Even if the landlord obtains the plan and licence during the pendency of the petition for eviction if he has got the same at the time of evidence he can satisfy the court that is only what is insisted by the section. So, The mere fact that the plan and licence were obtained only after the filing of the petition for eviction cannot be a reason not to grant eviction under s. 11 (4) (iv). Then the further question is whether the court can give any direction to the landlord to alter the plan under the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv) in a revision filed against the eviction ordered by the rent control court. The second proviso comes into play only after the eviction of the tenant and when the landlord does not make the reconstruction within the time allowed by the rent control court. In this case, Eviction has not taken place and hence no direction under the second proviso is possible. Not only that, The court which is competent to give the direction under this proviso is the rent control court and not, At any rate, The court which hears a revision against an order of eviction under s. 11 (4) (iv). So, It goes without saying that the direction given by the learned district judge to the landlords to re - submit a fresh plan in the orders disposing of the revisions is clearly without jurisdiction. It is true that a finding on the question of bona fide requirement is a finding on a question of fact. The appellate authority could not order question of a tenant of a residential building for reconstruction of the same into a non - residential one. In that case, The learned district judge was bound to exercise his revisional jurisdiction to set aside the eviction ordered by the appellate authority when the tenants questioned the eviction orders in revisions before him. As the learned district judge has chosen not to interfere with the eviction ordered by the appellate authority this is a clear case of non - exercise of jurisdiction by the learned district judge. Not only that, The direction for submission of a fresh plan given by the learned district judge is not one which he can give under the second proviso to s. 11 (4) (iv). In that respect also, The learned district judge has acted without jurisdiction so, This court is not lacking in jurisdiction to interfere in these civil
revision petitions.
6. For the reasons stated above, The eviction ordered under s. 11 (4) (iv) of the act by the appellate authority is set aside in all the cases. In r. C. P. No. 69 of 1969 the eviction ordered under s. 11 (4) (i) of the act by the appellate authority on the ground of subletting is not interfered with.
7. In the result, Civil revision petitions nos. 2294, 2310, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339 and 2345 of 1976 are allowed and the orders of eviction against the petitioners tenants will stand vacated. In crp. No 2333 of 1976 the order of eviction under s 11 (4) (i) will stand. The civil revision petitions are disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.
The address is not valid
Most likely causes:
There might be a typing error in the address.
If you clicked on a link, It may be out of date.
What you can try:
Retype the address.
Alert