Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Raja Ishwari Singh v. Raja Hari Singh

Rajasthan High Court
Nov 5, 1965
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kan Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision proceeding is directed against an interim order dated 5-7-1963 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City No. 1, in a partition suit. The suit concerns the estate of Raja Bishan Singh. The principal factual material before the trial court and this Court consisted of two handwritten documents (partition instruments) executed on 19-2-1932 and 21-2-1932 purporting to effect a division of property between Raja Kishan Singh and Raja Bishan Singh, with the blessings of Maji Panwarji. The plaintiff relied on those two documents; the opponent objected to their admissibility on the ground that they were unstamped in contravention of the Jaipur Stamp Act (Samvat 1983), which came into force on 1-3-1927.

The Senior Civil Judge admitted the documents, relying on a precedent (Miran Baksh v. Emperor) and concluded that because the deeds did not state the value of the property, no stamp duty could be levied and they were admissible. The opposing party challenged that interim order by way of revision to this Court. A Single Judge referred the matter to a larger Bench because the question was considered important. The opinion under summary is the decision of Kan Singh, J., on that revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two documents dated 19-2-1932 and 21-2-1932 are instruments of partition (admissible as partition deeds) or are instead awards/other documents not constituting partition instruments.
  2. Whether the Jaipur Stamp Act (Samvat 1983) was validly in force despite an argument that it had not been published in the official Gazette as required by the Jaipur Laws Act (the challenge being that the Validating Act refers to the Jaipur Laws Act of 1924 rather than 1923).
  3. Whether partition deeds which do not state the value of the property are chargeable with stamp duty under the Jaipur Stamp Act and, if so, whether unstamped partition deeds are inadmissible in evidence under the applicable stamp law.
  4. If the documents are found to be unstamped and inadmissible, what procedural steps should the civil court take (i.e., impounding and referral to the Collector under provisions of the Stamp Act and the procedure under the Indian Stamp Act applicable at the relevant later date).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. P.C. Bhandari)

  • The two documents were not partition instruments but awards regarding partition; they were incomplete and ineffective because the person said to give the award (Maji Panwarji) had not signed them.
  • The Jaipur Stamp Act had been passed during the Maharaja's minority by the Regency Council and was not published in the official Gazette in accordance with sec. 7(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923; therefore, the Stamp Act could not be said to have come into force in the State (i.e., an argument against the Act's validity).
  • Because the partition deeds do not state any valuation of the property, counsel argued that no stamp duty was chargeable on them (i.e., the absence of stated value meant no duty under the relevant schedule articles).

Applicant/Petitioner's Arguments (as articulated in the opinion)

  • On the character of the documents: both parties treated the documents as partition instruments, and the tenor of the instruments themselves showed that they were partition deeds made with the concurrence and acceptance of both brothers; the absence of Maji Panwarji's signature did not convert them into non-partition instruments.
  • On the Validating Act: the reference in the Validating Act to the "Jaipur Laws Act, 1924" should be read as referring to the Jaipur Laws Act in force (i.e., the Act of 1923 which came into force in 1924). The discrepancy of year is not a ground to defeat the Validating Act's intention; the Validating Act therefore condones lack of formal publication and validates the Jaipur Stamp Act.
  • On stamp liability: liability to duty attaches to instruments listed in the schedule (i.e., the instrument itself is chargeable), not to the underlying transaction alone. Partition instruments fall under Art. 23 of the Schedule (corresponding to Art. 45 of the Indian Act) and thus are chargeable; Art. 9 (bond) prescribes a minimum duty where no value is stated, so an unstated value does not nullify chargeability.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Miran Baksh v. Emperor Consideration of whether particular documents were liable to stamp duty as mortgage deeds or as agreements; analysis of stamp levy on documents silent as to consideration. The Court held this case was not helpful to the present point; the facts and legal questions in Miran Baksh did not control the present case. The Senior Civil Judge's reliance on Miran Baksh was rejected in part because the present question concerned chargeability as partition instruments and procedure under later statute.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Angus (Lord Esher) Principle that stamp duty is imposed on the instrument (the written document) and not directly on the underlying transaction; if a transaction can be effected without an instrument then that instrument-based tax does not reach it. The Court relied on this passage to explain the statute's scheme that duty attaches to specified instruments; the opinion used the principle to distinguish instrument chargeability from transactional chargeability while ultimately concluding the partition instruments were within the schedule and thus chargeable.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oliver Authority for looking to the real nature of the transaction (substance over form) when determining chargeability under stamp rules. The Court cited the case to support the proposition that where chargeability depends on real nature, courts can look beyond the document's face to the substance of the transaction; this supported the conclusion that the partition deeds were chargeable notwithstanding how parties framed the instrument.
Deddington Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Similar to Oliver — courts may examine the transaction's true nature for stamp chargeability. Used alongside Oliver to justify consideration of the real nature of the documents rather than being constrained by mere label or the parties' stated characterization.
In re Muhammad Muzaffar Ali Interpreted an article (Art. 33 of the schedule) where chargeability depended on the value "set forth" in the instrument; held that where no such value was given the instrument was not required to be stamped under that article. The Court distinguished that decision: the Muzaffar Ali case related to an article making chargeability depend on the value stated in the instrument, whereas Art. 9 (bond) and Art. 23 (partition) in the present statute did not relieve the instrument of chargeability merely because no value was set forth; therefore Muzaffar Ali did not control the present case.
Ajodhya Prasad v. Parashram Relied on the Allahabad case (Muzaffar Ali) and involved a Collector's certificate under sec. 42 of the Stamp Act, with the Collector's decision being final. The Court held this case did not assist the present point because factual and statutory contexts differed (in particular, the role of the Collector's certificate under sec. 42 was not determinative here).
Joint Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. K.R. Venkatarama Ayyar Principles on valuation for stamp duty on settlement deeds; the value for stamp purposes should ordinarily be the market value and must be set out in the document; registrar not empowered to conduct valuation enquiries in many cases. The Court observed that while that case discusses valuation and the need for true disclosure in the instrument, it was not especially helpful to whether the present partition deeds required any duty or not; the Court treated it as distinguishable on facts and statutory formulations.
In re C.R.M.M.L.A. Chettyar Firm Authority that the Collector may request particulars from the parties and form his own opinion about duty and valuation. The Court invoked this case to rebut the argument that a Collector cannot seek particulars; it supported the procedural route that an unstamped instrument may be impounded and referred to the Collector who can then determine proper duty and penalty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in sequential analytical steps, expressly limiting itself to the materials and arguments before it:

  1. Characterisation of the documents: Having examined the tenor and contents of the 19-2-1932 and 21-2-1932 instruments, the Court concluded they were partition deeds. The instruments recited that partition was effected with the concurrence and acceptance of both brothers and specified shares and joint areas. The absence of the mother's signature (Maji Panwarji) did not convert the writings into non-partition awards, particularly since both sides treated them as partition instruments.
  2. Validity and force of the Jaipur Stamp Act: The respondent's submission that the Jaipur Stamp Act was invalid because it had not been published per sec. 7(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923, was addressed via the Jaipur Laws (Validating) Act, 1952 (Act No. XXXI of 1952). The Validating Act declared that failure to publish a Jaipur law did not render it invalid and that such law should be deemed to have come into force on the date it was made. The Court rejected a narrow textual objection based on the Validating Act's reference to the "Jaipur Laws Act, 1924" (rather than 1923) as an unsubstantial discrepancy; the Court gave a purposive construction and held that the Validating Act was intended to validate laws enacted under the Jaipur laws regime, thereby curing the publication defect.
  3. Analysis of the Jaipur Stamp Act provisions and schedule: The Court compared the Jaipur Stamp Act (noting it follows the Indian Stamp Act closely) and focused on:
    • Sec. 4 (chargeability) — instruments listed in the schedule are chargeable with duty;
    • Sec. 24 (requirement to state facts affecting duty — corresponds to Indian Act sec. 27) — facts and consideration affecting chargeability should be set out in the instrument;
    • Sec. 29 (instruments not duly stamped inadmissible — corresponds to Indian Act sec. 35); and
    • Sec. 55 (penalty/prosecution for failure to comply with sec. 24 — corresponds to Indian Act sec. 64).
    The Court then turned to the First Schedule: Art. 23 (partition) provided that the duty on a partition instrument is the same as a bond for the amount of the value of the separated share(s). Art. 9 (bond) fixed minimum duties when the amount or value secured does not exceed prescribed slabs (e.g., minimum four annas where value does not exceed Rs. 25), thereby demonstrating that absence of a stated value does not automatically mean zero chargeability.
  4. Principle distinguishing instrument from transaction and valuation issues: Citing Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Angus, the Court restated that the tax is upon the instrument. It also relied on authorities (Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oliver and Deddington Steamship) to say that where chargeability depends on the real nature of the transaction, the court may look beyond form to substance. The Court concluded that the present partition deeds fell within the articles of the schedule and were therefore chargeable even though they did not state a valuation.
  5. Distinguishing contrary precedents: The Court distinguished inapplicable authorities (e.g., In re Muhammad Muzaffar Ali and Ajodhya Prasad) that had held non-chargeability where specific schedule articles made chargeability depend expressly on the value "set forth" in the instrument. Those cases were factually and legally distinct from the present case because the relevant schedule articles in the Jaipur Act (Art. 9/Art. 23) did not include the phrase “as set forth therein” and, in Art. 9, a minimum duty is prescribed even if no value is stated.
  6. Conclusion as to admissibility and procedure: The Court held that the partition deeds executed in 1932 were required to be stamped. As they were unstamped, they were inadmissible in evidence under the applicable provision (sec. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, with sec. 29 of the Jaipur Act being its counterpart). The Court also explained the procedural course to be followed under the Indian Stamp Act as in force in Rajasthan on and after 1-4-1951: if a party insists on admission of such an unstamped instrument, the court should impound the instrument under sec. 33 and forward it to the Collector under sec. 38(2), and the Collector will determine proper duty and penalty under sec. 40.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is allowed. The Court set aside the order of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City No. 1, dated 5-7-1963, and directed him to proceed further in the matter in light of the observations recorded in the opinion. The Court held that the two documents of 19-2-1932 and 21-2-1932 were partition instruments which were required to be stamped; being unstamped, they were inadmissible in evidence under the applicable stamp provisions.

Implications / Direct consequences:

  • The Senior Civil Judge's earlier decision admitting the unstamped partition documents is reversed.
  • If any party insists on the use of the unstamped partition instruments in evidence, the trial court must impound them under the Stamp Act (sec. 33) and refer them to the Collector under sec. 38(2) of the relevant Stamp Act, leaving it to the Collector to determine the proper duty and any penalty under sec. 40.
  • The opinion distinguishes several precedents and explains that absence of value in the instrument does not automatically negate chargeability where the schedule prescribes minimum duties (i.e., duty on bonds/partition instruments). The court applied a purposive construction to statute-language discrepancies in the Validating Act to uphold the validity/effect of the Jaipur Stamp Act.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel doctrine beyond these conclusions; it applies existing principles of statutory construction and established authorities to the facts before it and prescribes the procedural route for unstamped documents.
Show all summary ...

Kan Singh, J.:— This revision application, which is directed against an interim order dated 5-7-63 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur, City No. 1, in a partition suit, raises the question about the admissibility of two documents evidencing a partition dated 19-2-1932 and 21-2-1932, respectively, on the ground that they were unstamped.

2. Plaintiff Raja Hari Singh and the defendant Raja Ishwari Singh were the sons of one Raja Bishan Singh. One Raja Udai Singh had died issueless and his widow Maji Panwarji adopted two persons Raja Kishan Singh and Raja Bishan Page: 420Singh to her husband under some special orders of then Maharaja of Jaipur. We are not concerned with the validity of the adoption of two persons simultaneously as, it is common ground between the parties that it was in pursuance of the Ruler's order. The estate of Raja Udai Singh was partitioned between these two brothers under an arrangement sponsored by Maji Panwarji the widow of Raja Udai Singh. Raja Kishan Singh had no issue of his own, whereas Raja Bishan Singh had three sons, namely, Raja Ishwari Singh the defendant, Raja Hari Singh the plaintiff and Raja Dharam Singh. Raja Dharam Singh went in adoption to Raja Kishan Singh. The present partition suit relates to the estate of Raja Bishan Singh. In this suit the plaintiff Raja Hari Singh placed reliance on the two documents of partition between Raja Bishansingh and Raja Kishansingh executed in the year 1932. An objection was raised by the defendant to the admissibility of these two documents on the ground that they were not properly stamped in accordance with the Jaipur Stamp Act of Samvat 1983, which came into force from 1-3-1927. The learned Senior Civil Judge, placing reliance on Miran Baksh v. Emperor (1). came to the conclusion that, as the value of the property to be partitioned was not mentioned in these deeds, no stamp duty could be levied on them with the result that they were not rendered inadmissible. Aggrieved of this order the defendant came up in revision to this Court and the revision was heard, in the first instance, by a learned Single Judge of this Court. As the learned Judge felt that the question raised in the revision was of some importance the case was referred to a larger Bench. This is how the matter is before us. The first document is Ex-1, dated 19-2-1932. It conveys the blessings of Maji Panwarji to her two sons Lalji Kishan Singh and Lalji Bishan Singh and states that the two brothers having requested the Maji for effecting a partition she was doing so. Then the various portions falling in the shares of the two brothers were specified and it was ordained that the two brothers shall remain in possession and enjoyment of their respective shares. The deed then recited the open space and apartments that were to continue as joint. Then the document states that both the brothers had accepted this partition and had undertaken to abide by it failing which they were to incur the displeasure of Shri Ji (perhaps it meant the Rulep). The document does not bear the signatures of the Maji but the two brothers Raja Kishan Singh and Raja Bishan Singh signed it in token of their acceptance.

3. The other document dated 21-2-1932 is, more or less, in the same terms.

4. Mr. P.C Bhandari, learned counsel for the respondent, attempted to argue that these two documents were not instruments of partition, but were awards about partition and they were incomplete as the person giving the award, namely, the Maji Panwarji had not signed them. Apart from the fact that both the parties had therefore made it a common ground that these were instruments of partition, we are satisfied on a consideration of the tenor of these documents that they were partition deeds. The documents clearly recite that the partition was made with the concurrence of both the brothers and that they had accepted it. It is not clear that there was any dispute between the brothers which they wanted to be settled by their mother. It seems that the parties approached their mother who they thought was the most impartial person and so with her blessings they wanted to have the partition. All the same the deeds were nothing short of partition as it is clearly recited therein that the partition was being made with the concurrence of both the brothers and to it both of them were agreeable. In the circumstances we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the documents were anything else than partition deeds.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent then raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Jaipur Stamp Act of Samvat 1983 was passed by the Regency Council during the minority of the Maharaja of Jaipur and as it was not published in the official gazette of the State in accordance with sec. 7(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923, it cannot be said to have come into force in the State. The attention of the learned counsel was drawn to the Validating Law enacted by the Rajasthan Legislature known as the Jaipur Laws (Validating) Act, (Act No. XXXI of 1952), 1952. Sec. 2 thereof ran as under:—

“Sec. 2. Validation of certain Jaipur Laws:—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Jaipur Laws Act, 1924, or the Jaipur General Clauses Act, 1944, or in any other law or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, no Jaipur law shall be deemed to be, or ever to have been invalid by reason merely of the fact that such law was not published in the official Gazette or otherwise duly promulgated or published: and every such law shall, notwithstanding that it was not so promulgated or published, be deemed to have come into force on the date on which it was made and to have been or to be, in force until repealed by any competent legislative authority.”

6. The learned counsel submitted that this Validating Law makes a mention of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1924, and not of the Jaipur Laws Act of 1923. The learned counsel accordingly urged that the Validating Act, in the circumstances, will not cover the defect that was occasioned by the non-fulfilment of the requirement of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923. The learned counsel, however, candidly conceded that there was no Jaipur Laws Act, 1924, and there was only one Jaipur Laws Act, 1923, though put on the statute book in the year 1923, came into force on 1-11-1924 vide sec. 2 thereof. The approach suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent is a much too narrow one. The discrepancy about the year will not detract from the underlying intention of the legislature. The object of interpreting statutes is to discover the intention of the legislature and there is a very strong presumption that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable or irrational result. Canons of construction have never been held to be so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution of a problem about interpretation. The legislature could not but have meant the Jaipur-Laws Act, 1923, and making a mention of Jaipur Laws Act, 1924, was nothing but a reference to the Jaipur Laws Act as was in force for the time being and as there was only one Jaipur Laws Act in force, we are satisfied that the Validating Act condones non-fulfilment of the requirements of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has thus no substance and has to be rejected.

7. We may now deal with the various provisions of the Jaipur Stamp Act of Smt. 1983, which is a faithful copy of the Indian Stamp Act, though at places the numbering of sections is different and some sections have been omitted.

8. Sec. 3 of the Jaipur Act, which is the definition section, corresponds to sec. 2 of the Indian Act. The definition of the term “Bond” as given in the Jaipur Act is the same as that given in the Indian Act and is as follows:

“Bond” includes—

(a) any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to pay another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be;

(b) any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another; and

(c) any instrument so attested, whereby a person obliges himself to deliver grain or other agricultural produce to another.”

9. Similarly, the definition of the term “duly stamped” is also the same and is as follows:

“Duly stamped”, as applied to an instrument, means that the instrument bears an adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount and that such stamp has been affixed or used in accordance with the law for the time being in force in Jaipur territory.”

10. Sec. 4 of the Jaipur Act lays down as to what instruments shall be liable to duty and it corresponds to sec. 3 of the Indian Act. It is as follows:

“Sec. 4. The following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in schedule I as the proper duty therefor:

(a) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed in Jaipur territory on or after this Act comes into force.

(b) every bill of exchange, cheque or promissory note drawn or made out and payable in Jaipur territory on or after that day and accepted or paid, or presented for acceptance or payment, or endorsed, transferred, or otherwise negotiated in Jaipur territory.

(c) every instrument (other than a bill of exchange cheque or promissory note) mentioned in that schedule, which, not having been a previously executed by any person, is executed out of Jaipur territory on or after that day relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in Jaipur territory and is received in Jaipur territory.

Provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect of any instrument executed by, or on behalf of, or in favour of, the Durbar in cases where, but for this exemption, the Durbar would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument.”

11. Sec. 29 of the Jaipur Act which corresponds to sec. 35 of the Indian Act declares that instruments not duly stamped shall be inadmissible in evidence. The Page: 422material portion of this section is as follows:

“Sec. 29. No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped:

Provided that—

(a) any such instrument, not being an instrument chargeable with a duty of one anna only, or a bill of exchange or promissory note, shall, subject to all just exceptions, be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when three timer the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to three times such duty or portion; … … …”

12. Sec. 24 of the Jaipur Act required that facts affecting duty were to be set forth in the instrument. This corresponds to sec. 27 of the Indian Act and is as follows:

“Sec. 24. The consideration (if any) and all other facts and circumstances affecting the changeability of any instrument with duty, or the amount of the duty with which it is chargeable, shall be fully and truly set-forth therein.”

13. Sec. 55 of the Jaipur Act which corresponds to sec. 64 of the Indian Act renders the person not complying with the requirement of sec. 24, liable to punishment and he can be prosecuted under that section.

14. Learned counsellor the respondent submits that inasmuch as the so-called partition deeds do not contain the valuation about the property partitioned, the executants might have been liable to prosecution, but for want to valuation of the property in the instruments were not liable to stamp duty. This position is controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner defendant. According to the charging section, namely, sec. 3 in the Indian Act and sec. 4 of the Jaipur Act, the duty is chargeable on instruments as distinguished from the transaction that they incorporate. The scheme of the Stamp Act accords with the scheme of taxation of instruments in England as will appear from the following passage from Lord Esher's judgment in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Angus (2), on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent also.

“The first thing to be noticed is that the thing which is made liable to the duty is an ‘instrument’. If a contract of purchase and sale or a conveyance by way of purchase and sale, can be, or is, carried out without an instrument, the case is not within the section, and no tax is imposed. It is not the transaction of purchase and sale which is struck at; it is the instrument where by the purchase and sale are effected which is struck at. And if anyone can carry through a purchase and sale without an instrument, then the legislature have not reached that transaction.”

15. It is, however, evident from sec. 3 of the Indian Act that every instrument mentioned in the schedule is chargeable with duty of the amount indicated therein. Sec. 3 is subject to certain exemptions, but it is nobody's case that this class of instruments under consideration is covered by any of the exemptions contemplated in sec. 3. Thus, if the instruments in question can be said to be covered by any of the articles in the schedule then they shall be chargeable to duty. As to what will be the proper duty to be charged will be another matter, but so far as chargeability is concerned there can be no doubt if once it is found that the instrument is of the nature dealt with in the schedule. As we have already observed, the documents are instruments of partition and will thus be covered by Art. 23 of the Schedule of the Jaipur Act, which corresponds to Art. 45 of the Indian Act, the relevant portions thereof are as follows:

“Description of Instrument. Proper Stamp-duty. 23. Partition—Instrument of (as defined by sec. 3(13). The same duty as a bond for the amount of the value of the separated share or shares. N.B—The largest share remaining after the property is partitioned (or if there are two or more shares of equal value and not smaller than any of the other shares, then one of such equal shares) shall be deemed to be that from which the other shares are separated.”

16. It thus enacts that the duty on a partition deed is the same as on a bond. A bond is dealt with under Art. 9 of the Schedule to the Jaipur Act. It corresponds to Art. 15 of the Schedule to the Indian Act. The relevant portion thereof is as follows:

“Description of Instrument. Proper Stamp-duty. 9. Bond (as defined by sec. 3(4)—Where the amount or value secured does not exceed Rs. 25/-. Four annas

Where the amount or value secured does not exceed Rs. 50/- Eight annas Where the amount or value secured does not exceed Rs. 100/- One rupee For every Rs. 100/-, or part thereof in excess of Rs. 100/- upto Rs. 500/-. One Per cent For every Rs. 500/- or part thereof in excess of Rs. 5000/- Two rupees and eight annas.”

17. It will be evident from the above that a minimum duty is fixed when the value of the bond does not exceed Rs. 25/-. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the partition deeds did not mention any valuation of the property and, therefore, in such a case no duty is chargeable. This is, however, against the tenor of Art. 9 of the First Schedule to the Jaipur Act. Where no value is fixed it may be a case of “nil value”, but in that event the minimum duty shall be chargeable. In other words, it cannot be argued that the instrument is not chargeable with any duty whatsoever. If we contrast the frame of this article with Arts. 23, 31, 33, 54, 55 and 58, one important distinction is noticeable. The words “as set forth therein” occur in these articles which are conspicuously absent in Art. 9. This relevant portion of one article is reproduced hereunder for appreciating the difference;

Art. 23. Conveyance (as defined by sec. 2(10), not being a Transfer charged or exempted under No. 62— where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveyance as set forth therein does not exceed Rs. 50/-. (Italic is ours) Eight annas.”

18. The scheme of the Stamp Act seems to be that the changeability of certain instruments has been made to depend on the value set forth by the parties in the instrument. In some cases fixed stamp fee is chargeable and in other cases the chargeability depends on the value of the subject matter irrespective of what the parties have chosen to set forth. In the last category of cases the court is not bound by the apparent tenor of the instrument, but will decide the question of chargeability to duty according to the real nature of the transaction vide Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oliver (3). and Deddington Steamship Company Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (4). Thus to our mind, the documents in question were required to be stamped and as they are unstamped, they were inadmissible in evidence.

19. We may now briefly refer to some of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties before us.

20. In re Muhammad Muzaffar Ali (5), the document that fell for consideration was a deed of gift which contained no statement as to the value of the property thereby conveyed. The article that was considered to be applicable was Art. 33 of the First Schedule which laid down that the instrument should be stamped with the same duty as a conveyance for consideration equal to the value of the property set forth in such instrument and when no such value was given in the instrument it was not required to be stamped. This instrument was of the category the chargeability whereof was made to depend on the value set forth in the instrument. It will not thus cover a case of the kind before us. Thus, this case is clearly distinguishable.

21. In Ajodhya Prasad…Applicant; v. Parashram…Non-Applicant. (6), reliance was placed on the Allahabad case just referred to above. In that case the Collector had certified that the instrument was properly stamped and as according to sec. 42 of the Stamp Act, his decision was final and binding the civil court could not go behind it. This case again is not of any help in dealing with the point before us.

22. In the Joint Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. K.R Venkatarama Ayyar (7), the deed in question was a settlement deed and the duty for it was as for a bond for a sum equal to the amount or “value of the property settled as set forth in such settlement.” The learned Judges were considering the powers of the Registrar in ascertaining the true value of the property and observed as follows:

“Value, unless the term in any enactment suggests the contrary, must of course mean the real value, the real value of property of the nature of land and houses being ordinarily and most suitably estimated by determining what that property would fetch if sold in the open market. In other words, “value” ordinarily means ‘market-value’. The expression “market value” is not found any where in the Stamp Act. Only the expression “value” is found; and so it must be taken that the term “value” means market value. In order to properly calculate the amount of Page: 424duty payable on a settlement, the value of the property settled must be known as Art. 58 itself makes clear. Since the Registrar is not empowered to conduct an enquiry himself as to the market-value, the value must be set out in the document itself; and sec. 27 requires that fact (the value) should be truly set forth. It seems that the principle underlying the provisions of the Siarnp Act with regard to valuation and estimation of the duty payable is that the value of the property should be taken from the face of the document, and that the revenue of the Government is protected by requiring the parties to make true and full disclosure of all facts and circumstances having any bearing on the duty payable, failing which they must suffer the consequences of their false or defective statements. A settlor is therefore bound to give the true value of the property in the deed of settlement. Thus where the value of the property settled is two lacs, the statement in the deed that “for proposes of stamp duty and registration the value is Rs. 3000/-” contravenes the provisions of sec. 27.”

23. This case again, to our mind, is not of much help in considering whether the deed is not required to bear any stamp.

24. The case of Miran Baksh v. Emperor (1) is also not helpful as mil be clear from the concluding para of the judgment which is as follows:

“Agreement or memorandum of agreement not otherwise provided for is liable to the stamp duty of Re. 1/- under Art. 5. To sum up, I would answer the reference in the following terms: (i) That the documents, in addition to being powers of attorney are (a) mortgage deeds, in so far as they purport to relate to the amounts due to the executants at the time the documents were executed, and (b) agreements in so far as they relate to the amounts that were to fall due in future, (ii) That no stamp duty could be levied on them as mortgage deeds and (iii) that as agreements they were, liable to the additional stamp duty of Re. 1/- each.”

25. It is not a case of the document being not required to bear any duty. The question that the learned Judges had to consider was whether the documents were required to be stamped as mortgage deeds. In the course of the judgment, however, it was observed that where a document was silent regarding the consideration the Collector had no power to take evidence to find out the consideration and he could only prosecute the executant under sec. 64 of the Stamp Act. Here, we are not concerned with the question of prosecution of the executant, nor are we concerned with the question whether the Collector has the power to record evidence or not. The Collector may not have the power to record evidence to find out the validation, but he can certainly ask for the necessary particulars from the parties and then form his own opinion, as was held In re C.R.M.M.L.A Chettyar Firm (8). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the documents being unstamped were not admissible in evidence under sec. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The chargeability of the document to duty will have to be seen according to the Stamp Law in force when the document was executed, but what has to be done with such a document now will have to be seen according to the Indian Stamp Act which came into force in Rajasthan from 1-4-1951, thereby repealing the earlier law. Thus, the question now is as to what has to be done with these documents which are unstamped. If the party insists that the documents should be taken in evidence then the Court shall impound the instrument under sec. 33 of the Stamp Act and forward it to the Collector under sec. 38(2) of the Act, and it will be then for the Collector to give his decision under sec. 40 of the Act about the proper duty and penalty, if any, to be charged.

26. The result is that we allow this revision application, set aside the order of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City No. 1, dated 5-7-63 and hereby direct him to proceed further in the matter in the light of the observations made by us above.