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Kanwar Singh v. Om Kant And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Three persons — Om Kant, Suraj Parkash and Ram Rattan — brought a suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellant from a shop situated at Udhampur. The principal ground alleged for ejectment was that the shop was required for the personal necessity of Om Kant, to whose share the shop had fallen in a family partition, for running a Karyana shop. The learned Sub-Judge, Udhampur, dismissed the suit on 22-11-1975. That decree and judgment were set aside in appeal by the learned District Judge, Udhampur, on 1-5-1976. The defendant-appellant (tenant) filed a civil second appeal to this Court, which is the subject of this opinion. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, Om Kant died and his legal representatives were brought on the record.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a ground of ejectment pleaded as the personal necessity of the landlord (Om Kant) survives the landlord's death during the pendency of appellate proceedings such that the landlord's legal representatives may continue to defend or prosecute the proceedings on that ground.
- Whether a decree that is under appeal (i.e., not final) confers a vested benefit on the decree-holder's estate or legal representatives, enabling them to claim the benefit after the decree-holder's death.
- Which judicial precedents govern the question — specifically the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal ((1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358) vis-à-vis earlier decisions such as Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahuwalia ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110) and certain High Court decisions that relied on it.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Appellant's Arguments (Mr. R.P. Bakshi)
- The sole ground of ejectment was the personal necessity of Om Kant to start his own Karyana shop; on his death that ground has ceased to exist and therefore the appeal should be allowed and the suit dismissed.
- The position would be different for a residential house, where family members might assert a continuing necessity, but not for a commercial shop in which Om Kant personally intended to trade.
- An appeal is a continuation of the suit; a decree under appeal is not final and therefore no right vests in the decree-holder or his estate until the decree becomes final. Reliance was placed on District Board Muzaffarnagar v. Upper India Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1957 All 527.
- The Supreme Court judgment in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal ((1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358) expressly overruled Phool Rani's case, and therefore contrary High Court authority (e.g., AIR 1976 Mad 205) based on Phool Rani is no longer good law.
Respondents' / Legal Representatives' Arguments (Mr. T.S. Thakur)
- The ground of eviction was also available to the heirs of Om Kant, who could continue running the shop after his death; a decree for possession passed in favour of Om Kant conferred a benefit that could be defended by his legal representatives for the estate's benefit.
- The benefit by way of a decree is an incorporeal right that had vested in Om Kant and could pass to his heirs; death of the landlord during proceedings should not divest his legal representatives of that benefit. Reliance placed on Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahuwalia ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110), Vijayaraghavan v. Mohammed Yakub (AIR 1976 Mad 205) and Smt. Dhan Devi v. Bakhshi Ram (AIR 1969 Punj & Har 270).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahuwalia ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110) | Held that where a plaintiff dies during proceedings, the heirs may be entitled to the benefit of a decree passed in the plaintiff's favour; recognized exceptions where estate could defend benefits accrued by decree. | The opinion recounts the decision and the reasoning relied upon by respondents' counsel, but ultimately treats this authority as having been disapproved by the later three-Judge Bench decision in Shantilal (1976) 4 SCC 417 and thus not followed. |
| Vijayaraghavan v. Mohammed Yakub, AIR 1976 Mad 205 | State[d] that an incorporeal right by way of a decree vests in the landlord and can pass to heirs; death does not divest such a right during revision or appeal. | The court noted reliance on this Madras High Court decision by respondents, but concluded that it was based on Phool Rani and therefore is not good law in view of Shantilal (1976) 4 SCC 417. |
| Smt. Dhan Devi v. Bakhshi Ram, AIR 1969 Punj & Har 270 | Observed that the ground of ejectment under the statutory provision is not necessarily personal to the original landlord and should normally be available to successors-in-interest. | The court recorded reliance on this decision by respondents but concluded it could not follow it because subsequent Supreme Court authority (Shantilal) took a different view. |
| District Board Muzaffarnagar v. Upper India Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1957 All 527 | Noted that a decree of the trial court has an element of finality but, once an appeal is filed and heard on merits by the appellate court, the element of finality disappears and the case is reopened before the appellate court. | The court agreed with this principle and held that because an appeal is a continuation of the suit the decree was not final; therefore no vested right had passed to the landlord's estate while the appeal was pending. |
| Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal ((1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358) | The three-Judge Bench expressly disapproved the earlier Phool Rani decision and held that the benefit of a decree obtained by an original landlord may not necessarily be available to heirs in the way previously held. | The court treated this Supreme Court decision as authoritative and dispositive, relied upon it to reject the respondents' reliance on Phool Rani and related High Court authorities, and followed Shantilal in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a series of linked findings rooted in the facts of the case and in precedent.
- Nature of the pleaded ground: The court observed that the pleaded and evidential position was that the shop was required personally by Om Kant to run a Karyana shop. Witnesses (P.W.1 Shiv Ram, Prem Nath, Arun Kumar, Amar Nath, and Om Kant himself) supported that the requirement was personal to Om Kant. The pleadings and the application by the legal representatives did not assert that the shop was required for the benefit of the legal representatives.
- Necessity of specific pleadings by heirs: Because the disputed premises was a commercial shop, the court explained it was necessary for the legal representatives to plead and prove that they, or one of them, intended and had capacity to run the shop and that the shop was required bona fide by them. No such amendment to pleadings or proof was placed before the Court.
- Personal nature of the ground: Drawing on the statutory language (S. 11(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966), the court emphasized that "requirement" implies "necessity" and that the ground under S. 11(h) is for the personal necessity of the landlord or of a person for whose benefit the premises is held. On the facts, the court concluded the necessity was personal to Om Kant and thus perished with his death: "A personal action ... must die with the person."
- Finality of decree and effect of appeal: The court accepted the submission that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and treated the decree under appeal as not final. Relying on the All-India precedent (AIR 1957 All 527), the court held that no vested right passed to the estate by reason of a non-final decree, so the argument that the estate retained the benefit of a decree passed in favour of the deceased landlord was not available on the present facts.
- Precedential resolution: The court examined conflicting precedents. It noted respondent counsel relied on Phool Rani and certain High Court decisions (including AIR 1976 Mad 205 and AIR 1969 Punj & Har 270) that supported heirs' rights to benefit from a decree. However, the court found the three-Judge Bench decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal ((1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358) to be authoritative and expressly disapproving Phool Rani. Consequently, the court declined to follow the contrary High Court authorities based on Phool Rani.
- Conclusion: Combining the factual finding that the ground was personal to Om Kant, the absence of any pleading by the legal representatives asserting their personal necessity or capacity to use the shop, and the legal position that the decree under appeal was not final, the court concluded that the personal ground of ejectment perished with the death of Om Kant and did not survive to his legal representatives.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): Appeal allowed; the suit filed by Om Kant and others is dismissed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The defendant-appellant's civil second appeal was allowed and the original suit for ejectment was dismissed.
- There were no orders as to costs.
- The court rejected the respondent's prayer for leave to file an appeal to the Letters Patent Bench under Section 12 of the Letters Patent, finding no valid ground in view of the Supreme Court decision in Shantilal ((1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358).
- The court expressly recorded that it remains open to the legal representatives of the deceased Om Kant, if so advised, to institute fresh proceedings against the defendant-appellant for ejectment on the ground of their own personal necessity; the dismissal on the present grounds will not stand in their way.
Broader implication as addressed in the opinion: The court followed the three-Judge Bench decision in Shantilal Thakordas and declined to follow prior High Court decisions that had relied on Phool Rani; the opinion applies existing Supreme Court authority rather than purporting to create a new precedent. The opinion does not expressly state that it is laying down any new legal principle beyond applying Shantilal to the facts.
1. A suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellant from the suit Page: 23shop situate at Udhampur was brought by three persons namely S/Shri Om Kant, Suraj Parkash and Ram Rattan. The principal ground on which the ejectment of the defendant-appellant was sought was that the suit shop was required for the personal necessity of Om Kant to whose share the shop had fallen in a family partition. The suit was dismissed by the learned Sub-Judge, Udhampur, on 22-11-1975 but the decree and judgment of the learned Sub Judge was set aside in appeal by the learned District Judge, Udhampur, on 1-5-1976. Aggrieved against the decree of reversal, the defendant-appellant filed the civil second appeal which is the subject-matter of decision by this court. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, Shri Om Kant died and his legal representatives were brought on the record.
2. Mr. R.P Bakshi, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant appearing in support of the civil second appeal, has submitted that since the sole ground for ejectment of the appellant was that the suit shop was required by Om Kant for his personal necessity and since Shri Om Kant had died, the ground of personal necessity had perished with him and as such, it is contended, the appeal be allowed and the suit filed against the appellant be dismissed. It is maintained that the premises in dispute was a commercial shop and the ground for eviction was that Om Kant needed the same to start his own Karyana shop and, therefore, on his death that ground was no longer available. Mr. Bakshi urges that the position in case of a residential house would be different as the family members might be allowed to say that since they were living with the landlord before his death, his personal necessity included their personal necessity, also. No other ground has been urged by Mr. R.P Bakshi in support of the civil second appeal. Mr. T.S Thakur, learned counsel for the legal representatives of Shri Om Kant and the other respondents, has contended that the ground of eviction was also available to the heirs of Om Kant as they would have continued with the running of the shop after Om Kant and that since a decree for possession had been passed in favour of Om Kant, the landlord, the decree could be defended by his legal representatives for the benefit of his estate and that the decree was not liable to be upset only on the ground that the landlord for whose personal necessity the order was passed, had died. It is urged that the benefit by way of a decree is an incorporeal right and that right having vested in Om Kant in that a decree for eviction having been passed against the appellant, the legal representatives of Om Kant cannot be divested of that benefit on the death of Om Kant.
3. Mr. Thakur has, in support of his submissions, placed strong reliance on Smt. Phool Rani v. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahuwalia ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110). In that case the plaintiff, in a Rent Act application against his tenant, sought possession of certain premises on the ground of personal requirement but died during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. The legal representatives of the deceased made an application for being brought on record of the appeal and that application was opposed by the tenant. The Appellate Authority, however, allowed the legal representatives to be brought on the record. The contention of the tenant that the right to sue (including the right to continue the appeal) did not survive to the heirs of the plaintiff, was negatived by the appellate authority. In an appeal before the High Court at Delhi, their Lordships of the Delhi High Court took the view that the right to sue did not survive to the heirs of the plaintiff and on that ground the application for ejectment was dismissed, leaving it open to the heirs to bring fresh proceedings founded on their own requirements. The correctness of that decision was challenged by the plaintiff's heirs in the appeal before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court considered various aspects of the case and came to the conclusion that the cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after a decree for possession was passed in his favour say, for example, during the pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant, the estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, had accrued in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the legal representatives in such cases are entitled to defend all such proceedings which constitute a challenge to that benefit. The plea of the tenant was therefore rejected.
4. Reliance has also been placed on Vijayaraghavan v. Mohammed Yakub, AIR 1976 Mad 205 by Mr. Thakur, wherein it was observed as follows (at p. 207):
“The benefit by way of a decree which a predecessor-in-interest has secured Page: 24being an incorporeal right and that right having vested in a landlord or landlady in that a decree for eviction has already been passed cannot be divested by his or her death, as it could pass on to the heirs as it becomes part and parcel of the property owned by the landlord or landlady. Thus viewed, the respondents (legal representatives of deceased landlord) in the revision filed by tenant are entitled in law and in equity to take advantage of the favourable decision obtained by the deceased landlord before the Rent Controller and which gained acceptance before the appellate authority as well. There cannot be a divesting of such a right by reason of the death of the landlord in the course of the revision proceedings.”
5. Mr. Thakur has then relied upon Smt. Dhan Devi v. Bakhshi Ram, AIR 1969 Puni and Har 270. In para. 7 of the judgment their Lordships observed (at p. 277):
“Moreover, it cannot be held as a matter of law that the ground of ejectment contained in sub-para. (ii) of paragraph (a) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 13 of the Act is a ground personal to the landlord who originally files the action for ejectment. The ground relates to the landlord and should in the normal course be available to the landlord who files the application for ejectment as well as to his successors-in-interest.”
All the aforesaid authorities undoubtedly support the arguments of Mr. Thakur.
6. Mr. R.P Bakshi, appearing for the defendant-appellant, has, on the other hand, contended that since an appeal is a continuation of the suit, the decree passed in the suit against which an appeal is pending cannot be treated to be a final decree and no right can be claimed on the basis of a decree which is not yet final. Mr. Bakshi has, in this connection, placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in District Board Muzaffarnagar v. Upper India Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1957 All 527 wherein it was observed that (at. p. 530):
“no doubt there is an element of finality attaching to a decree passed by the trial court. Once, however, an appeal is filed from the decree of the trial court, and the case is heard on merits by the appellate Court, the element of finality disappears and the whole case is reopened before the Court of appeal.”
7. On the basis of this authority it is vehemently maintained by Mr. Bakshi that unless the decree had become final, no right can be said to have vested in the decreeholder or his estate unless after the decree had become final.
8. While replying to the arguments of Mr. Thakur based on (1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110 (Supra) and AIR 1976 Mad 205 (Supra) Mr. Bakshi submits that in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal, (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358, a bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court had expressly overruled the judgment in Phool Rani's case ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110) and that since AIR 1976 Mad 205 (supra) was also based on (1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110, the law laid down by the Madras High Court is no longer good law.
9. In Shantilal Thakordass v. Chimanlal Maganlal, (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358, their Lordships were called upon to determine whether the decision in (1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110 was correct or not. In para. 4 of the judgment their Lordships opined thus (at p. 2359):
“The foremost and the first question urged before us by Mr. Dholakia was that Phool Rani's case ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110) was not correctly decided. We agree with this contention and say with respect that we do not subscribe to the view expressed by the Bench of this Court in that case.”
10. Again, while dealing with the question whether the benefit of a decree obtained by the original landlord could be denied to the legal heirs. Their Lordships observed in para. 6 of the judgment as under (at p. 2360):—
“Counsel for the appellants endeavoured to bring their case within one of the exceptions noted in Phool Rani's case ((1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110). He submitted that a decree had already been passed in favour of the original plaintiff by the trial court and that could not be disturbed on his death either in appeal or revision. We do not accept the contention as sound or correct.”
This judgment, therefore, is a complete answer to the arguments raised by Mr. Thakur.
11. In the present case it is not disputed that the ground on which the ejectment of the appellant was sought was that the suit shop was required by Om Kant for his own benefit to run a Karyana shop. P.W 1, Shiv Ram stated that the shop was required for the personal use of Om Kant who wanted to run a Karyana shop therein. To the same effect is the evidence of Page: 25Prem Nath, Arun Kumar, brother of the deceased, Amar Nath, P.W's and Om Kant, plaintiff, himself. This was in fact the case pleaded by the plaintiff also. It is thus obvious that the ground on which ejectment was sought i.e to run the Karyana shop was a ground personal to Om Kant, only.
12. Section 11 of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, provides protection to a tenant against his eviction. It is provided in sub-s. (h) of the Act that a landlord may seek the ejectment of his tenant on the ground that he requires the premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises is held. The word, “requirement” implies ‘necessity’ and therefore, the ground for eviction under S. 11(h) of the Act, 1966, would be where the premises is required for the ‘personal necessity’ of the landlord himself or such person for whose benefit the premises is held. In the instant case, the personal necessity was of the landlord, Om Kant himself and of no one else. There is neither any pleading in the original suit nor any averment in the application of the legal representatives of Om Kant while seeking permission to be brought on the record (in place of the deceased) that the suit shop was required for the benefit of the legal representatives also. Since, the premise in dispute is a commercial shop it was necessary for the legal representatives to urge that they or any one of them was going to run the shop and that they or any one of them had the ‘capacity’ and the ‘capability’ to run the shop to negative the contention of the tenant that the suit shop was not required bona fide by the landlord for his personal necessity. It was open to the legal representatives of Om Kant to come forward and say that they also required the suit shop for their personal necessity and seek amendment of pleadings. If amendment was allowed the case might have to be remanded but they have not made any such application before this Court and it would be conjectural to hold that the suit for ejectment was for their benefit also. As noticed earlier, the requirement of ‘personal necessity’ was personal to Om Kant and in my opinion it perished with the death of Om Kant. A personal action, of the type we have in the facts and circumstances of the present case, must die with the person.
13. Since, an appeal is a continuation of the suit it cannot be said that there was any final decree in favour of the landlord and, therefore, the question of divesting the estate of the benefits of any final decree does not arise, I am in respectful agreement with AIR 1957 All 527 (supra). In view of the clear law laid down in (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358 (supra) I am unable to follow the law laid down in AIR 1976 Mad 205 or AIR 1969 Punj and Har 270, which no longer can be regarded as good law.
14. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal of the appellant is allowed, the suit filed by Om Kant and others is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
15. Before parting, I must make it clear that it shall be open to the legal representatives of the deceased, if so advised, to bring in fresh proceedings against the defendant-appellant for his ejectment on the ground of their personal necessity and the dismissal of the suit for the aforesaid reasons shall not stand in their way.
16. After the judgment was announced, Mr. Thakur, the learned counsel for the respondent, has prayed that leave be granted to him to file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench under S. 12 of the Letters Patent. The question decided in this appeal has been concluded by the Supreme Court in (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358 and I, therefore, do not find any valid ground for granting leave. The prayer is rejected.
17. Appeal allowed.
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