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Chandulal Harilal Lodhiya v. State Of Gujarat & Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The present Revision Application was filed by the original complainant (the father of the deceased) challenging a bail order dated 8-7-1992 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Junagadh, which released respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (original accused Nos. 2 to 4). The original accused No. 1 is the father-in-law, No. 2 the mother-in-law and No. 3 the husband of the deceased (the opinion identifies the husband as accused‑respondent No. 4 / Kantilal Purshottam / Kantilal Parshottam in different paragraphs).
Facts as stated in the complaint: on 3-7-1992 at about 10:30 p.m. in the house of the husband (original accused No. 3) the deceased suffered burn injuries and died. The complainant alleged that the husband either throttled the deceased and then poured kerosene on her and burned her, or, alternatively, that due to torture and harassment by her husband and in‑laws she committed suicide after a recent abortion carried out two to four days earlier. The accused were arrested and obtained bail from the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 8-7-1992. The State did not move to cancel bail; the complainant (private party) filed this Revision Application for cancellation of bail.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a private party (the complainant) can maintain an application for cancellation of bail when the State has not challenged the grant of bail.
- Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in granting bail to the accused-husband (respondent No. 4) charged under Section 306 IPC, particularly by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat.
- Whether, on the facts and prima facie material, bail granted to respondent No. 4 ought to be cancelled.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Complainant's) Arguments
- The learned Additional Sessions Judge committed an error in releasing all the original accused on bail, and specifically the husband (original accused No. 3 / respondent No. 4) ought not to have been released on bail.
- The trial judge wrongly relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Bhagirathsinh (1984) to grant bail.
- Offence under Section 306 IPC is very serious and therefore the husband should not have been granted bail.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Revision Application by a private party should not be entertained because the State did not challenge the bail order.
- The scope of revision is limited; absent an error of law or fact the High Court should not interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion in granting bail.
- There was no allegation that the accused breached bail conditions, attempted to tamper with evidence or was likely to jump bail, and a charge-sheet has since been filed.
- The petitioner could have approached the learned Additional Sessions Judge to seek cancellation of bail.
- The respondents relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Bhagirathsinh to argue that once discretion is properly exercised by the trial court, higher courts should not lightly interfere unless tampering with evidence or jump‑bail is alleged.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 : A.I.R. 1984 SC 372 | Principle that once the trial court has properly exercised its discretion in granting bail, the High Court should not lightly interfere; interference is warranted mainly where accused tampers with evidence or attempts to jump bail. | The trial judge relied on this decision in granting bail. The High Court held that Bhagirathsinh was wrongly relied upon here because the trial judge had misdirected himself; consequently the principle could not save the bail order in this case. |
| Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684 | Emphasized that in view of the seriousness of the offence bail should be refused (context: Section 302 IPC — murder). | Referred to in support of the proposition that serious offences may require refusal of bail; used to bolster the conclusion that bail should not have been granted to the accused-husband charged under Section 306 IPC. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, 1990 SCC (Cri) 126 | Guidance on factors to consider mainly in non-bailable cases: nature of crime, circumstances of commission, background of accused, possibility of jumping bail, effect on prosecution witnesses, impact on society, possibility of retribution, etc. | Quoted by the court and applied to conclude that release of respondent No. 4 would have a wrong impact on society and that these considerations supported cancellation of bail. |
| Arvindkumar J. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (1) G.L.R. 623 (1990 (2) G.L.H. 442) | Authority at the High Court level taking the view that offences under Sections 306 and 498A IPC are increasing and bail should be refused to avoid societal harm. | Relied upon by this court to show consistent judicial approach at the state level, supporting refusal/cancellation of bail in cases of this nature. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in distinct stages:
- Preliminary objection on locus: The court rejected respondents' submission that a private party cannot seek cancellation of bail where the State has not challenged the bail. The court reasoned that the complainant (the father of the deceased) is an appropriate person to apply for cancellation and there is no law prohibiting such an application. The learned A.P.P. (State) supported cancellation as well.
- Nature and seriousness of Section 306 IPC: The court analysed the trial judge's reliance on the lesser maximum punishment under Section 306 IPC (maximum 10 years) compared to Section 302 (murder — life or death). The court held that a difference in sentencing range does not change the gravity or societal impact of an offence under Section 306. The offence can be equally serious and is often an offence against society as well as the individual.
- Misapplication of Bhagirathsinh: The court concluded that the trial judge erred in relying on Bhagirathsinh (a Section 307 case) because that decision protects a trial court's discretion when properly exercised; here the trial court had misdirected itself and therefore Bhagirathsinh could not justify the bail order.
- Use of later and corroborative authorities: The court referred to Shahzad Hasan Khan (on seriousness of offence), State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (enumerating factors relevant to bail in serious/non-bailable matters) and Arvindkumar J. Gupta (state-level authority refusing bail in similar offences). These authorities supported the proposition that in offences of this character, bail may and often should be refused in order to protect societal interest and prevent recurrence.
- Practical considerations and policy: The court observed that applying Bhagirathsinh mechanically in Section 306 cases would lead to near‑automatic grant of bail in such cases (because accused often have family ties and prosecution witnesses are close relatives), which would undermine efforts to check the increasing incidence of such crimes. The court framed a policy approach that courts should be strict in handling offences under Sections 304B/306 and ordinarily refuse bail in such matters.
- Application to facts: On the specific facts, the court found a "very strong prima facie case" against the accused-husband (respondent No. 4) based on averments in the complaint, police papers and the accused's presence at the time of the incident. Given the trial judge's misdirection and the prima facie material, the court held that bail should be cancelled.
- Jurisdictional point: Although the petition was labelled a Criminal Revision, the court stated it was exercising its power under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and alternatively under Section 401 Cr.P.C. in revision; in either view the bail order was open to be quashed because of misdirection by the trial judge.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Revision Application is allowed; the order of bail granted to respondent No. 4 (Kantilal Purshottam / Kantilal Parshottam) dated 8-7-1992 is quashed and set aside, and the bail granted to respondent No. 4 is cancelled.
Direct consequences and directions:
- The accused (respondent No. 4) shall surrender to custody forthwith; the Rule is made absolute as to respondent No. 4.
- The Rule is discharged as to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (the application against them was rejected as not pressed by petitioner).
- At the respondents' counsel's request, respondent No. 4 was permitted to surrender to custody on or before 20-1-1993; failing which a non-bailable warrant was ordered to be issued against him at once.
- Final short form notation in the record: "Bail granted to resp. 4 cancelled."
Wider implication: The court indicated a policy stance (expressed in the judgment) that no new precedent was being created beyond applying existing authorities; the decision's immediate legal effect is the cancellation of bail for respondent No. 4 and associated procedural directions. The opinion expressly grounds its result on its reading of precedent and the facts of this case rather than announcing a novel legal doctrine.
B.J Shethna, J.:— This Revision Application is filed by the petitioner, who is the original complainant, against the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on 8-7-92 releasing the respondents Nos. 2 to 4-original accused on bail. Original accused No. 1 is the father-in-law, original accused No. 2 is the mother-in-law and original accused No. 3 is the husband of the deceased.
2. The incident took place on 3-7-92 at about 10.30 p.m in the house of the husband-original accused No. 3. The deceased died due to burn injuries. On 4-7-92 at 14.45 hours the complainant, who is the father of the deceased, lodged the complaint before the police, wherein he has stated that the deceased must have been murdered by her husband by throttling and, thereafter, she was burnt after pouring kerosene on her body. It has been also stated that if she is not murdered then due to torture and harassment by her husband and her in-laws, she must have committed suicide after the abortion, which was done in private dispensary two to four days before the incident. The accused were arrested by the police. They presented bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 577 of 1992 before the court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Junagadh. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jungadh by his order dated 8-7-92 ordered to release the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 on bail on certain conditions. Being aggrieved by that order the State has not come before this court for cancelling the bail but the private party, i.e the complainant, who is the father of the deceased, has filed this application for cancellation of bail.
3. Mr. Tripathi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently submitted that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has committed an error in releasing all the original accused on bail. In any case he has submitted that the husband-original accused No. 3 (present respondent No. 4) ought not to have been released on bail. He has not seriously pressed this bail against the in-laws of the deceased, i.e respondents Nos. 2 and 3. He submitted that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has committed an error in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State Of Gujarat., reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284 : A.I.R 1984 Supreme Court 372. He further submitted that the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C is very serious one and at least the husband of the deceased ought not to have been released on bail.
4. Mr. Nanavati learned Advocate appearing for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, submitted that this application should be rejected. Because first of all the State has not challenged the order of bail and, therefore, the Revision Application filed at the instance of private party should not be entertained by this court. He also submitted that the petitioner has filed this application as Revision Application and the scope of Revision Application is very limited. In absence of the error of law or fact committed by the trial Judge, this court should not interfere with the grant of bail order passed by the learned trial Judge. He further submitted that the order of bail was passed on 8-7-92 and till today it is not reported that the accused have committed any breach of the conditions. He further submitted that now the charge-sheet is filed on 1-12-92 and the case is likely to be committed to the court of Sessions and, therefore, also the bail should not be cancelled. He also submitted that it was open to the petitioner to approach the learned Addl. Sessions Judge for cancelling the bail order granted in favour of the accused. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagiratsinh (supra) and submitted that the considerations for cancellation of bail are different and once the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has exercised his discretion in favour of the accused, this court should not lightly interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, unless and until it is pointed out that the accused are likely to jump the bail or have tried to tamper with the evidence of prosecution witnesses, this court should not cancel the bail of the accused.
5. As stated earlier, Mr. Tripathi has not seriously pressed this Application for cancelling bail of the accused-respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who are in-laws of the deceased. Therefore, this application against them is rejected.
6. Before dealing with the contentions raised by Mr. Tripathi against the accused-respondent No. 4-husband of the deceased, preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, is required to be dealt with. Mr. Nanavati submitted that this Revision Application is filed by the private party against the order of grant of bail passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and the same has not been challenged by the State by filing application before this court for cancellation of that bail order. Therefore, this court should not entertain this Revision Application.
7. It is true that the State has not challenged the order of bail passed by the learned Trial Judge. But merely because the State has not challenged the same before this court, it would not be a ground for this court not to entertain this Application filed at the instance of private party. Present petitioner is none else but the original complainant and the unfortunate father of the deceased and if the State will not prefer to file an application for cancellation of bail granted in favour of the accused, then except the complainant who else will come before this court? Therefore, in my view, the petitioner could be the best person to approach this court for cancellation of bail. There is no law which prohibits this court from entertaining the application for cancellation of bail filed by a private party, when the State has not come before this court against the impugned order of grant of bail passed by the trial court. There may be more than one reason why the State has not challenged the impugned order of bail and this court would also not like to go into it. At this stage it is required to be stated that the learned A.P.P Mr. K.C Shah has also supported the case of the petitioner and urged that bail order passed in favour of the accused-husband must be cancelled, which is in my view is more than sufficient to do so, if this court is satisfied that the accused-husband ought not to have been released on bail. I may also make it clear that even if the learned A.P.P had not supported the case of the petitioner, even then this court would have cancelled the bail of the accused-husband, if otherwise this court was satisfied about the fact that the accused-husband is wrongly released on bail. Thus, there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, that this court should not entertain this Application, which is filed at the instance of private party in absence of any application filed by the State against the order of grant of bail passed by the learned trial Judge.
8. Mr. Tripathi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently submitted that the learned Trial Judge has much relied upon the fact that the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C is not punishable with life imprisonment like Section 302 of I.P.C Therefore, the accused could be released on bail. It is true that offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C is punishable with maximum punishment of ten years. None the less it can never be said that offence punishable under Section 306 is not a serious offence. In my opinion, if it is not more serious than offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C it can never be said that offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C is less serious than that. Merely because there is a difference in the punishment for the aforesaid two offences, namely, for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302, it is death or life imprisonment and for the offence punishable under Section 306 it is ten years imprisonment, it would not change the gravity and seriousness of offence punishable under Section 306. In fact the offence of murder is offence against individual but the offence under Section 306 is not only an offence against an individual but it is also against the whole society as well. In fact, this court in this short sitting of one and half months had come across several such cases where young brides have lost their valuable lives within a span of less than seven years of their married life. This type of incidents are increasing rapidly in our society and if the courts will become strict in their approach and continue to remain liberal, like in the present case in releasing such accused-husband on bail, then such incidents would go on increasing and it would not be brought under control either by the State or by the Society. Therefore, the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Judge in releasing the accused on bail is totally unjust and, therefore, the impugned order of bail passed in favour of the accused-husband is required to be quashed and set aside.
9. Mr. Tripathi, learned Advocate, has rightly submitted that the learned trial Judge has erred in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathsinh's case. It was a case under Section 307 of I.P.C wherein the learned trial Judge exercised his discretion and released the accused on bail, which was cancelled by the High Court on different considerations. The Supreme Court held in that case that once the discretion is properly exercised by the trial court then High Court should not lightly interfere with the said discretion. It can only interfere with said order if the accused has tried to tamper with the evidence or jump the bail. I agree with the submission made by Mr. Tripathi that the judgment of Bhagirathsinh's case could not have been relied upon by the trial court for releasing the accused on bail. In this case the offence under Section 306 of I.P.C is registered against the accused, and the discretion is wrongly exercised by the learned trial Judge in favour of the accused.
10. However, Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate for the respondents-accused, has heavily relied upon the said judgment and submitted that once the trial court has granted the bail it can be cancelled only if it is alleged that the accused has tampered or tried to tamper with the prosecution evidence or jumped or tried to jump the bail. In this case the petitioner has not come out with that case and, therefore, this application should be dismissed. In my view, the judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagiratsinh's case would not come to the rescue of the respondents-accused in this case. Because, as pointed out earlier, the learned Trial Judge has totally misdirected himself and wrongly exercised the discretion in favour of the accused. Once it is found that there is a prima facie strong case against the accused for the serious offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C bail should be refused. In fact, in its later decision in case of Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 684 the Supreme Court has held that in view of the seriousness of the offence bail should be refused. Of course that was a case under Section 302 of I.P.C In its subsequent decision in case of State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao ., reported in 1990 SCC (Cri) 126 the Supreme Court has clearly observed that, “This decision has to be made, mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to the nature of the crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, the background of the accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on society and the possibility of retribution, etc. “In this case if the respondent No. 4 is allowed to remain on bail it will have a wrong impact on society. In case of Arvindkumar J. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1990 (1) G.L.R 623 (1990 (2) G.L.H 442) this court has also taken the same view that such offences are on the increase and if bail applications in such serious offences are taken lightly it will have its impact on the society and the bail was refused to the accused, who was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of I.P.C In this case the learned Judge has erred in holding that “the suicide was committed by deceased Naina because of some incident between herself and her husband could not be said to be a serious offence, for which the accused could not be released on bail as the offence is not punishable with imprisonment of life.” This approach of the learned Judge is totally perverse. Having come to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge has wrongly exercised his discretion in favour of the accused, then other considerations, namely, that the accused is not likely to jump the tail or tamper with the prosecution evidence, become totally irrelevant and the bail of the accused must be cancelled. If the learned Judge had refused the bail, then this court would have never granted bail. Therefore, under the aforesaid circumstances, no other order, except the order of cancelling the bail, can be passed by this court in this application and accordingly this application has to be allowed.
11. It is also required to be stated that the accused persons, who are charged with the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C, would ordinarily be having their family and would be very well settled in their life and, therefore, there will be little scope of they being jumping the bail. Secondly, whatever would be the evidence would be that of the close relatives of the deceased and, therefore, there is also a little scope of accused making an attempt to tamper with the prosecution evidence. Thus, these two things would be the common feature which would be found in almost all such cases in favour of the accused persons who are charged with the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C If the aforesaid ratio of Bhagirathsinh's case (supra) has to be applied in this type of cases also, then practically in no case the accused persons, who are charged with the serious and heinous offence like Section 306 of I.P.C, could be denied bail and almost all of them have to be released on bail by the trial court itself. And, in that case if any application for cancellation of bail is preferred either by the state or by the private party, who may be father or close relative of the deceased, this court can never interfere with the bail order granted in favour of the accused. I am afraid in that case what will happen? If the submission made by Mr. Nanavati, based upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagiratsinh's case (supra) is accepted, then it will give free licence to the husband and his close relatives to ill treat and torture his wife, which would lead to the wife to commit suicide, which can never be permitted by this court. In our cultured society when the wife commits suicide due to torture by her husband and relatives, is not an individual offence but it is offence against the society also. Such crime is nothing but a revolt against the society. In my view, it would be the duty of the court to become as strict as it is possible while dealing with cases of such nature like Section 304B and/or Section 306 of I.P.C and ordinarily bail should be refused to such accused persons.
12. Coming to the facts of this case, it clearly appears that there is a very strong prima facie case against the accused husband for the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C Taking into consideration the averments made in the complaint as well as the police papers and the fact that accused-husband was very much present at the time of incident, it would be sufficient for this court to cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused-husband, i.e respondent No. 4.
13. Lastly, Mr. Nanavati submitted that the scope of the Revision Application is very limited and, therefore, this court should not interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. It is true that this petition is labelled as Criminal Revision Application. In fact it is an application for cancellation of toil and this court has to exercise its powers under Section 439 of Cr. P.C and not under Section 401 of Cr. P.C Even if this application is to be treated as Revision under Section 401 of Cr. P.C, even then this Revision Application has to be allowed because as stated earlier, the learned trial Judge has misdirected himself in exercising his discretion in favour of the accused on totally irrelevant grounds. Therefore, the impugned order of bail is required to be quashed and set aside by this court also in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of Cr. P.C Therefore, there is no substance in this contention raised by Mr. Nanavati and it fails and rejected. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge releasing the respondent No. 4-Kantilal Purshottam on bail has to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, this Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge releasing the respondent No. 4-Kantilal Purshottam on bail is quashed and set aside. The accused shall surrender to custody forthwith. Rule is made absolute accordingly qua respondent No. 4-Kantilal Parshottam and Rule is discharged qua respondents Nos. 2 and 3. At this stage Mr. Nanavati, teamed Advocate for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, requested to stay this order for some time, to enable the respondent No. 4-Kantilal Parshottam to approach the higher court. Therefore, respondent No. 4-Kantilal Parshottam shall surrender to custody on or before 20-1-1993, failing which non-bailable warrant shall be issued against him at once.
14. Bail granted to resp. 4 cancelled.
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