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Chimna v. Chunilal
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chimna — Execution Second Appeal)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an execution second appeal brought by the judgment-debtor Chimna arising from a suit for money originally for Rs. 3,073 and 7 annas. The parties obtained a decree by compromise from the Court of the Judicial Superintendent, Sojat. The compromise required the judgment-debtor to pay Rs. 700 on Falgun Sudi 11, Smt. 2004 and a further instalment of Rs. 1,000 on Baisakh Sudi 15 of the same Samwat year; default on those dates would entitle the plaintiffs to recover the entire decretal amount. Each party was to bear its own costs.
The appellant paid the first instalment (Rs. 700) shortly after the due date and it was accepted. Regarding the second instalment, the appellant's case was that he offered the Rs. 1,000 to the decree-holders on the due date but they refused to accept it; after courts closed for summer vacation he allegedly deposited Rs. 1,000 in the executing court on 1 July 1948 and informed the court that the decree-holders had refused to accept the amount.
On 1 July 1948, respondent Bakhtawarmal filed an execution application seeking recovery of the entire decretal amount except the Rs. 700 already received and obtained a warrant of attachment against the judgment-debtor's property. The judgment-debtor objected in the executing court arguing that he had satisfied the decree; the executing court dismissed that objection, finding that the judgment-debtor had not paid the instalments on the due dates, that his claim of offering payment on the due date was false, and that his deposit of Rs. 1,000 on 1 July 1948 did not comply with the decree terms.
The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Judge, Pali, who affirmed the executing court's findings and dismissed the appeal. The present second appeal challenges that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal is defective for want of necessary parties because only two of seven decree-holders (Chunnilal and Bakhtawarmal) were impleaded as respondents while the others (including minors) were not.
- Whether, in the context of a joint decree, the application for execution by one or more decree-holders relieves the necessity of joining all joint decree-holders as parties to an appeal from an executing court's order.
- Whether the objection for non-joinder of necessary parties can be treated as waived under Order I, rule 13, C.P.C., when it was not raised in earlier proceedings.
- Whether the Court should permit adding the non-impleaded decree-holders at this stage under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C., despite no written application having been filed requesting such relief.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents (through learned counsel) raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is defective for non-joinder of necessary parties: the decree had been obtained by seven plaintiffs in all, but only Chunnilal and Bakhtawarmal have been impleaded in this appeal.
- It was argued that the failure to join all decree-holders could produce inconsistent decrees if this appeal were allowed, and therefore the non-joinder is fatal. Counsel relied on Chandra Kumar v. Elahi Buksha (A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 667) for the principle that non-joinder which would lead to inconsistent decrees is fatal.
- Respondents emphasized that even if one decree-holder applied for execution, Order XXI r.15 C.P.C. permits one or more of joint decree-holders to apply for execution for the benefit of all; but this does not mean that the other decree-holders are not parties to the execution or not necessary parties to an appeal from the executing court's order. The Court was referred to Madho Parshad v. Ghanaya Lal (A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 603) on the power/role of the executing court to safeguard interests.
- Counsel for respondents pointed to the inclusiveness of the decree-sheet (names of all decree-holders appearing) to buttress the contention that all decree-holders were parties and necessary for the appeal.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that only Bakhtawarmal and Chunnilal had applied for execution and, believing those to be the only decree-holders, he impleaded only them as respondents in the appeal. Therefore, he argued, the appeal was properly constituted.
- It was further argued that the other decree-holders were minors who had sued through their next friends (e.g., Chunnilal and Juharmal), and that impleading those next friends effectively represented the minors such that the failure to implead the minors directly should not be fatal.
- The appellant advanced the proposition that in execution proceedings the only necessary party was the decree-holder who applied for execution (Bakhtawarmal), i.e., that others were not necessary participants for execution.
- Finally, the appellant argued that an objection as to non-joinder should not be allowed at this stage because Order I rule 13 C.P.C. ordinarily requires such objections to be taken at the earliest opportunity (implying waiver if not raised), and he also orally prayed for permission to bring the other decree-holders on record under Order I, rule 10 C.P.C.; however, no written application for that relief was filed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandra Kumar v. Elahi Buksha, A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 667 | Non-joinder is fatal where not joining some defendants in an appeal would lead to two inconsistent decrees. | The Court relied on the principle to support the view that omission of joint decree-holders would risk inconsistent outcomes and is therefore fatal to the appeal. |
| Madho Parshad v. Ghanaya Lal, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 603 | Where one of joint decree-holders applies for execution, there is a presumption he applies for the benefit of all; the executing court can take steps to safeguard interests of decree-holders who have not applied. | The Court used this authority to confirm that although one decree-holder may apply for execution, the other decree-holders remain parties to the execution and their interests cannot be ignored in an appeal. |
| Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Buddan Das (Privy Council) | Persons named as co-plaintiffs become parties to the suit from the date of institution even if they did not sign or verify the plaint; co-plaintiffs so named are treated as plaintiffs. | The Court applied the principle to hold that the decree-holders named in the suit were parties from inception and thus necessary parties to any appeal from the executing court's decision. |
| Chocklingam v. Seethai Ache, A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 252 | On powers to add respondents under O. XLI r. 20 C.P.C.: where appellants failed to make certain defendants respondents within time, decrees in their favour became substantive rights and should not lightly be set aside. | The Court cited the case to underscore that valuable substantive rights may accrue to absent respondents and that the Court should not lightly deprive them of those rights by adding them belatedly; this influenced the decision to refuse to add parties at this stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, grounded in the facts and the authorities brought to its attention:
- Identification of the joint-decree context: The Court observed that the decree had been obtained by seven plaintiffs jointly and that the decree-sheet recorded the names of all these decree-holders. This factual position made the question of who are the persons interested in the execution central to the matter.
- Legal effect of an application for execution by one decree-holder: The Court acknowledged that Order XXI r.15 C.P.C. permits one or more of joint decree-holders to apply for execution for the benefit of all, and that there is a presumption that such an application is made for the collective benefit. The Court relied on Madho Parshad v. Ghanaya Lal to state that the executing court can safeguard absent decree-holders' interests. But the Court distinguished that fact from the separate requirement of party-joinder in an appeal: being an applicant for execution does not remove the status of other joint decree-holders as parties whose presence is necessary on appeal.
- Status of minors and next friends: The Court considered the appellant's contention that impleading the next friends (who had sued on behalf of minors) sufficed to represent the minors. The Court stated that a minor is a party to a suit (though suing through a next friend) and the next friend merely represents the minor; the minor remains the real party. Therefore, impleading the next friend did not substitute for impleading the minor decree-holders themselves in an appeal where their interests are directly affected.
- Distinction between necessary and proper parties: The Court drew a legal distinction between non-joinder of proper parties (which a court may overlook and proceed with the matter amongst present parties) and non-joinder of necessary parties (in whose absence the court cannot pass an effective decree). It categorised the absent decree-holders here as necessary parties because any favourable order in their absence could create inconsistent decrees or affect indivisible rights shared with the present respondents.
- On waiver and timing of objections: Although Order I r.13 C.P.C. ordinarily requires non-joinder objections to be raised at the earliest opportunity, the Court held that this rule does not apply where it is impossible to decide the appeal in the absence of necessary parties. Thus, the failure to raise the objection earlier did not prevent the Court from upholding the preliminary objection of non-joinder in this case.
- Discretion to add parties: The Court considered the appellant's oral request to add the absent decree-holders under Order I r.10 C.P.C. but declined to exercise this power. The Court noted (i) no written application had been filed, (ii) no reasons were advanced to show the omission to join was bona fide or excusable, (iii) the first appeal below had itself been defective for the same reason, and (iv) valuable rights may have already accrued to the absent decree-holders which the Court should not lightly deprive them of (citing Chocklingam v. Seethai Ache).
- Conclusion on defectiveness of the appeal: Given the joint nature of the decree, the presence of minors as decree-holders, the lack of a satisfactory explanation for non-joinder, and the risk of inconsistent or indivisible outcomes, the Court concluded that the appeal was not properly constituted and could not proceed in the absence of the other decree-holders.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court's core ruling was that the preliminary objection prevails and that the appeal is defective for want of necessary parties and must therefore be dismissed.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The appeal is dismissed for being improperly constituted by reason of the non-joinder of necessary decree-holders.
- Because this objection was not raised in the court below, the Court ordered that both parties bear their own costs in this Court.
- The Court recorded the statement: "Leave to appeal is granted." (as stated in the opinion).
Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established principles distinguishing necessary and proper parties, the status of minors as real parties who sue through next friends, and the limits on curing non-joinder at a late stage. The opinion does not purport to set a novel precedent beyond applying these established principles to the facts of the case.
This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what appears in the text.
Modi, J.:— This is an execution second appeal by the judgment-debtor Chimna arising out of a suit for money. The respondents Chunnilal and Bakhtawarmal along with five others who have not been made parties to this appeal instituted a suit against the appellant for a sum of Rs. 3073,7/-. The parties obtained a decree on the footing of a compromise from the court of the learned Judicial Superintendent, Sojat, by which it was provided that the present appellant would pay a sum of Rs. 700/- on Falgun Sudi 11, Smt. 2004 and a further instalment of Rs. 1000/- only on Baisakh Sudi 15 of the same Samwat year but that in case he defaulted to make the aforesaid payments on the due dates, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover the entire suit amount, that is, Rs. 3073/7/-. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the suit. It is admitted that the present appellant paid the first instalment of Rs. 700/- a little after Falgun Sudi 11, Smt. 2004 which was, however, accepted by the respondents. As regards the second instalment, the appellant's case is that he offered the amount to the decree-holders on the due date but they refused to accept the money. It is further alleged that as the courts had closed for the summer vacations immediately thereafter, the appellant deposited the entire sum of Rs. 100/- in the executing court on the 1st July, 1948, when that court reopened after the long vacation saying in his application that the decree-holders had refused to accept the money on its having been offered to them. On 1st July, 1948, respondent Bakhtawarmal who was Page: 593one of the decree-holders, filed an execution application for the recovery of the whole of the decretal amount except the sum of Rs. 700/- already received, and obtained at warrant of attachment against the judgment-debtor's property. The latter raised an objection that he had satisfied the entire decree and was not liable to pay anything more towards its satisfaction. The executing court dismissed the objection. The finding of that court was that the judgment-debtor had failed to pay the instalments on the due dates and that his version that he had offered to pay the sum of Rs. 1000/- to the decree-holders on the due date was false and that the deposit of Rs. 1000/- made by him on the 1st July, 1948, was not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree. The judgment-debtor took an appeal from the above decree to the learned District Judge, Pali, who affirming the findings of the court below, dismissed the appeal. This second appeal has been filed from the above judgment and decree.
2. A preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the respondents that this appeal was defective for want of necessary parties thereto and must be dismissed.
3. The argument of learned counsel was as follows. The decree had been obtained against the present appellant by seven persons in all. Of these, Chunnilal and Bakhtawarmal only have been impleaded as parties to this appeal. The other decree holders were Hastimal and Babulal who have been described as minor sons of Chunnilal and they had brought the suit through their father Chunnilal who acted as their next friend. Jeevraj and Prithviraj were also decree-holders and they were sons of Juharmal. It appears that they were also minors and sued through their next friend Chunnilal. The seventh decree-holder was Bastimal, also minor son of Juharmal, and he sued through his father Juharmal who was his next friend. The names of all these persons appear in the decree of the trial court dated 18th March, 1949, as plaintiffs. The contention of learned counsel is that all these persons are necessary parties to the present appeal as they had obtained a joint decree against the present appellant. He cited Chandra Kumar v. Elahi Buksha A.I.R 1926 Cal. 667 in his support where it was held that where the result of not joining some defendants in an appeal would be that if the appeal is decreed there will be two inconsistent decrees, the non-joinder is fatal to the appeal and it must be dismissed. It must be pointed out, however, that the application for execution moved on the 1st of July, 1948, was signed by Bakhtawarmal only and he put his signatures as Bakhtawarmal Chunnilal. Now, in the case of a joint decree, O. XXI r. 15 C.P.C permits one of the decree-holders to apply for execution for the benefit of himself and the other decree-holders. There is in fact a presumption, that when one of the decreeholders applies for such execution, he does so for the benefit of the whole lot of the decree-holders and it is not for the judgment-debtor to object to such a course being adopted. If the executing court finds it necessary it can always take the necessary steps to safegurad the interests of the decree-holders who have not applied. See Madho Parshad v. Ghanaya Lal A.I.R 1930 Lah. 603. Although, therefore, it was open to one of the decree-holders to apply for execution in the present case, it cannot be said that the other decree-holders, who had not applied, were not parties to the execution. Bakhtawarmal had stated, the names of the decree-holders in his application for execution of the decree. When the executing court dismissed the judgment-debtor's objection, I am of opinion that he should have impleaded the rest of the decree-holders as parties to his appeal whether in this Court or in the first appellate court. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that as only Bakhtawarmal & Chunnilal had applied to execute the decree and as he thought that these were two decree-holders, he had impleaded only these decree-holders as Page: 594parties to his appeal. This contention, in my opinion, has no forcer. The test in such a case is not as to who is the applicant for the execution of the decree for Order XXI r. 15 permits any one or more of joint decree-holders to apply for execution of the whole decree; but the real test is who are the persons interested in the execution of the decree and all such persons are, in my view necessary parties to an appeal from the decision of the executing court. Reference may be made in this connection to Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Buddan Das(1) which is a case which went up to their Lordships of the Privy Council. There three suits were brought by one of three joint-creditors, the others being named as co-plaintiffs with him in the plaints, which he alone signed and verified. It was contended that as the plaint had been signed and verified by one of the creditors only, he alone must be treated as plaintiff. This contention was repelled and it was held by their Lordships that there was no rule that a person named as a co-plaintiff was not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signed and verified the plaint. It was further held by their Lordships that the two plaintiffs who had not signed became parties to the suit on the very day it was instituted, and, therefore, the suits were not barred by time and that any further proceedings taken to add one of them as co-plaintiff were wholly inoperative and the suits when instituted were not defective for want of parties. Applying the principle of the case above referred to, I have no hesitation in holding that all the decree-holders were parties to the execution, and are further necessary parties in any appeal from the decision of the executing court.
4. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the other decree-holders were minors and that the persons who have been impleaded as parties to this appeal effectively represented them, and, therefore, the failure to implead the minors should not be held to be a defect fatal to the present appeal. I am unable to accede to this contention. It may be pointed out that all the seven persons named above were plaintiffs in the case and a decree had also been passed in favour of all of them. Hastimal and Babulal plaintiffs are sons of Chunilal and Jeevraj and Prithviraj are sons of one Juharmal, although they also sued through Chunilal as their next friend. The remaining plaintiff Bastimal sued through his next friend Juharmal who is not a party to this appeal. It is not correct to say that as Hastimal, Babulal Jeevraj and Prithviraj were minors and sued through Chunnilal as their next friend, it was sufficient to implead Chunnilal as a respondent. A minor is a party to a suit and every suit by such person has to be instituted in his own name although the law provides that such a suit has to be brought by his next friend. The reason why no proceedings can be taken by an infant without the assistance of a next friend is his supposed want of discretion and his inability to bind himself with, or make himself liable for the consequences of the suit. But it must be remembered that it is the minor who is the real party; the next friend only represents him and acts for him and is not a party to the suit in the proper sense of the term. So far, therefore, Chunnilal was a next friend of the minor plaintiff-decree-holders above named, he could not be considered to be a party instead of the minors themselves in so far as their interests were concerned. So far as the plaintiff Bastimal is concerned it must further be pointed out that he did not sue through Chunnilal as his next friend, and Chunnilal could in no case act for him in any manner whatsoever. The result is that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant, that his appeal was properly constituted as regards parties because the next friends of the minor plaintiffs had been impleaded by him, has no meaning and is consequently repelled.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant at one stage argued that so far as the decree was concerned, the minors were undoubtedly parties, but that it was the decree-holder Bakhtawarmal only who applied for execution, and so he was the only necessary party in execution proceedings. Learned counsel was, however, unable to produce any authority in support of his proposition, and I find it utterly impossible to accept it.
6. Lastly it was contended by learned counsel that an objection relating to non-joinder of parties should not be allowed to be raised at this stage according to the principle underlying Order 1 rule 13 C.P.C It is true that ordinarily all objections on the ground of non-joinder of the parties must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and if an objection of this nature has not been so raised, it must be deemed to have been waived. It is necessary to point out, however, that this rule cannot apply to cases where it may be impossible to decide a suit or an appeal in the absence of necessary parties on the record. A distinction must be drawn between non-joinder of necessary parties and non-joinder of proper parties. If the non joinder is only of proper parties, the principle is well settled that such a defect will not be fatal to the suit. In such a case, the court must deal with the matters in controversy in so far as the parties actually before the court are concerned. But where there is a non-joinder of necessary parties, that is, parties in whose absence the court cannot pass an effective decree at all, different considerations would seem to arise, and in such cases there will be no alternative but to hold that such a defect would be fatal, and O. 1, r. 13 C.P.C cannot be pressed into service to dispense with the joinder of such necessary parties. Thus, if the decree that has been passed by the courts below has to be set aside against the repsondents who are on this record in the absence of the other decree-holders, it would at once result in two inconsistent decrees existing side by side, and such a situation has to be avoided at all costs. Such a contingency in my opinion, clearly shows that the other decree-holders whose rights are one and indivisible with the present respondents were and are necessary parties to this appeal. In these circumstances, I am constrained to come to the conclusion that the present appeal is not properly constituted and cannot be proceeded with in the absence of the other decree-holders who have not been impleaded as parties to this appeal and whose interests are indivisible and inseparable from the interests of the respondents who are on the record.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant eventually prayed that the other decree-holders may be brought on this record under the provisions of O. 1, r. 10 C.P.C, and that this Court had ample power to do so. It may be pointed out that no application was submitted to this Court praying for this relief, and learned counsel thought fit to make an oral request in the matter only. I am not oblivious of the fact that a written application is not an indispensable requirement of law, but I should have expected learned counsel to put one in the circumstances of the case, stating the reasons which in his opinion entitled him to that relief. I have, however, given this matter my very careful and anxious consideration, and have come to the conclusion that no such permission should be granted in the circumstances of this case at this stage. It is necessary to point out in this connection that even the judgment-debtor's first appeal in the lower appellate court was not properly constituted in the absence of the other decree holders having been impleaded as respondents. There appears to me to be no reason why they should not have been impleaded. The names of all the decree-holders have been clearly mentioned in the decree-sheet prepared by the trial court. The decree-holder Bakhtawarmal, who thereafter applied for execution also clearly Page: 596mentioned the names of all the decree-holders, although he did not say that they were minors at that stage; but whether they were or were not so, in my opinion, did not make any difference as regards the necessity of, their having been impleaded in any appeal from the order passed by the executing court dismissing the judgment-debtors objection. No reasons were intimated to this court to enable it to come to the conclusion whether it was a bonafide mistake on the part of the appellant or his legal advisers or whether it was a case of sheer negligence on their part. It cannot also be over-looked that the other respondents having not been impleaded, in the appeal, valuable rights have accrued in their favour of which they need not be deprived in the ordinary course. No exceptional circumstances have been pointed out why a departure from that rule should be made in favour of the appellant in the present case. I may in this connection refer to Chocklingam v. Seethai Ache A.I.R 1927 P.C 252, which dealt with the powers of the court to add a respondent under O. XLI r. 20 C.P.C, which was, however, not relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant in the present case, where their Lordships of the Privy Council held that owing to the appellants' failure to make certain defendants respondents within the time limited for filing an appeal, the appeals so far as such respondents were concerned, were prima facie barred by limitation, and that they were entitled to hold the decrees in their favour undisturbed and a substantive right of very valuable kind had accrued in their favour of which they should not lightly be deprived.
8. The net result is that I hold that the preliminary objection prevails and that this appeal is defective for want of necessary parties and must, therefore, be dismissed. In view of the fact that this objection was not raised in the court below, I would leave both parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Leave to appeal is granted.
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