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Ghulam Ahmed v. Mohammad Iqbal And Others

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
May 1, 1970
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Case Summary — Revision Before Full Bench (Bhat, J.; S.M.F. Ali, C.J.; Jaswant Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs-respondents sued the defendant-petitioner in the Sub-Judge, Ramban, for dissolution of a partnership and rendition of accounts. The parties had executed a registered partnership deed dated 3 January 1969 in respect of a truck (No. JKA-6591, Model 1962) and its Jammu–Srinagar route permit, stating that the defendant (executant No.1) made the plaintiffs partners and fixed the valuation of the truck together with the route permit at Rs. 21,000, with each plaintiff to pay Rs. 7,000. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant (who drove the truck) did not render accounts. The defendant asserted, inter alia, that the partnership deed purported to transfer a route permit and that a route permit could not be transferred without the transport authority's permission, rendering the deed illegal and the plaintiffs' suit not maintainable. The trial court framed issues on 4 August 1969 (including Issue No. 2 about transferability of route permits), and the Sub-Judge, relying on AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 13, held the partnership was not hit by the Motor Vehicles Act and decided the issue against the defendant. The defendant filed this revision petition; by order dated 9 March 1970 the Chief Justice referred the matter to a Full Bench, which heard counsel and delivered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, as a matter of law under Sections 42 and 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a route permit (or any share of it) can be transferred from one person to another without the permission of the transport authority who granted the permit.
  2. If transfer (or purported transfer) of the route permit without authority is prohibited, what is the effect of such a transfer recorded in a partnership deed upon the validity of the partnership and upon the maintainability of a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The partnership deed effected a transfer (in terms of shares) of the truck's route permit (the deed stated executant No.1 transferred one-third shares to each partner, effectively giving the plaintiffs 2/3rds of the permit) even though, on the date of the deed, the permit stood in the petitioner's name alone.
  • Sections 42 and 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act prohibit the transfer of a permit except with the permission of the authority that granted it; therefore the deed's transfer of a share of the permit is forbidden by law.
  • Authorities (cited: AIR 1963 Mad 413; AIR 1950 Mad 44; AIR 1957 Mad 620) support the proposition that partnerships involving transfer of permits are illegal and unenforceable.
  • Consequently the partnership is illegal and any suit based on it (such as for dissolution and rendition of accounts) is not maintainable.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Relied on decisions of higher courts (notably (1959) 37 ITR 271 [SC], and (1969) 1 SCC 188 / AIR 1969 SC 493) and AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 13 to argue that partnerships can validly operate where permits are held in the name of a partner (or where permits are not proved to have been transferred) and that such arrangements are not necessarily illegal under the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Contended that the partnership deed merely recorded an agreement to move the transport authorities for transfer of ownership of the truck and the permit in favour of the plaintiffs, so that the partnership was an agreement for future regularisation rather than an immediate illegal transfer.
  • Argued alternatively that transfer of the truck's material (the vehicle itself) did not require permission of the transport authority, and therefore at least that portion of the deed was valid and the suit should be allowed to proceed in respect of that valid portion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1963 Mad 413 Held that a partnership formed for purchase/use of a lorry when a permit is obtained in one partner's name only is illegal and opposed to public policy because it contravenes Sections 42(1) and 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act; partnership cannot use a permit standing in another's name unless transferred with Transport Authority's permission. Referred to by petitioner as supporting illegality; the Court accepted the principle that transfer/use of a permit without authority can render a partnership illegal and relied on the reasoning as supportive of its conclusion in the present facts.
AIR 1950 Mad 44 Authority (Madras) indicating that partnerships in lorry/transport business involving transfer of permits are illegal. Noted by the Court as part of the body of Madras precedents relied on by the petitioner to show partnerships involving permit-transfer are illegal; used to reinforce the conclusion that transfer here taints the partnership.
AIR 1957 Mad 620 Similarly holds that partnerships in lorry business involving transfer of permit are illegal. Referred to by petitioner and considered by the Court as supporting the view that transfer of permit or share therein without authority renders the partnership illegal.
(1959) 37 ITR 271 (SC) In a case under the Bengal Excise Act the Supreme Court found no evidence of transfer or sub-letting of licences and therefore no invalidation of the partnership; key point was absence of transfer. Distinguished by the Court: it does not help respondents because in that case no licence transfer was proved, whereas in the present case the deed expressly transferred 2/3rds share of the permit to the plaintiffs.
(1969) 1 SCC 188; AIR 1969 SC 493 Addressed whether suits by an owner against a benamidar would lie; Supreme Court observed the Motor Vehicles Act does not prohibit benami transactions and did not treat benami holding as per se invalid. Distinguished by the Court: in that case the real owner and permit holder was the plaintiff who sought declaration; here the deed shows the petitioner's transfer of 2/3rds of the permit to plaintiffs without permission, so the benami reasoning does not assist respondents.
AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 13 Held that a partnership business in transport could be carried on on the strength of a permit obtained by a partner and that Sections 31, 42 and 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act were not transgressed where no transfer of permit or of vehicles occurred; partnership under those facts was not illegal. The trial Judge had relied on this decision to hold the suit maintainable. The Full Bench examined it and concluded the Madhya Pradesh authority was not applicable to the present facts because in that case there was no transfer or share-transfer of a permit, whereas in the present deed an express 2/3rds transfer of the permit was recorded without authority.
Mistri Alla Ditta v. Puran Chand (decided 30 April 1962) Decision of this Court cited by the Full Bench as taking the view that an agreement transferring a route permit/share without authority is hit by Section 59 and is illegal. The Full Bench relied upon this Court's earlier decision as supporting the conclusion that the partnership in the present case is illegal because the deed purports to transfer the permit without Transport Authority permission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Textual analysis of the partnership deed: the Court reproduced the relevant clause which stated that the truck and its route permit were the property of executant No.1 and that executant No.1 made executants Nos.2–4 partners such that executant No.1 would be owner to the extent of one-third and executants Nos.2–4 each to the extent of one-third; the valuation of the truck together with the route permit was fixed at Rs. 21,000 and payments were to be made accordingly; earnings and losses were to be borne according to the shares.
  2. Statutory provisions: the Court examined Section 42 (use of vehicle in accordance with permit conditions) and Section 59 (a permit shall not be transferable except with the permission of the transport authority that granted it) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and concluded that on a plain reading Section 59 prohibits transfer of a permit or any share therein without the transport authority's permission.
  3. Application to facts: it was undisputed that on the date of the partnership deed the route permit stood in the petitioner's name alone and that the deed expressly transferred two-thirds of the permit in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court held that such transfer (or purported transfer of a share) was forbidden by Section 59.
  4. Assessment of authorities: the Court considered precedents cited by both sides. It accepted petitioner-cited Madras precedents that partnerships involving transfer of permits are illegal. It examined the respondents' Supreme Court authorities ((1959) 37 ITR 271 and (1969) 1 SCC 188/AIR 1969 SC 493) and the Madhya Pradesh decision (AIR 1966 Madh Pra 13), and distinguished them on the ground that in those cases there was either no proved transfer/subletting of licences/permits or the real owner and permit holder remained identifiable; hence those decisions did not apply to a case where the deed itself transferred a share of the permit without authority.
  5. On the respondents' contention that the deed only contemplated applying for transfer in the future, the Court rejected this: it read the deed as giving the plaintiffs ownership of the truck and its permit to the extent of two-thirds effective from 1 January 1969, at which time no permission for transfer had been obtained.
  6. On the argument that transfer of the truck (material) was separable from transfer of the permit and that the contract could be severed, the Court held the contract was one and indivisible: both truck and permit were valued together at Rs. 21,000 with no separate valuation; it invoked the principle (quoting Atkinson J. via Sanjiva Row's Contract Act) that if part of the consideration is void the whole contract may be tainted and cannot be severed in such circumstances.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: because the deed effected (in terms) a transfer/share in the permit without the requisite permission, the partnership was illegal under Section 59; consequently the Sub-Judge's contrary conclusion was erroneous.
  8. Remedy and costs: the Full Bench allowed the revision, set aside the Sub-Judge's order, declared the partnership illegal and held that no suit for rendition of accounts and dissolution based on that partnership could be maintained. Given that the petitioner had taken advantage of his own fraud, the Court ordered that parties bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision allowed; the order of the Sub-Judge, Ramban, is set aside; the partnership is illegal because it records a transfer/share of a route permit without the permission of the transport authority, and therefore the suit for dissolution of partnership and for rendition of accounts founded on that partnership is not maintainable.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the trial court's finding that the suit was maintainable is reversed; the partnership is declared illegal on the ground that the partnership deed purported to transfer shares in the route permit without statutory permission; the plaintiffs' suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts based on that deed cannot be maintained.
  • Costs: the Court directed that the parties bear their own costs, noting that the petitioner had taken advantage of his own fraud.
  • Broader precedent: the judgment applies statutory interpretation of Sections 42 and 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act to the particular facts and relies on earlier authorities; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying established principles to the facts before it, and no broader change in the law is announced beyond the Court's conclusions in this case.

Disposition: Revision allowed (Full Bench).

Show all summary ...

Bhat, J.:— This revision application is directed against the order of the Sub-Judge, Ramban, dated 10th November, 1969. The facts giving rise to this application are as under:—

2. A suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts was instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents against the defendant-petitioner in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Ramban, on the following facts that the plaintiffs and the defendant by means of a partnership deed dated 3rd January, 1969, registered by the Sub-Registrar, Ramban on the same date, became partners in a truck No. JKA-6591, Model 1962, in equal shares; that the plaintiffs had invested Rs. 14,000/- as their share of the business; but the truck was being driven by the defendant and he had to render accounts towards the plaintiff No. 1 but as no accounts were rendered by the defendant, a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts was instituted. We need not go into the pleas taken on the merits of the case by the defendant but as an additional plea, it was asserted by him that a route permit could not be transferred in favour of anybody and in the partnership deed the route permit also was transferred, therefore the partnership deed was illegal and the suit of the plaintiffs was not as such maintainable. Issues were struck in this case on 4th August, 1969 and issue No. 2 ran in the following words:—

“Whether under law, no person can transfer a route permit to another person and since there is no mention of transfer of route permit in the partnership between the parties, the partnership-deed is against law and what is its effect upon the present suit? O.P.D”

3. After hearing arguments, the learned trial Judge by his order under revision relying on a Madhya Pradesh ruling reported as AIR 1966 Madh Pra 13, held that this partnership was not hit by any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and decided the issue against the defendant. It is against this order of the learned trial Judge holding that the suit is maintainable that this revision petition has been preferred in this Court.

4. The revision petition came up for hearing before His Lordship, the Hon'ble Chief Justice who by his order dated 9-3-1970, referred it to a Full Bench. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. In order to understand the argument advanced on the legal proposition by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant clause from the partnership deed. The relevant clause translated, reads as under:—

Truck No. JKA-6591 Model 1962, Jammu Srinagar route, is the property (material of the truck as well as the route permit) of the executant No. 1 (i.e, defendant). Executant No. 1 has now made executants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (i.e, plaintiffs) as partners of this track; henceforth executant No. 1 will be the owner of the material of the truck as well as its route permit to the extent of one-third, and executant No. 2 to the extent of one-third, executant No. 3 and 4 also to the extent of one-third. The valuation of the truck along-with route permit has been fixed at Rupees 21,000/- and executant No. 2 will pay Rupees 7,000/- and executants Nos. 3 and 4 will also pay a sum of Rs. 7,000/- to the executant No. 1 before the Sub-Registrar Ramban. From 1st January, 1969, the earnings of the truck and its expenses and profit and loss will be borne by executants 1 to 4 according to the shares mentioned above….”

5. From the above it is clear that route permit of this truck as well as the material of the truck was the property of the executant No. 1 i.e, the defendant-petitioner. He has transferred the truck itself as well as its route permit (Jammu-Srinagar route) to the plaintiffs. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that under Section 42 of the Motor Vehicles Act no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or the Commission authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used, and Section 59 of, the same Act says:—

“Save as provided in Section 61, a permit shall not be transferable from one person to Page: 167another except with the permission of the transport authority which granted the permit and shall not without such permission operate to confer on any person to whom a vehicle covered by the permit is transferred any right to use that vehicle in the manner authorised by the permit.”

6. On a plain reading of these two sections, particularly Section 59 the transfer of a permit from one person, to another is prohibited unless it is permitted by the Transport Authority who granted the permit. In this case admittedly on the date on which the partnership was entered into, the route permit stood in the name of the petitioner only. He could not transfer the permit either wholly or partly in favour of anybody (in this case the plaintiffs) without the permission of the Transport Authority mentioned in the Section. In this case the permit holder i.e, the defendant-petitioner has in clear and unambiguous terms transferred the ⅔rd of this permit in favour of the plaintiffs which is forbidden by law. On a plain reading of these sections no legal discussion is necessary but as some authorities have been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be worthwhile to mention them.

7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred us to AIR 1963 Mad 413 which says:—

“A partnership between A and B for the purchase of a lorry and to use it for carrying on the business of transport service with a permit obtained in B's name only is illegal and opposed to public policy as it involves the contravention of the provisions of Sections 42(1) and 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The partnership firm being the owner of the vehicle cannot use the permit obtained in B's name unless the permit is transferred in the name of the partnership with the permission of the Transport Authority under Section 59(1) of the M.V Act. Therefore, any claim arising out of the settlement of accounts of the partnership is also illegal, and cannot be enforced.”

8. He has also referred us to AIR 1950 Mad 44 which has been considered in AIR 1963 Mad 413 supra and AIR 1957 Mad 620 also says that partnership in lorry business involving transfer of permit is illegal. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the partnership is illegal and cannot be enforced, and as such the present suit cannot lie.

9. The learned Counsel for the respondents, however, has invited our attention to two Supreme Court authorities namely (1959) 37 ITR 271 (SC) and (1969) 1 SCC 188 : AIR 1969 SC 493, and to AIR 1966 Madh Pra 13 (16).

10. In (1959) 37 ITR 271 (SC) three brothers carried on the business of sale of foreign liquor and the licences for its three shops were held in the different names of the members, but not in the name of the family. It was claimed that in 1938 the family was disrupted and on April 7, 1939, the three brothers entered into a deed of partnership which was registered, by which they agreed to carry on the business in partnership. They opened a separate book of account which they called the Bati Khata which purported to show the capital contribution and accounts of the partners as well as the division of profits amongst them. Two brothers died and a new partnership was entered into in respect of the said three liquor shops and the main relevant provisions of the partnership were that the partnership would be deemed to have commenced from January 25, 1947 and that the capital of the partnership was the amount as found to the credit of the parties thereof, and the banking accounts could be opened in the firm's name or any other name as may be agreed upon. The Income-tax Officer rejected their claim for registration on the ground that there was no separate capital account of the partners and that the share of profit of each partner was not credited in his account in the ledger. The officer placed no reliance on the Bati Khata maintained by the partners. On facts it was held by the S.C that there was no evidence of transgression of the provisions of the Bengal Excise Act, 1911 and there was nothing affecting the validity of the partnership. The argument advanced before the Supreme Court was that the partnership was illegal being against Section 42(1) of the Bengal Excise Act, which read as under:—

“42(1): Subject to such restrictions as the State Government; may prescribe the authority who granted any licence permit or pass under this Act may cancel or suspend it (a) it is transferred or sub-let by the holder thereof without the permission of the said authority.”

11. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the finding that there was no evidence that the excise licences were transferred or sub-let. The three shops, it appears, were managed separately and their accounts were kept distinct. So in this case as each of the brothers held a licence and all the three joined in a partnership agreeing to share the profits earned by them in this business, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the transfer or sub-letting of the licences could not be thereby inferred and it was not therefore proved. This authority is therefore distinguishable because in the case before us the respondent has transferred ⅔rd share of the route permit in favour of the plaintiffs.

12. The other authority relied upon is (1969) 1 SCC 188 : AIR 1969 SC 493. In this case the point for determination was whether a suit by the owner of vehicles against the benamidar thereof for declaration and mandatory injunction, would lie. The relevant facts of that case are given in para 2 of the judgment and may be again summarized as under:—

13. The parties were members of a Joint Hindu family. On 29th June, 1953, the six brothers who constituted the Joint Hindu Family entered into a partition of the properties belonging to the Joint Family. A Motor Bus MDH 662 fell to the share of the plaintiff. At the time of partition the permit was not in the name of the defendant and some proceedings for the transfer of the permit to his name were pending, and it was recited in the deed that as soon as the route permit and registration etc., are transferred to the name of the defendant he shall have the same transferred to the name of the appellant. The defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff and in the presence of attorney the defendant admitted that three buses belonged to the plaintiff and were plying in his name as requested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that the defendant was carrying on business on his behalf as a benamidar. He accordingly prayed for a declaration. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act which was against Benami transaction as their Lordships have said in para 12 of the judgment with reads as under:—

“The learned Counsel for the respondent says that at any rate the Act (i.e, Motor Vehicles Act) does not contemplate persons applying for permits benami. In India benami transactions are recognized and not frowned upon…….”

14. Therefore in our opinion this authority also does not help the case of the plaintiffs. In that case the real owner of the vehicles as well as the permit was the plaintiff but - he had allowed the defendant to become a benamidar. Therefore the declaration and, injunction sought by the plaintiff were granted in his favour.

15. In AIR 1966 Madh Pra 13 the narration of the facts would make it clear that it has no application to the facts of this case. The portion of the judgment relating to the facts may be quoted:—

“…… Prior to the formation of firm Motor Bus and Truck plying business of Bar-wani was being carried on by Shri Dayabhai as a proprietary concern. But due to lack of proper administration the business was running in losses and to improve efficiency in management he admitted Shri Chhotabhai Poonambhai as a partner and agreed to carry on the business of bus plying and Cinemas in partnership and accordingly this partnership firm has been constituted.

16. According to the deed the capital contributed by the partners was to be credited to their respective accounts. It said nothing about the transfer to the partnership firm or any permits held by Dayabhai or by any assets including buses and trucks belonging to him…….”

17. Then in para (5a) of the judgment, it is again reiterated that such an agreement was neither illegal nor opposed to any statutory provisions. Their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that:—

“It follows from the above propositions that partnership business in transport, can be carried on the strength of a permit obtained by a partner and with a vehicle belonging to him. It can also be carried on with vehicles belonging to the partnership firm on the basis of permits obtained by a partner in respect of those vehicles, as a partner though not owner of those vehicles is clearly as a partner in possession of these vehicles. In the absence of any provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act laying down the transport business in partnership can only be done on permits issued and obtained by the firm itself and with vehicles of which the firm is the owner, it cannot be held that Sections 31, 42 and 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act are transgressed when-transport business is carried on with vehicles belonging to a partner or to the firm on the authorisation of permits held by a partner. In the partnership business done by partner with vehicles belonging to him or to the partnership firm on permits obtained and held by him, there is no transfer of vehicles or transfer of permits. There being thus no violation of any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, a partnership firm constituted for carrying on transfer business cannot be regarded as illegal merely because the partnership business is carried on by a partner on the strength of permits obtained and held by him and with vehicles belonging to him or to the partnership firm.”

18. So in all these cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents there was no transfer of permits or any share therein. Therefore, these authorities do not help the respondents at all. If however, the terms of the partnership would have been that the permit would continue in the name of the petitioner and he had joined the other partners who either invested some money or their physical or mental labour, which would entitle them to share the benefit of the partnership, keeping the permit intact in the name of the petitioner, there would have been nothing objectionable in such a partnership. It is this kind of partnership which is saved by the authorities mentioned above.

19. A further argument was made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the defendant had not transferred the permit to the plaintiffs but it was stated in the partnership deed that he would move the transport authorities for the transfer of ownership of the truck as well as the permit in favour of the plaintiffs also. Therefore, this partnership was only an agreement and as the parties were aware of the necessity of getting the route permit transferred they had put down this term in the so-called partnership; the suit of the plaintiffs was maintainable. But in our opinion this argument is Page: 169without any substance because according to the terms of this document the plaintiffs became owners of the truck as well as its permit right from 1st January, 1969, to the extent of ⅔rd. At that time admittedly there was no permission obtained from the Transport Authorities to transfer this Share in the permit to the plaintiffs. Therefore, in our opinion this partnership is hit by Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act and is illegal. The same view has been taken in a case decided by this Court viz., Mistri Alla Ditta v. Puran Chand decided on 30th April, 1962.

20. The last argument of Mr. D.D Thakur was that the transfer of the truck i.e the material of the truck did not require any permission of the Transport Authority. To that extent the partnership deed would be valid and not hit by the provisions of Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act and to that extent the suit should be allowed to proceed. But in our opinion even this argument has no strength in it. There has been no separate valuation of the truck i.e, the material of the truck and the permit as such. Both the truck and the route permit have been valued at Rs. 21,000/-. We do not know what was in the mind of the parties when they placed this valuation, what was the worth of the material of the truck and what notional value was placed on the permit. The contract is one and indivisible and cannot be separated. In such cases where part of the consideration is void, the whole contract is vitiated, Atkinson, J., observed that:—

“If any part of the consideration supporting a contract is void, it taints the whole contract with illegality; and even though a part of the consideration may be legal yet you cannot sever the illegal from the legal; the taint of illegality vitiates the entire contract.”

21. Quoted from Sanjiva Row's Contract Act, 1959, Edition, Vol. I page 436. Therefore, in our opinion the Sub-Judge was wrong in holding the suit as maintainable. The partnership in question is an illegal contract and no suit for rendition of accounts and for its dissolution can be maintained. The revision is therefore, allowed and the order of the Sub-Judge, Ramban, is set aside but as the, petitioner has taken advantage of his own fraud, we leave the parties to, bear their own costs throughout.

S.M.F Ali, C.J:— I agree.

Jaswant Singh, J.:— I also agree.

22. Revision allowed.