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Sir Bissessar Dass Daga, And Others v. Emmanuel Vas And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1916 the respondents (a syndicate working manganese mines) contracted with K. Ettlinger & Co., London, for the sale of 38,000 tons of manganese ore by instalments. The benefit of that contract was assigned to the appellants by the Official Liquidator. In 1921 the appellants commenced suit No. 4 of 1921 alleging diversion of ore to third parties in breach of the contract and claiming mandatory injunction and other relief. The parties settled by a compromise decree dated 28 February 1922, which embodied detailed provisions for deliveries (4,000 tons per year for seven years, with a balance of 3,234 tons) and included, among other clauses, a restraint on selling ore to third parties (Cl. 2), a price provision (Cl. 9 at Rs. 8 per ton) and Cl. 10 providing for liquidated damages at Re. 1 per ton for undelivered quantities.
On 5 November 1923, in execution proceedings on that decree, two applications were heard by the Additional District Judge of Nagpur: (1) the respondents (judgment-debtors) applied for leave to deposit Rs. 28,649-2-9 to be paid to the decree-holders and for an order declaring the decree satisfied; and (2) the decree-holders applied for execution by seizure/delivery of ore alleged to be at mines and sidings and for appointment of a receiver. The District Judge granted the respondents' application, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces affirmed that decision on appeal.
The matter reached the Board (their Lordships) for determination of the proper construction of Cl. 10 of the compromise decree and whether that clause permitted the judgment-debtors effectively to terminate their delivery obligations by paying the liquidated sum at Re. 1 per ton.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Clause 10 of the compromise decree, which prescribes payment of liquidated damages at Re. 1 per ton for undelivered quantities, permits the judgment-debtors to treat payment of that sum as a full and exclusive satisfaction of all obligations under the decree (including the restraint on selling to third parties) and thereby escape enforcement of other terms (notably the injunction in Cl. 2).
- Whether payment into Court in accordance with Cl. 10 operates to satisfy the decree and prevent the decree-holders from seeking other relief under the decree (for example, enforcement of the injunction or other remedies for breach).
- Whether, on a true construction of the decree read as a whole, the remedy in Cl. 10 is exclusive (i.e., displaces other remedies) or is cumulative with other appropriate remedies available to the decree-holders.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (decree-holders / buyers)
- Cl. 10 is a clause providing for liquidated damages in favour of the decree-holders; without it the decree-holders would otherwise have to enforce the injunction to obtain specific deliveries.
- The clause is intended to be a claimant's option — if the buyer does not seek delivery he can ask for a calculable money judgment — and is not an option for the seller to buy back obligations by paying only Re. 1 per ton.
- Interpreting Cl. 10 as allowing the seller to avoid performance by paying the nominal sum would defeat Cl. 2 (the restraint on selling to third parties) and would allow the seller to repudiate the contract when it becomes unprofitable, producing an absurd and commercially unlikely result inconsistent with the compromise's object.
Respondents' Arguments (judgment-debtors) and Reasoning of Courts Below
- Cl. 10 must be read with the other clauses but controls Cl. 2: its provision that the defendants "shall" pay the specified damages means that payment under Cl. 10 is a sufficient compliance with the whole decree.
- The clause contains no limiting words confining its application to failures beyond the sellers' control; it thus operates in every case of violation of the compromise's conditions, including diversion of ore to third parties.
- Accordingly, the respondents contended (and the Courts below accepted) that on making the payment prescribed by Cl. 10 the sellers were entitled to be treated as having satisfied the decree and to be free to sell ore to third parties without further relief being available to the decree-holders.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Board proceeded by construing the compromise decree as a whole and examining the natural commercial objects of the agreement. It noted that the general tenor of the decree, like the original agreement, contemplated execution by actual deliveries in annual instalments, enforced by an injunction preventing diversion of ore to other markets.
The Board recognized the competing constructions advanced. The respondents' construction treated Cl. 10 as controlling and as effecting complete satisfaction of the decree upon payment of the stipulated sum, while the appellants' construction treated Cl. 10 as a provision in the decree-holder's favour giving an alternative remedy (liquidated damages) but not discharging other remedies (such as specific enforcement of delivery by injunction).
Several analytical points supported the Board's rejection of the respondents' construction:
- Distinction between two types of breach: (a) diversion of ore to third parties in violation of the restraint (for which an injunction is the appropriate relief), and (b) failure to deliver the agreed quantities (for which damages are appropriate). The clause for liquidated damages should not be read as extinguishing the right to injunctive or other relief for the distinct wrong of diversion.
- Cl. 10 states that defendants "shall" pay the specified rate if they fail to perform, but it does not expressly provide that such payment is a full and exclusive satisfaction of all obligations under the contract or that it discharges the injunction or other remedies; the clause therefore supplies a mode of recovery of the damages (execution), not an express discharge of other remedies.
- Reading Cl. 10 so as to permit the seller to end the contract at will by paying a nominal forfeit would defeat the clear business object of the compromise — securing supply at Rs. 8 over years — and would be an implausible commercial intention unless the debtors had deliberately trapped the decree-holders.
- The clause does not cover all types of breach (for example, anticipatory refusal to perform before any time for performance would not be a breach of an expressed condition and would fall outside Cl. 10), which undermines a reading that Cl. 10 was intended as an exhaustive remedy for every possible default.
On these grounds the Board held that Cl. 10 provides a remedy (liquidated damages recoverable by execution) but does not, on its true construction, operate as a complete answer to the decree-holders' petition for execution or relieve the sellers of the obligation to obey the injunction to which they consented.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Cl. 10 of the compromise decree of 28 February 1922 does not, on a true construction, afford to the judgment-debtors any answer to the petition for execution presented by the decree-holders.
Direct consequences ordered by the Board (as stated in the opinion):
- The appeal of the decree-holders is allowed (the opinion says "allow the appeal of the decree-holders with costs here and below").
- The decisions of both lower Courts in favour of the judgment-debtors are set aside.
- The matter is remitted to the Court of the District Judge of Nagpur to be dealt with in accordance with the Board's declaration and otherwise as may be right.
The opinion does not address in detail what specific remedies or concurrent relief might be appropriate in all possible circumstances; the Board expressly refrained from deciding questions that would follow if the contrary construction were adopted or the extent to which a remedy under Cl. 10 might be available concurrently with other remedies. Those questions remain for determination by the District Judge on remittal.
No broader pronouncement of new legal principle or precedent is stated in the opinion beyond the construction of Cl. 10 in this compromise decree; the decision's practical effect is to permit enforcement of other remedies under the decree (such as the injunction) and to deny that payment under Cl. 10 alone automatically satisfies or discharges all other obligations under the decree.
Viscount Sumner. -
On the 5th November 1923, two applications came on for hearing before the Additional District Judge of Nagpur in execution proceedings taken in suit No. 4 of 1921. The first in date was that of the present respondents, defendants and judgment-debtors in the suit, for leave to deposit Rs. 28,649-2-9 to be paid over to the decree-holders, and for an order declaring the decree to have been thus fully satisfied. The other was that of the decree-holder for execution of their decree by seizure and delivery to them of certain manganese ore, alleged to be lying at several mines and railway sidings, and by the appointment of a receiver and other relief. The respondents, having got wind of the appellants' intention to apply to the Court, lodged their application first, but nothing turns on this. The learned Judge, holding that under the decree the judgment-debtors were entitled to take the course proposed, granted their application and held that the decree-holders were not entitled to the relief prayed but must take in satisfaction the amount deposited by the judgment-debtors, and his determination was affirmed on appeal by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces. The case now comes to their Lordships' Board on the construction of the decree in question and particularly of Cl. 10, which is as follows :
10. That in the event of the defendants failing to deliver the full quantity of 4,000 tons, of ore of the, stimulated grade in any particular year or violating any of the conditions of this compromise, the defendants shall pay to plaintiffs damages at the rate of Re. 1 (rupee one per ton on the whole of the quantity which may then have remained undelivered out of the total quantity of 31,234 tons and the same shall be recovered by execution of this decree.
On the 1st March. 1916, the respondents, a syndicate possessed of and working manganese mines and dealing in the ore produced there, had contracted with K. Ettlinger and Co., of London for the purchase of 38,000 tons of their manganese ore by instalments over an extended period. The contract contained provisions to secure to the buyers the exclusive supply of the sellers' ore till the contract quantity had been worked out. At the end of the year the benefit of this contract was assigned to the present appellants by the Official Liquidator under the war legislation applicable, and deliveries of ore under it and payments for purposes connected with it were made for some time. In 1921 the buyers commenced the suit No. 4 of 1921, abovementioned alleging deliveries of ore by the defendants to third parties in breach of the contract to the extent of over 1,000 tons and claiming a mandatory injunction and other relief. The defendants in their written statement alleged that the contract was all along wholly void as constituting a trading with the enemy ; that the assignment of it was invalid ; that their deliveries of ore to third parties were justifiable on various grounds ; and that the appellants on their side were guilty of numerous breaches of contract.
The suit proceeded as far as the formulation of the issues, but they were never tried. The parties arrived at an agreement of compromise, and the terms, with one variation, which their Lordships agree with the Judicial Commissioner's Court in thinking immaterial for present purposes, were embodied in the compromise decree of the 28th February 1922, out of which the execution proceedings now in question arose. It is entitled in the suit ; it recites that
this suit coming on this day for final disposal ... it is hereby ordered and decreed in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties and sanctioned by the Court
and it then sets out the agreed clauses. The second of these restrains the defendants from selling ore from the mines mentioned in the agreement of the 1st March 1916, or alienating the mines themselves (except as provided in C1. 8), till they have delivered the whole remaining balance of 31,234 tons. They third provides for deliveries at the rate of 4000 tons per year for seven successive years ending in February 1929, with a balance delivery of 3,234 tons in the next and final year. Then follow provisions for the quality of the ore to be delivered and for determination of that quality by analysis ; for tender of each lot in writing, with particulars of the mine of origin and the place of delivery, each lot not being less than 500 tons, with liberty to the defendants in case they raise more than 4,000 tons in one year to sell the surplus to third parties giving notice of the same with full particulars to the plaintiffs. Cl. 9 fixes the price payable by the plaintiffs at Rs. 8 per ton. Then follows Cl. 10 quoted above. The general tenor of this agreed decree shows that, like the original agreement on which it is founded, the parties had in contemplation the execution and completion of this contract by actual deliveries in annual instalments, the performance being secured by the present grant of an injunction preventing the defendants from finding any alternative market for their ore.
Seventeen months later the decree-holders filed their application for execution, alleging that the first 4,000 tons had been short-delivered by about 1,240 tons, and that only 60 tons more had been delivered in the first half of the second year. In the judgment-debtors' statement in reply to the application the substantial correctness of these figures is admitted with the additional allegation that their best efforts had not enabled them to deliver any more. It also mentions, what was no doubt a material factor in the dispute, that
price of the manganese has at present gone very high.
and in their judgment 24th March 1924, the Judicial Commissioner's Court mention that the price was then, as they were informed, about Rs. 25. It may accordingly be taken that the business object of the compromise was to get the supply of ore at Rs. 8 continued for years to come, and the business object of the breach was to put an early stop to so ruinous a loss by bringing the contract to an end. The question is whether Cl. 10 permitted this to be done.
The appellants point out that this clause provides for liquidated damages and that without it the decree would only be capable of execution by enforing the injunction. In order to ascertain the sum, for which execution should go, it would be necessary to bring a suit or suits to have the damages ascertained. Cl. 10 is, therefore, a clause in the decree-holder's favour in the first instance. Though by saving time and costs it may really benefit the debtor as well in the long run, it is not framed as a clause mainly intended for the debtor's convenience. In a sense it is an option to the buyer, for if he does not choose to seek an order for delivery of specific ore, he is able to ask for execution as of a judgment for a calculable sum of money, but in no sense can it be construed as an option to the seller, when it no longer suits him to go on with the contract, to buy back at an advance of only Re. 1 per ton the whole of the undelivered portion of the contract. Why restrain the judgment-debtors from delivering their ore to third parties, if in effect they can do so at will on merely paying the agreed forfeit ? This virtually makes Cl. 2 inoperative. It would be a strange result of a compromise, aiming at the continuance of deliveries to authorize the seller to repudiate his obligations and, taking advantage of his own wrong, to end the matter at his own selected moment by a pre-arranged payment, which might not be an adequate compensation at all.
The argument for the respondents and the reasoning, on which both Courts below proceeded, is the same. All the clauses of the decree are indeed to be read together, but Cl. 10 controls Cl. 2. Payment of sums calculated in accordance with Cl. 10, if the seller chooses to make it, will be a sufficient compliance with the whole decree and, in spite of non-delivery of by far the greater part of the deliverable quantity, no further relief will be available to the decree-holders. The clause contains no words limiting the case provided for to failures arising from causes beyond the sellers' control but it does say that the provision as regards the damages "shall" operate on the defendants' violating any of the conditions of the compromise and it must be enforced as it stands. Among the principal conditions are the sellers' obligation not to deliver to third parties, an act from which they consented to be restrained, but, if they delivered to others in violation of this restriction as the Court plainly 'understood that they had done, it was also in violation of the conditions of the contract, and would only result in bringing into play the penalty named in Cl. 10. The learned Judges recognized that this construction rendered nugatory the stipulated restraint upon selling elsewhere, and enabled the defendants to escape consequences of a wilful breach of contract consisting in the withholding from the decree-holders of ore actually in their possession and capable of being delivered to the plaintiffs, by simply paying Re. 1 per ton as liquidated damages. Why the decree should begin by forbidding delivery to third parties except in a named case under Cl. 8, and then end by giving permission to do so to any extent in 'case " a different event happened under Cl. 10, is not explained or explicable.
It must be borne in mind that there are two distinct breaches, for which the decree provides. There is delivery of ore to third parties, except as authorized by Cl. 8, for which an appropriate relief is an injunction, and there is failure to deliver the agreed quantities to the decree-holders, for which damages, liquidated or not, will be the proper remedy. Their Lordships do not think that they are constrained to a construction of Cl. 10. which will enable the judgment-debtors to render nugatory all their obligations under the prior part of the contract, whenever it suits their pockets to do so. Cl. 10 provides that they shall pay at the specified rate, if they fail to perform the contract in any respect, but it does not say that such payment is to be a full and exclusive satisfaction of all obligations under the contract. The payment into Court does not make the decree a satisfied decree. It provides a mode of enforcing such payment : the same shall be recovered by execution of this decree.
but it does not say that the other terms shall not be enforced by execution of the decree, namely, by applying to the Court to enforce the injunction. The sellers have to show some cause in argument why they should not obey the injunction to which they have consented. They cannot do so merely by pointing to a clause, which provides an alternative remedy, under which they "shall" pay so much by way of liquidated damages, if a money payment is sought at all.
Reading the contract as a whole and taking all its terms together is a very different thing from reading it so that its final clause defeats the whole object of the agreement. Such a meaning even the debtors never could have intended unless they deliberately proposed to lay a trap for the decree-holders. As the clause stands it provides a remedy for the decree-holders without stipulating for the debtors any corresponding discharge of the injunction. It does not even cover all the possible events, in which the contract might be broken, for, if before the time had arrived for any performance at all, the judgment-debtors had announced that they would never perform it in any respect, this would have been an anticipatory breach, for which unliquidated damages would be recoverable if the decree-holders chose so to treat it, but not being a breach of any of the conditions, that is the expressed conditions, it would be outside of Cl. 10. On the other hand, an unintentional failure to satisfy all the requirements of C1. 5 would be as much a violation of a condition as a deliberate diversion of the ore to other buyers and failure to deliver the full or any quantity to the decree-holders, and, on the respondents' contention, would equally imperatively 'require payment of the expressed forfeit, C1. 2 notwithstanding. The chapter of accidents equally with the deliberate pursuit of gain might thus bring the whole scheme to an end at the outset before any ore had been delivered, or again, by a combination of luck and care the sellers might keep the contract going till it became profitable to them to break it, and then bring it to an end whenever they pleased. This is not giving to a business contract a construction that will give it the efficacy which the parties must have intended at the outset. The compromise agreement is one for the non-performance of which mere payment of this sum of money would not be an adequate relief and, in spite of C1. 10, the contract is otherwise proper to be specifically enforced. Accordingly their Lordships think that this appeal succeeds.
In the view which they took of the construction the Courts below rightly refrained from expressing any opinion as to the relief, which might be proper, if the contrary construction were adopted or as to the extent to which a remedy under Cl. 10 would be available to the decree-holders concurrently with other appropriate remedies in the circumstances. These and similar questions remain to be determined by the Court, which will dispose of the decree-holders' application. The proper course will be to declare, that Cl.10 of the compromise decree of 28th February 1922, does not, on a true construction, afford to the judgment-debtors any answer to the petition for execution of it, presented by the decree-holders ; to allow the appeal of the decree-holders with costs here and below; to set aside the decisions of both Courts in favour of the judgment-debtors, and to remit the application of the decree-holders to the Court of the District Judge of Nagpur to be dealt with, in accordance with the above declaration and otherwise as may be right, and their Lordships will humbly advise. His Majesty accordingly.
Case remanded.
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