- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lord Russell of Killowen)
Factual and Procedural Background
In December 1909 Rampat Das was the mahant of a mutt at Paliganj (Patna District). On 21 December 1909 he executed a mukarrari (permanent lease) of about 70 acres to Munshi Naurangi Lal, in which a premium and annual rent were paid. On 13 February 1911 Rampat Das executed a sale-deed of the same land, subject to and with the benefit of the lease, to Mt. Sampat Kuer for Rs. 900. Although each document recited that it was executed for the expenses and necessities of the mutt, the trial findings led the Board to treat those recitals as disregarded and to conclude neither document was executed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the mutt or its deities.
Rampat Das died in or about July 1913. Thereafter Sant Das assumed possession claiming to be mahant, but on 20 February 1916 Sant Das by registered deed surrendered all his rights to the plaintiff (the mahant of Ramdih Baga mutt); the registered deed included the 70 acres. The plaintiff alleged a right to possession as mahant of the branch Paliganj mutt and sued on 27 May 1924 for possession of the 70 acres and mesne profits.
Defendants in their written statements advanced multiple contentions; two principal contentions were that (1) the 70 acres were the personal property of Rampat Das, and (2) the suit was barred by the Limitation Act. The trial court (Subordinate Judge) found the land appertained to the mutt, rejected the personal-property contention, and held the suit was not barred; it granted a decree for the plaintiff. On appeal, the High Court reversed and held the suit barred by limitation. The Board (Lord Russell) heard the appeal from the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's suit for possession of the 70 acres is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act.
- If limitation applies, whether the relevant period of limitation (Art. 144, Limitation Act) begins from the date of the alienation/assurance (the date of the lease or sale) or from the date of the death of Rampat Das (the mahant who executed the dispositions).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff claimed title and present possession as mahant of the Ramdih Baga mutt (including rights over the subordinate Paliganj mutt) and sued to recover the 70 acres as property appertaining to the Paliganj mutt and for mesne profits.
- The plaintiff relied on the trial finding that the 70 acres appertained to the mutt (the personal-property contention having failed).
Defendants' Arguments
- One defense was that the 70 acres constituted the personal property of Rampat Das rather than mutt property (this contention was rejected by the trial court).
- The principal surviving defense, pressed on appeal, was that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the Limitation Act (Art. 144 being applicable), i.e., that adverse possession began at the date of the alienation/assurance (the 1909 lease or the 1911 sale) so that the 12-year limitation had run prior to the plaintiff's 1924 suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami-Ayyar, AIR 1922 PC 123 (65 IC 161; 48 IA 302; 44 Mad 831 (PC)) | Holds that where a mahant disposes of an item of mutt property by a permanent mukarrari lease (or equivalent disposition), such a disposition is ineffective to create an interest beyond the mahant's life; the grantee's possession is not adverse while the grantor (mahant) or his successor continues to treat it as a tenancy during their life. | The Board treated Vidya Varuthi as directly applicable and relied on its language that a mahant can create an interest limited to his life/tenure and that possession does not become adverse until the mahant who made the disposition ceases to be mahant. Using that principle the Board held the lease and sale in the present case were effective only during Rampat Das's tenure and adverse possession began only at his death. |
| Damodar Dass v. Lakhan Das, (1910) 37 Cal 885 (37 IA 147; 7 IC 240 (PC)) | As cited, it is a decision where assignments/dispositions of a mutt and its properties were void (because they were disposition of the mutt itself) and thus in law passed no title; possession of the assignee was adverse from the moment of the attempted assignment. | The Board (and the High Court in its analysis) contrasted Damodar Dass with Vidya Varuthi: Damodar Dass concerned assignments of the mutt and its properties (void dispositions) which rendered assignee's possession immediately adverse, whereas Vidya Varuthi concerned a mahant's disposition of an item of mutt property where a life-limited interest is created and possession is not adverse until the mahant's tenure ends. |
| Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram, (1900) 23 Mad 271 (27 IA 69 (PC)) | One of the older Privy Council decisions held that in suits to recover property of an idol or a mutt the period of limitation began at the date of the alienation (the attempted assignment) rather than at the date the successor assumed office; these cases involved assignment/disposition of the mutt and its properties. | The High Court relied on this line of authorities to hold limitation ran from the date of alienation. The Board noted these cases both involved assignments of the mutt and its properties (void dispositions) and thus distinguished them from cases of a mahant's disposition of an item of mutt property. |
| Ramrup Gir v. Lal Chand Marwari, AIR 1922 Pat 243 (67 IC 401; 1 Pat 475) | Appears cited as authority by the Subordinate Judge in support of the view that where title is in the mahant (not in the idols) adverse possession begins on the death of the mahant who made the disposition. | The Subordinate Judge relied on this case in reaching his conclusion that adverse possession began at the death of the mahant; the Board described that reliance in summarizing the Subordinate Judge's reasoning. |
| Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohamad Mustapha Maracayar, AIR 1923 PC 175 (74 IC 492; 50 IA 295; 46 Mad 751 (PC)) | Explained that where a trustee attempted to dispose of charity property by a permanent mukarrari lease, the trustee has power to dispose only during his life/tenure, and a grant for a longer period is valid only to the extent of his life interest; possession during his life is therefore not adverse. | The Board cited Subbaiya Pandaram to reinforce the principle (expressed in Vidya Varuthi) that dispositions by a trustee/mahant are good only to the extent of the trustee's/mahant's life interest and that possession is not adverse during that life/tenure. The Board used this to conclude the 1909 lease and 1911 sale were effective only while Rampat Das remained mahant. |
| Ishwar Shyam Chand Jin v. Ram Kanai Ghose, (1911) 38 Cal 526 (38 IA 76; 10 IC 683 (PC)) | Referred to in Subbaiya Pandaram as one of the cases considered in articulating the rule about trustees' leases and life-limited interests. | The Board referenced its citation within Subbaiya Pandaram to show the doctrinal lineage supporting the proposition that a grant by a trustee/mahant is good only to the extent of his life interest; the Board relied on this body of authority to support its conclusion regarding the present lease and sale. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Board began by identifying the applicable limitation provision: Article 144 of the Limitation Act, since Article 134 did not apply. Article 144 prescribes a 12-year period "from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff" for suits for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not otherwise specially provided for.
The legal question was therefore whether the defendant's possession became adverse at the date of the relevant assurance (the date of alienation or lease) or at the date of the death of Rampat Das (the mahant who made the disposition). The Subordinate Judge had held that adverse possession began at the mahant's death; the High Court had held it began at the date of the alienation.
The Board analysed the distinction between two species of cases found in the authorities:
- Cases in which the attempted assignment consisted of an assignment or disposition of the mutt and its properties (for example, Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi and Damodar Dass). Those assignments were void as transfers of the mutt itself and consequently the assignee's possession was regarded as immediately adverse from the moment of the attempted assignment.
- Cases in which a mahant or trustee disposed of an item of mutt/charity property (for example, Vidya Varuthi and Subbaiya Pandaram). In these, the law (as stated by this Board) is that the mahant/trustee is incompetent to create an interest in mutt/charity property that endures beyond his life/tenure; he can create an interest that continues during his life/tenure, and any purported grant for a longer period is effective only to the extent of his life/tenure. Therefore possession under such a disposition is not adverse while the disposing mahant or his successor treats the occupation as a tenancy during their life/tenure; adverse possession commences only when the disposing mahant ceases to be mahant (e.g., on death).
The Board found the present case fell within the second category: Rampat Das's mukarrari (permanent lease) and the subsequent sale-deed related to an item of mutt property and were dispositions by the mahant. Applying the principle articulated in Vidya Varuthi and reiterated in Subbaiya Pandaram, the Board reasoned that such dispositions are effective only during the mahant's tenure and therefore adverse possession could not be said to have begun until Rampat Das ceased to be mahant (on his death).
On that basis the Board concluded that the plaintiff's 1924 suit was brought within the 12-year period from the time possession became adverse (i.e., from the mahant's death in or about July 1913) and therefore was not barred by Art. 144 of the Limitation Act.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Appeal allowed; the decree of the High Court set aside and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The Board held that the mukarrari (lease) of 21 December 1909 and the sale-deed of 13 February 1911 were valid and effective only for the period during which Rampat Das continued to be mahant (i.e., to the extent of his life/tenure), and that adverse possession in respect of the 70 acres began on his death.
- Because adverse possession began on Rampat Das's death (circa July 1913), the plaintiff's suit instituted on 27 May 1924 fell within the 12-year period prescribed by Art. 144 and was therefore not time-barred.
- The High Court's contrary finding that limitation began at the date of the alienation was reversed; the Subordinate Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiff was restored.
- The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and costs in the High Court as recorded by the Board.
The opinion does not assert that it creates a new principle of law beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities; its outcome is the adjudication of the limitation question in the particular factual and legal context described above.
Disposition: Appeal allowed. The decree of the High Court is set aside. The decree of the Subordinate Judge is restored. The respondents must pay the costs of the appeal.
Lord Russell of Killowen.-
The question for determination on this appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. The relevant facts must first be stated. In December 1909, one Rampat Das was the mahant of a mutt situate at Paliganj in Patna District. On 21st December 1909, he executed a mukarrari or permanent lease of some 70 acres of land to Munshi Naurangi Lal under which the latter paid a premium and an annual rent to the mahant. On 13th February 1911, he executed a sale-deed of the land subject to and with the benefit of the lease to Mt. Sampat Kuer in consideration of Rs. 900. Each document states that it is executed by the mahant for the expenses and necessities of the mutt, but in view of the findings at the trial these statements may be disregarded, and it must be taken that neither of these documents was executed for legal necessity or was for the benefit of the mutt or the deities installed therein.
Mahant Rampat Das died in or about July 1913. On his death one Sant Das took possession of the mutt claiming to be mahant, but on 20th February 1916, by registered deed he surrendered all his rights to the plaintiff, who was and is the mahant of a mutt at Ramdih Baga. The registered deed included the 70 acres. The plaintiff claimed that Rampat Das had died without leaving behind any disciple, and that in those circumstances he, as mahant of the Ramdih Baga Mutt, was entitled to take possession of the Paliganj mutt (which was subordinate to and a branch of the Ramdih Baga Mutt) and all properties appertaining to it. Their Lordships, however are not now concerned with any question of title because both the Courts below have found that the plaintiff is the person in actual possession of the Paliganj mutt and as such entitled to maintain a suit to recover property not for his own benefit but for the benefit of the mutt. The plaintiff instituted the present suit on 27th May 1924, against the lessee, the purchaser and the husband of the purchaser, claiming possession of the 70 acres as property appertaining to the Paliganj mutt and mesne profits. A number of contentions were raised by the written statements, the two main ones being : (1) that the 70 acres were the personal property of Rampat Das, and (2) that the suit was barred by the Limitation Act. The first contention failed completely. The 70 acres undoubtedly appertained to the mutt. The second contention failed at the trial and it is the sole contention which survived before the Board. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not barred and gave the plaintiff a decree.
On appeal, the High Court decided that the suit was barred. Both Courts agreed (and rightly) that Art. 134, Limitation Act, did not apply. The only article applicable is Art. 144. The article, which applies to a suit
for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for,
prescribes as the period of limitation 12 years from the time
when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
The question then resolves itself into this : Did the possession of the relevant defendant become adverse to the mutt or to the mahant as representing the mutt at the date of the relevant assurance or at the date of the death of Rampat Das ? The Subordinate Judge held the latter date to be the correct date, and the suit to be within the 12 years. The High Court held the former date to be correct and the suit to be barred.
The Subordinate Judge, it would seem, reached his conclusion upon the footing that the title to the property was in the mahant and not in the idols. His view was that, had the title been in the idols, the act of alienation would have been a challenge to the title of the idols and the limitation period would begin to run from the act of alienation;
but since (as he found) the title was in the mahant possession only became adverse when a new title came into existence, the owner of which had not approved of the alienation. He came to this conclusion upon the authority of the cases of Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami-Ayyar, AIR 1922 PC 123=65 IC 161=48 IA 302=44 Mad 831 (PC) and Ramrup Gir v. Lal Chand Marwari, AIR 1922 Pat 243=67 IC 401=1 Pat 475 distinguishing the case of Damodar Dass v. Lakhan Das, (1910) 37 Cal 885=37 IA 147=7 IC 240 (PC).
The Judges of the High Court, in deciding that the period of limitation ran from the date of alienation delivered a most painstaking and elaborate judgment in the course of which all available authorities were reviewed and considered. They held that two cases before this Board [Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram, (1900) 23 Mad 271=27 IA 69 (PC) and Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das, (1910) 37 Cal 885=37 IA 147=7 IC 240 (PC)] had affirmed the view that in a suit to recover the property of an idol or a mutt the starting point for the period of limitation was the date of the alienation and not the date on which the successor of the alienor assumed office. They also held that the authority of those cases was in no way affected by the later decision of this Board in Vidya Varuthi's case, AIR 1922 PC 123=65 IC 161=48 IA 302=44 Mad 831 (PC). Their Lordships do not think that it is necessary to follow the learned Judges of the High Court in their examination of the older authorities but they must point out that the cases in Gnanasambanda Pandara, Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram, (1900) 23 Mad 271=27 IA 69 (PC) and Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das, (1910) 37 Cal 885=37 IA 147=7 IC 240 (PC) were both of them cases in which the assignment or disposition consisted of an assignment or disposition of the mutt and its properties. Such an assignment was void and would in law pass no title, with the result that the possession of the assignee was perforce adverse from the moment of the attempted assignment: Vidya Varuthi's case, AIR 1922 PC 123=65 IC 161=48 IA 302=44 Mad 831 (PC) however was the case (as here) of a disposition by the Mahant of an item of property appertaining to the mutt, the disposition being in the form of a grant of a permanent lease.
The disposition was one not made for necessity and so was beyond the powers of the mahant to grant. But in delivering the judgment of the Board Mr. Ameer Ali used this most relevant and important language:
In view of the argument it is necessary to discover when, according to the plaintiff, his adverse possession began. He was let into possession by mahant No. 1 under a lease which purported to be a permanent lease, but which under the law could endure only for the grantor's lifetime. According to the well settled law of India (apart from the question of necessity which does not here arise) a mahant is incompetent to create any interest in respect of the mutt property to endure beyond his life. With regard to mahant No. 2 he was vested with a power similarly limited. He permitted the plaintiff to continue in possession and received the rent during his life. The receipt of rent was with the know ledge which must be imputed to him that the tenancy created by his predecessor ended with his predecessor's life, and can therefore only be properly referable to a new tenancy created by himself. It was within his power to continue the tenancy during his life, and in these circumstances the proper inference is that it was so continued and consequently the possession never became adverse until his death.
In other words a mahant has power (apart from any question of necessity) to create an interest in property appertaining to the Mutt which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of mahant of the mutt, with the result that adverse possession of the particular property will only commence when the mahant who had disposed of it ceases to be mahant by death or otherwise. If this be right as it must be taken to be, where the disposition by the mahant purports to be a grant of a permanent lease, their Lordships are unable to see why the position is not the same where the disposition purports to be an absolute grant of the property nor was any logical reason suggested in argument why there should be any difference between the two cases. In each case the operation of the purported grant is effective and endures only for the period during which the mahant had power to create an interest in the property of the mutt. The same view is apparent in a later judgment of this Board, viz., Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohamad Mustapha Maracayar, AIR 1923 PC 175=74 IC 492=50 IA 295=46 Mad 751 (PC). The disposition in that case was a sale in 1898 of land devoted to charitable purposes, under an execution decree against the person who was the trustee of the charity. In the year 1913 the person who was then trustee of the charity sued to recover the property from the purchaser at the execution sale, or those claiming under him. It was held not unnaturally that the purchaser's possession was adverse from the date of the sale but in delivering the judgment of the Board, Lord Buckmaster, after referring to a case in Ishwar Shyam Chand Jin v. Ram Kanai Ghose, (1911) 38 Cal 526=38 IA 76=10 IC 683 (PC) and to Vidya Varuth's case, AIR 1922 PC 123=65 IC 161=48 IA 302=44 Mad 831 (PC) said:
In each case they relate to the effect of an attempt on the part of a trustee to dispose of the property by a permanent mukarrari lease. This he has no power to do, though he is at liberty to dispose of it during the period of his life and a grant made for a longer period is good but good only to the extent of his own life interest. It follows therefore that possession during his life is not adverse.
This is a clear statement that a mahant is at liberty to dispose of the property of a mutt during the period of his life and that a grant purporting to be for a longer period is good to the extent of the mahant's life interest. Here again their Lordships think that the reference to life is upon the footing that the mahant continues during his life to hold that office. It will be observed that the statement is in no way confined to the grant of a lease, but covers the case of a purported out and out grant of the property. Whatever the intended duration of the attempted grant may be, it is good but good only for the limited period indicated. In view of these statements by the Board, their Lordships hold that in the present case the lease and the deed of sale of 13th February 1911 were good and effective so long as Rampat Das continued to be mahant and that therefore adverse possession only commenced when he died. The result is that the plaintiff's suit is not barred and the appeal succeeds. The decree of the High Court should be set aside with costs in that Court, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.
Alert