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Raman Nair v. State Of Kerala
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a complaint petition against a daily newspaper alleging a published news item was defamatory and constituted an offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code; the matter is pending as C.C. No. 474/96 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kottayam. The second respondent is identified as the Chief Editor of the newspaper and is also the Chief Minister at the time. The second respondent applied for exemption from personal appearance by C.M.P. No. 4193/97, and the learned Magistrate granted that exemption. The petitioner filed the present petition seeking quashing of the Magistrate's order granting exemption from personal appearance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Magistrate's order granting exemption from personal appearance to the second respondent (the second accused) can be quashed.
- Whether exemption from personal appearance under Section 205 Cr.P.C. must be exercised at the time of issuance of summons or may be exercised later (including on application after summons has been issued).
- Whether an accused must appear in court at least once (to obtain bail) before exemption from personal attendance may be granted.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The second respondent has not appeared in Court even once, and therefore the order granting exemption was not justified.
- Section 205 Cr.P.C. permits exemption from appearance at the initial stage only; Section 317 Cr.P.C. deals with exemption during the actual trial.
- The Magistrate's power to exempt under Section 205(1) must be exercised when issuing the summons; if summons has already been issued, the accused must appear and then seek and obtain bail.
Respondent's Arguments
- Exemption from appearance was proper in the circumstances; authorities such as Helen Rubber Industries and Ors. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT 794) and Mathew v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 128) support the grant of exemption.
- The offences in question do not involve moral turpitude and, given the accused's public duties, exemption was justified.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Helen Rubber Industries and. Ors. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT 794) | These decisions show that where the offences are of a technical nature or do not involve moral turpitude, exemption should be the rule and the Court should not insist on personal appearance of the accused person. | The court relied on the principle to support the proposition that exemption from personal appearance is appropriate where offences are not of moral turpitude, reinforcing that the Magistrate's grant of exemption was permissible. |
| Mathew v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 128) | These decisions show that where the offences are of a technical nature or do not involve moral turpitude, exemption should be the rule and the Court should not insist on personal appearance of the accused person. | The court treated this authority similarly as support for permitting exemption in cases of non-moral-turpitude offences and for the proposition that exemption can be granted on application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the Magistrate's order and the statutory provision relied upon (Section 205(1) Cr.P.C.). The text of Section 205(1), as quoted in the opinion, reads: “Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.”
The court considered the competing interpretations of Section 205(1). The petitioner urged that the power to exempt must be exercised at the time the summons is issued and that, if summons is already issued, the accused must appear and obtain bail. The court rejected the contention that Section 205(1) contains a temporal restriction precluding exercise of the power after the issuance of summons. Instead, the court observed that nothing in the statutory text indicates the power cannot be exercised after issuance of summons.
The court referred to the cited decisions which indicate that exemption is appropriate where offences are technical or do not involve moral turpitude and that exemption can be exercised on application. The opinion notes that such applications can be filed once summons is issued and that some decisions have allowed withdrawal of warrants and granting of exemption under Section 205 Cr.P.C. on application of the accused.
Applying these principles to the present case, the court found no illegality or irregularity in the Magistrate's exercise of discretion in granting exemption to the second respondent and therefore concluded that interference with the Magistrate's order was not warranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition seeking to quash the Magistrate's order granting exemption from personal appearance is dismissed.
Implications: The direct effect is that the Magistrate's order granting exemption to the second respondent remains in force and is not set aside. The opinion did not announce any novel or broader precedent beyond applying existing principles that exemption is appropriate for offences not involving moral turpitude and that Section 205(1) may be applied by the Magistrate on application; accordingly, no new legal principle was laid down.
K.V Sankaranarayanan, J.:— Petitioner has filed a complaint petition against a daily newspaper alleging that publication of a news item was defamatory and it amounted to an offence under S. 500 I.P.C It is pending as C.C No. 474/96 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kottayam. The second respondent is the Chief Editor of the newspaper. He also happens to be the Chief Minister at present The second respondent sought exemption from personal appearance by C.M.P No. 4193/97. The learned Magistrate has considered and granted the prayer. This petition is filed for quashing the order of the learned Magistrate granting exemption to the second respondent from personal appearance. A persual of the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate shows that exemption has been granted on the basis that the second respondent who is the second accused in the case is only the Chief Editor. He is, the Chief Minister also. The offence is not one involving moral turpitude and being a busy person, exemption from personal appearance will be justified.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that though exemption from personal appearance may be justified at the trial stage, in this case, second respondent has not appeared in Court even on one occasion and so the order was not justified. S. 205 Cr.P.C permits exemption from appearance at the initial stage, S. 317 Cr. P.C deals with such exemption during the actual trial. Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out the decisions in Helen Rubber Industries and. Ors. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT 794) and Mathew v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 128) and contended that exemption from appearance granted was proper.
3. These decisions show that where the offences are of a technical nature or do not involve moral turpitude, exemption should be the rule and the Court should not insist on personal appearance of the accused person. But learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the accused has to appear in Court at least once and seek and obtain bail. According to learned counsel, exemption can be granted under S. 205 Cr. P.C only if the Magistrate decides to exempt the accused from personal appearance even at the time of issuance of summons and not at a later stage. S. 205(1) reads as follows:
“Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.”
4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that this right to exempt must be exercised by the Magistrate when the summons is issued. If summons is already issued, the accused has necessarily to appear and then seek bail. But there is nothing in S. 205(1) to indicate that the power to grant exemption from personal attendance cannot be exercised after issuance of summons. The Section only means that in cases where the Magistrate issues a summons, he can dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. Such exemption is not expected in cases where the Magistrate decides to issue warrant The decisions on the point indicate that the right can be exercised on an application. Such applications can be filed only when summons is issued and not earlier. Some decisions even go the the extent that warrants issued can be withdrawn and exemption granted under S. 205 Cr.P.C on application of the accused, In this case, there is nothing to find that the Magistrate has exercised the discretion illegally or irregularly. No interference is called for. Hence, this petition is dismissed.
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