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Susheela Devi v. Padma Devi .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.N. Bhat, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a single Judge of the High Court dated 17-11-1966 (Ali, J.). The core procedural event was that on 29-9-1966 the trial Judge added an additional issue: “Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case the suit stands adjusted in full as alleged by the defendants?” and directed that this issue be tried along with the other issues, with the defendants to lead their evidence. A preliminary objection was taken that the order refusing to try that additional issue as a preliminary issue was not a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and therefore the appeal was not maintainable.
Relevant factual chronology recorded in the opinion:
- 23-12-1965: Parties informed trial Court that an attempt at compromise was under way; Court fixed 10-3-1966 as next date.
- 13-1-1966: Parties again requested time; Court directed them to report any compromise to the Deputy Registrar before 1-2-1966. No report was given.
- Between April and June 1966: Multiple hearings occurred (14-4-1966, 16-4-1966, 28-4-1966, 13-6-1966 and 14-6-1966); evidence of several plaintiff witnesses was recorded.
- 28-6-1966: Application presented alleging compromise on 23-4-1966 in Delhi.
- 27-9-1966: Plaintiff filed objections denying any such compromise.
- 29-9-1966: Trial Judge framed the additional issue and directed it to be tried with other issues.
- 14-11-1966: Defendant applied that the additional issue be tried as a preliminary issue.
- 17-11-1966: Trial Court disposed of pending matters, including refusal to try the additional issue as a preliminary issue — that order was impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal now dismissed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order of the single Judge refusing to try the additional issue as a preliminary issue is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 12 (referred to in the opinion) of the Letters Patent and thus appealable under the Letters Patent.
- Whether, having regard to Order 14 Rule 2 read with Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), the trial Court was bound to try the alleged compromise issue as a preliminary issue before proceeding with other evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)
- Mr. Mahajan (learned counsel for appellant) argued that the word "judgment" in the Letters Patent should be given a liberal construction such that any order deciding an important point could be treated as a judgment.
- He relied on Order 23, Rule 3 CPC which provides that when it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by agreement or compromise the Court shall record the agreement and pass a decree accordingly; thus, if the trial Court had recorded evidence on the additional issue and concluded the suit was lawfully compromised, the Court would be bound to pass decree and so the refusal to try the issue as preliminary should be regarded as a judgment and appealable.
- He cited a number of authorities and Halsbury's definition of "judgment" to support a broad interpretation of the term (authorities are listed in the Precedents section below).
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of opposing counsel's (respondent's) specific legal arguments beyond the trial Court's order and procedural history.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (how the opinion used the authority) |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1949 Bom 125 | That an order should be a judgment within the Letters Patent only if it affects the merits by determining some right or liability. | The Court observed this authority does not support the appellant's argument for a liberal meaning of "judgment." |
| AIR 1935 Cal 1 | Held that an order refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 CPC is a judgment within the Letters Patent (as cited). | Noted as one view; the Court stated there are numerous authorities to the contrary and reserved further discussion. |
| AIR 1942 Lah 95 (Full Bench) | Held the word "judgment" is not synonymous with a decree; whether an order is a judgment depends on facts and circumstances; order determining forum (e.g., refusal to transfer) can be a judgment. | Court accepted part of the view but said the conclusion that refusal to transfer is a judgment conflicts with later Supreme Court authority (AIR 1953 SC 198) and thus cannot be treated as good law in that respect. |
| AIR 1933 Bom 85 | Decision under Section 10 of CPC held to be a judgment (as cited). | Court observed that this view was not uniformly accepted by other High Courts; cited as part of the divergent authorities. |
| AIR 1924 Mad 597 | (Madras authority) An appeal lies under Letters Patent against an order refusing stay of execution pending appeal/second appeal (as cited). | Court noted this authority but also observed it had been considered in later cases; used as part of survey of conflicting authorities. |
| AIR 1963 SC 946 | (Cited among authorities presented by appellant.) | Listed among appellant's citations; the opinion does not extract a separate principle from this citation beyond listing it. |
| AIR 1953 SC 198 (Supreme Court) | Formulated two practical tests: an order is a "judgment" if it (1) terminates the suit/proceedings or (2) affects the merits of the controversy; an adjudication which is merely a step towards final adjudication is not a judgment. | The Court relied heavily on these tests from the Supreme Court to assess whether the impugned order was a "judgment" and concluded the impugned order did not meet those tests. |
| (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (Sir Arnold White, C.J.) | Test: effect of adjudication — if it puts an end to the suit or proceeding (or would do so if not complied with) it is a judgment; mere steps towards a final adjudication are not judgments. | The Court described this as a standard authority and applied the same "effect" test to the present facts, concluding the impugned order was a mere step and not a judgment. |
| AIR 1959 J & K 139; AIR 1928 Rang 20; AIR 1957 Cal 727; AIR 1949 FC 1; AIR 1958 Cal 284; AIR 1960 Cal 190; AIR 1964 Andh Pra 162 | Cited collectively as authorities favouring a liberal view of the term "judgment." | The Court listed these as part of decisions that favour a broader interpretation, but observed that, on the facts, the authorities cited by appellant did not support him. |
| AIR 1954 Mad 1053 (Full Bench) | Exhaustively dealt with case-law and held an order under Section 10 CPC staying a suit is not a "judgment" for Letters Patent purposes. | Court treated this authority as part of the body of case-law that supports a restrictive view and cited it in support of the conclusion that interlocutory procedural orders are not judgments. |
| AIR 1960 All 692 (Full Bench) | Reviewed case-law on "judgment"; held in majority that some interlocutory orders could be "judgments" (with substantial discussion and divergence reported in the opinion). | The Court noted this authority reviewed much of the case-law; used as part of the survey but did not rely on it to support the appellant's position. |
| AIR 1962 Pat 67 (Full Bench) | Held an order under Section 301 of the Succession Act was not a judgment. | Quoted as an instance where an order was held not to be a judgment; used to show other High Courts treated interlocutory orders as non-judgments. |
| AIR 1961 Punj 424 | An order setting aside an abatement was held not to be a judgment (as cited). | Used as an example of an order held not to be a judgment. |
| AIR 1957 Andh Pra 491 | An order dismissing an application under Section 10 CPC was held not to be a judgment (as cited). | Used to illustrate that Section 10 orders have been held by some Courts not to be judgments. |
| AIR 1950 Bom 345 | An order allowing an amendment was held not to be a judgment (as cited). | Quoted among authorities holding interlocutory orders are not judgments. |
| AIR 1962 Mys 108; AIR 1950 Mad 596; AIR 1943 Bom 83; AIR 1953 Kutch 32; AIR 1923 Pat 344; AIR 1932 Bom 128 | Authorities on the proper approach to preliminary issues and questions of law and fact (Order 14 R.2): issues primarily of fact should not normally be tried as preliminary issues. | The Court relied on these authorities to support the principle that where facts and evidence are involved an issue should not as a rule be tried as a preliminary issue, and thus the trial Judge was justified in directing that the additional issue be tried along with other issues. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a careful survey of the conflicting authorities and legal tests about what constitutes a "judgment" for the purposes of Letters Patent appeals. The analysis proceeded along the following lines:
-
Identification of competing tests and authorities:
- The Court recognised significant divergence in judicial opinion across High Courts and the Supreme Court about the meaning of "judgment" in Letters Patent clauses.
- It extracted two practical tests from the Supreme Court decision (AIR 1953 SC 198): (a) a "judgment" is one that terminates the suit or proceedings; or (b) it affects the merits of the controversy between the parties. Conversely, an order that is merely a step towards final adjudication is not a "judgment."
- The Court also relied on the formulation in (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (Sir Arnold White) that the correct test is the effect of the adjudication — whether it puts an end to the suit or is merely a step towards final adjudication.
-
Consideration of procedural rules invoked by appellant:
- Mr. Mahajan relied on Order 23 Rule 3 CPC (recording and decreeing where a suit is adjusted) and Order 14 Rule 2 CPC (try issues of law first if suit may be disposed of on law). The Court quoted these provisions and explained their scope.
- The Court emphasised that Order 14 Rule 2 permits trying issues of law first only where the suit is capable of disposal on the issue of law alone; where facts and evidence are necessary, or where there are mixed questions of law and fact, such issues should not ordinarily be tried as preliminary issues.
- The established law (citing several authorities) is that issues that are primarily factual should not as a rule be tried preliminarily, and when evidence on fact is required a trial on all issues avoids piecemeal litigation.
-
Application of the tests to the present facts:
- The Court found that the trial Judge had not decided any matter that affected the merits of the case nor had he terminated the proceedings. The order simply directed that the additional issue be tried along with the other issues.
- Factual background weighed against viewing the order as a judgment: the alleged compromise was said to have been effected in April 1966, but the application alleging compromise was filed only on 28-6-1966; plaintiff evidence was recorded afterwards; the appellant did not materially object to plaintiff's evidence being recorded and did not seriously object when the Judge framed the additional issue on 29-9-1966.
- Given that evidence was to be recorded on the additional issue together with other issues, the order was characterized as a mere procedural step toward final adjudication rather than a conclusive determination of rights or termination of the suit.
- The Court observed that had the trial Judge, after taking evidence, refused to record a compromise that clearly would have been a judgment and possibly appealable; but that stage had not been reached.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
- Applying the tests and authorities, the Court concluded the impugned order is not a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent (the opinion repeatedly uses analogous clause numbers from other Letters Patent provisions in case law discussion), and therefore the Letters Patent appeal was not competent.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The Court held that the order of the single Judge dated 17-11-1966 — insofar as it refused to try the additional issue as a preliminary issue and directed that the issue be tried along with other issues — is not a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, and therefore the appeal under the Letters Patent was not competent or maintainable.
- The direct effect is that the trial Court's order stands and the trial will proceed in accordance with that order (i.e., the additional issue to be tried along with the other issues and evidence to be taken accordingly).
- The Court did not purport to lay down any new, comprehensive definition of "judgment" beyond applying and endorsing the established tests; consequently, no novel precedent redefining the term was created by this judgment. The opinion expressly notes the lack of unanimity in prior authorities and relies on existing tests from case-law.
Disposition
The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. The Court recorded: "This appeal is, therefore, not competent and maintainable and is hereby dismissed."
J.N Bhat, J.:— This is a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a single judge of this Court (Ali, J.), dated 17-11-1966 whereby the learned Judge amongst other things has decided that an additional issue raised by him in this case on 29-9-1966 which was to the following effect:—
“Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case the suit stands adjusted in full as alleged by the defendants? OPD be tried along with other issues. A preliminary objection has been taken that this order is not a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the present appeal does not lie.
2. The brief facts relevant for the disposal of this preliminary objection are that, while the suit was going on between the parties in the trial Court, on 23-12-1965, it was stated by the parties before the Court that an attempt was afoot to get the case compromised. The learned Judge fixed 10th March 1966 as the date in the case. On 13th January 1966, when again this request was made to the Court, it was directed that the parties should report the compromise to the Deputy Registrar before 1st February 1966. No such intimation was given to the Deputy Registrar and nothing about a compromise was stated on a number of hearings in the case which took place on 14th April 1966, 16th April 1966, 28th April 1966, 13th and 14th June 1966. The evidence of a number of witnesses for the plaintiff was recorded by the trial Court. On 28th June 1966 an application was presented that the parties had entered into a compromise on 23rd April 1966 in Delhi. On this application the plaintiff filed her objections on 27-9-1966 wherein any such compromise having been arrived at was altogether denied. On 29th September 1966 the issue mentioned above was added by the learned Judge who ordered that this issue be tried along with other issues and the defendants were directed to lead their evidence. On 14th November 1966, an application was presented by the learned counsel for the defendant that this additional issue be tried as a preliminary issue. There were some other applications pending before the trial Court which were ultimately disposed of by its order dated 17th November 1966 which is the subject-matter of this appeal. The only grievance of the learned counsel is with respect to that portion of the order whereby the application of the defendant for trying the additional issue as a preliminary issue has been refused. Mr. Maiiajau, the learned counsel for the appellant, in order to overcome this objection of the respondent has stated that the word ‘judgment’ should be very liberally construed and any order which decides some important point would be construed as a judgment. His argument is based on the wording of O. 23, R. 3 of the CPC. Under that rule, when it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. According to Mr. Mahajan, if the trial Court had recorded evidence with respect to the additional issue and come to the conclusion that the suit had been lawfully compromised, it was bound to pass a decree in terms thereof. Therefore, the refusal of the Court to try the additional issue as a preliminary issue should be construed to be a judgment and therefore this appeal is maintainable.
3. In support of his argument Mr. Mahajan referred to the following authorities:—
AIR 1949 Bom 125; AIR 1935 Cal 1; AIR 1942 Lah 95 (FB); AIR 1933 Bom 85; AIR 1924 Mad 597 and AIR 1963 SC 946.
4. He also referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 22, p. 740. According to Halsbury, the definition of a judgment under paragraph 1603 is given as under:—
“The terms ‘judgment’ and ‘order’ in their widest sense may be said to include any decision given by a Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to a proceeding properly before the Court. The terms as used in this title exclude decisions of a Court in criminal as opposed to civil matters; and such decisions of the Court in civil matters as do not determine the main question or questions at issue between the parties for the determination of which resort has been had to the Court, but only determine preliminary or subsidiary questions relating to procedure, are not considered here in detail.”
5. The same learned author under para No. 1609 says:
“Generally speaking, an appeal from a final judgment of a Judge lies to the Court of Appeal without leave, but, with certain exceptions, no appeal lies from the interlocutory judgment or order of a Judge without the leave of the Judge or Court of Appeal.” In AIR 1949 Bom 125 (supra), although cited by Mr. Mahajan in support of his argument, it was laid down that an order of the Judge should be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and it must effect the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. Therefore, in our opinion this case does not support him.
6. In AIR 1935 Cal 1 (supra), it has been held that an order refusing to stay the suit to which the provisions of Section 10 apply is a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the letters Patent and is appealable. But there are numerous authorities to the contrary which will be discussed later.
7. In AIR 1942 Lah 95 (supra), a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court laid down that the word judgment is not synonymous with a decree. Clause 10 contemplates orders other than a judgment or a decree. Whether an order amounts to a judgment in Cl. 10 must be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. An order determining the forum in which the suit will be tried amounts to a Judgment within Cl. 10 and is therefore appealable. It was further held that an order refusing to transfer a suit is a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 10 and therefore is appealable.
8. So far as the first point decided in this case is concerned, there can be no dispute about it. But the second point, namely, that an order refusing to transfer a suit is a judgment cannot be held to be good law in view of the Supreme Court authority AIR 1953 SC 198 which shall be discussed hereinafter.
9. AIR 1933 Bom 85 (supra) pertains to the decision of a Judge under Section 10 of the CPC and it has been held to be a judgment, but this view has not been accepted in a number of other cases decided by other High Courts.
10. The Madras authority (supra) decides that an appeal lies under the Letters Patent against an order of a single Judge refusing the stay of execution pending the execution of an appeal or second appeal in the Court. But this authority has been considered in later cases decided after this authority.
11. The Supreme Court authority (supra) was a case under the U.P Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948 (3 of 1949). Under that Act an Additional Collector made an order of assessment, which was set aside under Article 226 by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on the ground that the assessment was without jurisdiction. An application for review made to the single Judge who had passed an order under Article 226 was dismissed on the ground that the U.P Act, 14 of 1956 did not apply to orders under Article 226. An appeal against the order was taken to a Division Bench but was dismissed on grounds (1) that the order dismissing review application was not a judgment within the meaning of Chap. VIII, R. 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules and was not, therefore, appealable and (2) that the U.P Act, 14 of 1956 had no application to an order made under Article 226. In the appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court it was held that the application under Article 226 was not a proceeding under the principal Act, i.e, U.P Agricultural Income-tax Act (supra) nor a continuation of a proceeding under the Act, and Section 11 of the Act, therefore, did not apply to the order of the single Judge under Article 226.
12. In this case it was further held by a majority of Judges that the order of the Division Bench dismissing the application for review of the order under Article 226 was a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, as the new Act created a right and the order decided a question relating to this right and the order was, therefore, appealable. In this case their Lordships referred to a number of other authorities. So even this authority cannot help the appellant because in this case, as would appear later in the judgment, no right of either party has been finally determined.
13. These are the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant.
14. What is a judgment for purposes of Letters Patent has been the subject-matter of discussion in numerous authorities of the different High Courts. It can safely be said that there is no unanimity of judicial opinion on this score. The Courts have off and on tried to define what a judgment for purposes of Letters Patent means, but it seems that every time the Courts have avoided giving an exhaustive definition of the word ‘judgment’ and have tried to apply the tests to the particular facts of each case. However, in a very elaborate authority of the Madras High Court in (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1, Sir Arnold White, C.J and tried to define what a judgment for this purpose should be. His Lordship observed:
“The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end Page: 74to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding. I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause. An adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.
15. I think, too, an order on an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not Instituted as a step towards judgment, but with a view to rendering the judgment effective if obtained), e.g, an order on an application of a Receiver is a judgment within the meaning of the clause.”
16. This judgment is considered to be a standard authority on the subject and has been followed more or less uniformly by most of the Courts so far. In this case the learned Chief Justice has definitely held that an adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.
17. The Supreme Court also had occasion to interpret the word ‘judgment’. In AIR 1953 SC 198, their Lordships said in para 9 of the judgment:
“In view of this wide divergence of judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this Court at some time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which the different views mentioned above purport to be based and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word ‘judgment’ as it occurs in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts.”
18. The same difficulty was experienced by their Lordships in para (12):
“As already stated, it is not our purpose in the present case to frame an exhaustive definition of the word ‘judgment’ as used in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. We have indicated what the essential features of a judgment are according to both the Calcutta and Madras High Courts and all that we need say is that in our opinion, an order under Cl. 13 of the Letters Patent does not satisfy the tests of a ‘judgment’ as formulated by either of these High Courts.”
19. Therefore, even the Supreme Court in the conflict of decisions on this point has not so far been able to finally give a comprehensive and a final interpretation to the word ‘judgment’ as used in the Letters Patent of the different High Courts. But this judgment has laid down two tests which are to the effect (1) an order, in order to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent, should terminate the suit or the proceedings, or (2) affect the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself. But if it is only an adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaning a final adjudication in the suit, it is not a judgment at all. In the Supreme Court case (supra), however, the point decided was that an order for the transfer of a suit which was made under Cl. 13 of the Letters Patent was not a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and therefore was held not to be appealable, because it neither affected the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself nor did it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground.
20. It may be stated that basically there are three views as to what constitutes a judgment. A decision according to one view will amount to a judgment if it determines some right or liability affecting the merits of the dispute between the parties. According to the second the essential requirement is that it puts an end to the proceedings, so far as the Court in which those proceedings are pending is concerned, and according to the third view a judgment means a decree which determines the rights of the parties in any matters in dispute.
21. Even this Court in 1965 Kash LJ 244 : (AIR 1965 J and K 118) has had occasion to consider the meaning of the word ‘judgment’ as understood in the Letters Patent, and has reviewed a number of authorities discussing this point. Some of the authorities which favour a liberal view of the interpretation of the term ‘judgment’ may be mentioned as under:—
AIR 1959 J and K 139; AIR 1928 Rang 20; AIR 1957 Cal 727; AIR 1949 FC 1; AIR 1958 Cal 284; AIR 1960 Cal 190 and AIR 1964 Andh Pra 162.
22. Out of the authorities that we come across on the definition of the word ‘judgment’ two authorities, namely, AIR 1954 Mad 1053 (FB) and AIR 1960 All 692 (FB) have exhaustively dealt with the case-law on the subject and in the latter authority in our opinion almost the whole case has been reviewed. The Madras authority was considering a case in which an order under Section 10 of the CPC staying a suit was concerned. Their Lordships, held that an order made under Section 10 of the CPC, or any other provision of law for the stay of a trial of a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of that term in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and would therefore not be appealable.
23. Similarly in the Allahabad authority the majority held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing an appeal against an order granting temporary injunction was a judgment, but Srivastava, J., who wrote a more exhaustive judgment than the majority judgment disagreed with this view. A few more authorities only need be mentioned.
24. In AIR 1962 Pat 67 (FB), an order passed under Section 301 of the Succession Act, was eld not to be a judgment.
25. In AIR 1961 Punj 424, an order setting aside an abatement was held not to be a judgment.
26. Similarly, in AIR 1957 Andh Pra 491, an order dismissing an application under Section 10 of the CPC, was held not to be a judgment.
27. In AIR 1950 Bom 345, an order allowing an amendment was held not to be a judgment.
28. There are many other authorities which need not be multiplied.
29. Applying the broad tests laid down by the Supreme Court and by the different High Courts to the facts of this case, let us examine whether the order complained of amounts to a judgment or not. We have clearly shown that the authorities relied upon by Mr. Mahajan do not at all support him. In addition to the authorities cited by him, we have cited some more authorities which favour a rather liberal construction of the term ‘judgment’ as used in the Letters Patent. According to Mr. Mahajan, under O. 14, R. 2, read with O. 23, R. 3, the learned Judge was bound to decide the additional issue first. The relevant provisions of O. 23, R. 3, have been quoted above. We might in passing refer to O. 14, R. 2 also. This rule contemplates that, when both issues of law and fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part there of may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try that issue first. This rule contemplates that the suit should be capable of being disposed of on issue of law only, where, however, facts have to be inquired into and evidence has to be taken or where there are mixed questions of law and fact, they shall not be tried as preliminary issues. The law as laid down by various authorities on this point is that, where an appealable case is tried by a Court and when issues of fact are involved, the proper procedure is that evidence on all issues should be taken in order to obviate the necessity of piecemeal trial of cases, and where an issue which is primarily an issue of fact is involved in a case, it should not as a rule be tried as a preliminary issue. Reference may in this connection be made to AIR 1962 Mys 108; AIR 1950 Mad 596; AIR 1943 Bom 83; AIR 1953 Kutch 32 (sic); AIR 1923 Pat 344; AIR 1932 Bom 128 so on.
30. Here the learned Judge has not decided any matter which affects the merits of the case; he has not decided any issue which finally terminates the proceedings of the case before him. All that he has said is that this issue may be tried along with other issues. Without meaning any reflection on the merits of the alleged compromise, it is interesting to note that the compromise is alleged to have been effected in April 1966. An application in regard to this alleged compromise was put in the Court as late as 28-6-1966 and even after that date till the additional issue was framed, on 29-9-1966, evidence of the plaintiff was being recorded and no objection was taken by the present appellant who was propounding this compromise to the evidence of the plaintiff being recorded. On 29-9-1966 also the appellant did not raise any serious objection to the additional issue being tried along with other issues as contained in the order of the Court of that date. In the order under appeal all that the learned Judge has said is that the additional issue be tried along with the other issues already framed in the case. He has not decided any matter; he has only disposed of a matter which is a mere step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit and, therefore, according to all the authorities cited above, this order cannot by any stretch of imagination be designated as a judgment. If the learned Judge had, after taking evidence, come to the conclusion that, although a compromise was arrived at, refused to record the same, that would be a judgment and may be held to be appealable. That stage has not at all come yet. All that the learned Judge has directed is that the evidence may be produced with respect to the additional issue as well as other issues so that, when the case is finally decided, recourse may not be taken to piecemeal decision and piecemeal appeals in the same case. The suit has not been finally decided by this order, nor has any important matter which decides the merits of the case been disposed of by the order under appeal. Therefore, in our opinion, the order passed by the trial Court which is the subject-matter of this appeal is not a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. This appeal is, therefore, not competent and maintainable and is hereby dismissed.
TC/D.V.C
31. Appeal dismissed.
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