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Ajit Singh Etc. v. Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, Katra .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision Petitions challenging reference to arbitration)
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent Shr ine Board (the Board) floated a tender notice on 13-3-1999 inviting applications for allotment of shops at Lambi Keri. The petitioners (plaintiffs) applied and, by order dated 31-3-1999, each petitioner was allotted a shop for a period of two years and inducted into possession under a licence from 8-4-1999 to 3-4-2001.
In December 1999 the Board is said to have added a new route to the Holy Shrine, which the petitioners contend affected their business. The petitioners contend that, on representation to the Board, the Board orally agreed that their licence would be renewed for a further one year as compensation for loss caused by the new route.
The petitioners filed suits on 22-3-2001 (while the licence was still subsisting) seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants/respondent from forcibly evicting them from their shops and related residential/store accommodation.
The Trial Court initially issued an interim direction maintaining status quo. On 20-4-2001 the respondents-filed detailed objections to the application for temporary injunction; on the same date the respondents also filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration. The Trial Court decided that application by an order dated 31-5-2001 (the impugned order). These revision petitions seek to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to set aside that order.
Counsel appearing: Mr. G.A. Lone for the petitioners and Mr. Kohli for the respondent-Board. The High Court heard counsel, analysed the issues, and ultimately dismissed the petitions and withdrew the interim direction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there existed an arbitration agreement applicable to the dispute, given the petitioners' contention that a new oral agreement replaced the prior written licence agreement containing an arbitration clause.
- Whether an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could be entertained once the first statement on the substance of the dispute (in the form of objections) had been filed — in particular, whether the application was made at an appropriate stage.
- Whether a dispute seeking temporary injunctions (an injunction suit) could properly be referred to arbitration under Section 8.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (Mr. G.A. Lone)
- There was no agreement for arbitration between the parties because the old written agreement (the licence deed) had come to an end and a new oral agreement had come into existence; therefore the written arbitration clause could not be relied upon.
- An application under Section 8 could not be entertained because the first statement of the case had been tendered in the form of objections — once that first statement was filed, the Court no longer had power to refer the matter to arbitration.
- A matter seeking temporary injunction could not be referred to arbitration.
- Mr. Lone also referred to some judgments in support of these arguments (the opinion does not list those judgments in detail in the body of the text reproduced).
Respondent-Board's Arguments (Mr. Kohli)
- There was no fresh agreement in place that would displace the written licence agreement; the contention of a new oral agreement was denied.
- Section 8 relaxes the earlier position and empowers the Court to refer the parties to arbitration even where the application and the first statement (on the substance of the dispute) are filed simultaneously.
- The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 amplifies the Court's powers to deal with such cases and supports reference to arbitration; therefore the Trial Court's reference was justified.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P. Anand Gajapathi v. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539; AIR 2000 SC 186 | The Supreme Court held that where an arbitration agreement covers the subject-matter, Section 8 of the Act is peremptory and the Court is obliged to refer the parties to arbitration; the new Act envisages minimal judicial intervention (Section 5) and Part I limits Court intervention in arbitrable matters. | The Court relied on this authority to confirm that the Trial Court properly referred the parties to arbitration in respect of disputes covered by the arbitration clause, including disputes raised in an injunction suit, and to underscore the minimal role of courts in such matters. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court considered the three primary grounds raised by the petitioners and addressed them sequentially.
1. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement
- The licence deed (dated 4-4-1999) was operational when the suits were filed (licence effective 8-4-1999 to 3-4-2001). Clause 24 of the licence deed contains an arbitration clause providing that disputes arising out of or relating to the deed shall be referable to arbitration by a person nominated by the Chairman of the Shrine Board.
- The petitioners had pleaded (paras 8 and 10 of the plaint) that the defendant orally agreed to renew the licence for one year. The Court analysed the exact pleading and concluded those paragraphs disclosed no concluded fresh oral agreement but at best a promise to make an agreement. The Court treated the original written licence as continuing to govern the parties' relationship.
- The licence deed's surrender and removal clauses (paras 20 & 21 of the licence deed reproduced in the opinion) further supported the conclusion that the written licence remained operative and bound the petitioners.
- Because petitioners did not establish a new concluded oral agreement displacing the written licence, the arbitration clause in the written licence remained applicable. The Court therefore held the first ground (no arbitration agreement) to be unsustainable.
2. Appropriate Stage for Filing Section 8 Application
- The Court examined Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides that a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
- The Court contrasted Section 8 with the earlier wording of Section 34 (referred to in the text as Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 2002), noting that Section 8 is less restrictive and allows an application to be made simultaneously with the filing of the first statement. Thus, where the application under Section 8 and the first statement are filed on the same date, the application can be treated as filed at a permissible stage.
- On the facts, the Trial Court recorded that the Section 8 application was filed prior to the filing of the objections (even though both occurred on the same date), and the High Court accepted that factual finding. Consequently, the Court held that the Section 8 application was made at an appropriate stage and this ground failed.
3. Competence to Refer an Injunction Matter
- The petitioners argued that temporary injunction matters could not be referred to arbitration. The Court rejected this submission as having no solid foundation in the Act.
- The reasoning was that Section 8 empowers reference of disputes which are the subject of an arbitration agreement. Because the arbitration clause in the licence covered disputes that might arise between the parties, a dispute seeking injunctive relief fell within the referable subject-matter.
- The Court further observed that the powers exercisable by an arbitral tribunal under the Act are broader than under the earlier Arbitration Act and referenced Sections 9 and 16 of the Act as indicative of wider powers of the arbitral tribunal.
- The Supreme Court authority (P. Anand Gajapathi v. Raju) was invoked to demonstrate that Section 8 is peremptory and that Part I of the Act limits judicial intervention, reinforcing the conclusion that referral of the injunction suit to arbitration was permissible.
Overall Conclusion of Analysis
- Having addressed the three grounds raised by Mr. Lone, the Court concluded that no error of law or infirmity was committed by the Trial Court in referring the parties to arbitration. The High Court found the impugned order to be legally sound on the issues raised and therefore dismissed the revision petitions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the revision petitions and affirmed the Trial Court's order referring the parties to arbitration. The High Court also withdrew the interim direction issued earlier on 12-7-2001. No order as to costs was made.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect on the parties: the disputes between the petitioners and the Board, including those raised in the injunction suits, are to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause in the written licence deed; the interim status quo direction previously granted was withdrawn.
- The Court applied established principles limiting judicial intervention under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (notably the peremptory nature of Section 8 where an arbitration agreement exists). The opinion does not purport to set or announce a new legal precedent beyond applying existing law and the cited Supreme Court authority.
Petition dismissed.
This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what the opinion itself states.
1. These three revision petitions have been filed for invoking revisional jurisdiction of this Court in setting aside order dated 31-5-2001 passed by Sub-Judge Reasi. Respondent-Board floated a tender notice on 13-3-1999, inviting applications for allotment of shops at Lambi Keri. Petitioners-plaintiffs applied for allotment of shops and vide an order dated 31-3-1999, each of the petitioner was allotted a shop or a period of two years and they were inducted into possession vide a license from 8-4-1999 to 3-4-2001. The Board-respondent later, in December, 1999 seems to have made addition of one more route to the Holy Shrine. This, according to the plaintiffs, affected their business.
2. The case of the petitioners is that when they represented before the Board, the later orally agreed that their license would be renewed for a further period of one year by way of compensation for the loss they sustained by opening of a new route.
3. The suits were filed on 22-3-2001, when the licence was subsisting. Suits were for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from forcibly evicting them from their shops, along with a pertinent residential store accommodation.
4. The Trial Court issued an interim direction in the first instance, asking the respondent-defendant to maintain statusquo. This interim direction was subject to objections of the other side. On 20-4-2001 detailed objections to the application for temporary injunction were filed. On the same date the respondent-defendant moved an application in terms of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called the Act), for reference of the dispute to an Arbitrator. According to the Trial Court the application was filed before filing the objections. It is this application which was decided by the impugned orders.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the record.
6. Mr. G.A Lone, appearing for the petitioners, has assailed the order impugned on the following grounds:—
1. That there was absolutely no agreement for arbitration between the parties. Old written agreement had come to an end and that a new oral agreement had come into existence. Once that was so the agreement in writing could not be relied upon for the purpose of reference of the parties to the arbitrator;
2. That application under Sec. 8 could not be entertained by the Court because the first statement of the case was tendered in the form of objections. Once that was done, the Court had no power to refer the matter to the Arbitrator;
3. A case for temporary injunction could not be referred to arbitration.
7. Mr. Lone has referred to some judgments in support of his arguments, Mr. Kohli, appearing for the respondent-Board has vehemently rebutted the grounds raised by Mr. Lone and argued that there was no fresh agreement worth the name. Sec. 8 relaxes the position and empowers the Court to refer the parties to arbitration, even where the application and the first statement is filed simultaneously and that the Act amplified the powers of the Court in dealing with any sort of case or issue.
8. I have considered the matter. I propose to deal with the grounds taken above in the following manner:—
1—EXISTENCE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT:
As already observed, suits before the trial Court were filed on 22-3-2001 when the licence (effective from 3-4-99 to 3-4-2001) was in operation. This goes a long way in establishing that the status of the parties will be determined by the agreement between the parties which is in writing. Clause 24 of the licence deed, which postulates an arbitration agreement, reads as under:—
“In case of any dispute as to interpretation of terms and conditions of the deed or any other conditions stipulated in tender notice and arising out of or relating to the deed, shall be referable to arbitration of a person to be nominated by Chairman of Shrine Board.”
The petitioners have tried to escape from the arbitration agreement by raising a plea that a fresh oral agreement was made. This argument, though attractive, is not borne out by the pleadings. What is pleaded in paras 8 and 10 of the plaint is that the defendants had agreed to renewal of the licence for one year. In this behalf both these paras are reproduced as under:—
“8. That defendant orally agreed with the plaintiff that his licence shall be renewed for further one year in order to compensate him due to the opening of new route and by installation of cold drink stalls opposite the said shop on the new terms and conditions to be settled between the parties.”
xxxxxx
10. That plaintiff approached the defendant with the request that licence of running said shop for further one year be renewed as per agreement between the parties and not to give licence to any other person. But defendant paid no heed to the request of plaintiff and threatened to forcibly evict the plaintiff from the suit shop and throw his machinery and goods on the road. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of contract and defendant refused to perform his part of contract.”
9. A perusal of the above two paras shows that there has been no fresh agreement but only a promise to make an agreement. Mr. Lone's legal edifice that a new oral agreement had replaced the old agreement and that the arbitration clause was not applicable therefore, falls like a house of cards. In fact the agreement, couched as a licence deed dated 4-4-1999, bound the petitioner to surrender the shops in favour of the respondent-Board without any let or hindrance. In this behalf paras 20 & 21 of the deed are noteworthy. Same are reproduced as under:—
“20. That the licensee hereby covenan that after a period of licence granted here under, the licensee shall surrender the use of the shop in favour of the Shrine Board without any let and hindrance and remove all his articles and belongings. On the failure of the licensee to surrender the premise or any part thereof to the licensor the premises or any part thereof at the expiry on period of licence stipulated herein the licensee shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 12500/- + 1500/- per day.
21. That in case the licensee fails to surrender the premises or part thereof at the expiry of period of licence it shall be lawful for the licenser, it's employees and official to enter upon the premises and remove a the belongings and articles of the licencee.
10. Petitioner-plaintiffs have unsuccess fully tried to come out of the agreement However, in case they find that any term of the agreement was violated, parties on the issue could verily be referred to the arbitrator. Therefore, while finding no oral agreement having either been floated or proved the first ground fails.
11. 2—STAGE OF REFERENCE:
For determining as to which is the stag at which an application can be made, Section 8 of the Act requires to be keenly noticed. It reads as under:—
“8—Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement—
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substand of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”
12. On a bird's eye view of the above reproduced provision it becomes clear that the application could not be made later than point of time when first statement on the substance of the dispute is submitted. The bold distinction between Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 2002 and Sec. 8 of the Act is vivid. Under Section 34 of the Arb. Act an application for reference of the matter to arbitration could be filed only before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings. Under that Act even seeking an adjournment for filing a written statement would be taken to be a step towards the proceedings. Therefore, before doing anything, a party had to apply for reference of the dispute to the arbitrator. Under Sec. 8 of the Act the position has been tremendously relaxed. The expression “not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute” signifies that application under Section 8 can be made simultaneously with filing of the first statement. Had the intention of the legislature been same, as was working at the time of framing Section 34 of the Arbitration Act then the wording would have been altogether different. Therefore, in a case where the first statement and the application in terms of Section 8 are simultaneously filed, it cannot be said that the application has not been filed at the proper stage, envisaged by Section 8 supra.
Apart from this legal position, the trial Court in this case has expressly said that the application was filed prior to filing of the objections, though on the same date. That being the position this ground also fails.
3-IS THE REFERENCE INCOMPETENT:
13. The argument qua point No. 3 was that this being a matter relating to temporary injunction could not be referred to arbitration. There is no solid foundation for this argument. Section 8, as reproduced above, empowers reference of the parties to arbitration in matters which are subject of an arbitration agreement. Since the arbitration agreement in the matter covers all the disputes which might arise between the parties, therefore, the Court did not commit any error in referring the parties to arbitration. In fact looking at the scheme of the Act, the powers exercisable by the Arbitral Tribunal, are far wider than those prescribed by the earlier Arbitration Act. In this behalf Sections 9 & 16 of the Act can be referred to.
14. The scope of Section 8 was discussed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in case titled P. Anand Gajapathi v. Raju reported in (2000) 4 SCC 539 : (AIR 2000 SC 186). Their lordships held as under:—
“8. In the matter before us, the arbitration agreement covers all the disputes between the parties in the proceedings before us and even more than that. As already noted, the arbitration agreement satisfies the requirements of Section 7 of the new Act. The language of Section 8 is peremptory. It is, therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action of the appeal arising therefrom. There is no question of stay of the proceedings till the arbitration proceedings conclude and the award becomes final in terms of the provisions of the new Act. All the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties would now be governed by the new Act including the right to challenge the award. The Court to which the party shall have recourse to challenge the award would be the Court as defined in clause (e) of Section 2 of the new Act and not the Court to which an application under Section 8 of the new Act is made. An application before a Court under Section 8 merely brings to the Court's notice that the subject-matter of the action before it is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement. This would not be such an application as contemplated under Section 42 of the Act as the Court trying the action may or may not have had jurisdiction to try the suit to start with or be the competent Court within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the new Act.”
15. Referring to the minimal scope of Court's intervention their lordships, while dilating upon Section 5 of the Act held as under:—
“Part-I of the new Act deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 5 which is contained in Part-I of the new Act defines the extent of judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings It says that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by Part-I, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in that part. Section 5 brings out clearly the object of the new Act, namely that of encouraging resolution of disputes expeditiously and less expensively and when there is an arbitration agreement, the Court's intervention should be minimal.”
16. That being the position of law, I do not find any legal snag in the action of the Court when it makes a reference of the parties in respect of which an injunction suit was field in the Court. This ground No. 3 also fails.
17. After answering the three grounds taken, I find that no error of law or infirmity has been committed by the judicial authority below in passing the order under revision. I accordingly dismiss these petitions and withdraw the interim direction issued on 12-7-2001. No order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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