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Thakur Ashutosh Deo Ghatwal And Another v. Batisidhar Shroff
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Appeal Concerning Ghatwali Tenure (Rohini, Birbhum)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is the holder of a ghatwali tenure in Birbhum called Rohini. He appealed from a decree of the High Court at Patna which, reversing a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar, had granted the petition of the respondent (a decree-holder) and ordered execution by sale of the tenure to proceed. The Secretary of State intervened with leave and supported the appeal.
The factual context includes the appellant's succession in 1911 to the previous holder (his deceased cousin), his appointment by the Deputy Commissioner of the Sonthal Parganas, and the execution of a muchlika dated 23 October 1911 by which he undertook a variety of duties, many connected with maintenance of public peace — partly by personal service and partly by employing constables.
The Santhal Parganas Rural Police Regulation, 1910 (the "Regulation") is central to the dispute: the respondent contends that administrative arrangements under the Regulation have, in effect, commuted the ghatwal's personal services into money payments and thereby removed the historical ground for the inalienability of ghatwali tenures. Section 8 of the Regulation makes a zamindar or under-tenure holder liable to pay sums required for police where he holds subject to the condition of supporting the police, and provides for recovery of defaults by the process for arrears of Government revenue. The Regulation's definition section (section 3) applies its provisions to certain ghatwals by including them in the definition of "zamindar."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Santhal Parganas Rural Police Regulation, 1910 (and its predecessors) has the legal effect of terminating the inalienability of ghatwali tenure in Birbhum by commutation of personal services into money payments.
- If the Regulation does not itself terminate inalienability, what governmental action (if any) would be necessary to effect such a termination (i.e., whether a release or legal surrender and regrant is required)?
- Whether the maxim "cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex" (the law itself ceases when the reason for it ceases) applies so as to extinguish the historical incident of inalienability in this context.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the administrative arrangements contained in the Regulation of 1910 effectively commuted the ghatwal's personal services into money payments. On that basis, the historical reason for inalienability of ghatwali tenure was removed and the tenure became alienable; hence execution by sale should be permitted.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, point-by-point account of the appellant's or the Secretary of State's separate legal arguments beyond the factual record that the Secretary of State intervened in support of the appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh [1881] 9 Cal. 187; 9 I.A. 101; 4 Sar. 335 (P.C.) | Support for the settled principle that ghatwali tenures are inalienable under the general law. | The court invoked this authority as part of the established legal background affirming inalienability of ghatwali tenure; it formed a basis for rejecting an interpretation that the Regulation annihilated that incident of tenure. |
| Narain Singh v. Niranjan Chakravarti (Satya) AIR 1924 P.C. 5; 3 Pat. 183; 51 I.A. 37 (68) (P.C.) | Rule concerning when a regulation or administrative measure can be treated as effecting a release or discharge of the Government's proprietary or appointing rights in relation to tenure (i.e., that it does not operate as a release unless it effectually puts an end to the right). | The court relied on the Board's rule in this case to support the proposition that the Regulation of 1910 does not operate as a release of the Government's right unless it effectually brings that right to an end; this supported the finding that the Regulation did not terminate ghatwali character. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded from a foundation that the inalienability of ghatwali tenure is a settled principle under the general law and that Bengal Regulation 29 of 1814 and Act No. 5 of 1859 (with regard to Birbhum) had specifically affirmed that inalienability. The court examined the Regulation of 1910 and the muchlika executed by the appellant in 1911, and analyzed the nature and scope of the duties imposed by the muchlika and by the Regulation.
Key elements of the court's step-by-step analysis were:
- Scope of the Regulation: The Regulation of 1910 was intended primarily to organize the rural police in the Sonthal Parganas. It (a) included ghatwals within its scope by definition and (b) imposed a liability under section 8 for payment of police where the tenure holder held subject to the condition of supporting the police. The Regulation also provided for recovery of defaults as arrears of Government revenue.
- Effect on duties in the muchlika: The muchlika of 23 October 1911 contained a range of duties, many connected to public peace, and the court found that several of those duties went beyond mere obligations to support the rural police. Examples included continuity of old Amla arrangements, escort of pilgrims, lodging information about crimes, refusal of permission to bad characters to live in the taluk, maintaining annual lists of persons serving under the ghatwal, and the continuing obligation to appoint and be answerable for certain peace officers apart from the regular rural police.
- Commutation limited in effect: While the court accepted that so far as the duties fell to be performed by the rural police they could be said to have been commuted into a money payment (and that section 8 prescribes a recovery process for defaults), it concluded that this partial commutation did not, of itself, operate to abolish the inalienability of the ghatwali tenure.
- Legal standard for termination of ghatwali character: The court held that to terminate the ghatwali character of lands it is necessary to find something done (or omitted by Government) amounting to a legal surrender and regrant on new terms, or at least a release of the right to appoint the ghatwal and call for performance of his services. Mere provision of police-administration machinery by the Regulation did not amount to such a surrender or release.
- Rejection of the "cessante ratione" argument: The court rejected the respondent's reliance on the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex (that the law lapses when its reason ceases). It characterized the contention as asking a court to assess the present utility of an ancient incident of tenure and to annul it on that basis. The court said that this is a matter of policy, not of legal interpretation, and is beyond judicial power. Hence the maxim had no application to this case.
- Application of precedent: The court referred to existing authority (including Rajah Nilmoni Singh and the Board's decision in Narain Singh v. Niranjan Chakravarti) to support the view that the Regulation did not effectually discharge the Government's right or terminate the inalienability unless it clearly and legally effected such a release.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
Holding (direct court disposition): The court reversed the judgment of the High Court at Patna, restored the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar, and ordered that the respondent pay the appellant (Thakur Ashutosh Deo Ghatwal) his costs of the appeal and in the High Court at Patna and in the Subordinate Judge's Court. The final line of the opinion records: "Appeal allowed."
Immediate implications for the parties and rights affected (as stated in the opinion):
- The decree of the High Court that had permitted execution by sale of the ghatwali tenure is set aside; the earlier Subordinate Judge's decision (which had refused such a sale) is restored.
- The court held that the Santhal Parganas Rural Police Regulation, 1910, and its predecessors, did not effectually terminate the inalienability of the ghatwali tenure in Birbhum; therefore, the Government retains the right to enforce inalienability, including power to forfeit the tenure on failure to perform conditions and to make a new grant to some other ghatwal.
- To effect a lawful termination of the ghatwali character of the lands would require governmental action amounting to a legal surrender and regrant on new terms, or at least a release of the appointing right — something beyond mere administrative provision for police.
- The court declined to apply the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex to annul the ancient incident of tenure on the ground of perceived present uselessness; it treated such change as a matter of policy for the proper legislative or executive authority rather than for the courts.
The opinion does not purport to create a new rule displacing existing statutory provisions; rather, it applies established principles and precedent to conclude that the Regulation did not operate as a legal release of the inalienability of the tenure.
Viscount Sumner. -
The appellant, the holder of a ghatwali tenure in Birbhum called Rohini, appeals from a decree of the High Court at Patna, which, reversing a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar, granted the petition of the respondent, a decree-holder, and ordered execution, by sale of the tenure, to proceed. The Secretary of State, intervening by leave, supports the appeal.
Apart from the effect of the Santhal Parganas Rural Police Regulation, 1910, whatever it may be, it is quite clear that no such order could be made. The inalienability of a ghatwali tenure is a settled principle of the general law : (see Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh [1881] 9 Cal. 187 :9 I.A. 101:4 Sar. 335 (P.C.), and, with regard to those in Birbhum, Bengal Regn. 29 of 1814 and Act No. 5 of 1859, which the Regulation of 1910 does not purport to affect, have specifically affirmed it. The contention of the respondent is that the administrative arrangements laid down in the Regulation of 1910 have, in effect, commuted the whole of the ghatwal's personal services into a money payment and have accordingly removed the reason, which historically has been assigned as the explanation of this incident of ghatwali tenure. The Regulation of 1910 is itself plain enough, and nothing seems to turn on its mere construction. The principle of the decision below may be briefly said to have been an application of the maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex to the case of an established incident of a right to land.
The Regulation, which repeals and replaces a similar regulation of 1900, is designed to provide for the organization of the Rural Police in the Sonthal Parganas generally, but, in providing for the pay of different police grades, it enacts by S. 8 that, where a zamindar or under-tenure holder holds subject to the condition, express or implied, of supporting the police within his zimindary or under-tenure, he shall be liable to pay the amount of money required for such police. It is only by the definition section that the provisions of the regulation are applied to ghatwals at all, for, in defining the word "zamindar," S. 3 adds and includes also the ghatwals of Tapah Sarath Deoghar, whose tenures are subject to the provisions of the Bengal Ghatwali Lands Regulation, 1814.
The appellant succeeded the previous holder, his deceased cousin, in 1911 being duly appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of the Sonthal Parganas, and he executed, as usual, a muchlika, in an ancient and accustomed form, dated 23rd October 1911, by which, on his appointment, he undertook a variety of duties, most of them no doubt connected directly or indirectly with the "maintenance of the public peace" within his lands, partly by personal service, partly by constables and such like, employed for the purpose. It may be frankly recognized that, if relieved of that part of his obligations which would be dealt with under the regular system of the rural police, the residue of his duties would be neither onerous nor important. As is the case with many other ghatwals, his position might then be described as an interesting survival.
Accordingly, in so far as his duties fell to be performed by the rural police, they may be fairly said to have been commuted for a money payment, and S. 8 itself provides that, in cases of default in payment, the Deputy Commissioner is to recover it by the process prescribed for the recovery of arrears of Government revenue.
As between himself, as judgment debtor, and his judgment-creditor no doubt the appellant has no merits; but the issue involved in this case is the wider one of the effect of this regulation upon the alienability of a ghatwali tenure in Birbhum generally. If the effect is that contended for, the tenure would pass to a purchaser by the sale alone, and would in future involve no further obligation on the holder, if so much, than payment of such police salaries as might attach to it. The Government would lose its power of forfeiting the tenure on failure of the holder to perform the conditions and of making a new grant to some more worthy ghatwal. Not only judgment-creditors would be entitled to sale; the ghatwal himself would be able to sell at will, for inalienability, if removed at all by the effect of the regulation, must be removed for all. Apart from an actual repeal, which was the fate of the former regulation in about a decade, this regulation itself provides by S. 2, for its own withdrawal by the Local Government from any portion of the Santhal Parganas and also for its own restoration by the same authority. So far from being on its face a regulation altering the general law as recognized by the above-quoted regulation and Act, this local regulation only brings in ghatwals as zamindars, incidentally and for the sake of uniformity. It was passed, alio intuitu, to make better provisions for local police administration, and it is essentially of a temporary character and of shifting application. Nevertheless, the respondent has to contend that it has also incidentally terminated for ever an ancient characteristic of the ghatwali tenures to which it applies, not to be revived automatically on a withdrawal of the regulation, but only by some legislation in the future, which unlike this regulation, would have to be passed ad hoc.
If the contention be right, it was not the Regulation of 1910, but that of 1900 which really worked this novel and irrevocable change, for its provisions were essentially similar. If it be right, the muchilka taken in 1911 was, as to many of its terms, wholly otiose, and the appointment made by Government was no longer a personal appointment in favour of the next heir as an act of State, but had really become, apart from its form, an unqualified admission, to be made, of course, in favour of any donee or vendee who could show a title.
On examining the muchlika, which need not be set out at length, there is a good deal which cannot be said to fall merely within the duties of rural police, and in this the Government was plainly imposing useless obligations, since on a sale they would remain with the alienating ghatwal, while his alienee would be free of them. Such obligations are the continuance of the old arrangements of Amlas; the escort of pilgrims through the ghatwal's elaka, which is certainly not merely for their protection from the villagers or of the villagers from the pilgrims' thefts and violence; the obligation to lodge information as to crimes and other occurrences happening within the taluk; the refusal of all permission to bad characters to live within it; and the requirement of an annual list of Isimnavasi and of persons serving under the ghatwal. The words further contemplate a continuing obligation to appoint and be answerable for some peace officers of some sort apart from the constables appointed by and serving under the Local Government. They are as follows :
I will not allow any thief, badmash, or absconder to live within the jurisdiction of my taluk, neither will I plot or conspire against Government nor help others in doing the same. I will not discharge, without the order of Government, such persons under me who have been engaged in doing police duties; if it be found necessary to discharge any such person, I will first send an information thereof or report his faults to the authorities, and abide by such orders as will be passed by them.
Whatever may be done in actual practice, which may be little and of small moment, these words clearly import some kind of personal organization, appointed, directed and discharged by the ghatwal, over and above or it may be under and subject to, the regular rural police, and out of that nucleus an important revival of the old ghatwali obligations might at any time arise.
In their Lordships' opinion the following propositions may be laid down :
(1) Under the terms of his appointment the present ghatwal holds, under conditions which are more extensive than that of merely supporting within his zamindari the police, in respect of whom he has to pay the amount determined by the Deputy Commissioner, and which are also substantial enough to leave his inability to alienate unaffected, as if the regulation and its predecessors had not passed.
(2) The regulation contains nothing which can be construed as or operates to the same effect as a release or discharge of the Government's right to have the inalienability of the tenure enforced unless and until it effectually puts an and to it. The rule on this point was thus laid down by the Board in Satya, Narain Singh v. Niranjan Chakravarti AIR 1924 P.C. 5 : 3 Pat. 183 : 51 I.A. 37 (68) (P.C.).
To terminate the ghatwali character of the lands, it seems to their Lordships that it is necessary to find something done or omitted to be done on the part of Government as the grantors, which would have the effect of a legal surrender and regrant of the lands on new terms, or at any rate of a release of the right to appoint the ghatwal and call for the performance of his services
What has here been done on the part of the Government is a mere provision for the machinery of police administration and had no such effect as that mentioned above.
(3) The maxim cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex, or any corresponding rule, has no application to the present case. The contention really amounts to a claim that a Court of law can inquire into the present utility of an ancient incident of tenure and annul it and its enjoyment by the ruling power, whenever in its opinion the incident has survived its usefulness. This is a matter of policy, not of interpretation of a legislative instrument or of application of general law, and is beyond judicial powers.
Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that the judgment appealed against should be reversed and that of the Subordinate Judge restored and that the respondent should pay to the appellant, Thakur Ashutosh Deo Ghatwal, his costs of this appeal and in the High Court at Patna and in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and so they will humbly advise His Majesty.
Appeal allowed.
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