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Dame Alice Fraser And Others v. City Of Fraserville, Respondents

Privy Council
Jan 25, 1917
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lord Buckmaster)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were plaintiffs who sought to enforce an arbitration award dated 27 November 1911 fixing US$75,700 as compensation for the expropriation of certain falls and adjacent lands (the Grandes Chutes). The respondent (the City) was the defendant in that action and the plaintiff in separate proceedings seeking to set the award aside. The actions were consolidated at trial. The Superior Court, by judgment dated 14 October 1914, discharged the award with costs and dismissed the appellants' action. The Court of King's Bench for the Province of Quebec (Appeal Side) affirmed that judgment by two judgments. The appellants appealed those judgments; the appeals were consolidated and form the present appeal before Their Lordships.

Background facts relevant to valuation: the appellants owned land and water-power at the Grandes Chutes, which the city needed for municipal electric lighting. The falls had a history of leases and use for electric lighting; in 1905 a lessee sold a lease and business to the city for $60,000. The city had considered and in part undertaken construction of reservoirs on tributary valleys (in conjunction with the Riviere du Loup Pulp Company) that would regulate river flow and materially increase available horsepower. The critical date for valuation was 30 September 1910 (the date on which a city resolution expressing willingness to pay $20,000 was served). Arbitration under the Quebec Code (articles 5790–5800) followed because no agreed price was reached.

Under section 5795 the council appointed one arbitrator, the proprietors later had an arbitrator appointed by the Superior Court judge, and the two appointed a third arbitrator. The three arbitrators made an award on 27 November 1911. The award failed in certain formal respects to comply with article 5798, and more substantially the arbitrators (particularly the third arbitrator, Arthur St. Laurent) were alleged to have assessed compensation on an improper basis by including value arising from the city's planned works (i.e., value to the buyer once the city's scheme was carried out) rather than the value to the seller in the property's actual condition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction by valuing the expropriated property by reference to the value that would accrue to the buyer (the city) from carrying out the city's scheme (construction of reservoirs and related works), rather than the value of the immovable to the owner in its actual condition at the date of expropriation.
  2. Whether the award complied with the formal requirements of article 5798 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec (and, if not, whether those omissions were fatal to the award).
  3. Whether, if the award is defective for having been made on the wrong basis, the proper remedy is to remit the matter to the arbitrators to supply missing statements or to make a new award, or to uphold the setting aside of the award.
  4. How the statutory rule that arbitrators' awards are "final and without appeal" (section 5797) affects the ability to challenge the award, particularly where it is asserted the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The appellants sought enforcement of the arbitrators' award fixing compensation at $75,700.
  • In the event the award were found to be bad, the appellants urged that the matter should be remitted to the arbitrators to be reheard (i.e., that the arbitrators could and should make a new or corrected award rather than the award being finally set aside).

Respondent's (City's) Arguments

  • The city contended that the award did not comply with article 5798 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec in several material respects (omissions in the award), and this was relied on as a ground to object to the award.
  • More substantively, the city argued that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction by assessing compensation on a basis that took into account the value of the property as developed under the city's own scheme (i.e., value to the purchaser after the proposed reservoir works), rather than the value to the owner in its existing condition — in effect making the city bear the increase in value resulting from its own contemplated works.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lucas v. Chesterfield Gas and Water Board, [1909] K.B. 16 Established principles governing valuation for compulsory acquisition — focus on value to the seller in actual condition, with permitted consideration of existing possibilities but excluding advantage due to the scheme for which property is acquired. The case is cited as one of several recent authorities supporting the rule that valuation must exclude advantages arising from the purchaser's scheme; the Court applied that principle to find the arbitrator erred.
Cedars Rapids Manufacturing Company v. Lacoste, A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 199 = 1914 A.C. 569 Same principle: compensation must reflect value to the owner in existing condition, excluding benefit caused by implementation of the buy-er’s scheme; relevant authorities considered in the lower courts. The Court treated this decision (and others cited) as accurately stating the controlling principle and held the arbitrator's approach inconsistent with it.
Sidney v. The North-Eastern Railway Company, [1914] 3 K.B. 629 Another recent authority addressing how possibilities and prospective development are to be treated in valuation for compulsory acquisition. Cited with the other cases to support the conclusion that the arbitrator had failed to fix the value he was appointed to determine by including benefit from the city's scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in three main analytical steps:

  1. Statutory framework and formal requirements: The Court identified the statutory arbitration scheme in articles 5790–5800 (quoting section 5795 on appointment of arbitrators and section 5798 on contents of an award) and noted that awards under section 5797 are made final and without appeal. The Court acknowledged that the award before it omitted certain particulars required by article 5798, but observed that such omissions could be remedied by remittal to the arbitrators to supply the necessary statements and that those omissions did not, of themselves, determine the outcome of the appeal.
  2. Examination of the substance of the award and the arbitrator's method: The Court considered the evidence, including the notes and calculations produced by the third arbitrator, Arthur St. Laurent, who divided valuation into (a) the value of the lands and water-power in their physical condition at the valuation date and (b) the value of possibilities of development by storage and regulation of waters (reservoirs). The Court accepted, as a general principle, that existing possibilities of development may be properly considered in assessing compensation, subject to limits. However, the Court found that St. Laurent did not confine himself to the appropriate inquiry: instead of fixing the value of the immovable for the owner in its actual state (including legitimate possibilities), he assessed the value as it would be to the purchaser after the city's execution of its own scheme.
  3. Application of precedents and finality principle: The Court reviewed recent authorities (Lucas v. Chesterfield, Cedars Rapids v. Lacoste, Sidney v. N.E. Railway) and summarized their substance: the correct measure is the value to the seller in the property's actual condition at the date of expropriation, with existing advantages and possibilities taken into account but excluding any advantage that derives from carrying out the scheme for which the property is taken. Applying that principle, the Court accepted the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts (including detailed calculations showing how St. Laurent capitalized a purchaser's expected profits — arriving at $39,500 for potential value) and concluded that the arbitrator had fixed the property's value as to the buyer rather than as to the seller and thereby exceeded his jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized the statutory finality of arbitrators' awards, noting that normally their findings of fact and value cannot be challenged except on the ground that they had exceeded their jurisdiction or fixed a value other than that which they were appointed to determine. Having found excess of jurisdiction, the Court held the award could not be supported.

On the remedial question (whether the matter should be remitted to the arbitrators), the Court acknowledged the appellants' submission that remittal might be appropriate but declined to decide the issue. Their Lordships considered this to be essentially a question for the Quebec courts, not fully examined in the judgments before them, and therefore refrained from expressing an opinion on whether the arbitrators could or should proceed to make a new award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Their Lordships concluded that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction by assessing compensation based on the property's value to the purchaser after the implementation of the city's scheme, rather than the value to the owner in the property's actual condition. Consequently, the Court advised that the appeals fail.

DISPOSED OF: The appeals are dismissed, with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the prior judgments of the Superior Court and the Court of King's Bench, which discharged the award and dismissed the appellants' action, are upheld by Their Lordships; the appellants' attempt to enforce the award therefore fails in this appeal.
  • The Court applied established authorities to reaffirm the principle that in compulsory acquisition valuation the advantage resulting from carrying out the acquiring authority's own scheme must be excluded when assessing compensation due to the owner; the arbitrator's contrary approach amounted to an excess of jurisdiction.
  • The Court did not set a new, broader precedent on the procedural remedy of remittal to arbitrators; it expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrators could or should be sent back to make a new award and left that procedural question to the courts of Quebec. Thus, no definitive ruling was made on the availability of remittal in this case by Their Lordships.

This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Lord Buckmaster :-

The appellants in this case are the plaintiffs in an action brought by them against the respondent and the defendants in an action brought by the respondent against them.

The object of the appellants' action was to enforce an award of arbitrators dated the 27th November, 1911, by which the sum of 75,700 dollars was fixed as the sum to be paid by the respondent to the appellants in full compensation for the expropriation of certain property.

The action by the respondent was to set the award aside. The cases were consolidated at the trial and the Superior Court by its judgment dated the 14th October, 1914, discharged the award with costs and dismissed the appellants' action. The Court of King's Bench for the Province of Quebec (Appeal Side) by two judgments confirmed the Superior Court. The appellants have appealed from these two judgments and these appeals, which have been consolidated, constitute the present appeal.

The substance of the dispute is connected with a subject which has not been unfruitful in litigation, namely, the determination of the exact principle upon which prospects and possibilities of future development ought to be taken into account in determining the price to be paid for property compulsorily acquired.

The appellants are the owners of the banks and lands adjacent to the waterfalls of the River du Loup, known as the Grandes Chutes. These falls are within the limits of the jurisdiction of the respondent city, by whom the water-power is required for the operation of a municipal system of electric lighting.

It appears that the value of these falls for industrial enterprise has long been recognised, and as far back as 1881 William Fraser, the predecessor in title of the present appellants, granted a lease of the falls and the adjacent lands to a paper pulp company for twenty years at the rate of 30 dollars per year. This lease was extended from time to time, and in 1896 a final extension was granted to the then holder of the original lease for a period of ten years.

In 1905, one year before the expiration of this lease, the then lessees, who had used the water to carry on a business of electric lighting, sold the lease and the business to the city for the sum of 60,000 dollars. Since that time the electric light system has been operated exclusively by the municipality, who have been in continuous possession of the Grandes Chutes for that purpose.

In 1906 an offer was made by the city to William Fraser for a new lease of twenty-five years, but, though this offer was accepted, no formal lease was executed, and William Fraser died in 1908 with the matter still in abeyance.

On the 10th July, 1907, the respondents adopted a by-law authorising them to construct a reservoir higher up the river in order to regulate the flow of water and also to expropriate all the necessary land for the purpose of this enterprise. At certain falls lower down the river there was at this time another mill established for the purpose of pulp manufacture, and the lease of the falls and adjacent land, which was of long duration, was held by a company known as the Riviere du Loup Pulp Company, Limited.

The Riviere du Loup is fed by four tributary streams, which run down through valleys whose natural construction readily permits of the waters being dammed in reservoirs. It is of course obvious that if such reservoirs were constructed it would be possible to regulate the flow of water over the falls of the river so as materially to increase the amount of horse-power available at each fall throughout the year. The respondents accordingly in March, 1909, entered into an agreement with the Pulp Company, providing that the dams that they proposed to erect in the valleys should be exclusively used for the purpose of the storage reservoirs, and should not be parted with by the city without the express consent of the company, and for this consideration the company agreed to pay four-fifths of the total sum of 18,000 dollars, the proposed cost of expenditure, the future maintenance and repair of the reservoirs being divided between the city and the company in the ratio of one-third to two-thirds. These reservoirs were in course of erection, when on the 18th October, 1909, the city passed a by-law authorising the town to acquire the ownership of the Grand Falls and of the adjacent property necessary for the electric light system, and it was thereby enacted that in default of agreement the property should be compulsorily acquired, and certain loans necessary for the acquisition were thereby authorized. A further by-law to the same effect was passed on the 20th June, 1910, and a further loan provided for.

On the 27th September, 1910, the respondents passed a resolution expressing their willingness to pay to the proprietors of the lands and the water-power the sum of 20,000 dollars, and this was served on the parties.

It is quite unnecessary to examine the authority under which this notice was given. There is no question in this appeal but that the city had full power to take the steps they did, and for the purpose of determining the value of the property they intended to acquire, the 30th September, 1910, the date on which the resolution was served, is accepted by both parties as being the critical date. On that date there were four persons who together owned the interest in the property of the falls and lands originally held by William Fraser. One was the Mayor of the town, and he expressed his willingness to sell his share for 5,000 dollars. The remaining three proprietors, who are the present appellants, refused, and it therefore became necessary to determine the sum to be paid. The procedure that regulates the fixing of this compensation is to be found in articles 5790 to 5800 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec. Section 5795 is in these terms :-

"If there be no agreement between the parties the value of the immoveable in question together with whatever goes in compensation of the value of such immoveable shall be estimated by arbitrators named as follows : one by Council, one by the owner or on his behalf, and a third by the two former, or, if they cannot agree, by a Judge of the Superior Court on demand of any of the interested parties."

Section 5798 is as follows :-

"In any award rendered by them, the arbitrators shall mention the lot whereof the immoveable taken forms part, the name of the owner of such immoveable, and also the by-law or order of the Council under which such immoveable is taken, and shall fix the amount of the indemnity, if they grant one, and if they do not, a statement to that effect shall be entered in such award establishing their refusal."

While by Section 5797 the award is made final and without appeal.

Under Section 5795 the City Council appointed Mr. Bertrand as their arbitrator, and the proprietors having failed to appoint one on their behalf, a petition was presented to the Judge of the Superior Court in a case No. 4573, requesting the appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the other parties.

On the 21st July, 1911, the Court by consent appointed Mr. St. George on behalf of the appellants, and the two arbitrators appointed Mr. St. Laurent as the third arbitrator in accordance with the Code. The arbitrators proceeded with their work, and on the 27th November, 1911, made the award which is in question in these proceedings. It is in these terms :-

"To His Honour the Mayor and Council,

"City of Fraserville, County of Temiscouata, P. Q.

"We the andersigned, the arbitrators appointed in this case, No. 4573, after having examined and valued the property, heard the parties and their witnesses, under oath, administered by one of us, do hereby certify that we award to the respondents the sum of seventy-five thousand seven hundred (75,700) dollars to be paid by the petitioner in full compensation for the expropriation of the property expropriated by the said petitioner.

"arthur st. laurent.

"PERCIVAL W. st. george.

"I cannot agree with above award.

"J.T. bertrand."

Except so far as the No. 4573 introduces into this award the details of the process to which it is a reference, it is plain that the award does not comply with the provisions of article 5798 of the Revised Statutes in several material respects, and this was made one of the grounds of objection to the award on the part of the city; but it is not material to consider the effect of the omissions, for, even if this objection were maintained, the award could be remitted to the arbitrators to supply the necessary statements, and the substance of the award would remain. The real ground upon which the award is challenged is far more serious, and it is that the arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdiction and accessed the valuation on a totally wrong basis. There is nothing to support this contention on the face of the award; but in the course of the proceedings Mr. St. Laurent was called as a witness, and he produced a long and very elaborate system of notes of the evidence that he had taken and the calculations that he had made in order to arrive at his figures. He divided the subject-matter into two heads : the value of the lands and the water power in the physical condition in which they were found at the date of the valuation, and the value of the possibilities of development of those waterfalls by storing and regulating the waters through the medium of reservoirs. In doing this, their Lordships were of opinion that he was clearly right. The possibility of an added utility for any expropriated property due to existing possibilities of development is, subject to limits to which their Lordships will refer, a right and proper subject for consideration, in ascertaining the compensation to be paid on expropriation. But, in the method which was adopted by Mr. S. Laurent for arriving at what he regarded as the measure of this compensation he did not, in their Lordships' opinion, fix, as he wag bound to do, the value of the immovable he was appointed to determine, but the value of another thing which was altogether outside his powers.

It is unnecessary to examine the evidence upon this point in close detail because the statement of Belleau, J., in the Superior Court in these words :-

"IIs ont, comme dans la cause citee plus haut, commis l'erreur de faire participer l'expropriee aux benefices de la plus-value, donnee a la propriete. par la realisation do l'objet pour lequel acquisition en etait faite. Ils font payer a la ville, non pas la valeur d'un pouvoir d'eau pouvant developper 300 h.p., qui est ce quo les proprietaries vendent, mais moitie de la valeur d'un pouvoir additionnal de 1,200 h.p., qui. est ce que la ville doit realiser par l'execution des travaux qu'elle a en vue ou en voie d'execution. Ce n'est plus la valeur pour le proprietaire qui vend, mais la valeur pour celui qui achete, calculee sur le benefice qu'il doit retirer de l'exploitation a laquelle il destine la proprietee expropriee Le vendeur recoit plus qu'il ne donne, il partage dans ce que la propriete vaut pour l'acheteur. Voila ce qu'est l'indemnite' que la ville est appelee a payer. Je repete que le principe est faux et qu'il vicicles precedes des arbitres."

and that of the Chief Justice-

"On voit par les notes du tiers arbitre, Arthur St. Laurent, de quelle maniere il a precede. II a commence par calculer le revenu annuel que donneront les 1,200 forces nouvelles du pouvoir des Grandes Chutes, et il est arrive a la conclusion que ce revenu serait de 25,850.00 dollars; puis il a retranche de ce montant une somme de 23,875 00 dollars pour frais d'exploitation, interest sur montant debourse par la cite, fonds d'amortissement et part raisonnable de la cite dans les profits; ce qui laissait une balance de 1,975-00 dollars. II a accorde cette balance de revenu aux expropries comme etant la part qui devait leur revenir dans les profits, et il a capitalise ce revenu a 5 pour cent, ce qui forme un capital de 39,500-00 dollars. C'est ce dernier montant que les arbitres ont accorde aux expropries comme indemnity pour la valeur potentielle des Grandes Chutes."

are in effect concurrent findings of fact which there is an abundant evidence to support, that in truth the value which Mr. St. Laurent fixed was the value of the property to the person who was buying, and not to the person who was selling, and it was not this value that he was appointed to determine.

The principles which regulate the fixing of compensation of lands compulsorily acquired have been the subject of many decisions, and among the most recent are those of Lucas v. Chesterfield Gas and Water Board, [1909] K.B. 16. Cedars Rapids Manufacturing Company v. Lacoste. A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 199 = 1914 A.C. 569, and Sidney v. The North-Eastern Railway Company, [1914] 3 K.B. 629. The principles of those cases are carefully and correctly considered in the judgments, the subject of appeal, and the substance of them is this : that the value to be ascertained is the value to the seller of the property in its actual condition at the time of expropriation with all its existing advantages and with all its possibilities, excluding any advantage due to the carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired, the question of what is the scheme being a question of fact for the arbitrator in each case. It is this that the Courts have found that the arbitrator has failed to do, and it follows that his award cannot be supported.

Their Lordships desire to add that it is plain, from the language of the statute making the award of arbitrators final and without appeal, that apart from evidence establishing that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction, their award could not be disputed. Their findings of fact and their findings of value, unless it be shown that the value is not that which they were appointed to determine, are free from challenge.

The appellants have urged that in the present case if the award is found to be bad, the matter should be sent back to the arbitrators to be reheard. It is quite possible that this is the proper course to pursue. It may be that the arbitrators are not deprived of their office by what has occurred, that they have merely done an informal and an invalid act, but this is essentially a question which ought primarily to be considered in the Courts of Quebec, and it does not appear to have been the the subject of any close examination in any of the judgments which have been passed in these proceedings. It may well be that there is a recognised and established method of dealing with such cases acted on in those Courts, and without knowledge on this point their Lordships do not think it right to express any opinion at all upon the question as to whether the arbitrators can now proceed to make a new award, or whether they have no longer any authority to act. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs.

Appeals dismissed.