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T. B. Ramchandra Rao And Another v. A. N. S. Ramchandra Rao And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
On 6 August 1858 Ramjee Bavajee Pandit executed a deed of settlement of all his movable and immovable properties; he died on 10 August 1858. The deed recited that he had adopted Panchapikes (the second son of Mahasudh Rajaram) and (after gifts and other dispositions) provided that his adopted son (named Bavajee Pandit) should be entitled to half the remaining property, and that the remaining half should be taken half and half by two wives, the senior wife Sowbhagiavaty Kamatchi and the junior wife Sowbhagiavathy Tulja (Tulja Bayee).
In 1894 one acre and 74 cents of the land then in Tulja Bayee's possession was acquired by the Government and compensation was awarded. A dispute arose between the adopted son (Bavajee) and the widow (Tulja) as to whether the widow's interest under the settlement was absolute (alienable) or a limited Hindu widow's estate (non-alienable). This dispute affected the mode of dealing with the compensation money (division if absolute; investment if limited).
The Collector, relying on s.31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, deposited the compensation in Court because there was a dispute as to title/apportionment. The matter came before the District Court of Tanjore, where the District Judge held that the widow had an absolute estate. Bavajee appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. On 13 July 1897 the High Court (Sir Arthur Collins, C.J. and Mr. Justice Shephard) held that Tulja Bayee took a widow's estate only and set aside the District Judge's order, directing the District Judge to pass orders under s.32 and each party to bear own costs.
Tulja Bayee subsequently executed wills on 10 June 1911 and 11 January 1916 bequeathing all her movable and immovable properties to the first respondent; she died on 2 April 1916. The adopted son Bavajee later died; the present appellants are his sons. On 12 July 1916 these sons sued the claimants under Tulja's will alleging she had only a limited estate and therefore no power to dispose of the properties by will. The Subordinate Judge decided for the appellants (the sons), but the High Court reversed that decision. The present appeal to the Privy Council challenges the High Court's reversal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Tulja Bayee took an absolute, heritable and alienable estate under the 1858 deed of settlement, or only a limited Hindu widow's estate (incapable of alienation).
- Whether the prior judgment of the High Court delivered on 13 July 1897 (in proceedings connected to the Land Acquisition Act) constituted a final and conclusive determination between the same parties and those claiming under them, so as to preclude relitigation of the same question in the subsequent suit.
- Whether proceedings under sections 31(2) and 32 of the Land Acquisition Act (payment/deposit of compensation and investment orders) form part of the statutory "award" and are subject to the same limitations on further appeal as an award under section 54.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants (sons of the adopted son) alleged that Tulja Bayee held only a limited estate under the deed of settlement and therefore had no power to dispose of the properties by will. (They instituted the 1916 suit on this basis.)
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents argued that the earlier judgment (13 July 1897) could not be regarded as finally determining the question because it arose out of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In support they relied upon the decision in Rangoon Botatong Company Limited v. Collector, Rangoon.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mt. Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (1908) 30 All 84 : 35 IA 17 : 5 ALJ 69 (PC) | Established that a gift to a Hindu widow may, by words of sufficient amplitude, convey the fullest rights of ownership including the power to alienate; the High Court's prior assumption that power to alienate needed express provision was inaccurate. | Used to explain that previous Board decisions did not establish any rigid rule denying a widow the capacity to be given alienable rights; rather, the question depends on the wide meaning attributable to gift-words. |
| Mt. Sasiman Chowdhurani v. Shibnarayan Chowdhury, AIR 1922 PC 63 : 49 IA 25 (PC) | Reiterated the proposition that words of sufficient amplitude can confer full ownership (including alienation) on a widow. | Noted as repeating the same proposition; used to prevent confusion from contrasting different phrases used in various cases. |
| Bhadidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab, AIR 1922 PC 193 : 46 Bom 153 : 49 IA 1 (PC) | Also repeats the principle that a widow may be given alienable rights if the gift-words are sufficiently wide. | Referred to as further authority repeating the principle and reinforcing the explanation of prior decisions. |
| Rangoon Botatong Co. v. Collector, Rangoon (1913) 40 Cal 21 : 16 IC 188 : 39 IA 197 (PC) | Decided that an appeal under s.54 from an award as to compensation is the only appeal open in respect of the award and that such an award retains its characteristics and cannot be further appealed as if it were a High Court decree in original jurisdiction. | Distinguished by the Privy Council: the case concerns appeals from awards fixing compensation (the amount) and does not govern the separate proceedings which arise when compensation is deposited in Court under s.31(2) and a dispute between claimants as to title thereafter arises. |
| Sreemati Trinayani Dassi v. Krishna Lal De (1913) 17 CWN 935 N : 6 IC 157 and Balaram Bharamatar Ray v. Sham Sundar Narendra (1896) 23 Cal 526 | Held (according to some decisions) that an order under s.32 may be regarded as an integral part of the award made by the Court. | The Privy Council regarded this as a misapprehension: after deposit under s.31(2) the award's functions cease and disputes as to extent of interests are ordinary litigable matters distinct from the award. |
| Badar Bee v. Habib Merican Ncorain (1909) AC 615 | Authority for the principle that a Court cannot review a previous decision, no longer open to appeal, given by another Court having jurisdiction to try the second case. | Cited to support the conclusion that the earlier High Court decision on 13 July 1897 was a final determination between the parties (and those claiming under them) and could not be re-opened in the subsequent suit. |
| Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal, AIR 1921 PC 11 : 48 IA 187 | Affirms that the principle preventing the same case being litigated twice (res judicata / finality) is of general application and not limited to specific Code provisions. | Applied to reinforce that the prior decision must be treated as final and that the present litigants cannot dispute the point already decided. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Privy Council (Lord Buckmaster) proceeded by first acknowledging that the precise legal effect of the 1858 deed (whether it gave an absolute alienable estate to Tulja Bayee or only a widow's estate) was a question that could be considered on its own merits, but held that the question was not open for re-examination in the present proceedings because it had already been clearly and finally determined by the High Court on 13 July 1897.
The Court analysed the procedural framework of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and distinguished two distinct forms of procedure:
- Proceedings necessary for fixing the amount of compensation (the "award"), from which there is an appeal under s.54; and
- Subsequent proceedings that arise when compensation is deposited in Court under s.31(2) because of a dispute as to title among claimants—these disputes are ordinary litigation to determine rights and titles and are not part of the original award.
The Court explained that once the award as to amount has become final, questions of fixing compensation are at an end, and the Collector's duty (in case of dispute) is to deposit the amount in Court where the parties may litigate their titles in the ordinary manner. The Board emphasised that earlier decisions (such as Rangoon Botatong Co.) concern appeals from awards and do not affect the separate rights of appeal that arise from ordinary litigation over title after deposit under s.31(2).
The Court rejected the view (attributed to some earlier decisions) that orders under s.32 form part of the award; it treated that as a misapprehension. The reasoning was that the award statutorily relates to area, compensation, and apportionment among persons whose claims are not in dispute, whereas a dispute between claimants about the extent of their interests is a different matter and forms no part of the award.
Having clarified these procedural distinctions, the Board applied the doctrine that a prior decision between the same parties (or those claiming under them), which is no longer open to appeal, cannot be re-opened in subsequent proceedings. The Court cited Badar Bee v. Habib Merican Ncorain and Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal to underline that point. Consequently, because there had been a clear decision by the High Court on 13 July 1897 on the very question now in dispute, the matter could not be re-litigated by the present parties.
Holding and Implications
Final Ruling: The Privy Council allowed the appeal: the decree of the High Court is reversed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge is restored, with costs in the Privy Council and in the Courts below. (The opinion concludes with the short statement: "Appeal allowed.")
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the Subordinate Judge's judgment in favour of the appellants (sons of the adopted son) is restored and the High Court's contrary decree is set aside.
- The Court reaffirmed that a prior clear decision between the same parties (and those claiming under them), which is no longer open to appeal, is binding and cannot be re-opened in subsequent litigation between those parties; this is an application of the general principle preventing the same case being twice litigated.
- The opinion clarified (by distinguishing authorities) that proceedings to determine the amount of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act (the award) are distinct from later ordinary litigation between claimants after deposit under s.31(2); orders under s.32 are not to be treated as part of the statutory award for purposes of limiting appeals in the same way as awards under s.54.
- This decision applies the existing principles and authorities discussed in the opinion; it does not purport to establish a new rule beyond applying res judicata and clarifying the procedural distinction under the Land Acquisition Act as set out above.
Disposition in the case: The Privy Council reversed the High Court and restored the Subordinate Judge's decree; costs were awarded to the successful party in the Privy Council and in the Courts below.
Lord Buckmaster. -
On the 6th August 1858, Ramjee Bavajee Pandit who died on the 10th August 1858 executed a deed of settlement of all his moveable and immoveable properties. It is prefaced by a statement that he had adopted Panchapikes, the second son of Mahasudh Rajaram, and after various gifts and dispositions which are not material it continued in these terms :-
"Out of the remaining property, after deducting the above, my adopted son, to whom I have given the name of Bavajee Pandit, shall be entitled to and enjoy half of the property. Out of the remaining half of the property these two persons, namely (my) senior wife Sowbhagiavaty Kamatchi and junior wife Sowbhagiavathy Thulja shall take half and half".
In 1894 one acre and 74 cent, of the land so given and then in the possession of Thulja Bayee was acquired by the Government. The usual proceedings for determining the amount of compensation appear to have taken place, and no dispute arose as to the award but a question did arise as between Ramajee Bavajee Pandit, the adopted son, and the widow as to the character and extent of the estate that she took under the will. If she took absolutely, the money could be divided forthwith; but if she took a limited interest her share would have to be invested. It was consequently necessary that this dispute should he determined in order that the compensation monies should be properly dealt with.
S. 31, sub-section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, expressly contemplates this position, for after referring in sub-section I to the payment of the compensation by the Collector to the persons interested, sub-section 2 provides that
"if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted".
Section 18 does not define the Court : this is done by section 3, sub-section D which provides that that a Court means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless a special judicial officer within specified limits has been appointed to perform the functions of the Court under the Act.
S. 32 further provides that when money has been deposited in Court under subsection 2 of section 31, and it appears that the land whereof the same was awarded belonged to any person who had no power to alienate the Court shall order the money to be invested as therein mentioned.
Now the dispute between Bavajee and the widow was plain upon the face of the document. It depended upon whether the deed had conferred an absolute heritable and alienable estate upon the widow, or whether she took a limited Hindu widow's estate or a heritable estate which she was incapable of alienating. What the actual proceedings were that ensued between them is not plain, but they must have come before the District Court of Tanjore for the grounds of appeal from the order of that Court are before their Lordships, and from these it appears that the District Judge had held that the widow had an absolute estate.
From this decision Bavajee brought the appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. Judgment was delivered by the High Court on the 13th July 1897, by Sir Arthur Collins, C. J. and Mr. Justice Shephard. Their judgment is short and as it throws considerable light upon the whole proceedings, it is desirable that it should be reproduced in full.
It is as follows :-
"The first question is what estate the widow Tulja Bayee took under the gift of 1858. We cannot agree with the District Judge that the law is unsettled on the question of such gifts. There being no indication of intention to give a larger estate, we must assume that the husband intended that a widow's estate only should pass. That being so it is quite clear that Sections 31 and 32 of the Act apply. The order must be set aside as the parties are not agreed as to the mode in which the money should be invested."
We must direct the District Judge to pass orders under the provisions of section 32. Each party to bear his own costs of this appeal."
On the 10th June 1911, and again on the 11th January 1916, Tulja Bayee executed will and bequeathed all her movable and immovable properties to the first respondent; she died on the 2nd April 1916. The adopted son, Bavajee Ramajee Pandit, also died at a date subsequent to the decision of the High Court, but the exact time is not stated and is not material and the present appellant and his brother Jeevanna Rao, now deceased, were his two sons.
On the 12th July 1916, they instituted the suit out of which these proceedings have arisen against the claimants under Tulja's will, alleging that she had a limited estate under the deed of settlement, and that she had no power to dispose of the properties by will. The learned Subordinate Judge decided in their favour, but this decision was reversed by the High Court, from whose decree the present appeal has been brought.
Both the judgments of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court depended upon the true effect of the deed of settlement but for reasons which their Lordships will shortly explain, they do not think that this question was open to either of the Courts.
Their Lordships do not, therefore, propose to embark upon the consideration of what the effect of the deed of gift in favour of Tulja Bayee might be correctly determined to be, but as some misapprehension appears to exist as to the effect of certain decisions of the Board, and notably one, in 35 IA p. 17, their Lordships think it desirable to remove this doubt, lest error should creep into the administration of the law in India with regard to the rights of a Hindu widow.
In the case referred to Mt. Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha, (1908) 30 All 84 : 35 IA 17 : 5 ALJ 69 (PC) when originally heard before the High Court it had been stated that under Hindu Law in the case of a gift of immovable property to Hindu widow, she had no power to alienate unless such power was expressly conferred. The decision of this Board did no more than establish that that proposition was not accurate, and that it was possible by the use of words of sufficient amplitude to convey in the terms of the gift itself, the fullest rights of ownership including of course, the power to alienate which the High Court had thought required to be added by express declaration.
In that case it is true that there was some comparison drawn between the gift to a widow and a gift to a person not under disability, but that was not the foundation of the decision, which depended entirely upon the wide meaning attributed to the words in which the gift to the widow was clothed.
More recent decisions of this Board (in Mt. Sasiman Chowdhurani v. Shibnarayan Chowdhury, AIR 1922 PC 63: 49 IA 25 (PC).and Bhadidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab, AIR 1922 PC 193: 46 Bom 153 : 49 IA 1 (PC) at present unreported) do nothing but repeat the same proposition in other words. The importance of preventing confusion due to the contrasting of different phrases used in distinct cases to express the same idea has led their Lordships to make this explanation, but the points argued as to the effect of the gift in the present case are not now open to consideration, for in their Lordships' opinion the decision given on the 13th July l897, by the High Court at Madras is a clear and complete determination as between the parties to that suit and those claiming under them, which the present litigants cannot dispute.
It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the judgment cannot be so regarded because it arose out of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and for the purpose of their arguments they rely upon the case of Rangoon Botatong Company Limited v. Collector, Rangoon (4). There appears to be some misapprehension in the Courts in India as to the effect of this authority which it is desirable should be removed. Under the Land Acquisition Act there are two perfectly separate and distinct forms of procedure contemplated. The first is that necessary for fixing the amount of the compensation and this is described as being an award.
By section 54 an appeal from that award or of any part of the award is given to the High Court. The case in Rangoon Botatong Co v. Collector, Rangoon, (1913) 40 Cal 21 : 16 IC 188 : 39 IA 197 (PC) decided that in those circumstances the appeal so given, was the only one open to parties, and that even if appealed against, the award still retained its characteristics and was incapable of further appeal.
The argument which succeeded in that case emphasises the distinction between an award and a decree and the judgment mentions this in terms by stating that the appellants, although admitted to the High Court, could not have the right to carry an award, made under an arbitration as to the value of land taken for public purposes, up to this Board as if it were a decree of the High Court made in course of its original jurisdiction.
The manifest inconvenience that would attend any such proceeding is also pointed out, but neither this judgment nor any other judgment of this Board affects the question of an appeal on the totally different proceedings that arise when there is a dispute as between the persons claiming compensation involving, as it does in this case, a difficult question of title.
When once the award as to the amount has become final, all questions as to fixing of compensation are then at an end. The duty of the Collector in case of dispute as to the relative rights of the persons, together entitled to the money, is to place the money under the control of the Court, and the parties then can proceed to litigate in the ordinary way to determine what their right and title to the property may be. That is exactly what occurred in the present case. How the proceedings were commenced is a matter that is not material, provided that they were instituted in the manner that gave the Court jurisdiction, for they ended in a decree made by the High Court and appealable to this Board.
It is true that in the case of Sreemati Trinayani Dassi v. Krishna Lal De, (1913) 17 CWN 935 N : 6 IC 157 and following an earlier case, Balaram Bharamatar Ray v. Sham Sundar Narendra, (1896) 23 Cal 526 it was decided that an order under section 32 may appropriately be deemed as an integral part of the award made by the Court, but their Lordships regard this as a misapprehension as to the meaning of the award. The award as constituted by statute is nothing, but an award which states the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land of whose claims the Collector has information meaning thereby people whose interests are not in dispute but from the moment when the sum has been deposited in Court under section 31 (2) the functions of the award have ceased ; and all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the extent of their interest.
Such dispute forms no part of the award, and it would indeed be strange if a controversy between two people as to the nature of their respective interests in a piece of land should enjoy certain rights of appeal, which would be wholly taken away when the piece of land was represented by a sum of money paid into Court.
There has in the present case been a clear decision upon the very point now in dispute which cannot be re-opened. The High Court appears only to have regarded the matter as concluded to the extent of the compensation money but that is not the true view of what occurred for as pointed out in Badar Bee v. Habib Merican Ncorain, (1909) AC 615 : 78 LJPC 16 : 101 LT 161 it is not competent for the Court, in the case of the same question arising between the same parties, to review a previous decision, no longer open to appeal, given by another Court having jurisdiction to try the second case. If the decision was wrong, it ought to have been appealed from in due time.
Nor in such circumstances can the interested parties be heard to say that the value of the subject matter on which the former decision was pronounced was comparatively so trifling that it was not worth their while to appeal from it. If such plea were admissible, there would be no finality in litigation. The importance of a judicial decision is not to be measured by the pecuniary value of the particular item in dispute. It has been suggested that the decision was not in a former suit, but whether this were so or not makes no difference, for it has been recently pointed out by the Board in Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal, AIR 1921 PC 11: 48 IA 187 that the principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application, and is not limited by the specific words of the Code in this respect. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree appealed from be reversed and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs here and in the Courts below.
Appeal allowed.
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