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Kumarasamy And Ors. v. S.K. John Died And Ors.
Judgment Summary — Extracted from the Provided Opinion (Tnangamani, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent (plaintiff) instituted O.S. No. 104 of 1984 in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Poonamallee seeking specific performance of an agreement (ex. A-1) dated 19.9.1982. The agreement purportedly obliged appellants 1 and 2 to convey a suit property measuring 1 acre and 84 cents for Rs. 1,85,000, with Rs. 15,000 paid as advance on the same date. The plaintiff alleged that possession was given to him pursuant to the agreement and that he was permitted to make layouts and negotiate with third parties; the balance was to be paid and the sale registered within one year.
Appellants 1 and 2 denied execution of ex. A-1 and contended that signatures/thumb impressions were obtained in connection with a different 40-cent land sale; they claimed ex. A-1 was fabricated. They also asserted delivery of possession and title deeds to the third appellant pursuant to an earlier agreement (ex. B-5 dated 10.9.1982). The trial court found ex. A-1 genuine, held that ex. B-5 was subsequent or fabricated and could not prevail, and decreed the suit for specific performance with costs. The defendants appealed against that judgment and decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether ex. A-1 (agreement dated 19.9.1982) is genuine and entitles the first respondent to specific performance.
- Whether ex. B-5 (dated 10.9.1982) pre-dates ex. A-1 and, if so, whether it defeats the plaintiff's claim; alternatively, whether ex. B-5 is a later fabrication using earlier-dated stamp papers.
- Whether the alleged unilateral character of ex. A-1 (not signed by the plaintiff) negates mutuality and precludes specific performance, particularly in light of judicial authority and Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act.
- Whether the plaintiff has "clean hands" (i.e., whether false deposition or misrepresentation concerning prior transactions prevents equitable relief).
- Whether the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform (including payment of balance or deposit in court) is established and whether any undue hardship or unfair advantage arises under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.
Arguments of the Parties
First Respondent / Plaintiff
- Asserted execution of ex. A-1 dated 19.9.1982 by appellants 1 and 2, receipt of Rs. 15,000 as advance, and delivery of possession to him; claimed entitlement to specific performance.
- Produced oral evidence (P.W.1) and identifying witnesses/scribe/attestor (P.Ws.2 and 3) to support execution and delivery of possession.
- Relied on exchange of notices and mediation attempts to show his readiness and to demonstrate the appellants' conduct inconsistent with earlier claimed arrangements with the third appellant.
Appellants (Defendants 1 and 2) and Third Appellant
- Denied entering into ex. A-1 for sale of the suit property and denied receipt of Rs. 15,000 as advance; contended that signatures/thumb impressions were obtained in connection with a different 40-cent land sale and that ex. A-1 may have been fabricated by the plaintiff.
- Asserted that they sold a 40-cent parcel and that they affixed signatures on several papers out of trust and that ex. A-1 may have been made from such papers.
- Claimed execution of ex. B-5 (10.9.1982) in favor of the third appellant, delivery of possession and title deeds to the third appellant (advance allegedly paid to wife), and that ex. B-5 therefore preceded ex. A-1.
- Argued that ex. A-1 is unilateral (the plaintiff is not a signatory) and therefore lacks mutuality, which they submitted should prevent specific performance (relying on cited precedents).
- Suggested the plaintiff did not come with clean hands and had made inconsistent statements about prior transactions (alleging false deposition regarding prior sale transaction of 40 cents).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayana Pillai Chandrasekharan Nair v. Kunju Amma Thankamma, A.I.R. 1990 Ker. 177 | Example where an agreement for sale was held not to be a contract enforceable by specific performance because of lack of mutuality where the only enforceable right was a promissory note that became time-barred. | The court treated this decision as distinguishable on its facts and noted that the circumstances in that case were materially different from the present facts; therefore it did not preclude granting specific performance here. |
| K. Sheik Adham Sahib (died) v. A. Maruthamuthu Pillai, (1986) 2 M.L.J. 367 | Explains doctrine of mutuality: generally a contract must be mutually enforceable; mutuality requires each party have freedom to enforce rights, not strict equality. Also recognized that Specific Relief Act does not repudiate mutuality. | The court relied on the exposition of mutuality but observed Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act, which prevents refusing specific performance solely because a contract may not be enforceable at the instance of the other party; thus the court rejected the appellants' mutuality argument under the facts. |
| Nanak Builders and Investors v. Vinod Kumar Alag, A.I.R. 1991 Del 315 | Addresses an arrangement where vendor handed over possession on part payment and concerns about lack of security for balance consideration; considered in context of mutuality and enforceability. | The court cited this decision to show that on its facts the argument of lack of mutuality was not sound, and used the reasoning (together with Section 20(4)) to reject the appellants' contention that lack of mutuality barred specific performance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining evidence and documentary chronology rather than relying solely on the stamp-paper dates. Key elements of the court's reasoning were:
- Evidence for ex. A-1: The plaintiff's testimony (P.W.1) stated payment of Rs. 15,000 and delivery of possession; P.W.2 (scribe) and P.W.3 (attestor) supported execution of ex. A-1 at the plaintiff's residence by appellants 1 and 2 and payment of the advance. Cross-examination did not elicit reasons to discredit these witnesses. Appellants did not convincingly explain the presence of their signatures/thumb impressions in ex. A-1.
- Alleged fabrication of ex. B-5: Although the stamp paper for ex. B-5 is dated 10.9.1982, the court held that date alone does not establish temporal priority. The court gave significant weight to the sequence of notices exchanged between the parties (exs. A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-11, A-12, A-14 and A-15) to assess when parties had asserted particular positions. Notably, appellants denied any arrangement with the third appellant in earlier replies and did not reference ex. B-5 until ex. A-15 (10.10.1983), which the court treated as belated. The court viewed this chronology as strongly indicative that ex. B-5 was a later invention prepared using older stamp papers to undermine the plaintiff's rights under ex. A-1.
- Inconsistencies in defendants' evidence: The court found D.W.1's testimony (first appellant) internally inconsistent and lacking detail — for example, he did not give particulars of title deeds allegedly handed over, did not know amounts or rate particulars under ex. B-5, and did not clearly state that he had signed multiple blank sheets. The court concluded D.W.1 appeared to be a tool of the third appellant and did not reliably support the existence or priority of ex. B-5.
- Possession and demarcation stones: The existence of measurement/demarcation stones and the testimony about obstruction when plotting or measuring were considered. The court found that the presence of the stones and the accounts of obstruction supported the plaintiff's claim that he had been given possession pursuant to ex. A-1 and that attempts by the third appellant to act on the land were prevented by the plaintiff.
- Mutuality argument and statutory provision: The appellants argued ex. A-1 was unilateral and lacked mutuality (because the plaintiff was not a signatory). The court examined precedents and the doctrine of mutuality but concluded that Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act prevents refusal of specific performance merely because a contract may not be enforceable at the instance of the other party. Applying that statutory provision and the precedents, the court rejected the appellants' lack-of-mutuality contention.
- Readiness and absence of undue hardship: The court noted that if ex. A-1 is accepted as genuine and the plaintiff had paid Rs. 15,000 and deposited the balance in court at the time of filing, there was no reason to deny specific performance. The court found no plea or evidence of undue hardship to appellants or unfair advantage to the plaintiff as contemplated by Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.
- Clean hands argument: The appellants contended the plaintiff had not come with clean hands (alleged false deposition about a prior 40-cent transaction). The court observed that the plaintiff had acknowledged a broker-like role in earlier notices and plaint and that his testimony was not materially inconsistent in a manner that barred equitable relief. The court noted the panchayat (village mediation) allegation was not proved at trial.
Note: The provided opinion extract ends mid-paragraph and appears truncated. The summary above reflects only the reasoning and analysis expressly contained in the provided text.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court held that ex. A-1 is genuine, that the plaintiff had paid the Rs. 15,000 advance (and had deposited the balance in court at the time of suit), and that there was no reason to deny specific performance to the first respondent.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The opinion concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance based on ex. A-1 and the supporting evidence; the court rejected the appellants' claim that ex. B-5 pre-dated or superseded ex. A-1 and rejected the mutuality and clean-hands objections under the facts before it.
- On precedent and broader law: The court applied existing authorities and Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act to address the mutuality argument, but the opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts. No broader or novel legal doctrine is announced in the provided extract.
Tnangamani, J:-
The appellants are defendants before the trial court. The first respondent/plaintiff instituted o. S. No. 104 of 1984 on the file of learned subordinate judge of poonamallee for specific performance of ex. A - 1 agreement dated 19. 9. 1982 alleging that the appellants undertook to convey the suit property measuring 1 acre and 84 cents in his favour for a sum of rs. 1,85,000 and that they had received rs. 15,000 as advance on the same date. Possession was also given to him pursuant to the sale agreement. They permitted him to make lay - outs of the property and also to negotiate with third parties for the sale of the land. They also agreed to receive the balance of sale consideration and register the document within a period of one year. After taking delivery of possession he got the lands measured in january, 1983 in the presence of the first appellant. Since the sale did not fructify, notices were exchanged between the parties as per ex. A - 1 dated 11. 1. 1983, a - 5 dated 19. 1. 1983, a - 6 dated 21. 1. 1983, a - 7 dated 3. 2. 1983, a - 8 dated 5. 2. 1983, all dated 17. 2. 1983, a - 15 dated 10. 10. 1983. The mediation also did not yield any result. The first respondent was always ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement.
2. Appellants 1 and 2 are father and son. They denied that they entered into any agreement with the first respondent to sell the suit property for rs. 1,85,000 on 19. 9. 1982 or at any time and that they received rs. 15,000 as advance. They pleaded that the first respondent contacted them for the sale of a piece of land measuring 40 cents at thandurai village. They were asked to come to sub registrar s office at poonamallee on several occasions to execute the sale deeds in the name of the nominees of the first respondent. On that occasion they affixed their signatures on various papers on account of trust and confidence reposed by them in the first respondent. They were under the impression that they have signed those papers only in respect of the sale of the said 40 cents of land. For the sale of that piece of land they were paid on the whole a sum of rs. 16,500. The first respondent appears to have fabricated ex. A - 1 agreement taking advantage of his undue influence over the appellants. The first respondent was never given possession of the suit property either in january, 1983 or at any time. These appellants sever permitted the first respondent to form lay - cuts in that land. Instead in pursuance of ex. B - 5 agreement they delivered possession of the suit lands to the third appellant for plotting out them into house sites. The original title deeds of the property were also delivered to the third appellant along with ex. B - 5 on 10. 9. 1982.
3. The trial court found that ex. B - 5 agreement should have been brought into existence subsequent to ex. A - 1 by utilising the stamp papers containing a date anterior to that of ex. A - 1 and that it cannot prevail over exa - 1 agreement which is a genuine one and accordingly decreed the suit as prayed for with costs granting the relief of specific performance in favour of plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the court below, the defendants have come forward with the present appeal.
4. Ex. A - 1 purports to be the agreement dated 19. 9. 1982 executed by appellants 1 and 2 in favour of the first respondent undertaking to convey the suit property in his favour for rs. 1,85,000. The deed also recites that a sum of rs. 15,000 has been paid as advance and the sale is to be completed within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the balance sale price of rs. 1,70,000. The first respondent as p. W. I speaks about payment of rs. 15,000 as advance and the execution of the sale agreement by appellants 1 and 2. Though the sale agreement is silent, p. W. 1 swears that possession was delivered to him subsequent to the execution of the agreement. P. W. 2 venugopal, a former village munsif, is the scribe of ex. A - 1. P. W. 3 subramani is an attestor to the agreement. Both of them swear about the execution of ex. A - 1 at the residence of p. W. 1 first respondent by appellants land 2 and the payment of rs. 15,000 as advance. Nothing has been elicited in the cross - examination of these witnesses as to why their testimonies should not be accepted. No doubt all the three attestors to ex. A - 1 are not examined. But there was no question in the cross - examination of p. W. 1 relating to these attestors. Since the evidence of p. Ws. 2 and 3 is acceptable, the case cannot be rejected because other persons have not been examined.
5. Even the appellants 1 and 2 in their pleadings do not deny their thumb impression and signature in ex. A - 1 agreement. They would only say that in connection with the sale of another piece of land measuring 40 cents, they were constrained to affix their signature and thumb impression on a number of papers and the first respondent has fabricated ex. A - 1 agreement by utilising one such paper. But in the witness box, the first appellant as d. W. I merely states that he sold 40 cents of land to the first respondent and the sale deed was registered at the registrar s officeat poonamallee. He never entered into any agreement with the first respondent. This witness nowhere deposes that he had signed on a number of sheets along with the second appellant and handed them over to the first respondent. Besides there is practically no evidence to substantiate the plea of the appellants that there was any exercise of fraud, or misrepresentation on the part of the first respondent in getting ex. A - 1 agreement executed. The onus is on the appellants 1 and 2 to explain how their signatures are found in ex. A - 1. The explanation offered by them is not proved to be true. Both the appellants are worldly wise though they are not educated. Both are employed. D. W. I admits that he is a former employee of vehicle department. The second appellant is an employee of madras electricity system, so the claim of the appellants that first respondent played fraud on them and obtained their signature and thumb impression on blank papers representing that they were required for the purpose of sale of another piece of 40 cents land cannot be accepted.
6. D. W. 1 further states that he entered into ex. B - 5 agreement with the third appellant on 10. 9. 1992 to sell the suit property to him. Though the averments in the written statement are to the effect the pursuant to ex. B - 5 agreement, he delivered possession of the suit property to the third appellant and handed over the original title deeds, in the witness box he is conspicuously silent on this aspect. In the cross - examination, it was elicited from him that he handed over the title deeds to the third appellant as per the recital in ex. B - 5. Even in his chief examination he merely states that the advance was paid by the third appellant to his wife. He does not know what was the amount paid as advance. Though he claims to have handed over three prior title deeds and three patta books to the third appellant pursuant to the sale agreement, he has not chosen to say what are those documents. He does not even say that the title deeds handed over by him to the third appellant are exs. B - 1 to b - 4. In cross - examination he admits that he does not know that was the price under which he undertook to sell the lands. He does not know what was the rate per cent under ex. B - 5. This would indicate that he was merely a tool in the hands of the third appellant and he does not know anything about ex. B - 5 agreement.
7. The third appellant as d. W. 2 deposes that on 10. 9. 1982 appellants 1 and 2 undertook to convey the suit land to him and executed ex. B - 5 in his favour. D. W. 3 chandrasekar attestor to ex. B - 5 speaks about the execution of the document by appellants 1 and 2 and the payment of advance of rs. 5,000 to them by d. W. 2 and on the strength of the evidence of these two witnesses learned counsel for the appellants argued that ex. B. 5 came into existence on 10. 9. 1982 which is prior to ex. A - 1 in point of time and hence the trial court erred in granting the relief of specific performance in favour of the first respondent relying on ex. A - 1.
8. Now let us examine whether ex. B - 5 agreement would have come into existence prior to ex. A - 1 agreement. No doubt, the stamp paper for ex. B - 5 has been purchased in the name of the first appellant on 10. 9. 1982. But that itself cannot positively establish that this agreement is prior to ex. A - 1 in point of time. The notices exchanged between the parties assume much importance in this case. Ex. A - 2 is the copy of the notice issued by the first respondent to appellants 1 to 3 on 11. 1. 1983 stating that appellants 1 and 2 have executed ex. A - 1 agreement in his favour, received a sum of rs. 15,000 as advance and permitted the first respondent to form layouts in these lands and also to negotiate to sell them to various parties. While so, he understands that in contravention of the agreement, appellants 1 and 2 are making arrangements through the third appellant to sell the lands to third parties. So he has called upon appellants 1 and 2 not to alienate their lands to any third parties contrary to ex. A - 1 agreement. Ex. A - 5 is the reply notice sent by appellants 1 and 2 on 19. 1. 1983. In this reply they denied the execution of ex. A - 1 and alleged that by utilising the signatures and thumb impressions obtained from them in connection with the sale of a piece of land measuring 40 cents, the sale agreement ex. A - 1 could have been concocted. Significantly enough in this notice they have taken the stand that they have nothing to do with the third appellant viz. , janakiraman and they have not made any arrangements to sell their lands through him. Had really ex. B - 5 agreement come into existence on 10. 9. 1982 as claimed by the appellants, certainly mention would have been made about the same in this reply notice. The assertion in this reply notice that the third appellant janakiraman has nothing to do with appellants 1 and 2 runs counter to the genuineness of ex. B - 5 agreement. On 21. 1. 1983 as per ex. A - 6 the third appellant janakiraman has given his reply stating that the first respondent appears to have entertained unnecessary suspicion against him. The fact that the first respondent is called upon in this notice to tender his unconditional apology for having issued the original of ex. A - 2 notice itself indicates that ex. B - 5 agreement could not have been in existence at that time. Ex. A - 7 is the lawyer s notice dated 3. 2. 1983 issued by appellants 1 and 2 to the first respondent. In this notice also they state that taking advantage of the ignorance and illiteracy of appellants 1 and 2 the first respondent has obtained their thumb impression and signature on a number of papers on the representation that they were required for the sale of 40 cents of land. They have called upon the first respondent to return all the papers containing their thumb impression and signature. This notice also does not refer to the execution of ex. B - 5 agreement in favour of the third appellant on 10. 9. 1982in respect of the suit land. Ex. A - 11 is the rejoinder sent by the appellants 1 and 2 on 17. 21983 to the reply notice sent by the first respondent under ex. A - 8. This notice also is silent on the existence of ex. B - 5 agreement. Ex. A - 12 is the copy of another lawyer s notice passed from the first respondent to the appellants 1 to 3 stating that he was ready and willing to carry out the terms of ex. A - 1 agreement and calling upon the appellants to comply with the terms of the agreement within a week. Ex. A - 14 is the reply issued by appellants 1 and 2 on 16. 5. 1983. They expressly state that the allegation that they have made arrangements with the third appellant to sell the lands to him is absolutely false. The third appellant has not chosen to give any reply to ex. A - 12. Some five months later, he has issued ex. A - 15 notice on 10. 10. 1983. Only in this notice he reveals for the first time that appellants 1 and 2 have executed ex. B - 5 agreement in his favour on 10. 9. 1982. So it is crystal clear that ex. B - 5 is only a latter invention prepared by utilising old stamp papers for the purpose of depriving the rights of the first respondent under ex. A - 1. It is also signifi - cant to note that written statement of defendants 1 and 2 as originally filed does not refer to ex. B - 5. Even the written statement of the third appellant remains silent on this aspect. In fact appellants 1 and 2 categorically allege in their original written statement filed by them on 4. 12. 1983 that they have no intention of selling the suit property. This belies their claim that as early as on 10. 9. 1982 they had entered into ex. B - 5 agreement undertaking to sell the suit properties to the third appellant. Learned counsel for the appellants has not cared to seriously assail the findings of the court below on ex. A - 1 and ex. B - 5.
9. P. W. I states in the witness box that appellants 1 and 2 handed over possession of lands to him pursuant to ex. A - 1 agreement though the agreement makes no mention of it. It is in the evidence of d. W. 2 the third appellant that when he attempted to measure the lands after removing the shrub on the land for the purpose of planting demarcation stones, the first respondent objected to the same. Since the demarcating stones were admittedly in existence they should have been planted only by the first respondent as claimed by him. Admittedly appellants 1 and 2 are not in possession as they claimed to have handed over possession to the third appellant. The third appellant could not do anything on the land as the first respondent obstructed him. D. W. I states that the third appellant planted stones two or three years back and he was prevented when he tried to do so again. Whereas the third appellant as d. W. 2 deposes that when he tried to measure the land, the first respondent obstructed him from doing so. He does not support the version of d. W. I. Thus the existence of measurement stones on the land is admitted by d. W. 1. The only inference is that the version of p. W. I that possession was given to him is true.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that ex. A - 1 contract is unilateral in character. It has been executed by appellants 1 and 2 in favour of the first respondent undertaking to convey the suit lands on receipt of the balance of sale consideration within a period of one year. The first respondent is not a signatory to this agreement. So there is no mutuality between the parties to the contract. In support - of this contention, learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision in narayana pillai chandrasekharan nair v. Kunju amma thankamma, a. I. R. 1990 ker. 177, wherein an agreement for sale of property was unilaterally executed by the vendor and towards sale consideration a pronote, liable to become time barred, was executed by the vendor and the pronote had become time barred on the expiry of the term fixed for execution of sale deed. Held there was no mutuality between the parties and the agreement could not be termed as a contract in the circumstances of the case and specific performance could not be granted. But the facts in that case are different. There the pronote which ultimately became time barred was executed in consideration of the agreement. Learned judge has found that there was nothing which the defendant could have enforced in case of breach by the plaintiff except the pronote which was liable to become time barred and which actually became time barred on the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement. In k. Sheik adham sahib (died) v. A. Maruthamuthu pillai, (1986) 2 m. L. J. 367, swamikannu, j. , has held that a contract to be specifically enforced by the court, must be as a general rule, be mutual. The doctrine of mutuality means that the contract should be mutually enforceable by each party against the other and not that right for right, there must be a corresponding clause. A contract may contain a series of clauses and covenants which form the total bargain each of which is a consideration for the other. Mutuality does not mean equality and exact arithmetical correspondence. It means that each party must have the freedom to enforce rights under the contract against the other. The specific relief act does not anywhere repudiate the doctrine of mutuality. So mutuality means that each party must have the freedom to enforce the rights under the contract against the other. But under sec. 20 (4) of the specific relief act the court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of the contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. in nanak builders and investors v. Vinod kumar alag, a. I. R 1991 del 315, as per the agreement for sale on receipt of part of consideration the vendor had to hand over possession of the land to the vendee. It was argued on behalf of the vendor that thereafter there was no security for him that he would receive the balance sale consideration. Lack of this opportunity showed that the agreement suffered on account of lack of mutuality and was, therefore, unenforceable. The appellant also relied on the decision of this court in k. Sheik adham sahib (died) v. A. Maruthamuthu pillai, (1986) 2 m. L. J. 367 referred to above. Held on facts, that the argument of the defendant does not appear to be sound. Apart from this sec. 20, sub - sec (4) of the specific relief act, specifically provides that the court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. This statutory provision takes care of such an argument as has been advanced on behalf of the appellant. So we do not find any substance in the argument based on lack of mutuality in ex. A - 1 agreement advanced on behalf of the appellants.
11. Once we find that ex. A - 1 agreement is true and the first respondent has paid rs. 15,000 as advance and deposited the entire balance of sale consideration in court at the time of filing of the suit, there is no reason for denying the relief of specific performance. There is no plea of undue hardship to the appellants and unfair advantage to the plaintiff as contemplated under sec. 20 (2) of the specific relief act. The circumstances stated above are not present in the present case.
12 yet another argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants is that first respondent/ plaintiff has not come to this court with clean hands. He is said to have tendered false deposition regarding the prior sale transaction of 40 cents of
Land. No doubt, his evidence reads that he did not sell any land on behalf of appellants 1 and 2. But he has accepted in the notices as well as in the plaint the role played by him in the earlier transaction. So his deposition cannot be contrary. He has stated that he acted like a broker to them and he did not execute any sale on their behalf. His evidence that he does not know the particulars by which the first appellant sold his other lands may not relate to ex. B - 1 to b - 4. We are not in a position to know what was the exact question to which he gave the above answer. His evidence that he does not know the rate per cent could only mean that he was aware of the total consideration only and not the rate per cent. In many sale transactions, the price is fixed at one lump sum. Learned counsel for the appellants also commented upon the case of panchayat set - up in the plaint. The allegation therein is to the effect that there was a mediation in the village comprising of 8 persons and before them the appellants 1 and 2 admitted the suit agreement and agreed to fulfil their obligation. During the trial of the suit he made no endeavour to prove the panchayat. However, it is his version in the witness
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