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A. Sundaran v. P.V Mohammed Koya
Factual and Procedural Background
A landlord initiated a rent control proceeding seeking eviction of his tenant under Sections 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The tenant contended that he was entitled to protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (KLR Act) and requested that the question be referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act. The Rent Control Court declined the reference, holding that the tenant’s contention was not bona fide. The appellate authority concurred and dismissed the appeal. The tenant then filed this revision petition challenging the concurrent decisions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the question of the tenant's entitlement under Section 106 of the KLR Act arises bona fide in the rent control proceedings such that it requires reference to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act.
- The scope and application of Section 125(3) of the KLR Act regarding the obligation of civil courts to refer questions concerning tenant rights to the Land Tribunal.
- The extent to which bona fides of the tenant’s claim affects the duty of the civil court to make such a reference.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramadas v. Krishnan Nair, 1984 K.L.T 371 | Determination that questions under Section 106 of the KLR Act fall within the ambit of Section 125(3) and must be decided by the Land Tribunal. | Accepted as settled law that such questions should be referred to the Land Tribunal if they arise bona fide. |
| George v. Chakkunni, 1977 K.L.T 865 | Clarification that a civil court has no jurisdiction to decide tenant rights questions under Section 125(3) unless the question genuinely arises. | Established that the obligation to refer depends on whether the question "arises" legally and genuinely in the case. |
| Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat, 1979 K.L.T 766 | Affirmation of the principle that the civil court must refer questions to the Land Tribunal only if the question genuinely arises. | Reinforced the limitation on the duty to refer, supporting a bona fide standard. |
| Muhammad Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, 1993 (1) K.L.T 227 | Followed the principle that the civil court's duty to refer questions to the Land Tribunal is contingent on the genuine arising of the question. | Further confirmed the settled legal position on the scope of Section 125(3) references. |
| Ambu v. Vellachi, I.L.R 1994 (3) Kerala 460 | Criticism of the inefficiency and dormancy of Land Tribunals; advised courts to consider whether a reference is indispensable before making it. | Used to justify a practical and restrictive approach to references under Section 125(3) to prevent abuse and delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court recognized the settled legal position that questions concerning tenant rights under Section 106 of the KLR Act fall within Section 125(3) and ordinarily require reference to the Land Tribunal. However, the court emphasized that such referral is mandated only if the question genuinely and bona fide arises in the proceedings. The courts below found the tenant's plea not bona fide, viewing it as a dilatory tactic rather than a genuine claim. The court noted the systemic inefficiency and dormancy of Land Tribunals in Kerala, which often results in undue delay and injustice. Given this context, the court endorsed a practical interpretation that allows civil courts to refuse references when the claim lacks bona fides or reasonable prospects of success. This approach aims to curb abuse of the referral mechanism and reduce unwarranted delays in litigation. Thus, the court upheld the lower courts’ concurrent findings that the tenant’s claim was not bona fide and that the question did not genuinely arise, justifying refusal to refer the matter to the Land Tribunal.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED the revision petition filed by the tenant.
The court upheld the concurrent decisions of the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority that the tenant’s plea under Section 106 of the KLR Act was not bona fide and therefore did not require reference to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3). Consequently, the tenant’s revision was dismissed in limine. The decision directly affects the parties by affirming the eviction proceedings without reference to the Land Tribunal. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court reinforced existing principles while emphasizing a pragmatic approach to avoid abuse of the referral system given the inefficiencies of the Land Tribunals in Kerala.
Thomas, J.:— In a rent control proceeding initiated by a landlord for eviction of his tenant under Sec. 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 the tenant raised a contention, inter alia, that he is entitled to the protection envisaged in Sec. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short ‘the KLR Act’). He then pressed that the question be referred to the Land Tribunal under Sec. 125(3) of the KLR Act for decision. But Rent Control Court declined to do so on the premise that the said contention of the tenant is not bona fide. Thereupon, he went in appeal, but the appellate Authority concurred with the Rent Control Court and dismissed the appeal. Now the tenant has come up with this revision.
2. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the question whether the tenant is entitled to the right under Sec. 106 of the KLR Act is also one which should be determined by the Land Tribunal and hence the said question would fall within the ambit of Sec. 125(3) of the KLR Act (vide Ramadas v. Krishnan Nair, 1984 K.L.T 371).
3. The correctness of the said decision has not been canvassed before us. The line of thinking adopted by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority is that unless the claim is bona fide the question would not really “arise” for consideration in rent control proceedings and as such there is no need to make a reference of the question to the Land Tribunal.
4. Under Sec. 125(3) of the KLR Act if in any suit or other proceedings any question regarding the rights of the tenant, including a question as to whether a person is a tenant “arises” then the civil court does not have jurisdiction to determine that question. It is now well nigh settled that unless the question legally arises, there is no obligation for the civil court to make a reference of it. It was so held first by Bhaskaran, J. (as he then was) in George v. Chakkunni (1977 K.L.T 865). A larger Full Bench of this Court has affirmed, the said legal position in Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat (1979 K.L.T 766). Recently another Full Bench has followed the same principle in Muhammad Haji v. Kunhunni Nair (1993 (1) K.L.T 227).
5. But merely because a person raised a claim without any bona fides, can it be said that the said question would arise in the case. If the motive of the party who raised the plea is only to procrastinate the proceedings it is the duty of the civil court to decide first whether the question genuinely arises in the case. The amplitude of the expression “arises” must be constricted to what genuinely arises in a case in view of the very unsatisfactory function of the present Land Tribunal system in Kerala. A study of the statistics (concerning references made to Land Tribunals in Kerala) etches a lamentable picture of the fate of large number of such references. Mention of a few instances is sufficient to highlight the dimension of the malfunctioning of Land Tribunal system in Kerala, e.g:— Principal Munsiff's Court, Palakkad made a reference to the Land Tribunal, Palakkad on 7-9-1974, Principal Munsiff, Kollam had referred a case to the Land Tribunal on 1-2-1977, Principal Munsiff, Alappuzha has referred a question to the Land Tribunal on 19-11-74 and the Munsiff of Mavelikkara referred a similar question on 21-3-1975. From the High Court Registry we learned that those references still remain unanswered by the Land Tribunals concerned. Those are the extreme cases and the less serious instances are far too many. Adding fuel to fire, missing of vital records dispatched along with references made to the Land Tribunals is a frequent occurrence in Land Tribunals. When the subordinate courts bring such instances to the notice of the High Court no improvement could be achieved in the system due to the dormancy of the Land Tribunal system here.
6. One of us has expressed concern over the woeful lack of efficiency in the functioning of the Land Tribunals in a decision reported in Ambu v. Vellachi (I.L.R 1994 (3) Kerala 460). The following observations were made in the judgment:
“At a time when the functioning of land Tribunals is in dormant stage without adequate infrastructure provided, Courts should consider whether a reference to the Land Tribunal is inevitable on the facts. Only if reference is found to be indispensable that the court need to resort to that course. Very often such reference, in these days (as the experience shows) amounts to consignment of suit records to cold storage, if not to unreclaimable range. Unfortunately the system of reference under Section 125(3) of the Act has now become a haven for contumacious litigants and indulgers in dilatory tactics. Many a times the High Court has sounded to the Government to consider the desirability of retaining the system further.”
7. In the light of the above situation, the courts have to give a useful and practical interpretation to lessen the abuse of the legal requirement envisaged in Sec. 125(3) of the KLR Act. The civil court can consider whether the plea raised by the defendant or the respondent in the case is bona fide or genuine. If there is no reasonable prospect of the plea being upheld by a Land Tribunal, the civil court can justifiably take the view that the question does not reasonably arise in the case. If the question does not reasonably arise in the case, the civil court need not make the reference under Sec. 125(3) of the KLR Act.
8. We may again request the Government, to consider whether suitable amendments can be made on Sec. 125 of the KLR Act in the light of the present position resulting from the implementation of such a system.
9. In the present case the courts below have concurrently held that the plea based on Sec. 106 of the KLR Act is not bona fide. So the prayer for reference to the Land Tribunal was declined. We have no reason to interfere with the said stand. Accordingly, we dismiss this revision in limine.
10. Registrar shall forward a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary and Law Secretary of Kerala.
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