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Gopalakrishnan v. Chancellor, University Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Mar 7, 1990
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Judgment Summary — Viswanatha Iyer, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges nominations (proceedings Ext. P1 dated 12 January 1989) made by the Chancellor of the University of Kerala to nine seats in the category "other members" of the University Senate under Section 17 of the Kerala University Act, 1974. The petitioner is a working journalist who himself was one of the nine persons nominated (to represent journalists) and does not challenge his own nomination or that of P.K. Venukuttan Nair (representing recognised cultural associations). The petition contests the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 (seven persons) who were nominated to represent other specified categories.

The petitioner alleges that the Chancellor made these seven nominations without following the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (as required, he contends, by Article 163 of the Constitution) and further alleges mala fides, asserting that those nominees were recommended by leaders of the State Congress (I) to advance political interests. The petitioner seeks a declaration that the nominations of respondents 4 to 10 are invalid and that they are not entitled to hold office.

The Chancellor filed a counteraffidavit denying that she acted contrary to the law and asserting that the Chancellor's powers under the Act are statutory and distinct from the Governor's constitutional functions; she also denied the allegation that the nominees had been recommended by State Congress (I) leaders. A brief counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the State of Kerala was described as largely a legal dissertation asserting the Chancellor's obligation to follow ministerial advice and did not traverse the factual matters.

Relevant administrative correspondence in the record: the Registrar wrote to the Chancellor's Secretariat on 11 July 1988 asking that nominations be made before 30 July 1988; the Chancellor's Secretariat sought Government advice on 4 August 1988; follow-up contact occurred on 23 September 1988; Government wrote on 30 September 1988 that a panel was under consideration; Government sent a list by letter dated 14/25 October 1988; the Chancellor annotated the list on 18 November 1988 requesting a more exhaustive list; a Ministerial note dated 23 November 1988 indicated no departure from the Act and recommended approval; the Chancellor made nine nominations on 12 January 1989 (Ext. P1).

The High Court heard the matter and dismissed the original petition. The court also refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, concluding that the case did not involve any substantial question of interpretation of the Constitution or any substantial question of law of general importance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Chancellor of the University of Kerala (who is the Governor of Kerala by virtue of Section 7 of the Act) is bound to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in making statutory nominations under the Kerala University Act (in particular Section 17), by application of Article 163 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the Chancellor's nominations (Ext. P1) of respondents 4 to 10 were made mala fide or in abuse of discretion because the Chancellor allegedly acted contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers and pursuant to political recommendations.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Governor (Chancellor) is bound by Article 163 to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; therefore, any nominations made without such advice are unconstitutional and void.
  • The Chancellor disregarded a Cabinet-advised panel of nine names and nominated only two from that list, having chosen seven others independently; the seven nominees (respondents 4–10) were allegedly recommended by leaders of the State Congress (I) to advance political interests.
  • The nominations of respondents 4–10 were therefore made mala fide and in abuse of discretion.
  • The petitioner seeks a declaration that the nominations of respondents 4–10 are invalid and that those nominees are not entitled to hold office.

Chancellor's Arguments

  • The powers, functions and duties exercised by the Governor as Chancellor under the Kerala University Act are statutory and distinct from the Governor's constitutional functions; the Act specifically defines the Chancellor's statutory role and does not make the Chancellor bound to act on ministerial aid and advice in the exercise of those statutory powers.
  • The Chancellor denied the allegation that respondents 4–10 were recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I).

State of Kerala (counteraffidavit)

  • A counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the State (in another related petition) did not traverse the factual allegations and is described in the judgment as largely a legal dissertation asserting that the Chancellor is bound to follow the advice of the Council of Ministers; it did not address the factual contentions in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 : AIR 1974 S.C. 2192 Establishes that the President/Governor should act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising executive functions under Articles 53(1) and 154(1) of the Constitution. The court used this decision to distinguish constitutional/executive functions (which attract Article 163) from statutory functions conferred by a statute on the Governor in a different capacity (e.g., as Chancellor). The judgment accepts Samsher Singh's statement about executive functions but holds that Article 163 does not automatically apply to statutory powers exercised by the Governor as Chancellor under the University Act.
S.C. Barat v. Hari Vinayak, AIR 1962 M.P. 73 Distinguishes acts done by the Governor in his capacity as Governor from acts done by him in another capacity (e.g., as office-holder under a statute); holds Article 361 immunity does not extend to statutory functions performed in a different capacity. The court relied on this case to support the proposition that statutory functions conferred on the Governor as Chancellor are not necessarily exercises of the Governor's constitutional office and that such functions are amenable to judicial scrutiny where not in accordance with the statute.
Joti Prasad v. Kalka Prasad, AIR 1962 Allahabad 128 Holds that when the Governor exercises powers as Chancellor of a University, he exercises the powers of the Chancellor (not the State Government), and such actions are not necessarily exercises of the executive power of the State. The court cited this decision to reinforce the conclusion that the Governor, acting as Chancellor under university statutes, does not thereby act as or represent the State Government for the purposes of Article 163.
Kiran Babu v. Government of A.P., AIR 1986 A.P. 275 Holds that the Governor, while acting as Chancellor of a university under statutory provisions, acts in a capacity distinct from the Governor's constitutional capacity and may exercise discretion (for example in appointing Vice-Chancellors) rather than acting solely on ministerial aid and advice. The court relied on Jeevan Reddy, J.'s reasoning in Kiran Babu to support the proposition that university statutes distinguish the Chancellor from the government and that appointment/nomination powers under such Acts can be exercised by the Chancellor in individual judgment without being bound by ministerial aid and advice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual analysis of Article 163 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1974. The core reasoning steps in the judgment are:

  1. Distinction between constitutional/executive functions and statutory functions: The court observed that Article 163 applies to functions the Governor exercises "by virtue of his position as such" under the Constitution (i.e., executive functions). It held that where powers are conferred by statute the Governor is bound to exercise them in accordance with the statute; Article 163 is limited to constitutional functions and does not automatically govern every statutory power vested in the Governor.
  2. Examination of the Kerala University Act: The court examined multiple provisions of the Act (including Sections 2(6), 3, 7, 8, 17 and other provisions cited in the judgment such as Sections 35, 45, 48, 50, 52, 53, 64 and 77). The Act, the court held, makes a clear distinction between powers of the Chancellor and powers of the government, sometimes vesting related powers in each separately (for example the Chancellor's assent to statutes under Section 17(5)-(6) and government approval requirements in other subsections).
  3. Autonomy and statutory office-holding: The court emphasized that the Chancellor, although ex-officio the Governor, is part of the University and exercises statutory functions as head of the University. The Chancellor's functions under the Act are statutory and are to be performed in accordance with the Act, not necessarily as part of the State executive subject to Article 163's ministerial advice requirement.
  4. Support from precedent and reports: The court referred to earlier High Court decisions (Madhya Pradesh, Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh) and the Sarkaria Commission and committee recommendations, observing that these authorities supported the view that a Governor acting as Chancellor may exercise certain statutory functions in his individual capacity and need not always act on ministerial aid and advice.
  5. Mala fides allegation assessment: The court found the petitioner's mala fides allegations to be vague and unsupported by adequate particulars or material. The petitioner, despite claiming investigative machinery, did not disclose names or materials to substantiate the allegation that State Congress (I) leaders had recommended respondents 4–10. The court held that a plea of mala fides must be founded on facts and materials, and the petitioner’s pleadings were insufficient.
  6. Application to Ext. P1: Having determined that the Chancellor's statutory powers under Section 17 could be exercised without being bound by the Council of Ministers' advice, and finding no material to sustain mala fides, the court concluded that the Chancellor was within her rights in making the nominations under Ext. P1.
  7. Locus standi point: The court observed that the petitioner, being one of the nominated members, was not in a position directly aggrieved by the nominations and further noted that none of the persons included in the Government's list but not nominated had challenged the Chancellor's nominations. Although the court did not rest its decision on locus alone, it noted the point as additional support.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Original petition dismissed.

Additional core disposition: Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused because the court found that the case did not involve any substantial question of interpretation of the Constitution or any substantial question of law of general importance requiring the Supreme Court's consideration.

Implications / Direct consequences:

  • The nominations made by the Chancellor by Ext. P1 (dated 12 January 1989) — including those of respondents 4 to 10 — were upheld as valid exercises of the Chancellor's statutory powers under Section 17 of the Kerala University Act, 1974.
  • The allegation of mala fides against the Chancellor in making those nominations was rejected for want of adequate pleadings and supporting materials.
  • The petitioner's challenge under Article 226 failed, and the order of the Chancellor stands; the court expressly refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved.
  • The court's reasoning emphasizes a distinction between the Governor's constitutional/executive functions (which attract Article 163) and statutory functions performed by the Governor in another capacity (such as Chancellor), but the court did not purport to set a new binding precedent beyond its application to the facts and statutory construction in this matter.

This summary is compiled exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Viswanatha Iyer, J.:— The Kerala University Act, 17 of 1974, (the Act) was enacted to reorganise the University of Kerala with a view to establishing a teaching, residential and affiliating University for the southern districts of the State of Kerala. Under S. 3, the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor, if any, and the members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council for the time being, shall constitute a body corporate by the name of the University of Kerala. S. 7 of the Act provides that the Governor of Kerala shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University.

2. S. 8 provides that the Minister for the time being administering the subject of education in the State shall be the Pro-Chancellor of the University. In the absence of the Chancellor or during his inability to act, the Pro-Chancellor shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Chancellor. S. 17 specifies the constitution of the Senate of the University. It shall consist of the fifteen categories of ex-officio members (including the Chancellor), the twelve classes of elected members, the life members and the three groups of “other members”. Since this original petition concerns group (2) among other members; we shall extract the relevant portions of S. 17:—

“17. Senate.-The Senate shall consist of the following members, namely—

Ex-Officio Members

(1) The Chancellor

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Elected Members

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Life Members

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Other Members

XXXXXXXXXXXX

(2) Not more than nine members nominated by the Chancellor representing (i) recognised research institutions; (ii) recognised cultural associations; (iii) chambers of commerce; (iv) industries; (v) authors;, (vi) journalists; (vii) lawyers; (viii) sports; and (ix) linguistic minorities.

XXXXXXXXXXXX”

3. The controversy in this case relates to the nomination made by the first respondent, Chancellor of the University of Kerala, of respondents 4 to 10 as members of the Senate of the University by the proceedings Ext. P1. The said nomination relates to group (2) “other members” of the Senate, provided for in S. 17. The petitioner who is a working journalist, is himself a member so nominated by the Chancellor by the proceedings Ext. P1, as representing journalists. There is no controversy raised by him in relation to his nomination, or to the nomination of one P.K Venukuttan Nair, representing “recognised cultural associations”. The dispute is only in relation to the nomination of the other seven, namely respondents 4 to 10, representing the other seven categories, namely (i), (iii) to (v) and (vii) to (ix) enumerated above.

4. The controversy arises this way. According to the petitioner, the nominations have been made by the Chancellor, acting on her own, “without the advice of her Council of Ministers, the Cabinet had advised the nomination of nine persons, chosen by it, but the Chancellor nominated only two from out of this list of nine” (namely the petitioner and P.K Venukuttan Nair). The other seven, namely respondents 4 to 10 were nominated by her without the advice of the Cabinet. The petitioner points out that the Governor of Kerala is by virtue of her office, the Chancellor of the University. Article 163 of the Constitution therefore obliges her to act only in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Chancellor had no right to disregard the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, or act against it, and make nomination of persons of her own choice. Thereby the constitutional mandate of the Governor acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is violated and therefore, Ext. P1 to the extent it nominates respondents 4 to 10 to the Senate of the University of Kerala is unconstitutional, null and void.

5. It is also stated that these respondents are persons “recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I)” with a view to further their own interests. They were “nominated solely for the reason that their names were furnished by the leaders of the Congress (I). Their nomination was made to advance the political interest of the State Congress (I). Therefore the Chancellor has abused her discretionary power and acted male fide in nominating respondents 4 to 10”.

6. The petitioner therefore seeks a declaration that the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 to the Senate of the University of Kerala is “invalid and illegal” and that they are not entitled to hold the said office.

7. The Chancellor's stand in relation to Ext. P1 has been explained in the counteraffidavit, which has been filed on her behalf. It is stated that the powers, functions and duties of the Governor are constitutional, while those of the Chancellor are statutory. The powers, functions and duties of the Chancellor are specifically laid down in the Act. She exercises various functions. The Act makes a clear and definite distinction between the Chancellor and the Governor so that the Chancellor is not bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, while exercising her powers as Chancellor under the Act.

8. The allegation that the names of respondents 4 to 10 were recommended to the Chancellor by the leaders of the State Congress (I) is specifically denied in the counter affidavit.

9. There is a short counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Kerala. This is filed in another writ petition O.P No. 1973 of 1989, but the Government Pleader has filed a memo praying that it may be treated as the counter affidvit in this original petition But it must be stated that the counter affidavit has not at all chosen to deal with or traverse any of the factual matters, and therefore hardly serves any purpose as part of the pleadings in the case. The so called counter affidavit is only a brief dissertation on the law, asserting the Chancellor's obligation to follow the advice of the Council of Ministers.

10. The following facts emerge from the file produced before us by the counsel for the Chancellor. The Registrar of the University of Kerala addressed the Secretary to the Chancellor on July 11, 1988 pointing out that the Senate of the University had to be reconstituted by July 30, 1988, that the Chancellor has to nominate nine members in the category of “other members”, and therefore the question of making such nomination may be submitted before the Chancellor for orders. The Chancellor's Secretariat thereupon sought the Government's advice by letter dated August 4, 1988. There was no reply forthcoming from Government which led to a personal contact on September 23, 1988 by the Secretary to the Chancellor with the Commissioner and Secretary to the Higher Education Department of the Government. The latter thereafter wrote to the Secretary to the Chancellor on September 30, 1988 stating that the panel of names for consideration by the Chancellor, for nomination to the Senates of the Universities of Kerala and Calicut, was under consideration, and that it will be sent up as soon as it was finalised. A letter dated October 14/25, 1988 from the Commissioner and Secretary to Government was thereafter received in the Chancellor's Secretariat, suggesting the names of three lawyers (to represent lawyers), one from the Kerala University Law Department and Research Centre (to represent recognised research institutions), two to represent recognised cultural associations, one to represent sports, one to represent the linguistic minorities and one (namely the petitioner) to represent journalists. The list did not contain any one to represent Chambers of Commerce, industries, or authors.

11. The Chancellor made her note on this list on 18-11-1988 pointing out that the list was not exhaustive as envisaged in the Act. All the categories mentioned in S. 17-other members-had not been given due representation; certain categories were overrepresented. There did not seem to be any justification for departing from what was specifically provided in the Act. The Chancellor was not happy about the suggestion regarding “recognised research institutions” and noted that the desirability of giving representation to a University department under this category required to be examined, as the intention of the Act appeared to be to provide representation to “the various other recognised research institutions available in this part of the country”. The Chancellor therefore directed that an exhaustive list of names may be prepared and forwarded for consideration for nomination to the Senate. No fresh list was however submitted. The Government file produced before us by the Government Pleader does not disclose that there was any consideration of the matter thereafter by Government. Government has also no case that any fresh list was forwarded for the consideration of the Chancellor in compliance with the directions contained in her note. But we find in the Chancellor's file a note dated November 23, 1988 made by the Minister of Education and Law stating that there was no departure from what was specifically provided in the Act. According to him, it was not specifically stated in S. 17, that “one member each should represent one category”. It was only necessary that the total number shall not exceed nine, and that the nine shall not be from any category, other than those mentioned. There was therefore no question of over representation. So far as the desirability of giving representation to a University department in the category of “recognised research institutions”, was concerned, the Minister stated that the nominee suggested by the Government represented research in the Kerala University Law Department and Research Centre, Trivandrum. He therefore stated that the Chancellor may “be pleased to approve for issue”.

12. The Chancellor then went ahead, and made nine nominations as per Ext. P1, representing the nine different categories provided among “other members” in S. 17. The nominations which comprised the petitioner, P.K Venukuttan Nair and respondents 4 to 10 were made on January 12, 1989. The petitioner challenges the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 for the reasons noted in paragraphs 5 and 6 supra.

13. We shall first deal with the allegation of mala fides. This finds reflection in paragraph 6 of the original petition, where it is stated that from the investigation conducted by the journalists working under the petitioner, he had come to know that respondents 4 to 10 were nominated by the Chancellor without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and that they were persons recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I). This allegation has been specifically denied by the Chancellor. Though the petitioner is a journalist, apart from making an assertion that the names had been recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I), he has not chosen to give the names of those leaders, who are alleged to have made the recommendation. In fact, petitioner claims that he has got his own independent machinery to investigate and collect information, in which case it should have been possible for him to disclose the materials which he gathered, the persons from whom they were gathered and the like. An allegation of mala fides has to be founded on facts and supported by materials, and cannot be based on scanty foundation. If the petitioner had really any materials with him in support of his allegations, he should have been bold enough to disclose them in the original petition, instead of confining himself to vague allegations of information and investigation. It is not possible to found a plea of mala fides on such tenuous and shaky foundation.

14. There is absolutely no material before this court to come to the conclusion that the State Congress (I) leaders had anything to do with the nomination. Everything that the court does should be based on material and be supported by reason. Both are lacking on the side of the petitioner. This contention of the petitioner has only therefore to be stated to be rejected.

15. Coming to the main points argued in the case, based on Art. 163 of the Constitution, we are unable to agree with the petitioner's contention that the Chancellor of the University functioning under the Kerala University Act is bound to act solely on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This proposition is not warranted either by the relevant provisions of the Constitution or the provisions of the Act.

16. Petitioner's case is that under Art. 163 of the Constitution, there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head, to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Sub article (2) says that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of any such thing done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. Sub article (3) states that the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court. The petitioner's contention is that every action of the Governor, whether under the Constitution or otherwise, should be only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution requires any function to be done by the Governor in his discretion. The Governor is ex-officio the Chancellor of the University. Therefore, whatever the Chancellor does, is an act of the Governor, which should be done only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, Chancellor means the Governor, which, in turn, means the Government-so goes the equation. The Chancellor's functions are therefore, the functions of the Governor, governed by Article 163. Anything done without, or contrary to, the advice of the Council of Ministers is therefore, void. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 : AIR 1974 S.C 2192.

17. We must here observe that the Governor's functions are not purely those which are vested in him by or under the Constitution. He also exercises functions which are vested in him by statute. In our opinion, Article 163 is limited to those functions which the Governor exercises by virtue of his position as such, in respect of matters required to be done by him by or under the Constitution, and not otherwise. Where a power is conferred on the Governor under a statute, her is equally bound by the statute, and is bound to exercise those powers in accordance with the provisions of the statute in question. If the statute requires that the Governor shall act either in his discretion or in a particular manner, he shall have to act accordingly. None can thereafter contend that the Governor who has performed his functions in accordance with the statute or its mandate has nevertheless acted unconstitutionally for not acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163. It is only those functions which are vested in the Governor, or which the Governor is required to do by virtue of his position as such, under the Constitution, that are attracted by Article 163 and it is only in relation to these functions that the Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers-for instance, the executive functions of the Governor under Article 154. Statutory functions which the Governor is empowered or bound to do under a particular enactment are beyond the purview of Article 163.

18. The Kerala University Act has itself not equated the Chancellor with the Government. This is evident from an examination of the various provisions of the Act to which we shall presently refer.

19. S. 2(6).defines the Chancellor as the Chancellor of the University. S. 3 describes the University as being a body corporate by the name of the University of Kerala constituted of the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor if any, and the members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council.

20. Chapter III provides for the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor and officers of the University. Sub-section (1) of S. 7 states that the Governor of Kerala shall by virtue of his office be the Chancellor of the University. Under S. 8, the Ministers for the time being administering the subject of education in the State shall be the Pro-Chancellor. In the absence of the Chancellor, or during his inability to act, the Pro-Chancellor shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Chancellor.

21. The Chancellor is the head of the University and shall when present, preside at the meeting of the Senate and at any convocation of the University. He may by order in writing annul any proceeding of any of the authorities of the University which is not in conformity with the Act, the statutes, the ordinances, the regulations, the rules or the bye-laws. The Chancellor shall, when an emergency arises, have the right to suspend or dismiss any of the authorities of the University or to take measure for its interim administration. Every proposal for the conferment of an honorary degree shall be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor. An appeal lies to the Chancellor against any order of dismissal passed by the Syndicate or Vice Chancellor against any person in the service of the University. Before passing any order on the appeal, the Chancellor may refer the matter for advice to a tribunal appointed by him for the purpose. The Chancellor has the power to remove the Vice Chancellor or the Pro-Vice Chancellor from office by an order in writing on charges of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds or misbehaviour. He may also exercise such other powers as may be conferred on him by the Act or the statutes.

22. The Chancellor is thus made the head of the University with various powers vested in him as delineated above. The provisions of the Act make a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government We shall refer to some of them. S. S deals with powers of the University. Sub-section (xiii) of the section speaks of the University's power to regulate emoluments, pattern and conditions of service of teachers and nonteaching staff in private colleges. But this power of regulation is to be exercised with the previous sanction of government. Similar provision for previous sanction of government appears in sub-section (xxvii) dealing with borrowals by the University. Sub-sections (8) and (9) of S. 17 provide that the Secretary to Government or Additional Secretary, General Education Department to be nominated by the Government, and the Secretary to Government or Additional Secretary to Government, Higher Education Department to be nominated by the Government, shall be ex-officio members of the Senate. S. 35(8) stipulates that no statute providing for the conditions for or procedure relating to affiliation of private colleges shall be passed by the Senate without the previous approval of the Government. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of this section are significant and bring in sharp focus the distinction which the Act makes between the Chancellor and the Government Sub-section (5) provides that where any statute has been passed by the Senate, it shall be submitted to the Chancellor, who may refer the statute back to the Senate for further consideration, or assent thereto or withhold his assent Sub-section (6) states that no statute passed by the Senate shall be valid or come into force until it is assented to by the Chancellor. In other words, this section makes a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government, vesting certain powers in the Chancellor and certain others in the government. If really the Chancellor is the same as Governor, and therefore, the government, as the petitioner contends, every action of the Chancellor has to be informed by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, i.e the government If so, there was no necessity for making this dichotomy between the Chancellor and the government in various sub-sections of the very same section.

23. S. 45, which deals with the University fund, again speaks of State Government Sub-section (2) says that all moneys of the University fund shall be lodged in the government treasury or with the approval of the government in the State Bank of India or its subsidiaries upto such limits as may be fixed by the Government. S. 48 inter alia, requires that the annual accounts together with the audit report published by the Syndicate shall be placed before the Senate and submitted to Government. S. 50 requires the government to appoint auditors to audit the accounts of the University with further powers for government on various matters. S. 52 which appears in Chapter VIII relating to private colleges and their affiliation requires a unitary management, to constitute a governing body consisting inter alia, of a person nominated by government. S. 53 similarly requires a corporate management to constitute a managing council consisting, among others, of a person nominated by government. S. 64 vests the government with certain powers in the matter of transfer of teachers to other University areas. S. 77 is important. It states that if any question arises regarding the interpretation of any provision in the Act or of any statute, ordinances, regulation, bye-law or order as to whether a person has been duly elected, or appointed as, or is entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter may be referred to the Chancellor, and the Chancellor shall, after taking such advice as he deems necessary. decide the question, and that such decision shall be final. There are various other provisions in the Act which confer powers on the government to deal with one or other of the matters specified therein, but we are not referring to them in detail.

24. A conspectus of these provisions makes it evident that the statute has made a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government. Each one has got specific roles and functions to perform. Whenever the Chancellor is required to exercise a particular function, it is so specified. Whenever any powers or functions are vested on the government, they are also specifically delineated. There is thus a clear specification of the functions to be exercised by the respective authorities, namely the Chancellor and the government. The Chancellor is part of the University while the government is not. Whatever function the Chancellor exercises or does is by virtue of his position as a constituent part of the University, and not as Governor of the State. It is true that the Governor is ex-officio the Chancellor, but that is not to say that the position of the Chancellor is the same as that of the Governor. While the functions of the Governor are constitutional, the functions of the Chancellor are statutory, and are to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute. He is not acting as part of the executive government in exercising such functions, but as a statutory functionary forming a part and parcel of the University itself.

25. Such an independent exalted position for the Chancellor is in accord with the object of academic excellance which a statutory body like the University is intended to achieve. That position is not liable to be diluted by considerations of his acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Such dilution will reduce the University from a high level academic body to one subservient to Government, liable to act on its dictates, thereby destablising academic freedom and affecting academic excellence. University autonomy lies principally in three fields, namely selection of students, appointment and promotion of teachers and the determination of courses of study, methods of teaching and the selection of arrears and problems of research. The University should be governed by one over-riding consideration, namely commitment to excellence in all fields of its activity. Effective pursuit of this objective is possible only if the University is immune from extraneous pressures and influences.

26. The committee constituted by the Inter University Board on University Autonomy, which consisted of eminent personalities like Dr. C.P Ramaswamy Iyer, Dr. AL. Mudaliar, Dr. C.D Deshmukh, Dr. K.L Shrimali and Dr. B. Mullick to review the provisions in the various University Acts and to suggest ways and means, inter alia, to establish cordial relations with Government pointed out that Universities are the keys to social and economic progress. Therefore it is important that they should be helped to grow and develop their personalities unhindered by extraneous pressures. The fullest possible measure of autonomy is indispensable for their proper functioning and growth in the interests of the country's advancement. The committee therefore, recommended, inter alia, that the practice of having State Governors as Chancellors of Universities in their States has much in its favour, but only if the Chancellors functioned in their individual capacity consulting the State Government, only when they considered it necessary. (The committee's statement is extracted in paragraph 28 of the judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. in Kiran Babu v. Government of A.P, AIR 1986 A.P 275).

27. It is thus imperative that the Chancellor, in exercising his powers and functions under the law governing the University, should act on his own discretion, unhampered by, without the necessity of, seeking or following, the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. This view of ours is supported by certain observations of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh's case ((1974) 2 SCC 831 : AIR 1974 S.C 2192). The Supreme Court stated thus in paragraph 25:

“The executive power of the Union is vested in the President under Article 53(1). The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor under Article 154(1). The expression “Union” and “State” occur in Article 53(1) and 154(1) respectively to bring about the federal principles embodied in the Constitution. Any action taken in the exercise of the executive power of the Union vested in the President under Article 53(1) is taken by the Government of India in the name of President as will appear in Article 77(1). Similarly, any action taken in the exercise of the executive power of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) is taken by the Government of the State in the name of the Governor as will appear in Article 166(1)”.

28. What the Supreme Court states is that the President and the Governor should act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising their executive functions under the Constitution.

29. We may now refer to a few decisions, which have taken the view we have taken. There are two early decisions which dealt with the matter. The first one is that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in S.C Barat v. Hari Vinayak, AIR 1962 M.P 73.

30. In that case the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of the Jabalpur University by the Chancellor of that University was challenged. A preliminary objection was raised that Article 361 of the Constitution barred the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceedings under Article 226 because the Governor of the State was the Chancellor of the University. The court overruled the plea holding that Article 361 gave absolute personal immunity to the Governor for all his public acts, not only in respect of his powers and duties under the Constitution, but also for any act done by him as Governor in exercise of those powers and duties conferred on him by any Act or statutory Rules. But the immunity did not extend to the exercise or performance of the powers and duties conferred on the Governor under any Act, not in his capacity as Governor, but in a different capacity held by him by virtue of his office as Governor. The powers and duties so conferred are not powers and duties of the office of the Governor, but they are the powers and duties of a different office which the Governor holds by virtue of his office as Governor. The preliminary objection was accordingly overruled.

31. It is true that in paragraph 10 of the judgment a distinction is made between two modes of appointment of Chancellor, namely where the Governor as Governor of the State is the Chancellor, and cases where he is ex-officio the Chancellor. It is unnecessary for us to go into this distinction as we are of the opinion that the functions of the Chancellor under the Kerala University Act stand apart from his functions as Governor under the Constitution for the purposes of Article 163(1).

32. In Joti Prasad v. Kalka Prasad, (AIR 1962 Allahabad 128) the question relating to the functioning of Governor as Chancellor of the Agra University arose incidentally in an election petition. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealt with the matter as follows:—

“When the Governor exercises the executive power of the State, we may equate him with the State Government; but not when he exercises other powers. As already discussed above, while exercising the powers as Chancellor of the Agra University, the Governor exercises the power of the Chancellor, and not of the State Government, and while functioning as Chancellor he cannot be deemed to be exercising the executive power of the State, whether as Governor or the State Government. In other words, when the Governor, as Chancellor of the University, appoints a Vice-Chancellor, he does not exercise the executive power of the State and the appointment made by him cannot be deemed to have been made by the State Government. The office of the Vice-Chancellor may be said to be under the Chancellor, but not under the Governor or the State Government”.

33. The matter recently came up for exhaustive review by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The matter related to the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of the Venkiteswara University where the chancellor exercised his own option in the matter de hors the aid and advice, of the Council of Ministers. The question was dealt with by a Division Bench consisting of Raghuvir, J. and Seetharama Reddy, J. They differed in their opinion. Raghuvir, J. held on the basis of the decision in Samsher Singh's case that the Governor was bound to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Seetharama Reddy, J. differed to hold that while functioning as the Chancellor, Governor was not bound by such advice, and that he was entitled to act on his own. The matter was referred to a third Judge, Jeevan Reddy, J. All the three judgments are reported as Kiran Babu v. Govt. of A.P, 1986 (1) Andhra Law Times, 37. The judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. alone is reported in AIR 1986 AP. 275. Jeevan Reddy, J. dealt with the matter exhaustively with reference to the decisions of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad referred to above, the Kothari Commission Report and others, and agreed with the view of Seetharama Reddy, J. He observed:

“It is true that, according to S. 10, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh is to be the Chancellor by virtue of his office; but it is not possible to say that, while acting as the Chancellor, he acts as the Governor. The context of the Act does not permit such an interpretation. According to S. 9, Chancellor is one of the officers of the University. He has to preside at the meeting of the Senate and Convocations of the University, and exercise many other powers as Chancellor. It is difficult to envisage how he can act upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, while presiding at the meeting of the Senate. Indeed, the Act refers to ‘Governor’ only once, i.e in S. 10; at all other places it refers to the ‘Chancellor’, and it confers several powers upon the Chancellor as such. As pointed out in S.(E)(i) of this judgment, the Act throughout makes a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the State Government, and confers distinct and separate powers upon them. In many cases, the very same Section, or the sub-section, as the case may be, refers to both the ‘Chancellor’ and the ‘State Government’ separately, for exercising identical powers, e.g nominations to the Senate and Academic Council. In the face of this fact. I do not see any warrant to read the Chancellor as Governor, which in turn means ‘State Government’. The autonomy of the University and the interest of higher education demand that there should be no political interference in the governance of the Universities, as also in the appointments of Vice-Chancellors. The Kothari Commission Report, and in particular the recommendations of the Committee of the Inter-University Board, composed of very eminent educationists of this country, clearly says that the appointment of Vice-Chancellor should be made by the Chancellor in his individual judgment, and not by the State Government. It would be consistent with the spirit of the enactment to hold that, while appointing the Vice-Chancellor, the Chancellor should act in his individual discretion. While exercising the power under S. 12(1)(a). the Chancellor does notact as the Governor, and if so the very question of aid and advice of the Council of Ministers becomes irrelevant”.

34. We may now refer to the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations which dealt with the matter in Chapter IV, paragraphs 11.32 to 11.39 The subject discussed was the role of the Governor as Chancellor of a University. After, formulating the question and referring to the cases referred to earlier by us, and other relevant opinions on the subject, by the Attorney General of India, the Administrative Reforms Commission and of some States (which had expressed differing opinions), the Commission expressed itself as follows:—

“4.11.36 The powers and duties conferred on the Governor by a statute fall in two distinct categories. Those conferred on the Governor in his capacity as Governor constitute one such category. Such functions pertain to the office of the Governor, as provided for in Article 154(1) and are to be exercised by him on ministerial advice in accordance with Article 163(1). Further, by virtue of Article 361(1), the Governor enjoys personal immunity from answerability to any court for the exercise by him of such functions.

4.11.37 The other category of functions are those which a statute may confer on the Governor, not in his capacity as Governor but in a different capacity, such as, for instance, the Chancellor of a University. Here, the Governor functions in pursuance of a statute in relation to the affairs of the University-not as Governor but as Chancellor, notwithstanding that he holds the office in the University in an ex-officio capacity. Even though the Governor is the Chancellor by virtue of his office and would cease to be the Chancellor on ceasing to be Governor, it does not necessarily follow that the functions assigned to him as Chancellor of the University are to be performed by him in his capacity as the Governor. In fact, University Acts generally confer certain powers on the State Government which are distinct and separate from those conferred on the Chancellor. It has been held (S.C Barat v. Hari Nayak: AIR 1962 M.P 73 (V 49 C 31) that the immunity given to the Governor under Art. 361(1) does not extend to the exercise of powers and duties falling under this category. The statutory functions of the Chancellor do not fall within the purview of Article 154(1) and cannot be regarded as ‘business of the Government of the State’ under Art. 166(3), the reason being that the office of Chancellor is distinct from that of the Governor.

4.11.38 In relation to exercise of executive power of a State, the word ‘Governor’ can normally be equated with the State Government However, the office of Chancellor, even though held by the Governor under a statute in an ex-officio capacity cannot be so equated the former, being an officer of the University, is not obliged to seek the advice of the State Government in the matter of exercise of his functions such as the appointment of Vice-Chancellor. The same view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Kiran Babu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. (M. Kiran Babu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh etc. (AIR 1986 A.P 275).

4.11.39 Although there is no obligation on the Governor always to act on ministerial advice under Article 163(1), there is an obvious advantage in the Governor consulting the Chief Minister or other Ministers concerned, but he would have to form his own individual judgment. The Governor, in his capacity as Chancellor of a University, may possibly be required by the University's statute (e.g the Calcutta and the Bardwan University Acts) to consult a Minister mentioned in such statute on specified matters. In such cases, the Governor may be well advised to consult the Minister on other important matters also. In either case, there is no legal obligation for him to necessarily act on any advice received by him”.

35. The Commission has incidentally traced the matter with reference to the opinion of the Attorney General as follows:—

“4.11.33 The question first arose when the Governor of Bombay had to nominate members of the Senate of the University of Poona in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor. The Attorney-General for India reportedly held that, as Chancellor, the Governor was not bound to act on the aid and advice of his Ministers the position was later accepted by Pandit G.B Pant as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh when a question arose about the role of the Governor as Chancellor of Universities in that States.

(23). Munshi K.M: Pilgrimage to Freedom”, Vol. I: Pages 271 and 272.

36. This accords with the view which we have taken about the powers and functions of the Governor while functioning ex-officio as the Chancellor of the University of Kerala.

37. The advice which the then Attorney General of India Sri. M.C Setalved tendered to Sri. C.M Trivedi, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on 21-1-1954 on a similar matter is quoted in the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kiran Babu's case cited supra. The question arose in relation to the Andhra University Act. Sri. M.C Setalvad rendered the following opinion, which supports the view we have taken:

“(3) No doubt, the Governor is the Chancellor of the University by virtue of his office as the Governor of Andhra S. 10(1). On ceasing to hold that office he would cease to be the Chancellor and would automatically vacate the other positions occupied by him in the University (Section 30(3)). These provisions do not however necessarily indicate that the functions assigned to him as the Chancellor of the University are intended to be performed by him in his capacity as the Governor. The powers vested in the Chancellor are very limited as compared with the powers exercised by the Visitor under the Delhi University Act. The nature of these powers and the language in which they are couched, would seem to indicate that these powers are vested in him as the leading officer of the University.

(4) S. 44 of the Act confers powers on the Provincial Government to intervene by order as occasion may require and remove any difficulties which may arise in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. This power conferred on the Provincial Government as a Government supports the inference that the Chancellor under the Act though the Governor of the State does not function in his official capacity as the head of the State but rather as the head of the body corporate of which he is the Chancellor.

(5) On the whole, though the matter is not as clear as in the case of the Poona University Act, I am of the view that the Chancellor under the Andhra University Act, 1925, does not perform his functions in his official capacity as the constitutional head of the State. He is not, therefore, bound to act in the exercise of these functions with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers.

(6) What I have stated above, does not of course prevent the Governor consulting the Ministry if he chooses and give weight to the advice given. Indeed, notwithstanding the position of the Chancellor above indirated, conventions may grow under which the Chancellor would act in consultation with the Ministers………”

38. There was a fait argument that if the contention canvassed by the petitioner were not accepted, the Governor will be deprived of the immunity available under Art. 361 of the Constitution. This aspect has been dealt with by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Barat's case (AIR 1962 M.P 73). Art. 361 gives personal immunity to the Governor for the exercise and performance of the powers of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties. This immunity is not in any manner whittled down or affected by exposing the statutory actions of the Chancellor open to challenge, if they are not in accord with the statute or are otherwise available in law. We do not accept this plea of the petitioner.

39. For all these reasons we are unable to accept the contentions of the petitioner that the nomination made by the Chancellor, of respondents 4 to 10, is unconstitutional, illegal or void. The Chancellor was well within her rights in making the nominations under the powers vested in her under S. 17 of the Kerala University Act without being bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. There is no other challenge to the validity of the order Ext. P1 as the charge of mala fides also stands defeated for want of proper pleadings or sustaining materials.

40. The very locus of the petitioner to file this petition is in dispute. He is one of those nominated by the Chancellor. He is not in any manner affected by the nominations made. His complaint is regarding the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 on the ground that they were not in the list submitted by Government. None of the persons included in the Government's list, who were not nominated by the Chancellor, has chosen to challenge the nominations made by the Chancellor. Such a petitioner cannot call upon this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We are not, however, resting our decision on this ground as we are satisfied that the original petition is bereft of merit, even otherwise.

41. We dismiss the original petition.

42. Dismissed. We are not satisfied that this case involves any substantial question of interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution or any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence leave prayed for is refused.

43. Leave Refuesed.