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Lachhman Singh Etc. v. C.D. Taneja Etc.
Summary of Legal Opinion — B.C. Misra
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenges an order dated 11-09-1972 of the Subordinate Judge which granted the petitioners leave to defend a suit only in respect of part of the amount claimed and refused leave as to another part. The original suit was instituted under the summary procedure of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Narain Dass Babar (plaintiff; respondent No. 2 in the revision) against the petitioners and others, alleging two promissory notes in favour of defendant No. 4 (C.D. Taneja, who is first respondent in the revision). The first promissory note (15-11-1968) was for Rs. 1,800 and the second (22-11-1968) for Rs. 2,500. The plaintiff admitted payment of Rs. 950 towards the first note and claimed the balance together with unpaid amounts on the second note, aggregating Rs. 4,017.65, of which the plaintiff claimed Rs. 4,000 in the suit after conceding Rs. 17.65.
On service, the petitioners (defendants No. 1 and 3) filed separate applications for leave to defend under Order 37, raising various defences including alleged payments totalling Rs. 1,625 (of which Rs. 950 was admitted by the plaintiff and another Rs. 550 was asserted to have been paid by cheque to the assignor). The trial court found some defences to be sham but accepted there was substance to the plea of payment of Rs. 550 and disbelieved other alleged payments for want of particulars, and it proceeded to decree the suit to the extent of Rs. 2,375 while granting leave to defend in respect of the balance. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed this revision petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the revision is maintainable in view of the lower court having passed a decree for part of the amount and no appeal having been filed against that decree.
- Whether, under Order 37 (in particular Order 37 Rule 3), a court dealing with an application for leave to defend may grant leave only in relation to part of the claim and refuse it as to the remainder, effectively splitting the defence and the suit.
- Whether the defendants' pleaded payments and other defences were bona fide and plausible on the affidavits such that leave to defend the suit as a whole should have been granted, or whether the trial court was justified in refusing leave as to part of the claim for lack of particulars/evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments (as recorded)
- The plaintiff's counsel (Mr. Malviya) raised a preliminary objection that the revision was not maintainable because the lower court had already passed a decree for Rs. 2,375 and, in the absence of an appeal against that decree, the decree had become final and could not be set aside in revision.
- The plaintiff relied on Mohd. Yunus & Another v. Sugra Begum & Others (AIR 1955 Hyderabad 156) to support the proposition that certain interlocutory orders (e.g., rejection of a plaint under Rule 11 of Order 7) are decrees and are specifically appealable, thereby limiting the High Court's revisional power in some contexts.
Petitioners' / Defendants' Arguments (as recorded)
- The petitioners contended that the court below should have granted leave to defend in respect of the whole claim. They asserted substantive defences: (a) that no amount was due under the first promissory note (Rs. 1,800) because it was executed without consideration; and (b) that payments amounting to Rs. 1,625 had been made towards the amount claimed under the second promissory note (Rs. 2,500) — of this Rs. 950 was admitted by the plaintiff and a further Rs. 550 was asserted to have been paid by cheque but not adjusted by the plaintiff. They also alleged additional payments (amounting to Rs. 1,075) by cheques and cash which the trial court found insufficiently particularised.
- The petitioners argued that their defences were bona fide and triable and that, once that prima facie character was shown on affidavits, they were entitled to leave to defend the entire suit (relying implicitly on established principles about Order 37 leave applications).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohd. Yunus & Another v. Sugra Begum & Others, AIR 1955 Hyderabad 156 | Authority stating that an order rejecting a plaint under Rule 11 of Order 7 is a decree and is appealable; that such specific provisions limit exercise of inherent powers. | The court held that this authority was not relevant to the present facts. It rejected the plaintiff's preliminary objection that relied on this case and concluded that an order refusing leave to defend is revisable and the mere passing of a decree for part of the claim does not oust revisional jurisdiction. |
| Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 321 | Authoritative statement on principles for grant of leave under Order 37: court must determine whether, if the facts alleged by the defendant are proved, they would afford a good or at least a plausible answer to the plaintiff's claim; leave should not be withheld if the defence is prima facie plausible; affidavits are the stage-appropriate material and production of all documents is not required at the leave stage. | The court applied these principles to hold that the trial court erred in refusing leave as to part of the claim and in prematurely requiring proof beyond affidavits; the trial court should have granted leave to defend the whole suit once it was satisfied that the defendants' pleas were bona fide and plausible. |
| Jetha Singh v. Chaman Lal, A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 122 | Reported judgment of the court following the principles laid down in Santosh Kumar (as cited). | The opinion notes that this court has followed Santosh Kumar in Jetha Singh; the present decision aligns with that approach when assessing the trial court's conduct. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two main phases: (A) a consideration of the preliminary objection on maintainability of revision, and (B) an examination of the merits of the leave-to-defend decision under Order 37.
A. Maintainability: The plaintiff argued that because the lower court had passed a decree for part of the amount (Rs. 2,375) and no appeal had been filed against that decree, the decree had become final and the revisional forum could not entertain the petition. The court rejected this submission, distinguishing the authority cited by the plaintiff (Mohd. Yunus) as not applicable to the facts. The court held that an order granting or refusing leave under Order 37 is revisable in the High Court where conditions for revision are satisfied, and that the mere fact that the trial court, at or after the stage of refusing leave, passed a decree for part of the claim does not preclude revision against the interlocutory order that split the grant of leave.
B. Merits — scope of Order 37 Rule 3 and assessment of defences: The court reviewed the nature of the petitioners' defences and the trial court's findings. The trial court had found some defences sham but accepted that the petitioners had established prima facie that Rs. 550 had been paid beyond the Rs. 950 admitted by the plaintiff. However, the trial court disbelieved or refused leave as to other alleged payments (totaling an additional Rs. 1,075) for lack of particulars (no cheque numbers, dates or bank statements produced by the date of the order).
The revisional court found a legal error in the lower court's approach: under Order 37 Rule 3 the enquiry is whether the defence to the suit as a whole is bona fide and raises triable issues. The court emphasised that the judge's function at the leave stage is to determine prima facie — typically on affidavits — whether the facts alleged, if proved, would afford a plausible answer to the plaintiff's claim (following Santosh Kumar). It is not a stage for detailed proof. Therefore it was impermissible for the trial court to split the defence and grant leave only as to part of the claim while refusing it as to the remainder. The court held that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively trying part of the suit at the leave stage and by requiring a level of proof beyond what Order 37 contemplates.
Applying the principle in Santosh Kumar (and its own prior decision in Jetha Singh), the revisional court reasoned that because the lower court was satisfied that some additional amount beyond the admitted Rs. 950 had been paid (namely Rs. 550), the defendants' pleas were prima facie bona fide and triable; hence the trial court should have granted leave to defend the whole suit and permitted the defendants to produce fuller evidence (bank particulars, cheques, etc.) in the regular course after appearance.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the impugned order of the Subordinate Judge was not sustainable. The court concluded that the trial court erred in splitting the leave to defend between parts of the claim and, applying the principles laid down in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, should have granted leave to defend the suit as a whole once a bona fide and plausible defence had been made out on affidavit to the extent shown.
Direct consequences for the parties: The immediate effect is that the trial court's order granting leave to defend only in respect of part of the claim and refusing it for the remainder was set aside as unlawful in approach; the petitioners were entitled to leave to defend the entire suit and to produce the evidence necessary to substantiate their pleaded payments and other defences in the usual course of the suit. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies and follows the Supreme Court authority in Santosh Kumar and the court's prior decision in Jetha Singh to the facts at hand. No broader new precedent beyond the application of those authorities is claimed in the opinion.
B.C.Misra
(1) This Revision Petition Has Been Filed U/S 115, C.P C. Against The Order Of The Subordinate Judge Dt. 11-9-72 By Which He Has Granted Leave To The Petitioners To Defend The Suit In Respect Of A Part Of The Amount Claimed In The Suit While It Has Refused Leave In Respect Of Another Part. The Suit Was Instituted By Narain Dass Babar, Plaintiff Who Is Respondent No. 2 Herein It Was Instituted Against The Petitioners And One Bhagwant Singh Who Was Defendant No. 2 And Who Has Since Been Given Up By The Plaintiff. Mr. C.D. Taneja First Respondent In The Revision (The Original Holder Of The Promissory Notes) Was Defendant No. 4 In The Suit. The Plaintiff Instituted The Suit On The Allegations That Defendant 1, 2 And 3 Executed Two Pronotes In Favour Of Defendant No. 4; One Being Dated 15th November, 1968 For A Sum Of Rs. 1,800.00 And The Other Dated 22nd November, 1968 For A Sum Of 2,500.00. It Was Alleged That The Defendants Had Paid Rs. 950.00 Towards Debts Which Had Been Adjusted By Defendant No. 4 Towards The First Pronote Of Rs. 1,800.00 (Being Rs. 811.00 On Account Of Principal And Rs. 139.00 On Account Of Interest) And That The Balance Was Claimed In Respect Of The Said Pronote. It Was Also Alleged That Nothing Had Been Paid On Account Of The Second Pronote And So A Sum Of Rs. 2,500.00 As Principal And Rs. 431.25 As Interest Was Due On The Second Pronote Of Rs. 2,500.00; Besides Rs. 989.00 As Principal And Rs. 97.40 On Account Of Interest Was Due Under The First Pronote Making A Total Ofrs. 4,017.65 Out Of Which The Plaintiff After Giving Up Rs. 17.65 Filed The Suit For Recovery Of Rs. 4,00.00 Besides The Future Interest And Costs. The Suit Was Instituted Under The Summary Procedure Prescribed By Order 37 Of The Code Of Civil Procedure. On Service Of The Summonses The Petitioners Filed Two Separate Applications Being One On Behalf Of Defendant No. 1 And The Other On Behalf Of Defendant No. 3 For Leave To Defend The Suit. They Raised Various Defences In The Applications. The Applications Were Contested On Behalf Of The Plaintiff.
(2) The Same Were Disposed Of By The Lower Court By The Impugned Order. The Learned Lower Court Found That Some Of The Defences Raised On Behalf Of The Petitioners Were Sham, Bogus And Imaginary. It, However, Found Substance In The Pleas Of Payment Raised By The Petitioners. It Was Of The View That In Addition To The Amount Of Rs. 950.00 Admitted By The Plaintiff To Have Been Paid By Defendants Another Sum Of Rs. 550.00 Had Been Paid By Defendant No. 1 To The Fourth Defendant The Assignor On By Cheque. The Learned Lower Court Was, However, Not Satisfied With Regard To The Allegations Of The Defendants About The Payment Of Other Sums Of Rs. 625.00 By Cheques And Rs. 1,000.00 By Cash And Cheques In This Way Against The Plea Of Payments Of Rs. 1,625.00 The Court Was Satisfied About The Payment Of Rs. 550.00 But Not With Regard To The Rest. It, Therefore, Decreed The Suit To The Extent Of Rs. 2,375.00 Thereby Presumably Refusing Leave To That Extent. It, However, Granted Leave To Defendants 1, 3 And 4 To File Their Written Statements In Respect Of The Balance Amount. Aggrieved By This Order The Petitioners Have Filed This Revision Petition.
(3) Mr. Malviya, Learned Counsel For The Plaintiff Has Raised A Preliminary Objection To The Maintainability Of The Revision. He Contends That The Court Below Has Passed A Decree For Rs. 2,375.00 And Since No Appeal Has Been Filed Against It The Same Has Become Final And The Revision Is Not Maintainable To Have The Same Set Aside. He Has Cited, Mohd. Yunus And Another V, Sugra Begum And An Others. Air 1955 Hyderabad 156. In That Case A Division Bench Of The High Court Of Hyderabad Held That An Order Passed Under Rule 11 Of Order 7 Rejecting The Plaint Was A Decree And Was Appealable And If Necessary Could Be Reviewed And That Being A Specific Provision For Getting Rid Of The Order It Was Not Open To The Court To Exercise Its Inherent Power Under Section 151 Of The Civil Procedure Code . To Set Aside The Order And Thereby Deprive The Opposite Party Of The Valuable Right Acquired By The Bar Of Limitation. The Said Authority Has No Relevance To The Facts Of The Present Case. There Is No Doubt That An Order Refusing Leave To Defend The Suit Is Subject To Revision In The High Court If It Satisfies The Other Conditions Of Attracting The Provision Of Law. The Impugned Order Has Granted Leave To The Petitioners Only To The Extent Of Part Of Claim In The Suit And This Order Is Revisable At The Instance Of The Petitioners Who Contend That The Leave Should Have Been Granted By The Court Below In Respect Of The Whole Of The Claim In The Suit. The Mere Fact That The Court Below At The Time Of Or After Refusing Leave Has Passed A Decree For Part Of The Amount Does Not Have The Effect Of Depriving The Petitioners Of Their Right To Have The Impugned Order Revised By This Court In Exercise Of Its Revisional Jurisdiction. There Is No Force In The Preliminary Objection And The Same Is Rejected.
(4) So Far As The Merits Are Concerned I Am Of The Opinion That The Impugned Order Is Not Sustainable. The Defence Set Up By The Petitioners Was That No Amount Was Due Under The First Pronote Of Rs. 1,800.00 Which Had Been Executed Without Consideration And That They Had Paid Rs. 1,625.00 On Account Of The Amount Claimed By The Plaintiff Under The Pronote Executed For Rs. 2,500.00. The Payment Of Rs. 950.00 Was Admitted And The Court Below Found That Another Payment Of Rs. 550.00 Appears To Have Been Made Which Had Not Been Adjusted. With Regard To The Payment Of Rs. 1,075.00 Alleged By The Defendants, The Court Has Repelled The Allegation Of The Defendants With The Observations That No Details Of The Cheque Numbers Or The Dates On Which These Payments Had Been Made Were Given And It Had Not Been Disclosed As To Which Part Of Rs. 1,000.00 Was Paid In Cash And Which Part By Cheques. It Was Also Stated That Defendant No. 1was Still Obtaining Information From The Punjab National Bank Of The Cheques But Such A Statement Of Account Was Not Filed Till The Date Of The Order. The Court Found That The Defendants Had Reasonable Defence With Respect To An Amount Of Rs. 550.00 But Not With Regard To The Balance Of The Amount.
(5) There Is A Fallacy In The Reasoning And Conclusion Of The Court Below. The Defendants Had Raised A Defence To The Suit As A Whole And The Court Under The Law Had To Determine Whether The Defence Was Bona Fide And Raised A Triable Issue To Merit Leave To Defend. The Conclusion Of The Court Must Relate To The Defence To The Whole Suit. The Court Was Certainly Entitled To Consider The Various Defence Pleas Raised In Order To Determine Whether The Defence Was Bonafide Or Not But It Was Not Open To It To Return To A Finding That There Was A Bonafide Defence With Regard To The Part Of The Claim In The Suit And Not With Regard To The Remaining Part. It Is Obvious That The Court Was Not Trying The Whole Suit And Granting A Decree In This Behalf. The Question Raised Before The Court Was The Application Of The Defendant To Give Leave To Appear And To Defend The Suit. The Provisions Of Order 37 Rule 3 Speak Of Defence To The Suit And Not To Defence To A Part Of The Suit. The Jurisdiction Of The Court Consisted In Refusing Leave Or Granting It Un-Conditionally Or Subject To Such Terms As To Giving Of Security Etc. As It Thought Fit. After Taking All The Facts And Circumstances Of The Case And Plausibility Of All The Pleas Raised, The Court Ought To Have Determined Whether The Defence Raised To The Whole Suit Was Or Was Not Bonafide And Having Arrived At Such A Conclusion, It Ought To Have Acted According To Law In Refusing Leave Or Granting Leave Unconditionally Or Conditionally. The Lower Court Has, However, Granted Leave In Respect Of The Part Of The Defence Of The Suit And Has Refused It In Respect Of The Other Part. Thereby It Has Split Up The Defence As Well As The Suit. This Course In My Opinion Is In Excess Of The Jurisdiction Of The Court Below And The Impugned Order Is, Therefore, Not Sustainable.
(6) The Principles On Which The Leave Is Or Is Not To Be Granted Have Been Authoritatively Laid Down By Supreme Court In Santosh Kumar V. Bhai Mool Singh. A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 321. In This Authority The Court Observed That "The Learned Judge Has Failed To See That The Stage Of Proof Can Only Come After The Defendant Has Been Allowed To Enter An Appearance And Defend The Suit, And That The Nature Of The Defence Has To Be Determined At The Time When The Affidavit Is Put In At That Stage All That The Court Has To Determine Is Whether "If The Facts Alleged By The Defendant Are Duly Proved" They Will Afford A Good, Or Even A Plausible, Answer To The Plaintiff's Claim. Once The Court Is Satisfied About That, Leave Cannot Be Withheld And No Question About Imposing Conditions Can Arise ; And Once Leave Is Granted, The Normal Procedure Of A Suit, So Far As Evidence And Proof Go, Obtains." In Another Part Of The Judment The Court Disapproved The Observation Of The Trial Judge That Although The Defence Raised By The Defendant Did Raise A Triable Issue, It Was Not Enough For The Defendants To Back Up Their Assertions With An Affidavit ; They Should Also Have Produced Writings And Documents Which They Said Were In Their Possession And Which They Asserted Would Prove That The Cheques And Payments Referred To In Their Defence Were Given In Payment Of The Cheque In Suit. This Authority Has Been Followed By A Reported Judgment Of This Court In Jetha Singh V Chaman Lal, A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 122.
(7) In The Present Case The Court Below Had Found That The Defence Of The Petitioners Was Bona Fide And Plausible And Triable To The Extent That A Sum Of Rs. 550.00 Had Been Paid By Them Over And Above The Amount Admitted By The Plaintiff For Which The Plaintiff Had Not Given Any Credit. This Certainly Established A Bonafide Defence To The Suit. With Regard To The Allegation About The Payment Of A Further Amount Of Rs. 1,075.00 The Defendants Had Still To Prove And Establish The Case By Evidence On Record, And It Was Premature For The Court Below To Hold That The Said Payment Had Not Been Established. As Observed By The Supreme Court In Santosh Kumar's Case The Bonafides Of The Plea Had To Be Determined Prima Facie On Affidavits And An Opportunity Had To Be Given To The Defendants To Establish The Same By Producing Evidence After Having Been Granted Leave To Defend The Suit. In My Opinion The Court Below Was Not Justified In Prematurely Holding That The Defendants Had Not Established The Payment Of The Disputed Amount Of Rs. 1,075.00 And Refusing Leave In Respect Of The Defence To A Part Of The Claim In Suit. In View Of The Fact That The Defendants Had Satisfied The Court With Regard To The Fact That Some Amount In Addition To What Had Been Admitted By The Plaintiff Had Been Paid, The Court Was Bound To Grant Leave To Defend The Suit As A Whole.
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