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Partap Singh v. Dalip Singh

Allahabad High Court
Jan 22, 1930
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Summary of the Opinion — First Appeals Nos. 439 of 1926 and 198 of 1928

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two first appeals heard together: F.A. No. 439 of 1926 (Partap Singh v. Dalip Singh) and F.A. No. 198 of 1928 (Dalip Singh v. Mt. Ghasiti and Partap Singh). A registered deed of partition dated 30 May 1923 recorded that Dalip Singh separated from the joint family, receiving one-third by the terms of the deed, while the remaining two-thirds were retained by Partap Singh and his minor son Bir Singh.

Dalip Singh instituted various suits: suit No. 161 of 1924 (damages for alleged fraud; withdrawn), suit No. 256 of 1924 (partition against Partap Singh and Bir Singh; withdrawn after Bir Singh's death), and suit No. 303 of 1925 (claiming half the family property against Partap Singh alone). On 24 August 1926 the trial Court granted a decree to Dalip Singh for half the joint family property. Mt. Ghasiti (wife of Partap Singh and stepmother of Dalip) applied on 13 August 1926 to be joined in Dalip's suit; the application was rejected as too late. Separately, on 21 August 1926 Mt. Ghasiti brought suit No. 239 of 1926 claiming entitlement to one-third or at least one-fourth of the family property; on 30 March 1928 a different Subordinate Judge decreed that she was entitled to a share equal to the respective shares of her husband and her stepson (described in that decree as one-third).

Because these decrees conflict — one directing division into two equal shares and the other into three equal shares — the Court heard both appeals together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of partition dated 30 May 1923 was vitiated by fraud as found by the learned Subordinate Judge.
  2. If the partition deed is set aside, what is the correct method and date for determining the composition of the undivided family and the shares due to parties (i.e., whether to regard the state of the family in 1923 or the persons alive at the date of suit)?
  3. Whether Mt. Ghasiti (the wife/stepmother) lost any right to claim a share by acquiescence or delay in 1923, and whether she is entitled under Hindu law to a share on partition during the lifetime of the father.
  4. Who benefited from the death of Bir Singh (a son who died after the 1923 partition but before the present suit) in terms of the joint family property?
  5. How should the conflicting decrees be reconciled and what shares should be allotted to Dalip Singh, Partap Singh and Mt. Ghasiti?

Arguments of the Parties

Partap Singh (appellant in F.A. No. 439 of 1926)

  • Contended that the state of the joint family in 1923 should be taken into account to ascertain the share now due to Dalip Singh (i.e., rights fixed as of the 1923 partition).
  • Partap's counsel maintained that the deed of partition effected a partition separating Dalip in 1923, and accordingly Dalip should be treated as having separated then.
  • Partap (in evidence) said: "I did not consult my wife when I separated from Dalip Singh or Surat Singh," a fact relied on in assessing Mt. Ghasiti's knowledge of the 1923 partition.

Dalip Singh (appellant in F.A. No. 198 of 1928 and plaintiff in related original suits)

  • Contended that the persons composing the joint family who were alive at the date of the present suit should be the basis for ascertaining shares (i.e., Dalip argued that subsequent deaths might affect share entitlements).
  • Challenged the fairness of the 30 May 1923 deed and alleged fraud; the learned Subordinate Judge found fraud based on evidence including a commissioner's report and valuations.
  • Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (for Dalip) relied upon several rulings and authorities to show the legal position concerning the wife's or mother's entitlement under Hindu law (see precedents below).

Mt. Ghasiti (respondent and party seeking share)

  • Maintained that she was entitled to a share on partition and in suit No. 239 of 1926 sought a declaration to that effect (one-third or one-fourth).
  • In evidence she at times stated she was unaware that any division took place in 1923; other oral evidence contradicted that assertion, and the Court found she knew a partition was taking place but did not make a claim then.
  • Dr. Katju (for Mt. Ghasiti) relied upon authorities (notably Dalar Koeri v. Dwarkanath) that support a wife's entitlement to a share on partition during the father's lifetime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent / Authority Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mitakshara, Chapter 1, Section 7 States that when a distribution is made during the life of the father, the participation of his wives equally with his sons has been directed. The Court relied on this text as a primary doctrinal basis to hold that the wife of a Hindu father is entitled to a share equal to that of the father or sons when partition occurs during the father's lifetime.
Yajnavalkya (quoted in S.S. Setlur, "Inheritance", p.9) Text: "If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like portions." The Court cited this text to support the proposition that a wife should share equally where the father makes equal allotments at partition, reinforcing the conclusion that Mt. Ghasiti is entitled to an equal share.
Bilaso v. Dinanath [1881] 3 All. 88 A Full Bench considered Mitakshara and held that the mother could share with the sons after the death of the father (did not address partition during father's life). The Court noted this authority as supporting the mother's/shareholder status after the father's death, but observed it did not directly decide partitions made during the father's life.
Beti Kunwar v. Janki Kunwar [1911] 33 All. 118 Held in a partition among sons after the father's death that the mother had a right to a share on the ground she would have been entitled to it on partition. Used as supportive authority by counsel and noted by the Court to indicate recognition of a mother's right in certain partition contexts (post-death), contributing to the Court's view on wives' rights.
Dalar Koeri v. Dwarkanath [1905] 32 Cal. 234 Case of partition during the lifetime of the father; held that his two wives had rights and the property was divided into nine shares. Directly cited by the Court as an example where partition during the father's life resulted in wives being given shares; this authority supported the Court's conclusion that Mt. Ghasiti had a right to share during the father's life.
Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad [1912] 34 All. 505 Full Bench considered whether the grandmother (mother of the father) had a right to share; held the texts relate to the wife of the father and not to the father's mother. The Court treated this decision as implicitly supporting the proposition that the wife of the father is entitled to share in a partition between a father and his sons (the Full Bench recognised the wife's right while denying the grandmother's).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the matters in logical sequence:

  1. Fraud and validity of the 30 May 1923 deed: The Court reviewed the commissioner's report and valuation evidence. The commissioner's figures showed total family property value in 1923 at Rs. 1,12,663 while property allotted to Dalip Singh was valued at Rs. 21,490 (a little less than one-fifth), despite the deed stating a one-third allotment. A witness (Ratan Singh) gave rental-based calculations showing Dalip's allotment amounted to one-sixth of rental value. On this basis the Court agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge that fraud vitiated the partition deed and the deed should be set aside.
  2. Effect of the partition deed with respect to joint family status: Although counsel agreed that the 1923 deed effected a partition and that after that partition the property ceased to be joint family property (even if it remained jointly owned), the Court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge's finding that the plaintiff remained a member of a joint Hindu family after the partition. The Court observed that even apart from the deed, a 1924 suit for partition would have the effect of separating the family.
  3. Appropriate date for determining share entitlements: The Court considered competing contentions: Partap's submission to regard the state of the family in 1923 versus Dalip's submission to regard those alive at the date of suit. The Court concluded Dalip must be regarded as having separated in 1923; therefore, the later death of Bir Singh cannot increase Dalip's share.
  4. Mt. Ghasiti's acquiescence and knowledge: The Court examined oral testimony about Mt. Ghasiti's awareness of the 1923 partition. While some witnesses suggested she knew of the partition and did not then claim, there was no evidence she knew in 1923 that she had a legal right to a share on partition. The Court observed that the proposition that a Hindu mother in her position is entitled to a share on partition was not widely known. Given that absence of knowledge of a legal right, the Court held there was no bar of acquiescence preventing Mt. Ghasiti from now asserting her legal rights.
  5. Substantive right of a wife to share on partition during father's life: The Court examined textual authorities (Mitakshara and Yajnavalkya) and reported cases. On the basis of these texts and authorities (including Dalar Koeri and Sheo Narain considered by the Court), it held that where a partition occurs between a Hindu father and his sons, the wife of the father has a right to a share equal to that of the father or the sons.
  6. Application to the present family state (1923): Taking the composition of the family as of 1923 — father, mother (Mt. Ghasiti) and two sons (Dalip and Bir) — the Court determined that Mt. Ghasiti's share in 1923 was one-fourth of the joint family property.
  7. Effect of Bir Singh's subsequent death: By the 1923 partition, Dalip had one separate share and the remainder was to be held jointly by Partap and Bir. On Bir's death (after 1923 and before the present suit), Partap took the whole of the property that had been held jointly by survivorship.
  8. Reconciliation of conflicting decrees and final apportionment: Having set aside the fraudulent aspects of the 1923 deed and determined the legal entitlements, the Court adjusted the earlier decrees to reflect that Mt. Ghasiti is entitled to one-fourth (not one-third) and recalculated Dalip's and Partap's shares accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • F.A. No. 198 of 1928 (Dalip Singh v. Mt. Ghasiti & Partap Singh): Allowed to the extent that Mt. Ghasiti's share is held to be one-fourth of the joint family property (and not one-third). Costs are to be apportioned proportionately to success and failure.
  • F.A. No. 439 of 1926 (Partap Singh v. Dalip Singh): The Court held that the deed of partition of 30 May 1923 was vitiated by fraud and set it aside. The Court determined that Dalip Singh's share is one-fourth and Partap Singh's share is one-half. Each side was awarded half costs.
  • Administrative direction: In F.A. No. 439 the lower Court is directed to make Mt. Ghasiti a party and, in carrying out the partition, to allot her one-fourth of the property less ornaments valued at Rs. 500 (which the Court holds she received at the time of her marriage).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Shares are adjusted so that Mt. Ghasiti receives one-fourth, Dalip receives one-fourth, and Partap receives one-half (subject to deduction for ornaments valued at Rs. 500 received by Mt. Ghasiti). The conflicting earlier decrees are reconciled accordingly.
  • On precedent: The Court applied existing texts and case law (Mitakshara, Yajnavalkya, and reported cases) to confirm that a wife may be entitled to an equal share where partition occurs during the father's lifetime. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new legal precedent beyond its application of these authorities to the facts before it; the decision's practical consequence is the adjustment of the parties' shares in this dispute.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and conclusions contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. These are two first appeals, one being No. 439 of 1926 brought by Partap Singh against Dalip Singh and the other No. 198 of 1928 by Dalip Singh against Mt. Ghasiti and Partap Singh. The family tree is as follows:

Partap Singh ________|___________ | | Mt. Ghasiti Mt. Nankadei (died | 16 or 17 years ago).
"3. On 30th May 1923 there was a registered deed of partition by which Dalip Singh separated, obtaining one-third share of the joint family property and the remaining two-thirds shares were retained by Partap Singh and his minor son Bir Singh who was then alive. Subsequently Dalip Singh brought a suit No. 161 of 1924 against his father Partap Singh claiming damages for fraud, but he withdrew that suit. Again on 20th November 1924 Dalip Singh sued for partition against Partap Singh and Bir Singh in suit No. 256 of 1924 on the ground that the deed of partition of 30th May 1923 was unfair, and that he desired that the properties should be re-partitioned. During the pendency of that suit Bir Singh died, and on 5th September 1925 Dalip Singh withdrew his suit, and on 12th September 1925 Dalip Singh filed his present suit No. 303 of 1925, claiming half share of the family property. That suit by Dalip Singh was brought against his father Partap Singh alone. On 13th August 1926 Mt. Ghasiti, wife of Partap Singh and stepmother of Dalip Singh, made an application to the Court asking that she should be joined as a party to that suit, and that she should get a share on partition. That application was rejected, because it was hold it was made late after the evidence for the plaintiff had been closed, and the Court proceeded to grant a decree to Dalip Singh for half of the joint family property on 24th August 1926. Prior to this decree on 21st August 1926, Mt. Ghasiti brought a suit No. 239 of 1926 against her husband Partap Singh and her step-son Dalip Singh, claiming that she should get a declaration that at the time of partition between her husband and her stepson she was entitled to one-third or at least one-fourth of the family property. On 30th March 1928 a different Subordinate Judge has granted a decree to Mt. Ghasiti that she is entitled to a share in the family property equal to the respective shares of her husband and her stepson, i.e., one-third of the joint family property."

4. It is, therefore, evident that the partition Court is faced with a considerable difficulty as there are two conflicting decrees, one of which lays down that this joint family property is to be divided into two equal shares between Partap Singh and Dalip Singh, and the other decree declares that it is to be divided into three equal shares between Dalip Singh, Partap Singh and Mt. Ghasiti. We have heard these two appeals together as it is impossible to decide one without reference to the other.

5. We will first deal with the first appeal No. 439 of 1926 by Partap Singh. That appeal is chiefly against the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that there was a fraud committed by Partap Singh on his son Dalip Singh. We have been taken through the evidence in this connexion which consists chiefly of the finding of a commissioner appointed by the Court. The commissioner's report shows that the total value of the family property in 1923 was Rs. 1,12,663 and the total value of the property allotted to Dalip Singh was Rs. 21,490, that is Dalip Singh received a little less than one-fifth of the family property, whereas the deed of partition, states that he is to receive one-third. This conclusion is further supported by a calculation given by a witness, Ratan Singh, as to the rental value of the family property. This calculation shows that Dalip Singh received property yielding one-sixth rental of the joint family property.

6. We consider that the learned Subordinate Judge was correct in finding that there was fraud which vitiated the partition deed of 30th May 1923. Accordingly we agree with his conclusion that the partition deed should be set aside. It is common ground between learned counsel on either side that this deed of partition effected a partition of the joint family and that subsequent to that partition the property ceased to be joint family property, though it still may have remained as joint property. We do not agree with the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point and we consider that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in holding that the plaintiff still remained a member of a joint Hindu family after that partition. We may note that even apart from the deed of partition the suit for partition, which the plaintiff brought in 1924, would also have the effect of separating the joint family.

7. It was contended by the learned counsel for Partap Singh that regard was to be had to the state of the joint family in 1923 in order to ascertain the amount of share to which Dalip Singh is now entitled. On the other hand it was contended for Dalip Singh that we should have regard to the persons composing the joint family who happened to be alive at the date of suit. This point is of importance, because the minor Bir Singh, who was alive in 1923, was dead before the date of the present suit. Therefore there is now one person less in the joint family to take a share on partition. Is advantage of this fact to accrue to Dalip Singh or is it to accrue to other members of the joint family? We consider that Dalip Singh must be regarded as having separated from the joint family in 1923, and therefore the subsequent death of a member of the joint family cannot increase the share to which he is now entitled.

8. We now turn to the appeal of Dalip Singh against the decree in favour of Mt. Ghasiti. The first point with which we are concerned is the argument that whatever rights Mt. Ghasiti might be entitled to under Hindu law she has lost those rights by her failure to put forward a claim in 1923 to a share on the partition effected by the deed of 30th May 1923, that is that by acquiescence in the position that only the male members of the family should divide the property between them, she has lost her rights to obtain a share now. As is usual in oral evidence we find that each side overstated their case grossly. Mt. Ghasiti put forward the case that she was not aware at all that there was any division of the property in 1923. She was not supported in her allegation by her father Fateh Chand or by her hushand Partap Singh. Her husband Partap Singh says: I did not consult my wife when I separated from Dalip Singh or Surat Singh.

" But the allegation that he did not consult her is quite different from the allegation that she was not aware of what was taking place. On the other hand, we have the statement of Dalip Singh: This partition was talked over in the chauk in the presence of the plaintiff (Mt. Ghasiti)."
Mt. Bhagwandei, wife of Dalip Singh, has given evidence that Mt. Ghasiti knew all about the partition and that there was a dispute in regard to the ornaments of Dalip Singh's mother and that Mt. Ghasiti was successful in inducing her husband to give her those ornaments. We, therefore, consider that Mt. Ghasiti did know that there was a partition taking place at the time that it took place, and that she did not make any claim to have a share in that partition.

9. But it is nowhere stated in evidence that Mt. Ghasiti had any knowledge in 1923 that she had a right to receive a share on partition. The proposition of law that a Hindu mother in the position of Mt. Ghasiti is entitled to a share on partition is not a proposition which is at all well known, and in fact we have had a long and able argument from the learned counsel on the opposite side that she is not entitled to any share on a partition. Under the circumstances of the present case we consider, therefore, that there is no bar of acquiescence against the assertion by Mt. Ghasiti of the rights to which she is entitled under Hindu law.

10. We now come to a consideration of what those rights are. In Mitakshara Ch. 1, Section 7, it is laid down:

When a distribution is made during the life of the father, the participation of his wives equally with his sons, has been directed,

11. In Hindu law-books on' Inheritance by Mr. S.S. Setlur, p. 9, there is quoted a text of Yajnavalkya in dealing with the partition by a father:

If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like portions.

12. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, on behalf of Dalip Singh, has laid before us various rulings as follows: In Bilaso v. Dinanath [1881] 3 All. 88 a Pull Bench of this Court considered the text of Mitakshara and held that the mother could share with the sons after the death of the father. That ruling did not consider the case of a partition made during the lifetime of the father. In Beti Kunwar v. Janki Kunwar [1911] 33 All. 118, there was also the case of a partition among the sons after the death of the father, and it was held that the mother had a right to a share on the ground that she would have been entitled to it on partition.

13. On the other hand, Dr. Katju, who has ably argued the case on behalf of Mt. Ghasiti, refers to Dalar Koeri v. Dwarkanath [1905] 32 Cal. 234. In this case the family tree was as follows:

Dwarkanath _____________|___________ | | =Dular Koeri =Mt. Maina Koeri Brindranath | plaintiff. Sons Defts. 2, 3 and 4.

14. This was a case of partition during the lifetime of the father, and it was held that his two wives had rights to shares and the property was divided into nine shares.

15. The next case to which allusion was made is Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad [1912] 34 All. 505. In this case the family tree was as follows:

Janki Prasad Deft.

16. There was before the Full Bench a question as to whether Janki Prasad's mother, Mt. Maina, the grandmother of the plaintiff, had a right to a share in a partition, and it was held that the texts of Mitakshara and other authorities only relate to the wife of the father and not to the mother of the father in the partition between a father and his sons. Accordingly it was held that the grandmother was not entitled to a share in a partition between the father and his sons, but it was no where contested that the lower Court was not correct in awarding a share to Mt. Ramdei, the wife of Janki Prasad, the father with whom the partition was being made in that case. Accordingly we may consider by implication that this Pull Bench ruling supports the claim of the wife of a father to a partition along with the father and his sons.

17. We consider that the texts of Mitakshara and Yajnavalkya and the authorities which we have quoted are authority for the proposition that where there is a partition between a Hindu father and his sons the wife of the Hindu father has a right to a share equal to that of the father or the sons. Accordingly we consider that in the present case Mt. Ghasiti has a right to a share equally with her husband and sons. Taking the state of the family, as it stood in 1923, there were at the time the father, the mother and two sons in the undivided family. Accordingly the share of Mt. Ghasiti in 1923 was one-fourth of the joint family property.

18. One other matter remains for decision and that is who obtained the benefit of the death of Bir Singh subsequent to the partition of 1923 and before the present suit. By that partition the property was divided into two shares one of which was allotted to Dalip Singh and the remainder of the property was to be held jointly by Partap Singh and his son Bir Singh. Therefore we consider that Partap Singh and his son Bir Singh continued to form a joint Hindu family and on the death of Bir Singh. Partap Singh took the whole of that property which had belonged previously to the joint family by survivorship.

19. We now come to the effect of our decision on the two appeals before us. The appeal No. 198 of 1928 by Dalip Singh is allowed to this extent that we hold that the share which is to be allotted to Mt. Ghasiti is to be one-fourth and not one-third. Costs in this appeal will be granted proportionately to success and failure.

20. In the appeal of Partap Singh No. 439 of 1926, we hold that the share of Dalip Singh is one-fourth and the share of Partap Singh is one-half. As to costs, we allow each side half costs.

21. The result is that in F.A. No. 439 we direct that the lower Court will make Mt. Ghasiti a party and in carrying out the partition she will be allotted one-fourth share of the property less the ornaments of the value of Rs. 500 which we hold, with the Court below, she received at the time of her marriage.