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Sonubai v. Shivajirao Krishnarao Gopalrao Gaikwad
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns two applications (No. 302 of 1919 and No. 303 of 1919) by Sonubai (the widow and legal representative of the deceased plaintiff Baburao) to set aside orders of this Court dated 28 February 1916 that dismissed an appeal and rejected an application under the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction for default under Order XLI, Rule 17, and to re-admit the appeal and the application.
Relevant events and procedural steps appearing in the opinion:
- Suit No. 410 of 1911: Baburao sued in the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Poona for partition and to recover his half share of a valuable joint family property against Krishnarao. The estate was alleged to be large (Baburao valued his half at Rs. 18,72,005).
- Suit No. 359 of 1912: Gangaram (another co-parcener) sued for one-third share on behalf of himself and his minor son; he valued one-third at about Rs. 9,79,000.
- The opinion records that Baburao died during the pendency of his suit; the opinion contains differing date references for his death (one paragraph records "Baburao died in June 1918," while another records the date as 10 June 1913).
- On 10 September 1913 the Subordinate Judge held that the right to sue did not survive and ordered Baburao's suit to abate; an appeal (No. 158 of 1914) and an extraordinary-jurisdiction application (No. 288 of 1913) were filed on behalf of the infant widow Sonubai by her next friend (her father) through a pleader, Mr. Vidvans.
- Mr. Vidvans died in May 1915; a notice of his death was served on Sonubai's next friend but he did not appear or prosecute. On 28 February 1916 the appeal was dismissed for default under Order XLI, Rule 17, and the extraordinary-jurisdiction application was rejected for default.
- Sonubai attained majority on 21 February 1919, and on 11 March 1919 she applied to discharge the orders dismissing the appeal and rejecting the extraordinary-jurisdiction application and to re-admit them.
- The applications are opposed by the present opponent (the minor son of Krishnarao, represented by his mother and guardian Banubai). A preliminary objection was taken that the applications are barred by limitation (Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act).
- Gangaram's suit mentioned above was ultimately decreed and that decree is under appeal to this Court by Sonubai; the trial Court in that suit held that Sonubai was debarred from claiming her husband's share because of the order of abatement in Baburao's suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act bars Sonubai's application to discharge the orders dismissing the appeal and rejecting the extraordinary-jurisdiction application for default.
- Whether the Court has power, apart from Order XLI, Rule 19, to re-admit appeals or applications dismissed for default by exercising its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the alleged incapacity (insanity) or negligence of Sonubai's next friend (her father) during her minority is a sufficient ground to discharge the orders made for default and to re-admit the appeal and application in the interests of justice.
- Whether the circumstances and the prima facie merits of the underlying claim justify exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent loss of substantial property rights of a formerly-minor litigant.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (Sonubai)
- Her next friend (her father) was an old man who had been insane for nearly five years and was therefore not in a position to act for her as next friend or guardian at the date of the order dismissing the appeal or at the date notice of the pleader's death was served.
- She applied promptly on attaining majority (within a month) to discharge the orders and re-admit the proceedings, alleging inability of her next friend to act and asking the Court to exercise its powers to prevent loss of sizeable property rights.
- Affidavits were filed in support of the allegations regarding her father's incapacity (insanity) and his failure to act.
Opponent / Respondent (represented by Mr. Bhandarkar; on the record Banubai as guardian of the minor respondent)
- Preliminary objection: the application is barred by Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act and the minority of Sonubai does not excuse the delay; therefore the applications should not be entertained.
- It is asserted on the opponent's behalf that Sonubai's father was competent to act and did act in Gangaram's suit as her guardian.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Somayya v. Subbamma | Interpretation of corresponding provision in earlier Code (Code of 1882) showing difference between a rule for re-admission and the Court's inherent powers. | Used to support the proposition that Rule-based re-admission (e.g., Order XLI, Rule 19) does not exhaust the Court's inherent powers to set aside orders for default. |
| Lalta Prasad v. Ram Karan | Same view as in Somayya v. Subbamma concerning the meaning and scope of the corresponding rule (Order IX, Rule 9 in that context). | Relied upon to buttress the distinction between statutory rules and inherent powers in relation to setting aside defaults. |
| Cursandas Natha v. Ladkavahu | Shows that a minor, upon attaining majority, can sue to have a decree set aside on ground of fraud or negligence of his next friend or guardian. | Invoked to indicate that minors are entitled to remedies after attaining majority where their representatives' conduct prejudiced their rights, supporting the availability of relief against default orders. |
| Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramnandan Dobey | Authority allowing a minor, on attaining majority, to sue despite an order dismissing suit for default during minority (section 102 context); supports relief where next friend's default prejudices minor's rights. | Used to show that the minor's remedy is not limited to a fresh suit and that the Court can assist in setting aside default orders in appropriate cases. |
| Ranee Birjobuttee v. Pertaub Sing | Supports view that in a proper case the Court may re-admit an appeal or application in the exercise of its inherent powers for the ends of justice. | Relied upon as precedent for exercising inherent jurisdiction to re-admit appeals dismissed for default where justice requires. |
| Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah | Shows principles on which the Privy Council and courts permit relief using inherent powers in appropriate cases to prevent injustice. | Applied to justify exercise of the Court's inherent powers in the present case to avoid a result that would otherwise unfairly deprive the former infant of property rights. |
| Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain (Privy Council, Dec. 1912) | Observations regarding the question of severance of interests (relevant to merits of partition/severance claims). | The Court said these observations would have to be considered on the merits and that prima facie merits, including these observations, could be taken into account when deciding whether the ends of justice require relief from default. |
| Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty (Full Bench, Madras High Court, Oct. 1915) | Decision on the effect of the Privy Council's observations (referred to in Suraj Narain) regarding severance of interests. | The Court noted that it might, in considering the prima facie merits of the appeal for ends of justice, take a view consistent with the Madras Full Bench's approach to those Privy Council observations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Overview
The Court considered two interrelated questions: (1) whether Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act barred the applications to discharge the orders for default, and (2) whether the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could re-admit the appeal and the extraordinary-jurisdiction application despite the statutory limitation applicable to applications under Order XLI, Rule 19.
Reasoning by Shah, J.
- On limitation (Article 168) — Shah, J. accepted that Article 168 plainly applies to applications for re-admission under Order XLI, Rule 19 (and that section 6 of the Limitation Act would not ordinarily save such an application made long after dismissal). If the Court's powers were confined to Rule 19, the preliminary objection based on Article 168 would succeed.
- On inherent powers (section 151) — Shah, J. held that Rule 19 is not exhaustive of the Court's power to re-admit appeals or applications dismissed for default. The Court has inherent powers under section 151 to set aside orders for default for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. Such inherent powers are not subject to the statutory period of limitation which governs Rule 19 applications; however, delay remains a relevant factor when exercising those inherent powers.
- On authority — Shah, J. relied on earlier decisions (including cases cited in the opinion) to show that minors who attain majority can seek relief where their next friend or guardian's fraud or negligence resulted in loss; therefore, it is open to the Court to employ inherent powers to assist such a minor, particularly where the next friend failed to act.
- On the facts — The Court accepted that Sonubai had applied promptly on attaining majority. The allegations that her father was incapacitated by dementia and failed to act could not be conclusively decided on the existing affidavits but, taken with the surrounding circumstances, warranted relief: the father had failed to prosecute an appeal that affected rights to a very large estate and had not taken steps after the pleader's death to appoint another pleader. Shah, J. treated that failure as indicating either inability or negligence.
- On prima facie merits — Shah, J. considered it permissible to take into account the prima facie merits of the appeal (including relevant authorities such as the Privy Council's observations in Suraj Narain and the Madras Full Bench's decision in Soundararajan) when deciding whether the ends of justice require exercise of inherent powers. He emphasized that doing so did not amount to prejudging the appeal's merits but was proper in deciding whether to re-admit the appeal.
- Conclusion — After weighing the seriousness of the prejudice to the former infant's rights, the promptness of her application upon attaining majority, the alleged incapacity/negligence of her next friend, and the prima facie merits, Shah, J. concluded the Court should discharge the default orders, re-admit the appeal and the extraordinary-jurisdiction application, and allow Sonubai to prosecute them. He would make the rules absolute and order Sonubai to pay the opponent's costs in both applications.
Reasoning by Crump, J.
- Factual framing — Crump, J. set out the procedural facts more succinctly (including a specific date presented for Baburao's death: 10 June 1913) and noted the appeal was dismissed for default on 28 February 1916; Sonubai attained majority on 21 February 1919 and moved to re-admit on 11 March 1919 under Order XLI, Rule 19.
- On insanity of next friend — Crump, J. held that a person of unsound mind cannot act as a next friend (citing Order XXXII, Rule 4). Where a next friend is of unsound mind he is not a proper next friend at all, and the situation falls within Order XXXII, Rule 5; an order dismissing an appeal made in those circumstances may be discharged on the ground that the minor was not properly represented.
- On the alternative basis — Even if Order XXXII rule-based relief were not directly applicable, Crump, J. considered the case one in which the Court should interfere ex debito justitiae by exercising inherent powers under section 151 of the Code. He relied on principles applied by higher authorities (including Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah) to show that treating absence of a minor whose next friend is of unsound mind as mere default is inappropriate, and that an order passed in those circumstances is a nullity.
- On negligence — Crump, J. found the conduct disclosed gross negligence: after the pleader's death, the next friend took no steps to obtain another pleader or further the appeal, thereby risking the loss of a large estate for the infant. Such gross negligence of a next friend is a ground for avoiding proceedings even where there might be a statutory bar.
- Conclusion — For these reasons Crump, J. agreed that the Court's inherent powers permitted the proposed orders and concurred with making the rule absolute.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISCHARGED — The Court discharged the orders of 28 February 1916 dismissing the appeal and rejecting the extraordinary-jurisdiction application for default, and ordered that the appeal and the application be re-admitted so that the applicant Sonubai may prosecute them against the present opponent (the legal representative of the deceased Krishnarao). The Court made the rule absolute and ordered that the applicant Sonubai pay the opponent's costs in both applications.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the applicant (Sonubai) is permitted to prosecute the previously-dismissed appeal and extraordinary-jurisdiction application; the opponent (the minor son of Krishnarao, represented by Banubai) remains respondent to those proceedings; costs of the applications were ordered against Sonubai.
- Legal consequence regarding procedure: the Court confirmed that Order XLI, Rule 19 is not exhaustive of the Court's power to re-admit appeals or applications dismissed for default and that inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be exercised, in appropriate cases, even where statutory limitation (Article 168) would bar a Rule 19 application. Delay remains an element to be considered when exercising inherent powers but is not subject to the statutory limitation applicable to Rule 19 applications.
- Broader precedent: the opinion relied upon and applied existing authorities to justify the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in the interests of justice. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond these applications; it applied established principles to the facts to prevent a result that would otherwise potentially deprive a formerly-minor litigant of substantial property rights.
Note: All statements in this summary are drawn directly from the provided opinion. No information has been added that is not explicitly contained in that text. The opinion itself contains varying date references for certain events (see the factual background above), and this summary preserves those references as presented in the opinion.
Rule made absolute
R.R
Shah, J.:— These are two applications by Sonubai, widow of Baburao, to set aside the orders made by this Court on the 28th February 1916 dismissing the appeal and rejecting the application under Extraordinary Jurisdiction filed on her behalf by her next friend for default under Order XLI, Rule 17. The circumstances under which the applications are made are these: Sonubai's husband Baburao filed Suit No. 410 of 1911 in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Poona for a partition of the joint family property and to recover his half share against Krishnarao. One Limbaji had three sons, Balwantrao, Gopalrao and Gangaram, Balwantrao died leaving a son Baburao. Gopalrao died leaving a son Krishnarao. Thus Baburao and Krishnarao were cousins. Gangaram was not joined as a party to the suit, as it was stated that he had already separated. The joint property was stated to be very valuable. Baburao valued his half share at Rs. 18,72,005, In 1912, Gangaram filed Suit No. 359 of 1912 in the same Court in his own right and on behalf of his minor son —Yadurao alias Baburao—for one-third share in the joint family property. He joined Baburao Balwantrao as a party to this suit. He valued his one-third share at about Rs. 9,79,000. Baburao died in June 1918 leaving a minor widow, Sonubai. An application was made on her behalf by her father, Keshav Sambhajirao, in August 1913, to bring her on the record as the legal representative of her husband and to allow her to continue the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the right to sue did not survive and that the suit abated, and ordered accordingly, on the 10th of September 1913. It appears, however, that she was brought on the record in Gangaram's suit as the legal representative of her deceased husband in which Baburao was defendant No. 2. Sonubai's father filed Appeal No. 158 of 1914 in forma pauperis in this Court against the abatement, treating it as a decree, through Mr. Vidvans, a Vakil of this Court. The claim was valued at about Rs. 18,72,000. He also filed application No. 288 of 1913 under the Extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court against the same order, through the same Vakil. This was intended apparently to meet the possible objection that the order of abatement was hot appealable as a decree or an order. Mr. Vidvans died in May 1915. Thereafter a notice of his death was served upon the next friend of Sonubai. But he did not appear, and took no steps to prosecute the appeal or the application. On the 28th February 1916 my learned brother Batchelor and I dismissed the appeal for default under Order XLI, Rule 17. Neither party appeared at the time. The application also was rejected for default. Sonubai attained majority on the 21st February 1919, when she completed her 18th year. She made the present application (No. 302 of 1919) on the 11th March 1919, to discharge the order dismissing the appeal for default, and a similar application (No. 303 of 1919) to discharge the order rejecting the application under the extraordinary jurisdiction for default on the same day.
In support of these applications it is alleged by Sonubai that her father is an old man, who has been insane for nearly five years, that he was not in a position to act for her as her next friend or guardian on the record at the date of the order made by this Court or at the date when the notice of the death of Mr. Vidvans was served upon him. Some affidavits have been filed in support of her applications. The applications are opposed by Krishnarao's minor son Shivajirao, Krishnarao having died during the interval. The minor son of Krishnarao is represented by his mother and guardian Banubai on the record. It is asserted on her behalf that Sonubai's father was competent to act and did act in Gangaram's suit as the guardian of Sonubai.
I have not referred to the allegations in Sonubai's petitions as to the interest and conduct of the alienees from Baburao with reference to the estate and the litigation relating to the estate. It is not necessary to do so for the purpose of these applications.
It may be mentioned that Gangaram's suit, after certain proceedings, was finally decided only in April last. It is unnecessary in this application to go into the reasons of this delay. But the decree in the suit is now under appeal, preferred to this Court by Sonubai. The trial Court in that suit has held that Sonubai is debarred from claiming the share of her husband in consequence of the order of abatement in Baburao's suit.
On the facts as stated above, we have to consider whether a case is made out for discharging the orders made by this Court on the 28th February 1916.
On behalf of the applicant it is urged as a preliminary objection that the application is barred by limitation under Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act, and that the minority of Sonubai is not a ground for not giving effect to the provisions of this Article, as such an application is not within the scope of section 6 of the Act. It is urged that in spite of her minority the present application is barred, as it is made long after the date of the dismissal. It seems to me that Article 168 applies to an application for the re-admission of an appeal under birder XLI, Rule 19, under which, if sufficient cause is shown for default, the Court is bound to re-admit the appeal. Such an application is outside the terms of section 6 and the minority of Sonubai is no answer to the plea of limitation. I am of opinion that the preliminary objection would be good if the powers of the Court to re-admit the appeal were confined only to Rule 19 of Order XLI, and I would be bound to give effect to it. But if Rule 19 does not exhaust the powers of the Court to re-admit an appeal or an application dismissed for default, and if it is open to the Court to deal with these applications under section 151 of the Cade, and to make an order to that effect for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, the preliminary objection cannot succeed, as the period of limitation will have no application to the exercise of such powers. The delay would undoubtedly be an element to be considered in exercising the powers under the section which, in the very nature of things, ought to be sparingly exercised. But the inherent powers of the Court would be exercisable without any reference to the period of limitation fixed for applications to re-admit appeals or to restore any other proceeding dismissed for default.
The questions, therefore, are whether it is open to this Court to make an order readmitting the appeal and the application in the exercise of its inherent powers, and whether the facts brought to our notice render it necessary to make such an order for the ends of justice.
As regards the first question I am opinion that the Court has such a power. The provisions of Rule 19 are not exhaustive on the point. Under that rule the Court is bound to re-admit the appeal if sufficient cause is shown for the default, without any reference to the merits of the appeal. The inherent powers of the Court to discharge an order made for default depend upon somewhat different considerations. The corresponding provision in the Code of 1882 has been interpreted by Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in that sense in Somayya v. Subbamma In Lalta Prasad v. Ram Karan the Court took the same view as to the meaning and scope of Order IX, Rule 9. It is also clear that a minor on attaining majority can sue to have any decree against Mm set aside on the ground of fraud or negligence on the part 6f his next friend or guardian as the observations of Farran J. in Cursandas Natha v. Ladkavahu(3) show. In Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramnandan Dobey(4), a minor, on attaining majority, was allowed to sue on the same cause of action, in spite of an order dismissing his suit for default under section 102 during his minority on similar grounds. When it is open to the minor to resort to that remedy I do not see why it should not be open to a Court to help the minor in an application to set aside the order made on default, if it be shown that the next friend or the guardian was unable to act or was negligent in the discharge of his duties. The reasoning in Lalla Sheo Churn Lal's case supports this view. It may be that under the circumstances of a particular case the Court may leave the minor to his remedy by way of suit in view of the necessity of testing the allegations as to negligence or fraud in the strict manner in which they could be tested in a suit. But I see no sufficient reason to hold that that is the only remedy and that the Court has no power to help the minor otherwise with reference to an order made in consequence of the default of the next friend of the minor. The decisions in Ranee Birjobuttee v. Pertaub Sing(5) and Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah(6) appear to me to support the view that in a proper case it is open to the Court to make an order re-admitting the appeal or the application in the exercise of its inherent powers for the ends of justice.
The next question is whether the facts in this case demand that the power should be exercised in favour of the petitioner. The broad facts are that Baburao sued for his share in a large estate and died during the pendency of the suit. His widow was a minor then claiming to be entitled to his share on the ground that the severance of interest was effected during her husband's life-time. Her father as her next friend tried Jo put forward her rights, but failed in the lower Court. He appealed to this Court, but his pleader died and after the pleader's death he did not or could not take any steps to prosecute the appeal. On attaining majority Sonubai has applied to this Court, without losing any time, within a month after attaining majority, to allow her to prosecute the appeal. She points out that her father could not act as her next friend at the time when he received the notice of the pleader's death in November 1915 or thereabout owing to his demented condition, brought on probably by old age. On the materials before the Court the allegation as to his insanity could be neither accepted nor rejected without further inquiry. But whether on that ground or on any other ground, he failed to prosecute the appeal on behalf of his daughter, which affected her right to considerable property, worth about eighteen lacs of rupees according to the valuation in the appeal. In Gangaram's suit the one-third share is valued at about Rs. 9,79,000 (nine lacs and seventy-nine thousand). The order of abatement may have the effect of negativing her right to such property completely. I do not say that it has such an effect. That will have to be considered in the appeal which she has filed in this Court from the decree in Gangaram's suit. At any rate the trial Court in that suit has taken that view and the abatement may fairly be treated for the purpose of these applications as seriously jeopardizing her right to her husband's share in the property, In a matter of such importance, her next Mend failed to act for his minor daughter. I do not think it could serve any useful purpose to delay the disposal of these applications by asking the lower Court to find on further evidence as to whether the allegation as to insanity is proved. It would largely be a matter of inference from his present condition as to whether in November 1915 he was insane as alleged by Sonubai. His failure to act seems to me to indicate—and must be taken tinder the circumstances of this case to indicate—either inability due to physical incapacity or negligence on his part to safe-guard the interests of his daughter.
Looking broadly at the merits of the order of abatement, which it is permissible to take into account in determining the “ends of justice,” it is fair to say that if the appeal had been heard on the merits in February 1916, this Court would have been bound to consider the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain decided in December 1912, in connection with the question of the severance of interests; and whatever may have been the accepted view in this presidency then, it is not unreasonable to say that this Court might, have—I do not say would have—taken the view which a Full Bench of the Madras High Court took in October 1915 in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty as to the effect of these observations. At the same time I do not see any need or justification for rigorously excluding from our consideration the decisions of the Privy Council after February 1916, which may make the merits of the appeal appear stronger and clearer, in determining now what the ends of justice require. I do not desire to prejudge the merits of the appeal; but at is hardly possible and not fair to exclude what I may call the prima facie merits of the appeal from consideration in deciding whether for the ends of justice this Court should exercise the powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the Other hand the re-admission of the appeal cannot prejudice the just rights of the opponent. I have not Overlooked the fact, which has been pressed upon our attention by Mr. Bhandarkar that the opponent is a minor.
I am conscious that the inherent powers reserved under section 151 should be sparingly exercised and only when a clear case is made out. After a careful consideration of all the circumstances I have come to the conclusion that for the ends of justice it is necessary to discharge the orders dismissing the appeal and the application for default, to re-admit the appeal and the application, and to allow the present petitioner to prosecute the same against the present opponent as the legal representative of the deceased Krishnarao. I would make the rules absolute and order accordingly.
Under the circumstances I would order the applicant Sonubai to pay the opponent's costs in both the applications.
In the view I have taken, it is needless to consider the suggestion that, if necessary, the applications may be treated as applications for review and that the delay may be excused under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The procedure appropriate for review would be different, and it is not essential to pursue this point further.
Crump, J.:— In this matter Mr. Bhandarkar for the respondent has taken a preliminary objection that the application is barred by Article 168 of Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The facts necessary in order to understand the position are as follows.
In 1911, one Baburao sued for partition and a share in a joint family estate. On June 10th 1913, during the pendency of that suit, Baburao died. His widow, who is now the applicant before us, was at that date a minor. On August 4, 1913, she applied to be placed on the record as heir of the deceased plaintiff. For the purposes of that application she was represented by her father in the capacity of next friend. Her application was dismissed on September 10, 1913, on the ground that the right to sue did not survive, and it was ordered that the suit should abate. From that order the next friend lodged an appeal in the High. Court, and Mr. vidvans, a pleader of this Court, wag appointed to conduct the appeal. Before the hearing Mr. Vidvans died, and in accordance with the usual practice a notice was served on the next friend on November 4, 1915, directing him to appear, and stating that on failure the appeal would be dismissed for default. The appeal came on for hearing in due course on 28th February 1916 and neither side put in an appearance; it was accordingly dismissed under Order XLI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure on that day. The applicant attained majority on February 21, 1919, and, on March 11, 1919, she moved this Court under Order XLI, Rule 19, to re-admit the appeal.
If in such a case a minor is properly represented by a next friend it would ordinarily follow that an application to re-admit the appeal must be made within thirty days, the time allowed by Article 168 of Schedule II of the Indian Limitation Act. In this case, however, it is alleged at the outset that the next friend became insane about the year 1914. The allegation is supported by substantial affidavits, and it is necessary to Consider the case on that basis.
Assuming the allegation of insanity to be well founded the position is that a minor litigant has been prevented from appealing to this Court by reason of the fact that her next friend was of unsound mind, and her claim to a large estate has been allowed to go by default. The result would be deplorable were there no remedy, but the hardship is no ground for interfering unless interference is warranted by the powers of the Court.
In my opinion a person who is of unsound mind cannot act as next friend. This is indeed clearly laid down by Order XXXII, Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is urged that where a next friend becomes insane after appointment the remedy is to move the Court for his removal under Rule 9 of that Order and that unless and until this is done the minor is bound by the acts of the next friend as though he were of Sound mind. I am unable to accede to this contention. In my opinion a next friend who is of unsound mind is no next friend at all, for, he is not qualified to act. The case, therefore, falls within the scope of Order XXXII, Rule 5 and the order dismissing the appeal may be discharged on the ground that the minor was not represented by a next friend.
But even if this rule is not applicable the case would be one in which the Court ought, I think, to interfere ex debitio justitice and the inherent powers of the Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can very properly be applied to this case. The principles on which the Privy Council acted in Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah are applicable. To rank the absence of a minor whose next Mend is of unsound mind in the category of default is not very stateable. An order passed in these circumstances is a nullity.
But apart from the question of the insanity of the next friend which might in itself call for further enquiry beyond the affidavits on the record the circumstances disclose negligence so gross, whether arising from insanity or not, as to be in itself a sufficient ground for avoiding the order. The facts speak for themselves. There is a very large estate at stake. The refusal to place the minor on the record as heir of her husband has deprived her, or may deprive her, of that estate. I say “may deprive her” for the exact effect of the order of abatement is not certain. That order was challenged by an appeal, and certainly there is at least an arguable case. That case would indubitably have been argued but for the unfortunate death of the pleader engaged. At this point the next Mend became blind to his plain duty, and took no steps to appoint another pleader. A clearer case of the grossest negligence could hardly be found. It can hardly be doubts ed that where a minor is concerned the gross negligence of a next friend is a ground on which the avoidance of proceedings may be sought even where there is a statutory bar: of Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramnandan Dobey. It is impossible to permit the estate of an infant to be lost in this way, and in my opinion the inherent powers of the Court are wide enough to enable us to make such orders as the interest of justice require. The orders proposed by my learned brother are, in my opinion, appropriate ex debitio justitice.
Rule made absolute
R.R
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