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Bommadevara Naganna Nayudu Bahadur And Another v. Bommadevara Rajya Lakshmi Devi Amma Garu
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lord Carson)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 18th August 1924, which had reversed an earlier judgment and decree dated 22nd December 1920 of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Ellore.
The respondent (plaintiff) sued her husband, the Zamindar of Vallur (defendant 1), to recover twelve years' arrears of maintenance. Defendant 1 died shortly after the suit commenced; his two sons by another wife were added as his legal representatives and became defendants 2 and 3 (the appellants in this appeal).
The respondent married defendant 1 circa 1878 and bore him children (two sons who died young, and one daughter). Defendant 1 later married the respondent's younger sister Chaya Devi; from that marriage the appellants were born. The respondent left her husband's house in November 1894, taking his children with her and accompanied by Chaya Devi and the husband's brother Bhashyakarlu Nayudu. She had not lived with her husband as his wife for 23 years prior to his death.
The trial judge (Additional Subordinate Judge, Ellore) dismissed the respondent's maintenance claim on 22nd December 1920, holding she had no justification for living apart from her husband. The High Court (Madras) reversed that decision on 18th August 1924 and awarded Rs. 43,200 as arrears for twelve years at Rs. 300 per month. Defendants 2 and 3 appealed to His Majesty in Council.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the circumstances alleged in the plaint are true and whether those circumstances justify the plaintiff (respondent) in bringing the action for maintenance.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Case and Allegations
- The plaint alleged that around 1889 defendant 1 conspired with a subordinate (chiefly Boddu Narsimha Rao) and a dancing woman (Mahalakshmi) to defraud his brother by concealing property, and in furtherance of that design proposed marriages between his daughters and subordinates; the plaintiff and her sister protested these proposed matches.
- The plaint asserted that defendant 1, under the influence of Mahalakshmi, had been defaming, abusing, beating and otherwise ill-treating his wives (the respondent and her sister), and that the conspirators made the place so dangerous the respondent and others had to flee Pangidigudem for Cocanada around November 1894 after applying for police protection.
- At trial the respondent additionally alleged a poisoning incident: pills were allegedly found in fish curry, the pills were fed to a dog which died, and fearing for their lives the respondent and her sister left and sent for assistance from Cocanada.
- Earlier, in 1895, defendant 1 had taken proceedings claiming the respondent and the second wife had unlawfully taken his minor children; in those proceedings the respondent attempted to justify her actions by alleging gross neglect, ill-treatment and immorality, but produced no witnesses and judgment on 30th August 1895 ordered the children returned to defendant 1.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, separately labelled account of the appellants' legal arguments in conventional appellant/appellee form. The record reflects that the trial court and this Board treated the central controversy as the truth and sufficiency of the respondent's alleged justifications for long separation.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Board emphasised that the question before it was essentially one of fact — framed in the fourth issue as "whether the circumstances mentioned in the plaint are true and whether they justify plaintiff in bringing this action?"
The opinion examines not only the plaint's narrative but also prior proceedings on the record which bore on credibility and the history of attempts to enforce rights:
- The 1895 proceedings initiated by defendant 1 against his wives dealt with the alleged unlawful removal of his minor children; despite delays being granted to enable the respondent to prove her charges of neglect and ill-treatment, she produced no witnesses and the Subordinate Judge ordered the children given up on 30th August 1895. The lack of evidence in that earlier case undermined the respondent's present account.
- In a separate 1898 suit (proceedings taken by defendant 1's brother against the respondent for alleged loans), the Subordinate Judge at Coconada observed facts suggesting the brother had nevertheless brought the respondent and others away to Cocanada and that there were letters and suggestions of plans (including hopes of adoption) that showed the departure had been arranged in a "cunning way." This earlier judicial observation weighed against the respondent's account of a forced flight for life.
-
At the 1920 trial the respondent for the first time alleged the poisoning incident (pills in fish curry, dog died). The trial judge closely examined this allegation and the supporting evidence, and concluded the poisoning story was a "complete myth." The judge's reasoning included these points:
- The husband's brother (a confidant of the respondent and present at Pangidigudem when the incident was said to have occurred) was not told by the respondent of the alleged poisoning.
- The respondent did not report the incident to the police nor write to her husband informing him of it.
- Other people present in Pangidigudem, including defendant 2 and others who ought to have known of such an incident, testified they had never heard of it.
- The incident had not been mentioned in the prior civil and criminal litigation between defendant 1 and his wives.
- The Board (their Lordships) agreed with the Subordinate Judge's assessment of the evidence and with his broader conclusion that, in the long interval before this action, there had been no real attempt by the respondent to enforce a claim for maintenance or to secure a return to her husband's house. The Board found the Subordinate Judge's judgment to be preferable to the High Court's contrary factual findings.
- The High Court's divergent view was identified: one learned judge believed the poisoning story and treated it as "the immediate occasion" for leaving the protection of the house; another judge relied on a general proposition about the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of insidious ill-treatment within zamindar families (quasi-gosha practices). The Board expressly disagreed with those factual conclusions.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED
The Board advised His Majesty that:
- The decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (dated in the opinion variously as 11th/18th August 1924) should be set aside.
- The judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Ellore dated 22nd December 1920 should be restored.
- The respondent (plaintiff) must pay the costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
Consequences: The direct effect is that the respondent's claim for maintenance, as allowed by the High Court, is overturned; the earlier dismissal by the Subordinate Judge is reinstated and the respondent is ordered to bear costs. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent or principle beyond resolving the disputed facts in this case.
Appeal allowed.
Lord Carson. -
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree dated 18th August 1924, of the High Court of Judicature in Madras, reversing a judgment and decree, dated 22nd December 1920, of the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Ellore.
The suit was brought by the respondent (plaintiff) against her husband, the Zamindar of Vallur, hereinafter referred to as defendant 1, to recover twelve years arrears of maintenance. Shortly after the commencement of the suit defendant 1 died, and the appellants, who are his two sons by another wife, were added as this legal representatives and were made and are defendants 2 and 3 in the suit.
The respondent was married to defendant 1 about the year 1878. She had two sons and one daughter by him. The sons died young. A few years later her husband married Chaya Devi, a younger sister of the respondent, with her consent, and of that marriage there were two sons (the appellants) and three daughters. Another sister of the respondent's was subsequently married to Bhashyakarlu Nayudu, an undivided brother of defendant 1.
It was not in dispute that the respondent left her husband's house in November 1894, in the absence of her husband, taking with her his children, and accompanied by her sister, the said Chaya, and the said Nayudu, her husband's brother, and had not lived with her husband or in his house as his wife for a period of 23 years before his death. The main question in the action was whether she was justified under the circumstances proved in so leaving her husband's house and in continuing to remain away for all the intervening years that elapsed until the present suit was brought.
Other questions were raised in the course of the trial as to whether the respondent had waived her right to maintenance and whether she was estopped from claiming it, but, as these issues were found in favour of the respondent by both Courts below, they have become immaterial and have not been discussed before this Board.
The Additional Subordinate Judge of Ellore, who heard the case at considerable length on 22nd December 1920, dismissed the respondent's claim holding that she had no justification for living separate from her husband during the period for which she claimed maintenance.
On appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madras the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge was reversed by a judgment and order dated 18th August 1924, awarding the plaintiff Rs. 43,200 as arrears of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 per month for twelve years. From that decree defendants 2 and 3 have appealed to His Majesty in Council.
The question to be decided is, therefore, solely one of fact and arises in the fourth issue framed for the trial of the action, viz :
whether the circumstances mentioned in the plaint are true and whether they justify plaintiff in bringing this action ?
Having regard to the length of time which had elapsed before the present proceedings were instituted and the case attempted to be proved at the trial, it is important to examine not merely the case made by the plaint but certain other proceedings which are on record and in which the plaintiff was involved. The case as put forward in the plaint is as follows :
About the year 1889, disputes arose between defendant 1 and his younger brother, who demanded partition of the estate. The defendant, with intent to defraud his brother in case of a division of the estate, attempted to suppress valuable properties by converting them into currency notes and by transferring them to Hyderabad. For this purpose he engaged a number of subordinates who were ready to assist him in his evil design. Boddu Narsimha Rao was chief among them. As a means of securing their thorough co-operation in his design he offered to give his daughters in marriage to some of them. The plaintiff and her sister protested against such a course, as the daughters were not willing to accept the matches. About this time the defendant was entirely under the influence of a dancing woman named Mahalakshmi, at whose instance he was already defaming, abusing, beating and otherwise illtreating his wives, the plaintiff and her sister. Boddu Narasimha Rao made common cause with the defendant and his dancing-girl, and all the three conspired against the plaintiff and her sister and the defendant's brother. They made the place se hot for plaintiff and others that they had to flee for their lives from Pangidigudem to Cocanada about November 1894, after having applied for police protection.
Defendant 1 in 1895 took proceedings against the respondent and his second wife, her sister, complaining that, during his absence at Secunderabad, his said wives unlawfully took away his minor children out of his keeping in Pangidigudem without his consent and against his will. In those proceedings the respondent attempted to justify her action on the grounds of defendant 1's gross neglect, ill-treatment and immorality. Although various delays were granted to enable these charges to be proved, the respondent did not produce a single witness, and on 30th August 1895, judgment was given by the Subordinate Judge at Ellore ordering the children to be given up to the respondent' husband, defendant 1.
One more important matter on record ought to be considered before approaching the evidence produced at the trial.
When the respondent left her husband's house she was, as already stated, accompanied by her husband's younger brother, with whom, as stated in the plaint, her husband had differences and with whom the respondent apparently took sides. In the year 1898, proceedings were taken by the said brother against the respondent for alleged loans due by her to him, and it is important to observe that, in giving judgment dismissing the suit on 2nd December 1898, the Subordinate Judge at Coconada, in the course of his judgment, said:
Plaintiff admitted that he was warned by his brother (defendant 1) not to talk to defendants (of whom one was the respondent), but to quit his house at once, and in spite of this warning he brought them away to Cocanada, planning for their exit from Pangidigudem in a very cunning way, as will be seen from his letters.....giving them some hopes of his adopting a son of the defendant and making over to him the property to be received under the partition suit he had laid against their husband. Bearing these matters in mind, it is necessary now to consider the case made by the respondent at the trial of this action, which took place in 1920. No case was attempted to be proved of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the husband's brother, but in her evidence the respondent for the first time, after making various other complaints, deposed as follows:
One day, when myself and Chaya Devi Amma were taking our meals, some pills were found in the fish curry. They were thrown to a dog and the dog ate the same and died. We gave up taking our food. Then we got afraid lest we should lose our lives by remaining here and sent word to Cocanada in order to save our lives. We sent word to Cocanada to our mother; our mother caused a petition to be presented to the Collector, praying we should be set free.
The learned trial Judge, who has examined this allegation and the evidence in support of it with great care, having regard to the seriousness of the charge and the time at which it was first made, came to the conclusion that it was proved to be a complete myth. In para. 24 of his judgment he states his reasons for coming to that conclusion, and amongst other matters states as follows:
Defendant 1's brother was at Pangidigudem, when this incident is said to have occurred and he was a confidant of the plaintiff and of her sister. Yet the plaintiff admitted in her evidence she did not report this incident to defendant 1's brother. She did not make any report to the police about this. Nor did she address any letter to the Raja" (i. e. her husband), "informing him of the incident. Defendant 2 and other people who were in Pangidigudem and who ought to have known about the incident if it had really occurred, say that they have never heard of such an incident. This incident was not mentioned in previous litigation, civil and criminal, between defendant 1 and his wives. I am clearly of opinion that the poison incident has been invented for the purpose of this suit in order to find some justification for plaintiff's continued absence at Cocanada for 23 years. If this incident is rejected as false there could be no other justification for the plaintiff to live away from her husband.
With that conclusion of the learned. Subordinate Judge their Lordships agree, with the result that it is impossible to rely upon any evidence given by the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to repeat in detail the careful analysis made by the Subordinate Judge of all the evidence and contentions put forward on one side and the other and the various suggestion of demands for maintenance and restoration which took place during the long series of years. It is sufficient to observe that their Lordships are of opinion that there was no real attempt to enforce a claim for maintenance or to procure a return to her husband's house during the long series of years which had elapsed prior to the bringing of this action, and their Lordships agree with the Subordinate Judge when he says in para. 29:
I have shown in the above paragraphs sufficient facts which must lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff voluntarily lived at Cocanada apart from her husband for a period of 23 years without justification.
It is true that the learned Judges in the High Court of Judicature at Madras took a different view of the facts from that formed by the Subordinate Judge. The learned Chief Justice believed the poisoning story, and states that it. "was the immediate occasion for their leaving the protection of his house."
The other learned Judge does not mention the poisoning incident, but finds an excuse from the nature of the evidence given by stating that:
when the women of a particular family observe a kind of quasi-gosha, as they do in most zamindar families, it is not possible to obtain such direct evidence of ill-treatment or cruelty as may be possible in other cases. Further, the ill-treatment is not likely to be open or brutal, but insidious, and much more galling.
Their Lordships cannot agree with the conclusions of fact come to by the High Court and are satisfied, for the reasons already stated, that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is to be preferred, and they will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, that the decree in the High Court of Judicature in Madras of 11th August 1924 should be set aside, that the judgment and decree passed by the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Ellore, dated 22nd December 1920, should be restored, and that the respondent should pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
Appeal allowed.
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