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Himatlal J. Vakharia v. Urban Land Tribunal And Another

Gujarat High Court
Sep 29, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was the holder of vacant land in the Rajkot urban agglomeration. He submitted a form under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, and a final statement under Section 9 was issued on September 30, 1979. Although the petitioner had described his land as Survey No. 489, the final statement contained a typographical error listing the land as Survey No. 89. That clerical mistake was corrected by an order dated February 24, 1984 under Section 45 of the Act. The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 33 on March 26, 1984, contending that limitation should run from the correction order (Feb. 24, 1984) and thus the appeal was within time.

The Urban Land Appellate Tribunal held that the prescribed period of limitation began on the date of the original final statement (Sept. 30, 1979) and not from the date of the correction order, and it rejected the appeal on the ground of delay by order dated Nov. 12, 1984. The petitioner challenged the Tribunal's order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The record shows that the petitioner had consented to the original order, had himself expedited proceedings, applied for permission under Section 26 to sell part of the land and obtained such permission, and did not object when the correction was made. The petitioner also knew that the land he held was Survey No. 489 and not Survey No. 89.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the starting point of limitation in cases where an order passed by the competent authority is corrected under Section 45 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 — i.e., does limitation start from the date of the original order or from the date of the correction?
  2. Whether the petitioner has shown "sufficient cause" to condone the inordinate delay in filing the appeal despite the correction under Section 45 (in light of the Supreme Court's approach to "sufficient cause").

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The period of limitation for filing the appeal should be computed from February 24, 1984 (the date when the clerical mistake in the final statement was corrected under Section 45), not from September 30, 1979 (the date of the original final statement).
  • The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353) to urge that the phrase "sufficient cause" be interpreted liberally and that he should be granted condonation to argue the appeal on merits.

Urban Land Appellate Tribunal / Respondent's Position (as recorded)

  • The Tribunal held that the prescribed period of limitation began on September 30, 1979, the date of the original final statement, because the correction under Section 45 did not substitute or materially alter the original order.
  • The Tribunal found a gross delay in preferring the appeal and, since the petitioner had consented to and taken advantage of the original order (including applying for and obtaining permission under Section 26), there was no sufficient cause to condone delay; therefore the appeal was rejected on the ground of delay alone.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suba Singh v. Sadhu Singh, AIR 1966 Punjab 518 That correction of a clerical error under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code does not supersede the original judgment or decree; the court is duty-bound to rectify clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips or omissions; the same principle applies to Section 45 of the Urban Land Act. The court relied on this authority to conclude that the correction under Section 45 merely removed a clerical mistake and did not create a new order that would start a fresh limitation period; hence limitation runs from the original order (Sept. 30, 1979).
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 That the phrase "sufficient cause" (for condoning delay) should be interpreted liberally; the Supreme Court's approach widens the scope of what may constitute sufficient cause. The court acknowledged this principle but held that the present case was an exception where even the broad approach to "sufficient cause" did not assist the petitioner, because the petitioner had consented to and taken advantage of the original order and failed to show bona fide reason for delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by quoting Section 45 of the Urban Land Act, which authorizes correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in orders at any time, either on the authority's own motion or on application of a party. The court observed that Section 45 is in pari materia with Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The court explained the legal import of these correction provisions: their object is to remove clerical or accidental slips so that the true intention of the authority or court is properly reflected. Crucially, the court emphasized that when a clerical mistake is corrected under such a provision, the correction does not supersede or replace the original order nor does it materially alter the substance of that order; it merely removes an apparent anomaly caused by the error.

Relying on the Division Bench decision in Suba Singh v. Sadhu Singh, the court reasoned that the same principle applicable under Section 152 CPC applies to Section 45 of the Urban Land Act. Applying that legal principle to the facts — where the petitioner had himself described his land as Survey No. 489, had expedited proceedings, had consented to the final statement, had applied for and obtained permission under Section 26, and had not objected to the clerical error when it was corrected — the court concluded that the correction on February 24, 1984 did not create a new cause of action or a fresh point from which limitation should run.

Consequently, the court held that the cause for filing an appeal was the original order and the limitation period began on September 30, 1979. The court further examined the petitioner's contention invoking the liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" from Anantnag v. Katiji, but found that the petitioner had not shown any plausible explanation for the delay measured from the original order. The petitioner's conduct in taking advantage of the original order and the absence of any bona fide grievance (or any contention that the typographical error misled him) led the court to conclude that the petitioner did not merit condonation of delay even under a liberal approach.

The court therefore upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the appeal was barred by limitation and that there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the petition and upheld the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal's rejection of the appeal on the ground of delay. The court held that the limitation period commenced from the date of the original final statement (September 30, 1979), not from the date of correction under Section 45 (February 24, 1984). The petition is dismissed; notice discharged and any interim relief earlier granted was vacated.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the petitioner's challenge failed; the Tribunal's order rejecting the appeal as barred by limitation was sustained, and the petitioner lost the opportunity to have the appeal heard on merits because no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was found.
  • Broader implication: the court applied established principles that corrections of clerical mistakes under Section 45 do not create new orders or restart limitation; the opinion did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of this case.

End of summary. This summary is restricted to and derived solely from the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. Which is the starting point of limitation in cases wherein an order passed by the Competent Authority is corrected under the provisions of S. 45 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976? This, in short, is the question which calls for examination and answer.

2. The petitioner is holder of vacant land situated in the urban agglomeration area of Rajkot. In respect of the land held by him, the petitioner filled in form under S. 6 of the Act and thereafter final statement under S. 9 of the Act was issued on Sept., 30, 1979. The petitioner in fact consented and thereafter the final statement was issued. In the final statement, instead of Survey No. 489, by mistake Survey No. 89 was mentioned. The mistake was corrected as per order dt. Feb., 24, 1984. The petitioner preferred appeal under S. 33 of the Act on March 26, 1984. The petitioner contended that the appeal was within time because the starting point of limitation should be Feb., 24, 1984 and not Sept., 30, 1979 when the original order was passed. After considering the facts of the case, the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal held that there was gross delay in filing the appeal. The prescribed period of limitation started from Sept., 30, 1979, the date on which the final statement was issued and not from the order dt. Feb., 24, 1984, correcting the mistake. That the original order was passed with the consent of the parties and there was no justifiable reason to condone the delay. Hence, the appellate authority rejected the appeal on the ground of delay alone, as per its order dt. Nov. 12, 1984. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order by invoking the provisions of Art. 227 of the Constitution.

3. Be it noted that the petitioner knew and also understood that he held the land of Survey No. 489 of Rajkot and not that of S. No. 89. The petitioner had filled in the form mentioning therein that the land held by him was that of S. No. 489. The petitioner did not hold any land of S. No. 89. The petitioner in fact applied for permission under S. 26 of the Act for sale of the land. It was at the request of and by the consent of the petitioner that the proceedings under S. 6 of the Act were hastened and the final statement under S. 9 of the Act was passed with the consent of the petitioner. In the form, the petitioner described the land retainable by him. Therein the petitioner mentioned that he wanted to retain land of S. No. 489. However, typographical error crept in the final statement, in respect of land and instead of S. No. 489 it was written S. No. 89. The mistake remained as it is till the same was corrected as per Order dt Feb. 24, 1984. Meanwhile the petitioner took advantage of the order passed by the competent authority. He even obtained permission for sale of the land under S. 26 of the Act. It appears that at the stage when Notifications under S. 10 were issued, the mistake was detected and the same was sought to be corrected. The petitioner did not even raise objections when the mistake was corrected. In this connection, the Tribunal has observed as follows:—

“The clerical error in showing the suit land as Survey No. “89” in the Draft Statement was not objected to by the appellant and the said error has been corrected under S. 45.”

The aforesaid statement of fact which occurs in para 7 of the judgment of the Tribunal is neither disputed nor controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The only point raised at the time of hearing of the petition is that if the period of limitation is calculated from the date of the order correcting the mistake, then the appeal is within time. In his submission, the period of limitation should start from the date of the order directing correction to be made in the original order.

4. S. 45 of the Act reads as follows:—

“S. 45. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in any order passed by any officer or authority under this Act or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by such officer or authority either on his or its own motion or on an application received in this behalf from any of the parties.”

The aforesaid section is in pari materia with S. 152 of the C.P.C, 1908. The underlying object behind making provisions of S. 45 of the Act is to see that whenever on account of clerical or arithmetical mistake intention of the authority is left in doubt or not properly articulated, the same should be corrected. Rather it is the duty of the authority concerned to rectify the clerical error arising from an accidental slip or omission. When such mistakes are corrected, the original order passed by the authority is not replaced or superseded nor the same is materially altered by correction of mistake. All that is done by the authority is that the apparent anomaly arising out of error or mistake is removed. But the substance of the judgment or order originally passed remains the same. Different considerations may arise when an order is reviewed and ai the end of review proceedings, if a new judgment or order comes into existence superseding the original one. But that is not the case insofar as the facts of this matter are concerned.

5. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of Suba Singh v. Sadhu Singh, reported in AIR 1966 Punjab 518. After considering the case law on the point in para 16 of the judgment, it is observed that correction of a mistake or an error under the provisions of S. 152 of C.P Code does not supersede the original judgment or decree. All that the Court does is to rectify a clerical error arising from an accidental slip or omission and it is the duty of the Court to correct it whenever it comes to its notice or is brought to its notice by any of the parties. In case the intention of the Court is quite clear and if by some clerical error or omission that intention is left in doubt or is not properly effectuated then use can be made of the powers under S. 152 of the C.P.C and indeed the Court is bound to correct such errors or mistakes which fall within the ambit of S. 152 of Civil Procedure Code. Same principle would apply in cases falling within the perview of S. 45 of the Act.

6. In above view of the matter, it has got to be held that the subsequent order correcting the mistake instead of “S. No. 89” mentioning “S. No. 489” was within the perview of S. 45 of the Act and by correcting the mistake the competent authority did not supersede the original order nor did the authority alter the order in any manner. But it merely removed the clerical mistake which was even not objected to by the petitioner. Thus, cause for filing appeal remained the same, that is, the original order. Therefore it has got to be held that the limitation started to run from the date of the original order, i.e, Sept., 30, 1979.

7. Except the aforesaid argument, no cause much less “sufficient cause” for condoning such inordinate delay is made out. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 and submitted that the phrase “sufficient cause” should be interpreted liberally. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it should be held that the petitioner did not intend to give up his right of appeal and he should be given an opportunity to agitate the appeal on merits. After the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it would be difficult to discover a case which would not come within the sweep of “sufficient cause” as enunciated by the Supreme Court. But this is one of such rarest of rare cases which would not come within the sweep of widest possible meaning of the phrase “sufficient cause” as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. The petitioner filled in the form mentioning therein that the land held by him was that of S. No. 489. The petitioner in fact did not hold any land bearing S. No. 89. The petitioners consented to the order being passed by the competent authority under S. 9 of the Act. In fact the petitioner hastened up the proceedings. The petitioner applied under S. 26 of the Act for sale of the land. He even submitted indemnity bond for the purpose of selling away part of the land retainable by him. Thus he had no grievance against the order passed by the competent authority. It is not the case of the petitioner that he had no grievance against the order because it contained typographical error and that he was also misled by the error.

8. From the facts and circumstances of the case an irresistible inference has to be drawn that the petitioner wishes to take advantage of the mistake which had crept in the original order dt. 30, 1979 and which has been corrected as per order dt. Feb., 24, 1984. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is difficult to belive that the petitioner did not know nor did he understand that the land comprised in the order dt. Sept. 30, 1979 was that of S. No. 489 and not that of S. No. 89. By order dt. Feb. 24, 1984, merely a typographical mistake has been corrected and the original order remains as it is. In view of this position, the petitioner should have rendered sufficient explanation for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation against the order passed on Sept., 30, 1979. There is no explanation for not preferring appeal within limitation calculated from the date of original order. Hence, the only inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner after taking advantage of the order passed on Sept. 30, 1979 wishes to get reopened the entire case. The petitioner's action lacks bona fide and honesty. Therefore, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court do not help the petitioner. The Urban Land Appellate Tribunal was justified in rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay alone.

9. No other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petition. Hence, the petition is rejected. Notice discharged. Ad interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.

Petition dismissed.