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Rajindra Bahadur Singh v. Rani Raghubans Kunwar
Structured Summary of the Opinion by Sir John Edge
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit arises from competing claims to the movable and immovable property of Balbhaddar Singh, who died on 12 December 1898. His widow, Rani Raghubans Kunwar, and his brother, Sheo Singh, each claimed entitlement to all of Balbhaddar Singh's property. The Court of Revenue initially made an order for the imitation of names in favour of Sheo Singh, and he obtained possession. Rani Raghubans Kunwar brought suit on 6 February 1900 for possession of all the movable and immovable property, alleging that Balbhaddar had been adopted by his uncle Girwar Singh and had succeeded under Girwar Singh's will. Sheo Singh denied the adoption, relied on an 1859 sanad to Gajraj Singh (and that the estate was impartible under family custom), and relied on a sanad of 1861 said to have been accepted by Girwar Singh.
The case was appealed to the Board in 1905. The Board decided several questions but advised remittal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, with power to remit to the Subordinate Judge, for inquiry on other questions (judgment reported at 32 I.A. 203). The Judicial Commissioner issued decrees on 4 March 1907 and 21 January 1909 resolving various outstanding points arising from the remittal. The present consolidated appeals challenge those decrees. The original parties have since died; the appeals concern the rights as they existed when the decrees were made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Girwar Singh could lawfully surrender the 1859 sanad (granted to Gajraj Singh) and accept the 1861 sanad, and whether the 1861 sanad could validly impose a rule of descent by primogeniture contrary to ordinary (Hindu) law.
- Whether Balbhaddar Singh was in fact adopted by Girwar Singh and therefore succeeded to the taluqa under Girwar Singh's will.
- Whether any family custom excluding females from inheritance was proved and, if established, whether it operated to exclude Rani Raghubans Kunwar.
- Which lands and properties held by Balbhaddar Singh at his death formed part of the taluqa Mahewa as constituted by the 1861 sanad (including "accretions" and properties appurtenant), and which were non-taluqdari (acquired privately by Balbhaddar) and therefore not subject to the primogeniture limitation in the 1861 sanad.
- Whether particular items — specified villages, a house at Sitapur, a house at Lucknow (Kaiser Bagh), and moveable property — were taluqdari or non-taluqdari and whom they passed to on Balbhaddar Singh's death.
- What precise variations, if any, should be made to the decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner dated 4 March 1907 and 21 January 1909.
Arguments of the Parties
Rani Raghubans Kunwar (Appellant in the 1905 appeal)
- Contended that Girwar Singh was not competent to surrender the 1859 sanad, because the Government had already granted the estate to Gajraj Singh by the 1859 sanad and thus had nothing left to grant in 1861.
- Argued that the Government had no power to create by the 1861 grant a rule of descent contrary to the ordinary law of the family (Hindu law), and therefore the primogeniture limitation in the 1861 sanad was invalid as against Hindu law.
Sheo Singh (Respondent in the original litigation)
- Asserted that the property appertained to taluqa Mahewa and was impartible, relying on family custom to exclude females from inheritance (the only custom he sought to prove).
- Maintained that succession to the taluqa was governed by section 22 of the Oudh Estates Act, under which a brother was entitled in priority to the widow.
- Relied on a sanad of 19 October 1859 granted to Gajraj Singh and later argued that a 1861 sanad had been accepted by Girwar Singh in substitution for the 1859 sanad.
- Denied that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by Girwar Singh.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sheo Singh v. Rani Raghubans Kunwar, reported (1903) 27 All. 634 = 32 I.A. 203 | The Board's 1905 judgment (reported at 32 I.A. 203) that Girwar Singh had surrendered the 1859 sanad and accepted the 1861 sanad; that the 1861 sanad contained an express condition of descent by primogeniture; and the Board's guidance limiting its principle explicitly to the taluqa as constituted at the date of the 1861 sanad (including accretions and appurtenant properties, if any). | The court relied on the Board's earlier judgment to (a) accept the legal effect of the 1861 sanad in respect of the taluqa as constituted in 1861, (b) apply the Board's instruction to remit questions about properties not clearly part of the sanad to enquiry by the Subordinate Judge, and (c) interpret and apply the Board's limitation of scope (i.e., that the 1861 principle applies to the taluqa and accretions but not indiscriminately to every property of the deceased). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages, applying legal principle to the factual findings remitted for inquiry:
- On capacity to surrender and grant: The court accepted the Board's earlier conclusion that Girwar Singh, being entitled by inheritance to what had passed under the 1859 sanad, was competent to surrender the 1859 sanad and accept the 1861 sanad in its place. The court also accepted the statutory backing for the validity of limitations in Crown grants: the Crown Grants Act, 1895, section 3 (quoted in the opinion) validates provisions and limitations in grants notwithstanding contrary rules of law.
- On scope of the 1861 sanad and meaning of "accretions": The court clarified that when the Board referred to "accretions" and "properties appurtenant" to the taluqa it was not limited to natural accretions by gradual action of water; rather, the Board's allowance included any property that had accreted to the taluqa since the date of the sanad if, on inquiry, it could be shown to be appurtenant to the original sanad estate. The Board had not had sufficient materials in 1905 to determine which properties beyond the original contents of the taluqa passed as part of it.
- On limits of a subject's power to restrict descent of his own acquisitions: Adopting and agreeing with the statement of Sir Edward Chamier as to settled law, the court held that a private subject cannot by private act make his property descendible in a manner not recognised by the ordinary law applicable to him (here Hindu law). Therefore, property acquired by Balbhaddar Singh personally could not be subjected by him to the primogeniture rule of the 1861 sanad (except where such property had been purchased from the Government in exchange for sanad lands — in which case the Government's transfer could validly attach the sanad's rule of descent).
- On classification of lands for purposes of descent: The court explained the task remitted to the Subordinate Judge: identify lands of which Balbhaddar died possessed that were (a) part of the taluqa as constituted on the date of the 1861 sanad (including bona fide accretions and properties appurtenant) and therefore subject to the primogeniture limitation; or (b) lands acquired by Balbhaddar privately (non-taluqdari) and therefore not subject to the 1861 limitation unless acquired from the Government in exchange.
- On the Subordinate Judge's reports and the Judicial Commissioner's decrees: The Subordinate Judge reported 166 villages: 108 were admitted as taluqdari; for the remaining 58, he allocated 27 to Sheo Singh and 31 to Rani Raghubans Kunwar. Objections were filed by each side. The Judicial Commissioner allowed some objections and overruled others, producing the decree of 4 March 1907. Their Lordships reviewed the persisted objections and accepted the Subordinate Judge's findings except where specifically varied; they concluded that Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur should be added to the list of villages for which Rani Raghubans Kunwar could maintain her decree and that no village should be struck out from the list established by the Judicial Commissioner's decree.
- On the houses and moveable property: The court held the Sitapur house to be non-taluqdari (acquired by Balbhaddar and never part of the 1861 grant). The Kaiser Bagh (Lucknow) house, although not included in the sanad of 1861, had been allotted by Government for use as the taluqdar's house (first to Girwar Singh, later to Balbhaddar) and the court inferred that the right to possession passed, as taluqdar use, to the successor in the taluqdari and not to the widow. The moveable property of Balbhaddar Singh was held not to be subject to the 1861 primogeniture limitation and therefore passed to his widow, Rani Raghubans Kunwar.
- On limits of advisory power: Because the original parties had died (Rani Raghubans Kunwar in 1910; Thakur Rajindra Bahadur Singh, representative of Sheo Singh, died in 1912), their Lordships stated they could only advise His Majesty as to the rights of the parties as they existed when the decrees under appeal were made and were not in a position to tender advice as to subsequent or present entitlements beyond those dates.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Their Lordships advised that the decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner be varied and, as varied, affirmed:
- The decree dated 4 March 1907 should be varied by adding the villages Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur to the list of villages in respect of which Rani Raghubans Kunwar was entitled to maintain her decree for possession.
- The decree dated 21 January 1909 should be varied by decreeing that Rani Raghubans Kunwar's suit be dismissed so far as it related to her claim for possession of the house at Lucknow (Kaiser Bagh).
- As so varied, the decrees were to be affirmed as of their original dates and to have effect as to the rights of the parties who were concerned at those dates and of those claiming under them.
- No costs of these consolidated appeals between the parties were to be allowed.
Implications: The direct effects on the parties (as of the dates of the decrees) are: additions and adjustments to the list of villages in the 1907 decree in favour of Rani Raghubans Kunwar, dismissal of her claim to the Lucknow house, confirmation that moveable property passed to the widow, and confirmation that the Sitapur house was non-taluqdari. The court reiterated the legal principle that the Crown may validly impose limitations in grants (as reinforced by the Crown Grants Act, 1895) but that a private subject cannot unilaterally impose a rule of descent on property he acquired that is contrary to the ordinary law applicable to him. The opinion did not purport to create a new general precedent beyond its application to the facts remitted for inquiry, and the court expressly limited its advice to the rights as they existed at the dates of the contested decrees.
Disposition: Decrees varied and, as varied, affirmed.
Sir John Edge :-
The suit in which these consolidated appeals have arisen Crime on appeal before the Board in 1905. The Board which heard the appeal finally decided several important questions which were in dispute between the parties, but did not finally dispose of some other questions which related to portions of the property which were in dispute in the suit, and in respect of the questions which were not then finally decided advised His Majesty that these questions should be remanded to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh with power to that Court to remit the case to the Court of the Subordinate Judge for inquiry. The judgment of the Board is reported in 32 I. A. 203. [Sheo Singh Raghubans Kunwar, (1903) 27 All. 634 = 32 I. A., 203 = 9 C.W.N. 1009 = 2 C.L.J., 194 = 15 M. L. J., 352 = 8 O. C. 317 (P. C.)]. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner made on the 4th of March, 1907, a decree which dealt with some of the questions in dispute, and on the 21st of January, 1909, a further decree which dealt with the remaining questions in dispute, and from those decrees these consolidated appeals have been brought. The original parties to the suit are dead, and to understand the position of the parties to these consolidated appeals it is advisable to state, so far as it is material for the purpose, the pedigree of the family, to which they belong, so far as it has been proved or admitted in this litigation. The members of the family are Hindus.
The property to which the suit related was property, moveable and immoveable, of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed on the 12th December, 1898. On his death his widow Rani Raghubans Kunwar and his brother Sheo Singh each claimed adversely to the other all the property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed. The Court of Revenue made an order for the imitation of names in favour of Sheo Singh, and he obtained possession of all the property, moveable and immoveable. Rani Raghubans Kunwar, on the 6th of February, 1900, brought this suit against Sheo Singh for possession of all the movable and immovable property. She alleged that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by his uncle Girwar Singh and that Girwar Singh had by his will devised all his property to Balbhaddar Singh, who had enjoyed it until his death. Her suit was resisted by Sheo Singh, who alleged that all the property claimed by her appertained to taluqa Mahewa and was impartible; that by a custom in the family females were excluded from the inheritance; that the succession to the taluqa was governed by section 22 of the Oudh Estates Act (1 of 1869), under which he claimed that a brother was entitled in priority to the widow; and he denied that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by Girwar Singh. Sheo Singh relied upon a sanad of the 19th of October, 1859, by which the Government had granted taluqa Mahewa to Gajraj Singh and his heirs without other limitation of the line of inheritance. At some period of the litigation a copy of a sanad, which was granted by the Government to Girwar Singh in 1861 was produced, and the Board in 1905 held that the copy was admissible in evidence, and that Girwar Singh had in fact surrendered to the Government the sanad which had been granted to Gajraj Singh in 1859 and the estate which had been granted by it, and in lieu of that sanad had accepted the sanad of 1861. The sanad of 1861 said expressly:-
"It is another condition of this grant that in the event of your dying intestate, or of any of your successors dying intestate, the estate shall descend to the nearest male heir according to the rule of primogeniture."
The Courts in India had held that the sanad of 1861 could not in law operate to substitute the line of descent, prescribed by it, for the line of descent prescribed by the earlier sanad of 1859, and having found that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by Girwar Singh and had succeeded to Taluqa Mahewa under the will of Girwar Singh, and that the alleged custom excluding females from the inheritance had not been proved, gave Rani Raghubans Kunwar a decree for possession. That alleged custom excluding females from inheritance was the only custom of the family which Sheo Singh attempted to prove.
In the appeal which came before the Board in 1905 from the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner it was contended on behalf of Rani Raghubans Kunwar that Girwar Singh was not competent to surrender to the Government the sanad of 1859; that the Government, having granted by the sanad of 1859 the estate to Gajraj Singh and his heirs, had nothing left to grant to Girwar Singh in 1861; and further, that the Government had no power to create by the grant of 1861 an estate descending by any rule of inheritance that was contrary to the ordinary law, which, as the family were Hindus, was the Hindu law. The Board, however, held that Girwar Singh, being entitled by inheritance to everything that had passed to Gajraj Singh under the sanad of 1859, was competent to surrender the sanad of 1859 and to accept instead of it the sanad of 1861, and had surrendered the sanad of 1859 and the estate which had passed under it, and that the Government was competent to grant the sanad of 1861. As to the contention that the Government had no power to grant to a Hindu, as it did by the sanad of 1861, an estate which should descend on an intestacy to the nearest male heir according to the rule of primogeniture their Lordships said :-
"Whatever force such a contention might otherwise have had appears to their Lordships to be removed by the Act to which their attention was called, 'The Crown Grants Act, 1895,' (Act XV of 1895). That Act, recites, amongst other things, that, doubts have arisen as to the power of the Crown to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers made by it or under its authority, and it is expedient to remove such doubts. And section 3 enacts that-
"All provisions, restrictions, conditions, and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer, as aforesaid, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute, or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding."
"When the appeal was being argued before the Board in 1905 the arguments addressed to their Lordships related only to the right to the possession of taluqa Mahewa on the death of Balbhaddar Singh, and it appears to have been overlooked by counsel during the arguments that the appeal also related to other property which was alleged to have been acquired by Balbhaddar Singh, and which had not formed part of the property granted by the sanad of 1861. Before the judgment of the Board was delivered in 1905 the attention of their Lordships was drawn by counsel to the fact that the appeal also related to such other property. In the judgment of 1905 their Lordships consequently said:-
"The present appeal relates mainly to taluqa Mahewa, and the argument before their Lordships dealt only with it. The principle adopted in this judgment only applies to that taluqa, including, of course, any property that may have accreted to it since the date of the sanad under which it is held. It has been pointed out by counsel that the suit out of which the appeal arises related, also to property said to have been acquired apart from the taluqa. It seems clear that their Lordships have not materials before them to enable them to define what property (if any) other than the original contents of the taluqa now passes as part of it."
Their Lordships held that taluqa Mahewa, as constituted at the date of the sanad of 1861, with accretions (if any) or properties (if any) appurtenant to the taluqa, had, on the death of Balbhaddar Singh, passed in accordance with the limitations of that sanad to Sheo Singh as the next male heir according to the rule of primogeniture, and humbly advised His Majesty to make:-
"a declaration that the taluqa Mahewa, as constituted at the date of the sanad, with accretions (if any) or properties (if any) appurtenant to the taluqa, has passed to the appellant, and that as to any other property of the deceased the decrees of the Courts below are not affected, and to order that it be left to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, if it be found that there is real controversy on the point, either itself to determine what property falls under one category and what under the other, or to remit the case for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and to order that, so far as may be necessary to give effect to the first part of the foregoing declaration, the decrees of the Courts below ought to be discharged and the suit dismissed."
That declaration was made by the Order in Council, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner remitted the case for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge.
The Court of the Subordinate Judge made two reports, one relating to the villages in dispute, and the other to a house at Sitapur, a house at Lucknow, and moveable property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed. Objections which were taken to each of those reports came at different dates before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and from the decrees of that Court made upon those reports these consolidated appeals have been brought.
Some of the learned Judges of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner misunderstood what their Lordships meant in 1905 by the terms "accretions" and "properties appurtenant" to taluqa Mahewa. Their Lordships obviously did not mean to limit accretions to land which had gradually and imperceptibly by the action of water gone to the owner of the adjacent soil. No accretion of that nature had apparently been suggested by the parties to the suit. What was suggested was that Balbhaddar Singh had acquired property by the purchase and had added it to the estate which had been granted by the sanad of 1861 to Girwar Singh. The facts were not before their Lordships in 1905 which would have enabled them to decide whether any lands had accreted to taluqa Mahewa as it was constituted at the date of that sanad. The Crown has in British India power to grant or to transfer lands, and by its grant, or on the transfer, to limit in any way it pleases the descent of such lands. But a subject has no right to impose upon lands or other property any limitation of descent which is at variance with the ordinary law of descent of property applicable in his case. Sir Edward Chamier, then Mr. Chamier, Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, in his judgment on some objections taken to one of the reports of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, correctly stated the law in this respect as to the power of a subject, thus :-
"I take at that is settled law that a subject cannot make his property descendible in a manner not recognised by the ordinary law, and that be cannot subject it to a rule of descent such as is contained in the primogeniture sanad granted to Girwar Singh. If this is so, it appears to me to follow that Balbhaddar Singh could not by express declaration, still less by mere volition whether actual or presumed, subject property acquired by him to the rule of succession entered in the primogeniture sanad granted to Girwar Singh."
With that statement as to the law their Lordships agree. It follows that in ascertaining what were the lands claimed by Rani Raghubans Kunwar in respect of which her suit was not dismissed in 1905, it must be ascertained what were the lands of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed which were acquired by him and did not form part of taluqa Mahewa as it was constituted at the date of the sanad of 1861, and were not lands acquired by him from the Government in exchange for lands which were included in that sanad. The Government had power to give to Balbhaddar Singh in exchange for sanad lands other lands which had not been granted to Girwar Singh in 1861, and the lands so acquired by him in exchange would be subject to the rule of descent prescribed in the sanad of 1861.
By the sanad of 1861 the Government granted to Girwar Singh "the full proprietary right, title, and possession of taluqa Mahewa, consisting of the villages as per list attached to the Kabulyat you have executed," subject to the payment of rent and the other conditions in the sanad mentioned. The estate which was granted to Girwar Singh in 1861 was the same estate which had been granted to Gajraj Singh in 1859 and had been surrendered to the Government by Girwar Singh. Unfortunately neither the Kabulyat which was executed by Girwar Singh in 1861 nor the Kabutyat which was executed by Gajraj Singh in 1859 has been found, but the lands granted in 1861 were lands of which the Government was then in a position to grant "the full proprietary right and title" to Girwar Singh.
When the case was remitted for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, that Court reported that of the 166 villages for which Rani Raghubans Kunwar had obtained her decree, which was the subject of the appeal in 1905, there was no controversy as to 108 of them; it was admitted that the 108 villages were taluqdari villages, that is, that they were villages which were included in the sanad of 1861. As to the remaining 58 villages the Subordinate Judge reported that Sheo Singh was entitled to 27 specified villages, and that Rani Raghubans Kunwar was entitled to 31 villages, which also were specified in the report. Rani Raghubans Kunwar filed objections to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to 19 of the 27 villages which the Subordinate Judge had reported to be taluqdari villages, and on the other side objections were filed as to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to the 31 villages which he had reported to be non-taluqdari villages, that is, villages not covered by the sanad of 1861.
On the consideration of the report the Court of the Judicial Commissioner allowed the objections of Rani Raghubans Kunwar to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to Chak Sarkhanpur, Chak Simri, and one-half of Hasanpur, and held that they were non-taluqdari; and, on the other hand, allowed the objections to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to Sarkhanpur, Marhuna, Puraina, and Patti, Bhupatpur and held that they were taluqdari villages, and over rules all the other objections, and made the decree of the 4th of March, 1907, which is one of the decrees now under appeal.
Their Lordships will now deal with the appeals in which the title to the villages is disputed before them. They will consider only those cases in which it appears from the record that the objections to the report of the Subordinate Judge which had been filed were persisted in by one or other of the parties in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. It must be taken that the findings of the Subordinate Judge were correct in all those cases in which the objections to his findings were not supported in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner Here their Lordships discussed the case of several villages and concluded as follows :-
The result of their Lordships view as to the villages is that to the list of villages set out in the decree of the 4th of March, 1907, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, in respect of which Rani Raghubans Kunwar was entitled to maintain her decree for possession, the villages Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur should be added, and that no village should be struck out of that list.
Their Lordships will now consider the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the 21st of January, 1909, which was made on the hearing of the objections which were filed to the report of the Subordinate Judge which dealt with disputes as to a house in Sitapur, a house in Lucknow, and the moveable property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed.
The house in Sitapur was acquired by Balbhaddar Singh, and never at any time was part of the taluqdari estate which was granted to Girwar Singh by the sanad of 1861. It is non-taluqdari.
The house in the Kaiser Bagh at Lucknow. The right to the possession of this house does not depend upon the sanad of 1861, which was granted to Girwar Singh upon the surrender by him to the Government of the sanad of 1859, which had been granted to Gajraj Singh. The house in the Kaiser Bagh was not included in the sanad of 1861. It is common ground that a house in the Kaiser Bagh was allotted by the Government to Girwar Singh in 1864 or 1865 for his use as the taluqdar of taluqa Mahewa. That house was demolished when the Canning College was built, and in place of it another house, the house now in dispute, was allotted by the Government to Balbhaddar Singh for his use as the taluqdar of the taluqa Mahewa. No sanad relating to the house has been produced, nor has it been proved that any sanad relating to the house was granted. But it may be inferred from the fact that the house was allotted to Balbhaddar Singh for his we as taluqdar of Mahewa that such right to possession of it as he had passed, not to his widow; but to his successor in the taluqdari of Mahewa.
The moveable property of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed was not subject to the limitation of descent which was by the sanad of 1861 prescribed for the villages which were included in that sanad, and passed on his death to his widow, Rani Raghubans Kunwar.
The decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, dated the 21st of January, 1909, should be varied by decreeing that the suit of Rani Raghubans Kunwar should stand dismissed so far as her suit related to her claim for the possession of the house at Lucknow.
Thakur Rajindra Bahadur Singh, who was brought upon the record as the representative of his late father, Sheo Singh, died in 1912, and Rani Raghubans Kunwar died in 1910, and their Lordships have been much pressed to advise His Majesty as to who is now entitled to the property other than taluqa Mahewa as it was constituted at the date of the grant of 1861, in respect of which Rani Raghubans Kunwar brought her suit in 1900 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur, but their Lordships are not in a position to tender such advice, and can only advise His Majesty as to the rights of the parties as they existed at the time when the decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner now under appeal were made.
Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the 4th of March, 1907, should be varied by adding to the list of villages set forth in that decree the villages Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur, and that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the 21st of January, 1909, should be varied by decreeing that the suit of Rani Raghubans Kunwar should stand dismissed so far as her suit related to her claim for possession of the house at Lucknow, and that so varied those decrees should be affirmed as of the dates when they were made respectively by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and should have effect accordingly as to the rights of the parties who were concerned at those respective dates and of those claiming under them. No costs of these consolidated appeals as between the parties to them shall be allowed.
Decree varied.
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