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Maharaja Ram Narayan Singh v. Ram Saran Lal And Others

Privy Council
Dec 3, 1918
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Legal Opinion Summary — Sir John Edge (Privy Council)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree of the High Court at Calcutta dated 16 June 1914 which set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh dated 12 August 1910 and dismissed the suit. The original suit was commenced by Maharaja Sri Sri Ram Narayan on 4 February 1909 seeking khas possession of Mouza Saiga in Raj Ramgarh in Chota Nagpur and mesne profits.

Mouza Saiga had been granted as a jagir in 1852 to Kanai Singh by Maharaja Sambhunath (an ancestor of the plaintiff). The grant used the vernacular term "putrapoutradi," translated in the record as "descendants," which the plaintiff contended meant male descendants in the male line. By the time of suit, Kanai Singh's sons had both died without surviving issue. The plaintiff (now represented on appeal by his legal representative) claimed the mouza reverted to him on that failure of male issue.

Defendants were Ram Saran Lal and his minor sons, and Shib Saran Lal and his minor sons, who were collaterals descended from Pyary Lal (a brother of Kanai Singh). The defendants first alleged an earlier grant to their ancestor Raghu Singh (which they failed to prove), and then contended that the grant to Kanai Singh and his "putrapoutradi" created an inheritable estate which could descend to collateral heirs.

The Subordinate Judge held that "putrapoutradi" meant lineal male descendants only, found a custom in Raj Ramgarh that jagirs were resumable on failure of male heirs in the male line, and thus decreed possession and mesne profits for the plaintiff. The High Court on appeal reversed that decree, construing "putrapoutradi" as capable of conveying an estate of inheritance that could include collaterals, and dismissed the suit. The present appeal to the Privy Council challenges the High Court's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a grant of a jagir to a grantee and his "putrapoutradi" (vernacular term translated as "descendants") in Raj Ramgarh created an estate of inheritance that could descend to collateral heirs or was a tenure resumable on failure of male-line descendants of the original grantee.
  2. Whether, as a matter of construction and evidence of local custom, the term "putrapoutradi" in jagir grants in Raj Ramgarh should be interpreted to include collaterals or should be confined to lineal male descendants.
  3. Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Subordinate Judge's decree and dismissing the suit in light of the evidence and relevant authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The grant to Kanai Singh included the vernacular term "putrapoutradi," which, in the plaintiff's case, meant male descendants in the male line only.
  • On the death of Bansi Lal (the surviving son of Kanai Singh) without male issue, the mouza reverted to the grantor's legal representative (the plaintiff) under the local custom and construction of the grant.
  • Evidence (both documentary and oral) proved a custom in Raj Ramgarh that jagirs were resumable on failure of male heirs in the male line, supporting the Subordinate Judge's decree for possession and mesne profits to the plaintiff.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • First, the defendants asserted that the jagir had originally been granted to Raghu Singh (their ancestor), which if true would make them male-line descendants of the grantee; they failed to prove this assertion.
  • Second, having failed on the first point, the defendants contended that the grant to Kanai Singh and his "putrapoutradi" created an estate of inheritance which could descend to collaterals (i.e., to the defendants as descendants of the grantee's brother).
  • The defendants relied upon authorities construing similar vernacular expressions (including decisions about devises in Bengali wills) to support a wider meaning of such words that could include collateral succession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Perkash Lal v. Rameshwar Nath Singh [1904] 31 Cal. 561 Held that the vernacular words "al aulad" though etymologically including females were in local practice (Chota Nagpur) to be interpreted to mean lineal male descendants only, according to proved custom. The Subordinate Judge relied on this case (a Chota Nagpur decision) to support the conclusion that local custom required construing descendant-words as limited to lineal male heirs; this case was cited as a stronger authority supporting resumability on failure of male issue.
Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State (1881) 7 Cal. 304 (P.C.) Decision that the words putrapoutradikrame in a Bengali will, though primarily denoting males, could apply to female heirs of a female where by law the estate would descend, and were apt to confer an estate of inheritance upon either male or female. The High Court relied on this Board decision to construe "putrapoutradi" in the jagir grant as capable of conveying an estate of inheritance that could extend to collaterals; the Privy Council distinguished it as a devise case (not a jagir) and thus not directly determinative here.
Lalit Mohun Singh v. Chukkun Lal (1897) 24 Cal. 834 (P.C.) Another Board decision concerning construction of vernacular expressions in a Bengali will allowing a broad application to confer inheritable interests. The High Court cited this decision alongside Ram Lal Mookerjee in support of a construction rendering "putrapoutradi" capable of creating an inheritable estate; the Privy Council noted it was a will (devise) case and treated it as distinguishable from jagir grants.
Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat (1878) 3 Bom. 186 (P.C.) Established that a jagir is prima facie an estate only for life (i.e., not necessarily hereditary), though it may be granted in terms making it hereditary. The Privy Council cited this as authority that jagirs, by default, are life tenures; it supported the principle that terms creating a hereditary jagir must be clear and unambiguous.
Dosibai v. Ishivardas (1891) 15 Bom. 222 (P.C.) Where an unambiguous grant in English used the words "and his heirs for ever as jagir," the Board held that those words (being clear) created an absolute inheritable interest. The Privy Council cited this case to illustrate that clear, unambiguous terms will create a hereditary estate, contrasting it with the present case where "putrapoutradi" standing alone was ambiguous.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Privy Council's reasoning proceeded in steps, reflecting its evaluation of the Subordinate Judge's findings, the High Court's approach, the evidence of local custom, and the precedents cited.

  1. Presumption about jagirs: The Council began from the proposition (supported by cited authority) that a jagir must prima facie be taken as an estate for life only, although it may be granted in such clear terms as to be hereditary. (Gulabdas Jugjivandas was cited for the prima facie life-tenure rule.)
  2. Clarity of terms required for hereditability: Words which, standing alone, are ambiguous cannot be taken to vest a general inheritable right; where the grantor intended a hereditability that was general or confined to particular heirs, the terms must be clear and unambiguous. The Council referenced Dosibai v. Ishivardas as an example where unambiguous English words produced an absolute inheritable interest.
  3. Character of the vernacular term in the present grant: The term "putrapoutradi," standing alone in a jagir grant in Raj Ramgarh, was treated as ambiguous in the absence of evidence that it had been understood there to include collaterals or females.
  4. Evidence of local custom and practice: The record contained documentary and oral evidence (including local records and testimony) that in Raj Ramgarh succession to jagirs had been to males in the male line and that jagirs were resumable on failure of such male heirs. The Subordinate Judge was "so much impressed" by this evidence that he concluded a custom existed that jagirs were resumable on failure of male-line heirs.
  5. Distinction between devises in wills and jagir grants: Although the High Court relied on Board decisions (Ram Lal Mookerjee and Lalit Mohun Singh) that construed similar vernacular words in Bengali devises in wills to pass inheritable interests (potentially including collaterals), the Privy Council noted these were cases about devises in wills, not jagir grants. It concluded that those cases did not require the same result for jagir grants in Raj Ramgarh where local custom and historical practice pointed the other way.
  6. Conclusion on construction and application: Given the ambiguity of "putrapoutradi" in the context of a jagir and the evidence that in Raj Ramgarh succession had in practice been confined to males in the male line and that jagirs were resumable on failure of such heirs, the Subordinate Judge's construction (that the grant was resumable and did not create a general inheritable estate extending to collaterals) was justified.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Privy Council allowed the appeal. It advised that the decree of the High Court at Calcutta (which had set aside the Subordinate Judge's decree) should be set aside, and that the Subordinate Judge's decree (which awarded possession and mesne profits to the plaintiff) should be restored.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The decree of the Subordinate Judge ordering possession (and mesne profits to be ascertained) is restored.
  • The respondents (defendants) were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the Privy Council.

The opinion emphasizes that the decision rested on the construction of the grant in light of local custom and practice and on the distinction between devises in wills and jagir grants; the opinion does not purport to lay down a wider principle beyond the facts and authorities discussed, and it restores the Subordinate Judge's judgment rather than announcing a novel rule of general application.

Show all summary ...

Sir John Edge :-

This is an appeal from a decree, dated the 16th June, 1914 of the High Court at Calcutta, which set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, dated the 12th August, 1910, and dismissed the suit.

The suit in which this appeal was brought was commenced by Maharaja Sri Sri Ram Narayan on the 4th February, 1909, for khas possession of Mouza Saiga in Raj Ramgarh in Chota Nagpur and for mesne profits. Mouza Salga had been granted as jagir in 1852 to Kanai Singh by Maharaja Sambhunath, ancestor of the plaintiff, who was the zamindar, then possessed of the mouza. The original plaintiff has died and the appellant is his legal representative.

The grant of the jagir as translated is as follows :

"3rd Falgum Sudi 1908 Sambat.

"Pottah of agreement granted by order of His Highness Maharaja Sri Sri Sambhu Nath Singh Bahadur is as follows :-

The Jagir of Saiga, one village, in pergunnah Karanpura is granted to Kanai Singh, of which the jumma is Co"s Rs. 300. Out of that, the landlord"s 6 anna, share is Rs. 112-8 from which a remission of Rs. 75 is made, the balance of landlord"s share Rs. 37-8 shall be paid by you year by year. You, with your descendants, will continue to enjoy the same. The village is granted together with trees, wells, tinils, fish. This is granted by His Highness in the presence of Bakshi Joynandan Das, Bakshi Lachman Das, Mahta Bissambar Das, Bakshi Bhawani Ram, and Bakshi Bhagwan Das."

The vernacular word in the grant which has been translated as "descendants" is putrapoutradi; which, according to the plaintiff"s case, meant in the grant male descendants in the male line. Kanai Singh, died before suit, having had a son Sewbux, who predeceased him, and had died without issue, and one other son Bansi Lal, who survived him and died without issue before suit. The defendants are Ram Saran Lal, and his minor sons, and Shib Saran Lal, and his minor sons. The defendants are not descended from Kanai Singh, the grantee, they are descended in the male line from Pyary Lal, who was a brother of Kanai Singh. The plaintiff"s case was that on the death of Bansi Lal without male issue surviving him, Mouza Saiga reverted to him, ho being the legal representative of the grantor. The defendants put forward two different cases in defence to the suit, the first of which was that the jagir had been originally granted to Raghu Singh, who was the father of Pyary Lal and Kanai Singh, and that as they are the male descendants in the male line of Raghu Singh the mouza had not reverted and they are entitled to the possession of it under the grant alleged by them. The defendants failed to prove that the grant of the jagir had been made to Raghu Singh, and not, as the fact was, to his son Kanai Singh. It may be observed that in setting up that defence the defendants were obviously adopting the plaintiff"s construction of the vernacular word putrapoutradi, according to which it meant in the grant of a jagir in Raj Ramgarh, male descendants in the male line. Having failed to prove that the original grant was made to their ancestor Raghu Singh, the defendants then contended that the grant to Kanai Singh and his putrapoutradi created an estate of inheritance which descended to them as collaterals.

The Subordinate Judge considered that a grant of a jagir to a man and his putrapoutradi was a grant to him and his lineal male descendants, and that in Chota Nagpur the term putrapoutradi could not in a rant of a jagir possibly include col. lateral or female heirs. A great deal of evidence, documentary and oral, was given before the Subordinate Judge as to grants of jagirs which had been made in Raj Ramgarh, and that evidence satisfied the Subordinate Judge that all jagirs granted in Raj Ramgarh were resumable on failure of male heirs in the male line of the original grantees. The Subordinate Judge in his judgment said :-

"I have before stated that in 31 Cal. 561 "Ahwal jagirs" which is a term of much broader significance than "putrapoutradi jagir" were held to be resumable on proof of a custom that jagirs generally were resumable on failure of male issue. Also looking to "Hunter" there cannot be any doubt that jagirs of all sorts, without any exception, were resumable. The language of the sanad is ambiguous the word putrapoutradi does not clearly mean an absolute estate of inheritance, and jagirs generally are proved, both by oral and documentary evidence, to be resumable. No instances of "putrapoutradi" jagir not being resumed and that females and collateral heirs are still holding them. It is for the defendants, therefore, to prove the exception in the case of jagirs containing word putrapoutradi. Nothing has been done in this connection. It is not established that Ramgarh Raj used to grant both two distinct sorts of jagirs - one resumable on failure of male issue, and another, absolute estate of inheritance not resumable, with word "putrapoutradi" containing in the sanad. On the contrary, the evidence is that all jagirs, by whatever name called, condition or no condition attached, were primarily life-tenures and which by efflux of time became permanent and resumable and liable to resumption only on failure of male heirs of the original grantee. In the face of the strong documentary evidence of the custom alleged by the plaintiff, it is needless to comment at length on the oral evidence that was also given to prove custom. The Raja"s old servants all deposed to the existence of the custom and they stated specific cases of the resumption of some jagir villages that were within their knowledge and time, in addition to the cases to which the judgments filed relate. The case reported in 31 Cal. 561 is also a case of Chota Nagpur and is a much stronger case than the present. Thus the custom being fully established, all the ambiguity in the word "putrapoutradi" is removed, and it must be taken to mean lineal male descendants only."

The case in 31 Cal. 561, to which the Subordinate Judge referred was that of Perkash Lal v. Rameshwar Nath Singh [1904] 31 Cal. 561. In that case a proprietor of a Chota Nagpur Raj in a deed of gift had granted to a Brahmin and his al aulada, mouzah in pergunnah Kanda, and it was held by the High Court at Calcutta that although the words al aulad etymologically includes female as well as male descendants, yet according to a custom which was proved to have prevailed at the time of the grant, and subsequently in that part of the country, the words al aulad must be interpreted to mean lineal male descendants only. The learned Judges who decided that case in the High Court at Calcutta in 1904 referred in their judgment to a case in which the Deputy Commissioner of Chota Nagpur had decided in 1845 that a grant to a man and his putrapoutradi did not convey an estate of inheritance, and that the grantor was entitled to resume the lands granted on the death without issue of the grantee. The reference in the Subordinate Judge"s judgment to "Hunter" was without doubt a reference to Sir William Hunter"s Statistical Account of the districts of Hazaribagh and Lohardaga, which was printed in 1877. When he wrote that account he was Mr. W. W. Hunter, Director-General in India of Statistics, and at pages 121 and 122 of that work he gave a historical account of jagirs in Ramgarh. The Subordinate Judge gave to the plaintiff a decree for possession and for mesne-profits to be subsequently ascertained. From that decree the defendants appealed to the High Court at Calcutta.

The learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal as to the evidence said :

"There is evidence which may be summarised by saying that it shows that jagirs granted by the Raj were terminable on the death of male heirs, though there is no case to show that this was so when the words "putrapoutradi" were used."

They rightly held that the grant of a jagir without any words to show that it was not for life only would be a grant only for the life of the grantee, but they considered that the addition of putrapoutradi extended the estate for life. They said :

"The words literally translated are, as we understand, putra = son, poutra = grandson and adi - others, but the expression must of course, be construed in the first place, according to any construction that has been legally recognised."

As the Board had decided in Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State, (1881) 7 Cal. 304 = 8 I.A. 46 = 10 C.L.R. 349 = 5 Jur. 327 = 4 Sar. 225 (P.C.) that the words putrapoutradikrame, which occurred in a devise in a Bengali will, though importing the male sex in their primary signification, apply also to the female heir of a female where by law the estate would descend to such heirs, and were apt words for conferring an estate of inheritance upon either male or female, the learned Judges of the High Court considered that the term putrapoutradi in this jagir grant must be construed as conveying an estate of inheritance which would descend to collaterals of the grantee. They also referred to another decision of the Board in Lalit Mohun Singh v. Chukkun Lal, (1897) 24 Cal. 834 = 24 I.A. 76 = 1 C.W.N. 387 = 7 Sar. 155 (P.C.) which also was a case of a devise in a Bengali will and they allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. From that decree of the High Court this appeal has been brought.

There can be no doubt that a jagir must be taken prime facie to be an estate only for life, although it may possibly be granted in such terms as to make it hereditary. That was so decided by the Board in Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat, (1878) 3 Bom. 186 = 6 I.A. 54 = 3 Sar. 889 (P.C.) which was an appeal from the High Court at Bombay. But the terms which will make the grant of a jagir a grant of an estate of inheritance must, if they are to be considered alone, be terms which are not ambiguous, and must clearly show whether it was intended by the grantor that the right of inheritance should be general or should be confined to a particular class of heirs. In Dosibai v. Ishivardas (1891) 15 Bom. 222 = 18 I.A. 22 = 6 Sar. 10 = 15 Jur. 154 (P.C.) there was no ambiguity in the terms of the grant. In that case the Governor of Bombay in Council by a sanad in English, which was not ambiguous, had granted to Ardeser Bahadur "and his heirs for ever as jagir"" four villages, and the Board held that "where there is a grant to a man and his heirs, and nothing to control the ordinary meaning of the words, the grantee takes an absolute interest." In this case, now before this Board, the term putrapoutradi standing by itself, and without any evidence to show whether in Raj Ramgarh collaterals or females succeeded to jagirs is ambiguous. But the evidence shows that in Raj Ramgarh those who have succeeded to jagirs have been always males in the male line of the grantee.

The case of Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State (2) and Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat, (4) were not cases of grants of jagirs; they were cases of the construction of vernacular words in devises in Bengali wills, and it was obvious that the testators in employing terms, which usually in Bengal were understood as apt to pass an estate of inheritance, did employ them to pass such an estate. It may well be that in a grant of a jagir in Bengal by a Bengali similar words in the grant would imply that an estate of inheritance had been granted to the grantee if there was nothing to show a contrary intention. But there is nothing here to prove or even to suggest that the term putrapoutradi has ever been understood in Chota Nagpur or in Raj Ramgarh as including heirs collateral and there is no evidence that any one of the many jagirs which have been granted in Raj Ramgarh has ever descended to a collateral heir of the grantee. So much impressed was the Subordinate Judge by evidence, documentary and oral, that he came to the conclusion that there is a custom in Raj Ramgarh that jagirs are resumable on a failure of heirs male in the male line of the grantee.

In their Lordships" opinion the Subordinate Judge was justified in making the decree which he made in this case, and it should not have been set aside. They will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court should be set aside with costs, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.

Appeal allowed.