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Laxmichand v. The State Of Rajasthan
Factual and Procedural Background
Laxmichand filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of prohibition against the Sub-divisional Officer, Bayana. Opposite party Deviram had earlier filed an application under Section 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance (No. IX) of 1949 in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer on 1 July 1952. Those proceedings had been remanded twice by the Board of Revenue and were pending before the Sub-divisional Officer after the second remand when the present writ was filed. The applicant's primary contention was that the Ordinance had only been valid for two years and that extensions beyond 21 June 1951 were invalid.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Ordinance (Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance No. IX of 1949) remained in force beyond 21 June 1951, given extensions made from time to time.
- Whether Act No. X of 1954 (and Ordinance No. III of 1954) retrospectively validated or amended the duration of the original Ordinance so as to render it in force for seven years from 21 June 1949.
- Whether the Sub-divisional Officer had jurisdiction to entertain Deviram's application when it alleged the tenant was in possession after 1 April 1948, a phrase said to have been introduced only by a May 1952 amendment.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Ordinance was only operative for two years and any extensions after 21 June 1951 (and later) were invalid, so proceedings under it were without statutory foundation.
- Even if the Ordinance were treated as in force, the Sub-divisional Officer lacked jurisdiction because the application alleged possession after 1 April 1948 — wording allegedly introduced only by an amendment in May 1952 and not present in the Ordinance as it stood on 21 June 1949.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sukhlol v. Revenue Board Rajasthan | Held that the first extension of the Ordinance (notification of 14 June 1951) was valid. | The Court treated Sukhlol as a binding earlier decision on the validity of the first extension; it influenced the resolution of similar questions in later cases. |
| Sadaria v. The Rajasthan Board of Revenue | Considered validity of the first extension; Bapna J. upheld it while another judge expressed doubt but followed Sukhlol as binding. | The opinion notes the division of view in Sadaria but records that the earlier holding in Sukhlol was treated as binding; subsequently the difference became immaterial after Act X of 1954. |
| Ramdeo v. The State of Rajasthan (1955 RLW 368) | Held the second extension (June 1953) invalid; considered effect of Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 on the question. | The Court recorded agreement with the view in Ramdeo: the second extension was invalid, but subsequent legislation (Ordinance III of 1954 and Act X of 1954) required re‑examination; the present Court expressed full agreement with Ramdeo's approach and conclusions where applicable. |
| Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar | Principle enunciated in that case was cited for comparison; the Rajasthan courts found it inapplicable to the Rajasthan legislative context. | The Court accepted Ramdeo's conclusion that the principle from Jatindra Nath Gupta was not applicable to the Rajasthan situation and relied on the distinguishing features noted in Ramdeo. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first reviewed prior decisions bearing on the validity of extensions of the 1949 Ordinance. It noted that Sukhlol upheld the first extension (14 June 1951) and that Sadaria, though showing a division of opinion, followed Sukhlol as binding. Ramdeo later held the second extension (June 1953) invalid but observed that subsequent legislation (Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954) required re-examination of the validity of earlier extensions.
The critical legal development was Act No. X of 1954. The Court set out the text and legal effect of that Act as stated in the opinion: section 1(3) of the Ordinance was retrospectively substituted to provide that the Ordinance "shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of seven years." Section 1(2) of Act X of 1954 deemed the Act to have come into force on 21 June 1949, and section 3 removed doubts by declaring the Ordinance to have been validly in operation from that date with the amended duration.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court rejected the suggestion that Act X merely revived the Ordinance in its original unamended form. Instead, the Court explained that Act X retrospectively inserted a clause fixing the duration and that subsequent amendments (including the May 1952 amendment which introduced the words about possession after 1 April 1948) must be read into the Ordinance for present purposes. Consequently, because the tenant's allegation was that he was in possession after 1 April 1948, the Sub-divisional Officer had prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Taken together, these points led the Court to conclude that the Ordinance had been in continuous force (for seven years from 21 June 1949 as retrospectively enacted) and that the applicant's challenge to the existence of the Ordinance and to the jurisdiction of the Sub-divisional Officer lacked merit.
Holding and Implications
WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.
Direct consequences: the Court dismissed Laxmichand's writ petition challenging the continued validity of the Ordinance and the jurisdiction of the Sub-divisional Officer. The Court ordered that the Sub-divisional Officer be informed that the stay order has been vacated. The Court made no order as to costs, noting that Act No. X of 1954 came into force during the pendency of the application.
The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying the retrospective amendments in Act No. X of 1954 and endorsing earlier case law as described; the decision's immediate effect is the validation of the Ordinance's continued operation (as retrospectively fixed for seven years from 21 June 1949) and affirmation of the Sub-divisional Officer's prima facie jurisdiction in the pending proceedings.
Wanchoo, C.J:— This is an application by Laxmichand under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition against the Sub-divisional officer Bayana.
2. It appears that Deviram opposite party filed an application under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance (No. IX) of 1949 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Bayana, on the 1st of July, 1952. These proceedings have dragged on, and there were remands twice by the Board of Revenue.
3. When this application was made, they were pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer after the second remand.
4. The main contention of the applicant in this case is that, the Ordinance was only alive for two years, and its extension from time to time after the 21st June, 1951 is invalid.
5. The question whether the extension of the Ordinance from time to time after the 21st of June, 1949, is invalid or otherwise has come before this court in a number of cases. In Sukhlol v. Revenue Board Rajasthan (1) it was held by a Bench of this Court that the first extension made by notification of 14th June, 1951, was valid. The same matter came up before another Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, in Sadaria v. The Rajasthan Board Of Revenue of Revenue (2). In that case, Bapna J. took the view that the first extension was valid, while one of us was doubtful of its validity, but agreed to the final order proposed in view of the earlier decision in Sukhlal's case (1) which was held to be binding.
6. Ramdeo v. The State Of Rajasthan (3) since reported as 1955 RLW 368) which was heard by another Bench of this Court, and was decided on the 29th of September, 1954. In that case, the main attack was on the second extension which was made in June, 1953. It was held that the second extension by notification of the Rajpramukh was invalid; but the learned Judges went on to point out that an Ordinance (No. III) of 1954 had been promulgated before they came to hear that case, and that Ordinance had been replaced by the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) (Amendment) Act (No. X) of 1954. The validity therefore, of the extensions that had been made of the Ordinance from time to time had to be reconsidered according to the provisions of Ordinance III of 1954 and Act X of 1954. The learned Judges went into this matter, and cam: to the conclusion that the principle enunciated in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar (4) was not applicable to this case, and they pointed out the distinguishing features of the law as passed in Rajasthan. We have gone through the judgment in that case, and are in full agreement with the view taken there. We may also point out that after Act X of 1954 came into force, the earlier difference of opinion between one of us and Bapna J. in Sadaria's case (2) becomes immaterial, for Act No. X of 1954 retrospectively amends sec. 1(3) of the Ordinance, and substitutes the following, namely:—
“It shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of seven years.”
7. In sec. 1(3) of the earlier Ordinance No. III, five years were mentioned instead of seven years. Act No. X of 1954 clearly lays down in sec. 1(2) that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st of June, 1949. The result of this retrospective amendment is that one must read Ordinance No. IX of 1949 as containing the words.
“It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of 7 years” from the very beginning, i.e from the 21st of June 1949.
8. Further, sec. 3 of Act X of 1954 has provided for removal of any doubt, and lays down that the Ordinance shall always be deemed to have been validly in operation from the 21st of June, 1949, along with the amendment in sec. 1(3). It follows, therefore, that one must now take it that Ordinance No. IX of 1949 enacted that it was to remain in force for seven years when it came out on the 21st of June, 1949. Therefore, the Ordinance has been in force all along and is in force even now, and there is no force in the contention of the applicant that the Ordinance does not exist after the 21st of June, 1951, or 21st of June, 1953.
9. The next point that is urged is that even if it be taken that the Ordinance contained a term fixing its existence for, 7 years, the application before the Sub-divisional Officer was beyond his jurisdiction because it was said in that application that the tenant was in possession after the 1st of April, 1948, and these words did not appear in the Ordinance as it stood on the 21st of June, 1949, and were only brought in by an amendment in May, 1952. Learned counsel urges that even if Act X of 1954 re-enacts or revives the Ordinance, it only revives it in its original form. There seems to be some mis-apprehension in this connection. What Act X of 1954 does is not to revive or re-enact the Ordinance; but it puts a certain clause into that Ordinance giving the period for which that Ordinance would remain in force. That clause is put in the Ordinance retrospectively as if it was there from the very day it came into force, namely the 21st of June, 1949. Therefore we must read the Ordinance as providing that its duration is seven years. The later amendment, which was made in that Ordinance in 1952, by which certain words were put in and of which the tenant in this case is taking advantage, must therefore, be read into the Ordinance for our purposes. It is not that Act No. X of 1954 merely revives the Ordinance as it originally stood. It amends a particular provision of that Ordinance from the date it came into force. The later amendments of the Ordinance must therefore be taken into account for our purposes. If the later amendment of 1952 is taken into account, the Sub-Divisional Officer would obviously have jurisdiction prima facie Page: 378because the allegation of the tenant is that he was a tenant after the 1st of April, 1948.
10. In this view of the matter, there is no force in this writ petition, and it is hereby dismissed. We pass no order as to costs as the amending Act came into force during the pendency of this application. The Sub-divisional Officer will be informed that the stay order has been vacated.
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