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E.L. Ebrahim Lebbe Marikar v. Austin De Mel Ltd.
Comprehensive Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arose from a judgment and decree of the Supreme Court of the Island of Ceylon dated 15 January 1943, which set aside a judgment and decree of the District Court of Colombo dated 16 January 1942 and entered judgment in favour of the defendant-respondent for the sum of Rs. 107,055/81 with interest and costs.
The appellant instituted an action in the District Court of Colombo on 16 October 1940 seeking recovery of Rs. 56,185/18 as damages alleged to have been sustained between 1 April 1940 and 27 May 1940 in relation to contracts concerning rubber coupons issued under a Rubber Restriction Scheme in Ceylon (export of rubber without such coupons being prohibited under the Rubber Control Ordinance).
The respondent, a company acting as brokers in Colombo, admitted liability to the appellant for the sum claimed by the appellant but counterclaimed (in reconvention). The respondent alleged that on 15 May 1940 it was instructed by the appellant to purchase 1,000,000 coupons (each covering one pound of rubber), that it arranged the purchase on the appellant's account from an undisclosed principal, and that the appellant later repudiated the contract without lawful cause. After giving credits for sums admittedly due by the respondent to the appellant, the respondent claimed Rs. 107,055/81 in reconvention.
At trial the parties agreed the market prices of the coupons on relevant dates and agreed the consequences of success or failure of the reconvention claim (either judgment for the appellant for Rs. 56,185/18 or for the respondent for Rs. 107,055/81). The District Judge disbelieved the appellant's account of the contract of 15 May 1940 and found that the contract had been made as alleged by the respondent; that factual finding was upheld by the Supreme Court and was not challenged before Their Lordships.
The contract was evidenced in a bought note in the respondent's contract book dated 15 May 1940, addressed to the appellant and signed for Austin de Mel Ltd., stating that 1,000,000 lbs. of Rubber Coupons had been bought by order and for the appellant's account at 30 cts. per coupon lb., and containing a clause making the contract subject to alterations in the Rubber Control Ordinance or further legislation.
It was admitted that the seller was Kathleen de Mel, wife of Austin de Mel (managing director and principal shareholder of the respondent company). The appellant contended Mrs. de Mel was an alias for the respondent company; the lower courts rejected that contention and found no conflict of interest or improper relationship preventing the transaction being treated as between distinct parties.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent company (the broker), acting for an undisclosed principal, was entitled in law to maintain its claim in reconvention in its own name for damages arising from the buyer's repudiation of the contract of 15 May 1940.
- Whether the contract of 15 May 1940 was a wagering contract and therefore unenforceable.
- Whether, on the true construction of the contract, the broker was merely a surety for the performance of the buyer or seller such that it could not claim indemnity from the buyer unless it proved actual payment to the seller.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant denied the making of the contract of 15 May 1940 (a factual denial which the trial court rejected).
- The appellant argued that Kathleen de Mel was in reality an alias for the respondent company and that the respondent had effectively sold its own coupons to the appellant.
- The appellant contended the contract was a wagering contract and therefore unenforceable.
- The appellant further argued that, on proper legal characterization, the broker was a surety for the due performance of the contract by the seller and buyer, and that the broker could not claim indemnity from the buyer unless it proved loss by showing payments made to the seller.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent admitted arranging the purchase in question on the appellant's account with an undisclosed principal but maintained that it was properly instructed to do so and that the appellant repudiated the contract without lawful cause.
- The respondent relied on the terms of its bought note and the agreed market custom or usage in the Colombo market relating to rubber coupon contracts, under which brokers did not disclose the other contracting party, were liable to accept delivery and to pay the seller whether or not the buyer accepted delivery, and both buyer and seller looked to the broker for performance.
- Relying on that usage and on its contractual position, the respondent claimed it had the right to maintain an action in its own name for damages caused by the appellant's wrongful refusal to accept delivery.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion explains the courts' reasoning in a step-by-step manner:
- Factual findings: The District Judge found the contract of 15 May 1940 had been made as alleged by the respondent; that finding was affirmed by the Supreme Court and accepted by Their Lordships.
- Wagering argument: Both lower courts rejected the appellant's contention that the contract was a wagering contract. Their Lordships accepted the lower courts' factual findings and added that, as a matter of law, the contract could not be characterized as wagering if the appellant was entitled to demand delivery of coupons (and delivery was in fact tendered by the respondent's proctor on 11 June 1940, an offer which the appellant declined).
- Nature of the legal question: The principal legal question was whether the respondent broker could maintain its reconvention claim in its own name, given that it had acted as agent for an undisclosed principal.
- Market usage and contractual context: The parties had agreed the relevant market customs in Colombo: brokers' bought/sold notes did not disclose the other contracting party; brokers were liable to accept delivery and pay sellers and to deliver to buyers irrespective of whether they had themselves received coupons; sellers could direct brokers to negotiate fresh contracts and obtain or pay differences directly to the broker; buyers could direct brokers to sell tendered coupons and obtain differences directly from the broker; and buyer and seller had no direct dealings with each other regarding performance and each looked to the broker for performance.
- Analysis of the District Judge's error: The District Judge concluded that because the respondent had acted as agent for an undisclosed principal it could not sue on the principal's contract. Their Lordships identified the fallacy in that reasoning: the respondent was not suing on the principal's contract but was suing in its own name pursuant to rights conferred by the particular contractual and market arrangement under which brokers assumed obligations going beyond those of ordinary agents.
- Legal effect of the special contractual position: Under the agreed market usage and the respondent's contract, the broker was obliged to deliver to the buyer and to make payments to the seller as if acting in a principal capacity for those aspects of performance; correspondingly the broker possessed the right to enforce liabilities against the buyer if the buyer wrongfully refused to accept delivery. Their Lordships reasoned that it follows logically that the broker should be able to recover damages for breach when the buyer wrongfully refused to accept delivery.
- Rejection of the "surety" characterization: The appellant's submission that the broker was nothing more than a surety for the parties and therefore could not claim indemnity without proving payment to the seller was rejected. Their Lordships observed nothing in the contract suggested that the buyer must first claim delivery from the seller before recourse to the broker; indeed the agreed usage expressly provided that buyer and seller look to the broker for performance, negating the theory that the broker was merely a surety.
- Conclusion of analysis: For these reasons, which mirrored the approach taken by the Supreme Court, Their Lordships concluded the respondent was entitled in law to maintain its reconvention claim in its own name and that the Supreme Court's judgment in favour of the respondent was correct.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Holding (core ruling): Their Lordships advised His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent. The Supreme Court's judgment in favour of the respondent for Rs. 107,055/81 (with interest and costs) was thereby affirmed by reversal of the District Court's decision that had earlier decreed for the appellant.
Immediate consequences for the parties: The respondent's reconvention judgment in the amount stated stands; the appellant is liable for the respondent's costs.
Broader implications: The opinion upholds the legal effect of a broker's contractual position under an agreed market usage where the broker undertakes obligations to pay sellers and deliver to buyers and, correspondingly, is entitled to enforce rights in his own name for breaches by the buyer. The opinion does not, within the text provided, state that it is establishing a new general precedent beyond resolving the legal questions in this appeal.
Sir John Beaumont. -
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Supreme Court of the Island of Ceylon dated 15th January 1943, setting aside a judgment and decree of the District Court of Colombo dated 16th January 1942, and entering judgment in favour of the defendant-respondent for the sum of Rs. 107,055/81 with interest and costs.
The appellant instituted this action on 16th October 1940, in the District Court of Colombo against the respondent for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 56,185/18 being damages sustained by him between 1st April 1940 and 27th May 1940, on certain contracts relating to coupons issued by the Rubber Controller under a Rubber Restriction Scheme in force in Ceylon during the relevant periods under the Rubber Control Ordinance. The export of rubber without such coupons was prohibited.
The respondent which was a Company doing the business of brokers in Colombo admitted its liability to the appellant in respect of the said sum, but alleged that on 15th May 1940, the appellant had instructed it to purchase one million coupons each covering the export of a single pound of rubber, that on the same date it had arranged for the purchase of the said quantity of coupons on the appellant's account with an undisclosed principal, and that the appellant had subsequently repudiated the said contract without lawful cause. The respondent claimed that the appellant was liable to pay to it damages in respect of the said contract, or to indemnify it against liabilities incurred as his brokers, and, giving credit in certain sums admittedly due by it to the appellant, claimed in reconvention a sum of Rs. 107,055/81.
At the trial the market price at which the coupons were sold on various dates was admitted, and the figures were not in dispute. It was agreed that if the respondent succeeded in establishing its claim in reconvention judgment would be entered for it for Rs. 107,055/81, and that if the respondent's claim in reconvention was rejected judgment would be entered for the appellant for Rs. 56,185/18.
The making of the contract of 15th May 1940, on which the respondent's claim in reconvention was founded, was denied by the appellant. At the trial the learned District Judge disbelieved the evidence of the appellant and held that the contract was made as alleged by the respondent. This finding was upheld by the Supreme Court and has not been challenged before the Board.
The appellant also denied receiving the bought note embodying the contract and did not produce it, but its terms were proved from an entry in the respondent's contract book. That note was in the following terms :
"Austin de Mel Ltd.
Colombo, 15th May 1940.
Rubber Coupon Contract No. R.6661.
Messrs. E. L. Ebrahim Lebbe Marikar, Esq.
Dear Sirs,
We have this day bought by your order and for your account from Our Principals (1,000,000) lbs. of Rubber Coupons at 30 cts., per coupon lb. Delivery second issue 1940. Payment on Delivery,
Yours faithfully,
for Austin de Mel Ltd.,
(Sd.) Austin C. de Mel. Brokers.
Sold according to Chamber of Commerce Conditions of Sales.
This contract shall be subject to any alteration in the Rubber Control Ordinance or conditions that may be imposed under that Ordinance, or by further legislation affecting transactions in Rubber Coupons."
It was admitted by the respondent that the seller was Kathleen de Mel, wife of Austin de Mel the Managing Director and principal share-holder in the respondent company. The appellant contended that Kathleen de Mel was a mere alias for the respondent company which had really sold its own coupons to the appellant. The learned trial Judge held that there was no conflict of interest between Kathleen de Mel and the respondent company and that the respondent company dealt with Mrs. de Mel in the ordinary course of business, and this finding was accepted by the appellate Court. Their Lordships accept this concurrent finding of fact.
A further contention raised by the appellant, which can be disposed of at the outset was that the contract of 15th May 1940, was a wagering contract and unenforceable. This claim was rejected by both the lower Courts, and so far as the question is one of fact their Lordships accept the findings of the lower Courts. So far as the matter involves any question of law, it is clear that if the appellant was entitled to delivery of the coupons purchased the contract was not a wagering one. There is nothing in the terms of the contract to preclude the appellant from demanding delivery and he was, in fact, by the letter of the respondent's proctor dated 11th June 1940, offered formal tender of the coupons sold, which offer he declined. Their Lordships, therefore, agree with the lower Courts in holding that the contract was not a wagering one.
The principal question discussed in the judgments of the lower Courts, and the only question which really arises on this appeal, is whether the respondent company is entitled in law to maintain its claim in reconvention. In order to determine this question, it is necessary to notice the course of business and the custom or usage as regards contracts relating to rubber coupons in force in the Colombo market when the contract in suit was made. At the outset of the trial the parties, by their counsel, agreed as noted in the judgment of the learned District Judge that this custom or usage was as follows:
"The broker's bought note, or sold note (as the case may be) never discloses the name of the other party to the contract.
The broker is, as far as the seller is concerned, liable to accept delivery of all coupons tendered, and to pay the full contract price of the amount tendered by the seller whether the buyer accepts delivery or not.
The seller may, instead of tendering the coupons, instruct the broker to negotiate a fresh contract for the purchase of the same quantity of coupons as that covered by the original contract. In such a case, the seller is entitled to receive from, or liable to pay to, the broker direct the difference between the original contract price and the new contract price on a stated account.
As far as the buyer is concerned, the broker is liable to tender and deliver the coupons irrespective of whether the seller has tendered or not. If the buyer accepts delivery he is liable to pay the contract price direct to the broker. The buyer may, instead of accepting delivery of the coupons, direct the broker to sell the tendered coupons on his behalf at the market price of the day of tender. In that event the difference between the original contract price and the market price is received from or paid to the broker direct.
The buyer and seller have no dealings with each other direct in regard to performance of the contract. Each party is entitled to look to the broker for performance."
The District Judge having found all the facts against the appellant nevertheless decreed his suit and dismissed the respondent's claim in reconvention upon a point of law. He held that the respondent having entered into the contract in suit as agent for Kathleen de Mel could not sue upon it; that to allow an agent for an undisclosed principal to sue in his own name upon the principal's contract would be to disregard a well-established principle in the law of agency; and that the market usage subject to which the contract was made could not alter one intrinsic nature of the contract. The Supreme Court in appeal took a different view of the law, and gave judgment for the respondent upon its claim in reconvention. Their Lordships entertain no doubt that the view of the Supreme Court was right. The fallacy underlying the judgment of the learned District Judge lies in the assumption that the respondent was suing on a contract made by his principal. This was not the case; he was suing in his own name under a special power conferred upon him by his contract of employment. Under the agreed usage of the market the broker was liable to deliver to the buyer the coupons sold whether or not he had received them from the seller, and the buyer was liable to pay the contract price direct to the broker if delivery was accepted. In the event of the buyer accepting delivery and refusing payment it is plain that the broker must have a right to enforce the liability. It follows logically from this position that if the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept delivery (as in this case he did) the broker is the person to recover damages for the breach of contract. The fact is that the contract in this case imposed upon the broker obligations far more onerous than would normally rest upon an agent. The broker in making payment to the seller and delivery to the buyer was required to act as a principal, and these obligations conferred corresponding rights. There is no objection in law to parties entering into a contract of this nature, and, as the Supreme Court pointed out the respondent is not to be deprived of his rights under his particular contract because they would not have arisen under a normal contract of agency.
A further point taken by Mr. Sellers for the appellant was that on the true view of the contract of 15th May 1940, the broker became a surety for the due performance of the contract by the seller and the buyer, and that he could not claim indemnity from the buyer unless he proved that he had suffered loss, and that he had not done this since he had tendered no evidence of any payment made to the seller. The answer to this argument is that the contract is not one involving suretyship; there is nothing in the contract to suggest that the buyer must first claim delivery of the coupons from the seller before having recourse to the broker. On the contrary, the last paragraph of the agreed market usage expressly provides that the buyer and seller have no dealings with each other direct in regard to the performance of the contract, and that each party is entitled to look to the broker for performance. This negatives the theory that the broker was only a surety. For these reasons, which are substantially those upon which the Supreme Court acted, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
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