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Common Cause, A Regd.Society Through Its Director v. Union Of India
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion clarifies and modifies a prior judgment dated May 1, 1996, in writ petition (C) No. 1128 of 1988. The original judgment set time limits regarding the pendency of criminal cases, and this order addresses exceptions and procedural clarifications related to those time limits and their application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the time limits prescribed in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(f) of the earlier judgment apply when the delay in criminal proceedings is attributable to dilatory tactics or actions by the accused.
- How the phrases "pendency of trials" and "non-commencement of trial" are to be construed in relation to different types of criminal trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Whether certain additional categories of offences should be excluded from the directions regarding time limits for pendency and non-commencement of trials.
- Whether accused persons previously discharged or acquitted under the earlier order can be recalled for trial in respect of offences newly added to the exclusion list.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the application of its earlier judgment in light of concerns about accused persons potentially benefiting from their own delay tactics. It clarified that the time limits for trial pendency do not apply if the accused is responsible for prolonging the trial, either through dilatory tactics or by obtaining stays from higher courts. The court further defined when a trial is considered to have commenced under different procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, namely sections 228, 240, 246, and 251, depending on the nature of the trial and the court.
The court also expanded the list of offences exempt from the time-limit directions to include matrimonial offences (including Section 498A IPC), offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act (including Section 138), offences related to criminal misappropriation and breach of trust, offences under Section 304A IPC, and offences affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals. For these offences, the court directed that discharged or acquitted accused persons liable to be proceeded against shall be recalled and the cases restored for trial within three months.
However, for other offences covered by the original time limits, the court held that acquitted or discharged accused persons shall not be recalled, and the clarificatory order shall operate prospectively without reopening closed cases.
The court also mandated communication of this clarificatory order to all High Courts, state Chief Secretaries, and administrative heads of Union Territories, with a requirement for compliance reports within three months.
Holding and Implications
A. No. 3, 4, 5, 6 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in light of this clarificatory order.
The court's decision modifies the earlier judgment by excluding cases where delay is attributable to the accused from the prescribed time limits, and by expanding the list of offences exempt from these time limits. It directs restoration of certain criminal cases previously closed in respect of the newly added offences, while affirming that cases already closed for other offences shall not be reopened. There is no indication that this order establishes new precedent beyond clarifying and modifying the earlier judgment; its direct effect is on the procedural handling of pending and previously disposed criminal cases within the specified categories.
1. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the concerned parties in the present proceedings. Having given our anxious consideration to their contentions, We deem it fit to clarify/ modify our judgment dated may, 1996 in writ petition (c) no. 1128 of 1988 as under:
the time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paragraphs from 2 (a) to 2 (f) of our judgment shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the concerned accused or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words, It should be shown that the criminal
proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of para. 2 despite full co - operation by the concerned accused to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the concerned accused, Nor such delay is caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per para. 2 (a) to 2 (f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trial against them.
2. The phrase 'pendency of trials' as employed in paragraphs from 1 (a) to 1 (c) and the phrase 'non - commencement of trial' as employed in paragraphs from 2 (b) to 2 (f) shall be construed as under:
(i) in case of trials before sessions court, The trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under s. 228 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 in the concerned cases.
(ii) in cases of trials of warrant cases by magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under s. 240 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under s. 246 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973.
(iii) in cases of trials of summons cases by magistrates the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the magistrate are seized under s. 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make.
3. In para. 4 of our judgment in the list of offences to which directions contained in para. 1 and 2 shall not apply, The following additions shall be made:
(n) matrimonial offences under indian penal code including s. 498a or under any other law for the time being in force; (o) offences under the negotiable instruments act including offences under s. 138 thereof; (p) offences relating to criminal misappropriation of property of the complainant as well as offences relating to criminal breach of trust under indian penal code or under any other law for the time being in force; (q) offences under s. 304a of the indian penal code or any offence pertaining to rash and negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law for the time being in force; (r) offences affecting the public health, Safety, Convenience, Decency and morals as listed in chap. 14 of the indian penal code or such offences under any other law for the time being in force.
it is further directed that in criminal case pertaining to offences mentioned under the above additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to our judgment dated 1st may, 1996 and they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as aforesaid, The concerned criminal court shall suo mote or on application by the concerned aggrieved parties shall issue within three months of the receipt of this clarificatory order at their end, Summons or warrants, As the case may be, To such discharged or acquitted accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them for being proceeded further in accordance with law.
it is however made clear that in trials regarding other offences which are covered by the time limit specified in our earlier order dated 1st may, 1996 wherein the concerned accused are already acquitted or discharged pursuant to the said order, Such acquitted or discharged accused shall not be liable to be recalled for facing such trials pursuant to the present clarificatory order which qua such offences will be treated to be purely prospective and no such cases which are already closed shall be reopened pursuant to the present order.
4. Copies of this clarificatory order shall be communicated by the office of the court to all the high courts, Chief secretaries of all the states and the concerned administrative heads of all the union territories. Registrars of the high courts shall be requested by the office to communicate copies of this clarificatory order to all the criminal courts under the control and superintendence of the respective high courts with direction to send compliance reports to the high courts concerned within three months from the date of receipt of communication of this clarificatory order at their end.
i. A. No. 3, 4, 5, 6 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in the light of this clarificatory order.
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