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Karam Singh v. Transport Commissioner And Another .

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Jun 3, 1964
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Factual and Procedural Background

The case is a Letters Patent appeal from an order of Bhat, J., dismissing a writ petition that sought to quash respondent No.1's order discharging the petitioner from service. The petitioner had been a permanent driver in the Transport Department since 1950. He was suspended on 6 August 1962, served with a charge-sheet on 17 August 1962, and a departmental enquiry was held. The petitioner was discharged on 27 August 1963; a copy of the discharge order was said to have been given to him on 12 September 1963. The petitioner argued that the discharge violated Section 126 of the State Constitution (Jammu & Kashmir) because he was not served with the notice to show cause required by that provision. The Single Judge accepted that no such notice was served but upheld the discharge on the ground that the appointing authority had recorded reasons for not complying with Section 126 and that the case fell within proviso (b) to Section 126. The present appeal raises the limited question whether the petitioner’s case is fully covered by proviso (b) to Section 126.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the facts and reasons recorded by the appointing authority bring the petitioner’s case within proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution (i.e., whether it was "not reasonably practicable" to give the petitioner an opportunity of showing cause).
  2. Whether the appointing authority's statement that it was "neither desirable nor practicable" to give notice satisfies the requirements of proviso (b) to Section 126.
  3. Whether an admission of guilt and an apology (as asserted by one side) can dispense with the mandatory notice requirement under Section 126(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The discharge from service violated the provisions of Section 126 of the State Constitution because no notice to show cause (as required by Section 126(2)) was served on him before dismissal.
  • Proviso (b) to Section 126 contemplates cases where it is not reasonably practicable to give notice (e.g., non-availability of the delinquent); it does not cover mere considerations of expediency or desirability. The appointing authority's reliance on "desirable" was outside the scope of proviso (b).
  • The petitioner denied any categorical admission of guilt or that an apology could dispense with the constitutional notice requirement; even if an apology were tendered, it would not negate the mandatory notice requirement under Section 126(2).

Respondent / Appointing Authority's Arguments

  • The appointing authority recorded reasons for not giving notice, stating that "In view of serious offence involving defence stores, it is neither desirable nor practicable to issue any notice to the driver and cleaner to be discharges from the department." The Single Judge held that these reasons brought the case within proviso (b) to Section 126.
  • It was also contended (as an argument addressed by the Court) that the petitioner had admitted guilt and offered an apology at the conclusion of the departmental enquiry, and that therefore no further notice under Section 126(2) was necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re, Affairs of Farquhar; 1943-2 All ER 781 Establishes that the word "practicable" should not be construed to mean "equitable", "fair" or "reasonable". The Court relied on this authority to support the interpretation that "practicable" means possible or feasible, not a synonym for expediency or desirability.
State of Orissa v. P. Krishnaswami Murty, AIR 1964 Orissa 29 Explains that although the superior authority's satisfaction (that notice is impracticable) is declared final by clause (3) of Article 311, courts retain limited jurisdiction to examine the reasons to ensure there was no "unreasonable readiness" or failure to apply the mind to relevant facts; the satisfaction is subjective yet justiciable to an extent. The Court agreed with these observations and relied upon them to hold that the appointing authority's recorded reasons remain amenable to limited judicial scrutiny; the reasons offered here did not demonstrate impracticability as contemplated by proviso (b).
Meghraj v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1956 Raj 28 Holds that even where an apology is tendered and an oral inquiry may not be necessary, the authority must still, after deciding punishment, ask the delinquent to show cause why the punishment should not be imposed; failure to do so renders dismissal improper. The Court used this decision to reject the contention that an apology or admission absolved the appointing authority from serving the mandatory show-cause notice under Section 126(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework: sub-clause (2) of Section 126 requires the service of notice to show cause at two stages (when enquiry becomes necessary and when a tentative decision regarding punishment is reached), and proviso (b) permits an authority to dispense with the notice only if it is "satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause." Sub-section (3) declares the deciding authority's satisfaction on practicability to be final.

The Court analysed the language of proviso (b) and focussed on the meaning of "reasonably practicable." It relied upon dictionary definitions and Re, Affairs of Farquhar to conclude that "practicable" means possible or feasible with due diligence and is not synonymous with considerations of expediency, desirability or reasonableness in a general sense.

The Court contrasted proviso (b) with proviso (c), noting that proviso (c) (which allows the Sadar-i-Riyasat to withhold the opportunity in the interests of State security) expressly addresses expediency and vests absolute discretion in the highest authority. From this contrast the Court inferred that the Constitution-makers intended two distinct contingencies: (i) impracticability or non-availability of the delinquent (covered by proviso (b) and exercisable by the appointing authority), and (ii) considerations of State security/expediency (covered by proviso (c) and for decision by the Sadar-i-Riyasat).

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the appointing authority's recorded reason — that because of a "serious offence involving defence stores" it was "neither desirable nor practicable" to issue notice — did not show the kind of impracticability contemplated by proviso (b). The use of the word "desirable" indicated a consideration of expediency rather than impracticability. The Court observed that because the petitioner had been afforded the opportunity to defend himself at the departmental enquiry, it was inconsistent to hold that it was not reasonably practicable to give him the second-stage notice when a tentative decision on punishment had been formed.

The Court further addressed the appointing authority's asserted finality under sub-section (3), accepting the principle from State of Orissa that a subjective satisfaction is final but justiciable to the limited extent necessary to ensure absence of gross unreasonableness or failure to apply mind to relevant facts. On the record, the Court concluded the reasons recorded did not demonstrate impracticability; rather they reflected an inadmissible appeal to desirability/expediency, which proviso (b) did not permit.

Lastly, the Court rejected the contention that any admission or apology by the petitioner obviated the need for the statutory notice: even assuming an apology was tendered, Section 126(2) is a constitutional provision that must be complied with, and the Court relied on Meghraj to show that an apology does not eliminate the duty to afford the show-cause opportunity at the punishment stage.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF DISCHARGE SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences and remedial orders made by the Court:

  • The writ of certiorari was issued and the respondent's order dated 27-8-1963 discharging the petitioner from service was set aside.
  • The petitioner is to be deemed to have continued in service.
  • The authorities are permitted, if they think fit, to take further action against the petitioner after complying with the provisions of Section 126(2) of the State Constitution (i.e., by giving the statutorily mandated opportunity to show cause).
  • There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case.

The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal implications beyond these direct effects on the parties; it focuses on the application and interpretation of proviso (b) to Section 126 in the facts before the Court.

Show all summary ...

Fazl Ali, J.:— This is a Letters patent appeal against an order of (Bhat, J.) dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner for quashing the order of respondent No. 1 discharging him from service.

2. The petitioner was a permanent employee in the Transport Department having been appointed as a driver in the year 1950. On 6th August, 1962 the petitioner was suspended by the Traffic Manager and charge sheet was given to him on 17-8-1962. Thereafter a departmental enquiry was held and ultimately he was discharged from service on 27th August, 1963. According to the petitioner the order of discharge was not communicated to him but a copy of the same was given to him on 12-9-1963. The petitioner contended that the termination of his service was in violation of the provisions of Section 126 of the Constitution of the State and, therefore, void. The learned Judge accepted the contention of the petitioner that he was a permanent employee and that no notice as contemplated by Section 126 of the Constitution of the State to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him was served upon him before he was discharged from service. The order of discharge, however, was upheld by the learned Judge on the ground that the appointing authority had given reasons for not complying with the provisions of Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the case of the petitioner fell within the proviso (B) to that Section. In the present appeal, we are called upon to decide the limited question as to whether or not the case of the petitioner is fully covered by the proviso (B) to Section 126 of the Constitution of the State. It appears that the appointing authority had mentioned the following reasons for not giving notice to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him.

“In view of serious offence involving defence stores, it is neither desirable nor practicable to issue any notice to the driver and cleaner to be discharges from the department.”

3. In fact these reasons were given by the Deputy Transport Commissioner which were confirmed by the Transport Commissioner. The contention of the petitioner is that proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution contemplates a case where it is neither practicable nor feasible to give a notice to the petitioner and considerations of expediency are outside the scope of that proviso. In order to appreciate his contention it will be necessary for us to analyse proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution which runs thus:

“Where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause;”

4. Sub-section (3) of Section 126 of the State Constitution may be quoted thus:

“If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any person an opportunity of showing cause under sub-section (2), the decision Page: 55thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final”.

5. An analysis of these provisions would show that a delinquent may be deprived of the protection given to him under Section 126 of the State Constitution, only if the conditions mentioned in the proviso are satisfied. These conditions are as follows:

1. That the authority concerned must be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to give the petitioner an opportunity of showing cause.

2. That the authority concerned must give reasons for such a satisfaction.

6. The argument in the present case centres round the interpretation of the word “reasonably practicable”. In Webster's Dictionary the word “practicable” has been defined as possible to practice or perform, capable of being put into practice, done, feasible. Similarly in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at page 2258 the word “practicable” has been defined as possible. Further it was held in Re, Affairs of Farquhar; 1943-2 All ER 781 that the word “Practicable” cannot be construed as meaning “equitable” or “fair” or “reasonable”. In our opinion, before the aforesaid proviso applies so as to deprive an employee of the Constitutional protection afforded to him by Section 126 of the State Constitution, it must be shown that it was not possible or feasible with, due diligence to afford him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him impracticability for not giving such an opportunity may arise out of various circumstances. For instance an employee may be at such a place that it would not be reasonably possible to ensure his attendance or such other similar cases. In the instant case the only reason given by the authority concerned was that the petitioner was found guilty of having stolen defence stores. Such an eventuality, in our opinion, could not have been contemplated by the language used by the aforesaid proviso. Moreover proviso (C) which runs thus:

“Where the sadar-i-Riyasat is satisfied that in the interests of the security of the State it is not expedient to give that person such an opporunity”, vests an absolute discretion in the Sadar-i-Riyasat in denying the opportunity to a delinquent if the Saddar-i-Riyasat is satisfied that it is not expedient to give such an opportunity.

7. Thus analysing the language of Provisos (b) and (c) of Section 126 of the State Constitution it seems to us that the Constitution makers intended that where the question of expediency relating to the Security of the State or such other reason is involved, the power to dispense with the provisions of Section 126 of the State Constitution should be given to the highest authority in the State alone. The Constitution Makers also seem to have comtemplated a contingency where due to non-availability of the delinquent, or for some such similar reason, it may not be possible or feasible to give an opportunity to the delinquent of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. It was for such a contingency that a provision has been made in Proviso (b) to Section 126 of the Constitution of the State where the appointing authority has got the power to dispense with the compliance of Section 126(2) of the State Constitution after giving reasons for the same. Thus the Constitution Makers by engrafting provisos (b) and (c) contemplated two separate and different contingencies, in one case practicability was the test and in the other expediency has been made the ground for not complying with the provisions of Section 126 clause (2) of the State Constitution.

8. If the Legislature Intended that the word “Practicable” should be wide enough to include considerations of expediency, it should have been expressly stated in the language of proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution. The protection afforded to a delinquent under sub-clause (2) of Section 126 is an important constitutional right of an employee so as to guarantee security of service. There must be compelling reasons to deprive a delinquent of such a protection. It is only in special cases, where it is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State that a delinquent has to be deprived of this right and that too not by the appointing authority but by the highest authority in the State. In our opinion, therefore, the word “reasonably practicable” as used in proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution envisages a contingency where a delinquent is not available or where it is not possible or feasible to give notice to him. Moreover, in the present case, It is common ground that at the time of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was given an opportunity to defend himself. It is well settled that sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the State Constitution contemplates two notices one at the stage when a departmental enquiry becomes necessary and second when a tentative decision is arrived at regarding the punishment to be inflicted on the delinquent.

9. In the present case, however, if it was found reasonably practicable to allow the petitioner to defend himself at the first stage (stage of departmental enquiry) by the appointing authority, it will be serious contradiction in terms to hold that it was not practicable to give the same opportunity at the second stage; namely when the authority had formed a tentative opinion in regard to the punishment to be inflicted on the delinquent. In other words if the disability contemplated by proviso (b) to Section 126 was not found to apply to the departmental proceedings, one cannot understand how it could at once be made to apply to the second stage when the punishment is proposed to be inflicted on the petitioner. Finally, if a wide interpretation or connotation to the word “practicable” is given. It would in most cases defeat the very right which has been conferred by the Constitution on a delinquent under sub-clause (2) of Section 126 of the State Constitution. Although there is no direct authority on the question, yet a division bench of Orissa High Court in State Of Orissa…Defendant v. P. Krishnaswami Murty…Plaintiff ., AIR 1964 Orissa 29 throws some light on the point. In that case, it appears that no notice was given to the delinquent because he was not available and notice under registered cover had returned unserved. Their Lordships observed as follows:

“Thus mere is abundant authority for the view that though for adequate ground to be recorded in writing the superior authority may dispense with the service of notice (at both the stages) on the delinquent public servant if he is satisfied due to special circumstances that it will not be practicable to serve the notice on him and though by clause (3) of Article 311 his satisfaction is declared to be final the Courts have limited jurisdiction to examine the reason given by him with a view to satisfy themselves that he did not act with “unreasonable readiness” or with “culpable complacency” or by not applying his mind to the relevant facts and thereby acted either with gross unreasonableness or without regard to relevant circumstances. To that extent his satisfaction though subjective is justiciable.”

10. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made above. Our attention was, however, drawn to sub-clause (3) of S. 126 of the State Constitution and it was argued that the reasons given by the authority concerned are not justiciable. It is true that if proviso (b) had applied to the present case, sub-section (3) of Section 120 of the State Constitution would have at once come into play, but where we find that the conditions of Proviso (b) are not fulfilled at all, the application of Sub-section (3) of S. 126 of the State Constitution does not come into play. In the instant case, the appointing authority appears to have been under the impression that it could have dispensed with the notice contemplated by sub-clause (2) of Section 126 of the State Constitution even if it thought that it was not desirable to do so. The word “desirable” does not appear in proviso (b) at all. The reasons given by the appointing authority concerned do not show that it was not “practicable” as contemplated by Proviso (b) to give notice to the delinquent. Thus proviso (b) to Section 126 of the State Constitution does not apply in terms to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

11. It was lastly contended that since the petitioner had admitted his guilt and had offered an apology when the departmental enquiry was concluded against him, no notice under sub-clause (2) of Section 126 of the Constitution of J. and K. was necessary, in the first place, the petitioner has categorically denied this fact, secondly, even assuming that he did tender an apology, that could not, in our opinion dispense with the notice contemplated by Section 126 sub-clause (2) of the State Constitution which is a constitutional provision and has to be compiled with. We are fortified in our view by a division bench decision of Rajasthan High Court reported in Meghraj v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1956 Raj 28 where their Lordships observed as follows:

“They made a reply which necessitated an enquiry under Rule 16. Later, however, they submitted an unqualified apology, and so it was not necessary to hold an oral enquiry. What should have been done thereafter was for the authority concerned to decide what punishment should be Inflicted.

After that was decided, the applicants should Save been asked to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be meted out to them, and thereafter the order of dismissal should have been passed. In this case, however, the applicants were not asked what they had to say with respect to the proposed punishment and were straightway dismissed.”

12. For the reasons given above, therefore, we are satisfied that the conditions of proviso (b) to Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir have not been proved or satisfied in the present case and it was Incumbent on the appointing authority to give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. It was, however, conceded by the respondent that this was not done. The order of discharge passed by the respondent against the petitioner, being in direct contravention of the provisions of Section 126(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, is void and inoperative.

13. We would, therefore, allow this appeal and by a writ of certiorari set aside the order of the respondent dated 27-8-1963 discharging the petitioner from service. The petitioner will be deemed to have continued in service.

14. It will, however, be open to the authorities concerned to take such action against the petitioner as they think proper after complying with the provisions of Section 126(2) of the State Constitution.

15. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

16. J.N wazir, C.J:— I agree.

GH/AKJ/V.B.B

17. Appeal allowed.