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State v. Roop Singh

Rajasthan High Court
Nov 24, 1965
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Modi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the State against an acquittal given by the learned Sessions Judge, Pali (judgment dated 4 January 1964), in respect of the death of Jugtidan. Three persons were tried and acquitted: Roop Singh (charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code), Mst. Dhapu (charged under Section 302 read with Section 109 IPC), and Naingir (charged under Section 302 read with Section 118 IPC).

The prosecution case (as related by two child eye-witnesses, P.W.1 Mst. Chhagani — the deceased's daughter aged about ten — and P.W.8 Asia — another ten-year-old boy) alleges that on 24 January 1963 at about sunset Roop Singh, Naingir and Dhapu together strangled Jugtidan. The post-mortem (Ex. P-10) recorded multiple abrasions and bruises on the neck, fracture of the hyoid bone and other findings; cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.

The deceased's neighbours and other witnesses were involved in discovery and reporting of the death: a report (first information) was made to the Sarpanch and reached the Sub-Inspector, who proceeded under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The three accused were arrested on 27 January 1963. While in custody, Naingir and Dhapu made statements (Exs. P-12 and P-13) which the trial judge treated as exculpatory and inadmissible for proving guilt of co-accused. After trial, the Sessions Judge acquitted all three; the State appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt on the material on record.
  2. What weight should be given to the testimony of the two child witnesses (Mst. Chhagani and Asia), and whether that testimony is reliable or possibly the result of coaching.
  3. Whether the statements made by co-accused (Naingir and Mst. Dhapu) — which are self-exculpatory as to the maker and incriminatory as to others — can be acted upon to convict the other accused, and what their evidentiary value is.
  4. Whether circumstantial features and motive (in particular the illicit intimacy between Roop Singh and Mst. Dhapu) suffice to establish guilt without reliable direct evidence or corroboration.

Arguments of the Parties

State (Appellant)

  • The learned Deputy Government Advocate argued that the Sessions Judge erred gravely in acquitting the accused and that a serious miscarriage of justice occurred.
  • The State relied principally on the evidence of the two child eye-witnesses and on the totality of prosecution material to contend that the case against the accused was proved "to the hilt."

Accused / Defence

  • Roop Singh: pleaded that he was falsely implicated by one Dalpatsingh in collusion with the police.
  • Naingir: contended that P.Ws Zordan and Murardan had falsely implicated him because he had denied them water from his well (a motive of enmity).
  • Mst. Dhapu: asserted that her husband was an opium eater who died from stomach pain and that her daughter Chhagani had been tutored by the husband's relations to give false evidence against her.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Manni Lal Expressed the proposition that very young children are dangerous witnesses: they can be easily taught stories and may become convinced they saw what they were taught; their evidence must be accepted with great caution. The court reproduced the passage and used it to justify cautious scrutiny of the child witnesses' testimony and to treat contradictions and possible coaching as significant shortcomings.
Abbas Ali v. Emperor Stated that children are an untrustworthy class of witnesses: they may mistake dreams for reality, repeat what they have heard, and be influenced by fear, hope of reward or desire for notoriety; each case depends on facts and circumstances. The court relied on this authority to emphasize general unreliability concerns about child witnesses and to support careful assessment of their evidence in this case.
Darpan Potdarin… v. Emperor Held it unsafe to convict on the evidence of a child (ten years old in that case) unless the evidence was immediately available and received before any possibility of coaching arose. The court cited this to underscore the need for contemporaneous, uncoached child testimony; it concluded the child witnesses here may have been coached and their evidence was therefore unreliable.
Mohamed Sugal Esa v. The King (Privy Council) Observed that in England unsworn child evidence must be corroborated, while under the Indian law such evidence is admissible even if uncorroborated; nevertheless it is prudence (not law) to require corroboration in practice, and lack of corroboration affects weight. The court used this to explain that although Indian law admits child evidence without statutory corroboration, corroboration affects evidentiary weight; thus uncorroborated child testimony should generally be treated cautiously.
State v. Mohanlal Set out that the confession of a co-accused, uncorroborated by other evidence, cannot alone sustain a conviction, particularly where the confessor implicates others more fully than himself. The court relied on this to hold that the statements of Naingir and Mst. Dhapu (which did not implicate themselves fully) could not be used by themselves to convict the co-accused.
Jainand v. Rex Cited in relation to caution about relying on confession of co-accused; used as supporting authority in the line of cases limiting weight of such confessions. Referenced as part of the authorities supporting the rule that a co-accused's confession must be corroborated by other evidence before it can sustain conviction of others.
In re Malayara Deethu Cited as supporting authority concerning the limited evidentiary value of a co-accused's confession unless corroborated. Used as part of the legal foundation for requiring corroboration of confessions of co-accused; supported the court's approach to Exs. P-12 and P-13.
Haricharan v. State of Bihar Laid down the approach that when prosecution relies on a co-accused's confession against another accused, the court should first evaluate the other evidence against that accused and then use the confession to confirm or reject the conclusion suggested by the other evidence. The court applied this procedural approach and found that the other evidence against the accused was not satisfactory; therefore, the confessions could not be used to sustain convictions.
Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (Privy Council) Stated that a co-accused's confession is a weak kind of evidence (not within Sec. 3 Evidence Act), and while Sec. 30 permits consideration of such confession, it must be weighed with other evidence and cannot alone amount to proof. The court quoted this reasoning to reinforce that co-accused statements are weak and must be considered with other evidence; in the present case they did not supply the necessary corroboration.
Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Affirmed the Privy Council's view in Bhuboni Sahu's case; emphasized the limited role of confessions of co-accused and the need to assess other evidence first. Cited to support the court's stance that the co-accused statements here could not be the starting point and were insufficient without reliable other evidence.
Emperor v. Chatterpal Singh Referenced in connection with distinguishing statements that do not amount to a confession where the maker does not implicate himself as fully as he implicates others. The court relied on this to conclude that the statements of Naingir and Mst. Dhapu in the present case were not confessions in the true sense and so could not be relied upon to convict others.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in logical stages, each tied to the evidence on record and the authorities cited:

  1. Assessment of motive: The court accepted that there was abundant evidence that Mst. Dhapu had an illicit relationship with Roop Singh and that she had earlier sought to live with him; this furnished a possible motive for Roop Singh and perhaps for Dhapu herself. The court emphasised, however, that motive alone cannot sustain a conviction without proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that motive did not plausibly extend to implicate Naingir.
  2. Centrality of child eyewitness testimony: The prosecution's case rested principally on the testimony of two children (Mst. Chhagani and Asia). The trial judge had tested their intelligence and administered oath, finding them capable. The court nevertheless recognised well-established authorities that child testimony is potentially unreliable (prone to coaching, imagination, or suggestion) and must be treated with grave caution.
  3. Examination of contradictions and timing: The court catalogued numerous material contradictions between the statements made by the child witnesses at the trial and those they gave before the committing Magistrate on salient points (who sat on the chest vs. legs, whether Roop Singh slapped Asia, the presence of others, whether the house was dark, whether outcries had been raised). The court found such contradictions significant and unlikely to have arisen if the witnesses had actually and directly perceived the events; this supported the inference of coaching or fabrication.
  4. First information report (FIR) inconsistencies: The court highlighted the contents of the village report (first information) prepared by P.W.16 Rawatram, noting that it described the death as having occurred "last night" rather than at about sunset, did not identify any eyewitnesses, and confined itself to suspicious circumstances and the wife's illicit character. The absence of any mention of eyewitnesses in the first report—despite the prosecution's later reliance on two such witnesses—was taken as strongly suggestive that the child witnesses were not genuine eye-witnesses but were perhaps manufactured later.
  5. Improbabilities in the prosecution narrative: The court analyzed other improbabilities—timing of the alleged premeditated murder at sunset when neighbours were likely present, the inclusion of an unrelated child-labourer Asia in the alleged plan, the conduct of the accused after the crime (remaining near or visiting relatives), and failures of the child witness to alert immediate neighbours or relatives despite claiming an outcry. These features undermined the credibility of the prosecution's version.
  6. Admissibility and value of co-accused statements: The court examined Exs. P-12 and P-13 (statements of Naingir and Mst. Dhapu) and observed they were self-exculpatory as to their makers and implicated others but did not implicate the makers themselves to the same extent. Applying settled authority, the court reiterated that a co-accused's confession (or statement) that is uncorroborated and does not truly implicate the maker is of limited and weak evidentiary value. The court held that these statements in the present case could not be used to sustain the conviction of other accused and were inadmissible as proof of the guilt of co-accused.
  7. Conclusion on proof standard: After weighing the deficiencies in the child evidence, the FIR, the improbabilities in the prosecution story, and the infirmity of co-accused statements, the court found that the prosecution had not proved the case against any of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court emphasised that while there may be grave suspicion against Roop Singh and Mst. Dhapu, suspicion—even grave—cannot substitute for proof.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • One accused, Naingir, was reported to be in jail; the court ordered that he be released forthwith if not required in any other connection.
  • The other accused were on bail; their bail-bonds were discharged.

Broader implications: The opinion did not purport to set any new legal precedent. It applied existing principles concerning the caution required with child witnesses and the limited evidentiary value of confessions/statements of co-accused that do not implicate the maker. The decision's immediate effect is to uphold the trial court's acquittal for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Show all summary ...

Modi, J.:— This is an appeal by the State against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Pali, dated the 4th January, 1964, acquitting the three accused respondents Roop Singh, Mst. Dhapu and Naingir in connection with the murder of one Jugtidan. The first accused was charged under Sec. 302 I.P.C while the second one Mst. Dhapu was charged under sec. 302 read with sec. 109 I.P.C and the third accused Naingir was charged under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 118 I.P.C

2. The prosecution story as disclosed by the eye witnesses P.W 1 Mst. Chhaganij and P.W 8 Asia is briefly as follows. Chhagani is a daughter of the deceased and was ten years of age while Asia is also a minor of the same age but was a complete stranger and was admittedly engaged as a labourer by the accused Naingir for working at his well on the day of the incident, that is the 24th January, 1963. Mst. Dhapu was the wife of the deceased Jugtidan while the accused Roopsingh was carrying on illicit intimacy with Mst. Dhapu. The remaining accused Naingir appears to have a well near the house of the deceased in village Kundli, police station Gudaondla. It is alleged that on the 24th Jan., 1963, at about sunset time. Roopsingh and Naingir accused alongwith P.W 8 Asia aged about ten years came to the house of the deceased. It was meal time. Naingir asked Mst. Dhapu to make a few ‘Roties’ for them with the flour which he had brought with him. Dhapu was already making breads for the family at the time. Dhapu immediately started doing so. Naingir sat by her side near the kitchen while Asia was sitting outside the door on the Chabutara. Naingir had his food while sitting near Dhapu. A bread or Page: 383two was also served to Asia. It is then said that after having had his meal, Naingir and Dhapu came out for a little while Asia who was sitting at the door saw them, but according to Asia they had no talk between themselves. Thereafter both Naingir and Dhapu accompanied by Roopsingh went into the house. At that time Jugtidan deceased was sitting near the fire place. Dhapu had in the meantime served food to her husband before she had gone out with Naingir. Roop Singh accused then is alleged to have caught hold of the neck of the deceased with one of his hands and to have pressed his other hand against his (deceased's) mouth. The deceased was thus felled down. Then Naingir held both of his hands while Dhapu sat on his legs. The deceased is said to have struggled for some time but in vain and he was thus starngulated to death. The version of Chhagni further is that on seeing all this she raised a loud outcry but her mother Dhapu slapped her and threatened that she would be severely beaten if she cried further. According to her, her mother then enquired from the accused Roopsingh whether Jugtidan deceased had been killed to which Roopsingh replied, that he had been. Thereafter all these three persons, that is, Roopsingh, Naingir and Dhapu lifted the dead body of Jugtidan from the room and placed it outside the house where a camel was sitting. Thereafter Dhapu asked Roopsingh and Naingir to leave the place, it having been arranged between them that she would then raise an alarm. When Roopsingh and Naingir had left the place, Dhapu did raise an alarm for her son Bhanwaria P.W 13 asking him to come and see what had happened to his father. Bhanwaria then came from the house of Murardan P.W 12 which is situate to the north of the deceased's house and where it is said he had been sent by Mt. Dhapu after the two accused Roopsingh and Naingir had come to his house that evening for taking his lesson from one of the sons of Murardan. After the outcry had been raised by Dhapu, P.W 11 Zordan, P.W 12 Murardan and certain other persons of their family reached the spot and found that Jugtidan had died. They lifted the corpse from the place where it was laying and took it into the house. According to the evidence of Zordan, Murardan's son. Devidan had immediately told them that he had, seen the accused. Roopsingh coming out of the house of the deceased and that thereby a doubt had been raised in their minds that Roopsingh had killed Jugtidan. We further have it from the prosecution witnesses including Zordan that the accused Naingir and P.W 8 Asia had been sitting at his house while they had heard the Outcry from Dhapu and having heard the same, they rushed to Jugtidan's house and Naingir and Asia were also with them. This is in brief the prosecution story as related by the eye-witnesses. It appears that the news of Jugtidan's murder had been carried by P.W 12 Murardan to the Sarpanch of village panchayat Umkali though Murardan himself shrewdly enough does not utter a single word about it but we have it from P.W 7 Ratansihgh who was a clerk in the said village panchayat and whose evidence we see no reason whatsoever to doubt that Murardan had come to Umkali and informed the Sarpanch that Jugtidan had died. Thereupon the Sarpanch had asked him and the Ward Panch Rawatram P.W 16 and one other person Achlaram to go to the spot and prevent the corpse from being taken away for cremation. It was in this manner that Rawatram P.W 16 accompanied by Ratansingh P.W 7 happened to go to village Kundli where Jugtidan deceased lived. Having gone there, he found that the news of Jugtidan's death was correct and thereafter he got the first report Ex. P-8 written by one Zorawardan who has not been produced by the prosecution in evidence. The gist of this report is to the effect that in the previous night the exact expression used in Hindi is Jugtidan son of Karnidan Charan had suddenly died, that he was not ill, and that Jugtidan and his wife Dhapu were not on good terms because the latter was a woman of very bad character and she wanted to live as the wife of the accused Roopsingh which everybody knew. It was, therefore, said in this report that the dead body of the deceased had been detained. It was further said that the death of Jugtidan had occurred in very suspicious circumstances, and, therefore, an early investigation was necessary. This report reached Motilal, the Sub-Inspector of Police Station Gudaendla at 4 P.M on the 25th January, 1963. As it was not clear from the report made to him whether the deceased Jugtidan had died as a result of-some offence committed against him, the Sub-Inspector commenced a proceeding under sec. 174 Cr. P.C and sent the dead body Page: 384of the deceased for a post-mortem examination to the Bangur Hospital at Pali. The Officer in charge of that hospital Dr. Jethmal P.W 17 performed the post-mortem examination on the 26th January, 1963, at 11-35 A.M vide his report Ex. P-10. He found the following external injuries on the body of the deceased Jugtidan:

(1) An abrasion ¼″ × ⅛″ on the right side of the neck anterolateral aspect 1″, above the right clavicle.

(2) Two scratches each 1/5″ × ⅛″ on the right side neck postero-lateral aspect.

(3) Two bruises each ⅛″ × ⅛″ on the right side neck lateral aspect 3″ below the right ear lobula.

(4) A bruise ⅛″ × 5″ extending on the neck and upper part of the chest and both the shoulders.

(5) An abrasion 1″ × ¾″ on the right side back lateral aspect, 4″ above right Iliac Crest.

(6) Bruises five in number ½″ × ¼″ each below injury No. 5.

(7) Two abrasions each ⅛″ × ⅛″ on the right side knee anterior aspect.

(8) Neck: All around the neck there were bruises and swelling with redness.

3. Post-mortem staining was also present on the neck.

4. On dissection of the neck, the doctor found that there was ecchymosis all around the muscles of the neck and further there was a fracture of the hyoid bone on the left side, and the larynx and the trachea were deeply congested. According to the doctor, the cause of the death of jugtidan was asphyxia due to strangulation.

5. All the three accused were arrested on the 27th January, 1963, and while they were in the custody of the police, two of them, namely, Naingir and Dhapu are alleged to have shown their willingness to make a confessional statement. Accordingly Naingir was produced before the Munsiff-Magistrate, First Class, Pali, on the 4th February, 1963, and the statement made by him is Ex. P-12 while Mst. Dhapu was produce for a like purpose before the Additional District Magistrate, Pali on the 5th February, 1963, and her statement is Ex. P-10. The learned trial Judge has held that these statements are exculpatory so far as the persons making them are concerned and has therefore held them to be inadmissible in evidence. We shall have occasion to say some thing about these at the proper place. It is in these circumstances that all the three accused were challaned under sec. 302 I.P.C read with certain other sections for the murder of, the deceased Jugtidan and after the usual committal proceedings, they were put on trial in the court of the learned Sessions Judge Pali who, as already stated, has acquitted them.

6. All the accused completely denied to have had anything to do with the offence or offences with which they were charged Roopsingh pleaded that he had been implicated by one Dalpatsingh who was on terms of enmity with him in collusion with the police. Naingir's, defence was that P.Ws Zordan and Murardan had falsely implicated him in this crime as he did not allow them water from his well. As for Mst. Dhapu the wife of the deceased, her case was that her husband was an opium eater and he had died on account of the pain which he had developed in his stomach the further pleaded that her daughter Chhaganihad been tutored by the relations of her husband to give false evidence against her.

7. In this appeal by the State, it is strenuously contended before us by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the learned trial Judge has fallen into a grave error in acquitting the accused and thereby a serious miscarriage of justice has occurred. We have, therefore, to see whether the case against the accused stands proved beyond all reasonable doubt on the evidence which was produced by the prosecution in this case.

8. We may state at the very outset that there is abundant evidence on the record to show that Mst. Dhapu, wife of the deceased was a woman of rather loose character and that at the material time and for some time prior to that she had been in illicit intimacy with one of the accused Roopsingh. There is also evidence on the record to show and which we see no reason to doubt that some six to seven months before the present occurrence took place Dhapu had made an application before a Magistrate at Pali that she wanted to live as the wife of the accused Roopsingh but Page: 385thereafter she was some how prevailed upon by her husband Jugtidan to go back to his house. (See the evidence of P.W 6 Lumbia and P.W 16 Rawatram). This might have furnished a motive for the accused Roopsingh or Mst. Dhapu or either of them to see that the deceased had better be removed from the path of illicit love on which their hearts seem to have been set. But accepting that to the fullest extent possible, we do not see that would furnish any motive for the third accused Naingir to be a party to such a design.

9. Be that as it may, it would not be possible for us to convict all or any of these accused of the murder of the deceased Jugtidan merely because there was motive for one or more of them to have encompossed his death. The further question that remains to consider and that is the crucial question is whether on the evidence led by the prosecution the case against all these accused or any one of them is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

10. And this brings us to the evidence of the two eye-witnesses upon whom the case for the prosecution principally rests. It is contended by the learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State that the evidence of these witnesses should have been accepted as unquestionably correct by the learned trial Judge and that we should also accept the same as true and that if we do so, the case against all the accused is proved to the hilt. At the same time we should like to observe here that if the evidence of these two witnesses cannot be accepted as substantially correct, then the entire remaining evidence produced by the prosecution would not be enough to convict the accused of the crime with which they have been charged.

11. We have given the gist of the evidence of these two witnesses while narrating the story for the prosecution and we do not think that any useful purpose will be served by our repeating the same at this place. What we should like to point out here however is that both these witnesses were children of rather tender age. The learned trial Judge took the precaution of putting a few preliminary or introductory questions to test them to that their intelligence and regard for truth and he found that they were both ingelligent and clever enough to understand what they were talking about and that they also appreciated the sanctity of an oath and consequently he had no hesitation in administering oath to them. No infirmity therefore attaches to the evidence of these witnesses on this score only, and as we have already adverted to, if their evidence can be accepted at its face value, we should have no hesitation in convicting the accused.

12. But there is a further aspect of the evidence of such witnesses which we cannot ignore and it is this that it has been laid down by the courts time and again that the evidence of child witnesses is dangerous in the extreme and that they live not unoften in a climate of “make believe” so that if they are inducted into the belief that a certain event or events has or have happened in a certain manner, whether they have themselves seen the same or not, then they easily mistake what they had been asked to believe for what they may not have seen themselves and are persuaded to testify to or speak of such things as if they have seen them for themselves while what has really happened is that they have been made or coached to think that things did happen or must have happened in a given manner.

13. Thus it was observed in Emperor v. Manni Lal* (1) as follows—

“There is no more dangerous witness than a young child. Any mistakes or discrepancies in their statements are ascribed to innocence or failure to understand, and undue weight is often given to whit is merely a well-taught lesson. Children have good memories and no conscience. They are easily taught stories and live in a world of make-believe so that they often become convinced that they have really seen the imaginary incident which they have been taught to relate.”

14. It was, therefore, held that the evidence of a child should be accepted with great caution.

15. Again in Abbas Ali v. Emperor (2) it was laid down relying on the Outlines of Criminal Law by Dr. Kenny, Downing Professor of the Laws of England, Cambridge University—

“Children are a most untrustworthy class of witnesses, for, when of a tender age, as our common experience teaches us, they often mistake dreams for reality, repeat glibly as of their own knowledge what they have heard from others, and are greatly influenced by fear of punishment, by hop; of reward, and by desire of notoriety.”

16. It was further laid down that—

“When considering the evidence of child sight of, although each case would depend upon witnesses these observations should not be lost its particular own facts and circumstances.”

17. Again, in Darpan Potdarin… v. Emperor (3) it was held that it would be quite unsafe to convict on the evidence of a child (who incidentally was ten years old in that case also) unless it was immediately available and it was received before any possibility of coaching was eliminated.

18. There are certain observations to be found on this subject in the decision of the Privy Council in Mohamed Sugal Esa v. The King (4) which may be reproduced here with advantage—

“In England where provision has been made for the reception of unsworn evidence from a child it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particular implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration, unless required by statute, goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law.”

19. It is in the light of the law that has been so laid down and with which we respectfully agree, if we may say so, that we are called upon to scrutinise the evidence of the child witnesses in this case.

20. The learned trial Judge has contrasted the evidence of these witnesses as given at the trial from that which they gave before the committing Magistrate on a number of points and has found that no unhesitating reliance can be placed upon their testimony. Thus while the evidence of both these witnesses at the trial was that after the deceased Jugtidan had been felled down by Roopsingh, the accused Naingir had held him by both of his hands and sat on his chest and Mst. Dhapu had sat on the legs of her husband a little below the knees and pressed him down; they had, however, both stated before the committing court that it was Mst. Dhapu who had sat on the chest of the deceased and held his hands while Naingir had seated himself on his knees. When they were confronted by their statements made on this aspect of the matter before the committing court, Chhagani stated that she had made that statement by mistake while Asia explained that he had said so under a threat from the accused while in the next breath he further went on to the length of saying that he had never said before the committing court that Naingir had say on the legs of the deceased. We should like to pause for a moment to point out that a contradiction on what seems to us to be a very salient feature of the murderous assault on the deceased would not have easily transpired if both these witnesses had themselves seen the occurrence with their own eyes.

21. Again Mst. Chhangani said in her statement at the trial that Roopsingh accused had never slapped Asia during the course, of the incident while she had stated in her statement before the committing court (Ex. D-3) that he did slap Asia and asked him to mind his own business. Chhagani also stated at the trial that her mother had not called out to her brother Bhanwaria saying that the deceased was having a pain in his stomach. When confronted with her statement on this point as given before the committing Magistrate to the effect that her mother had shouted out to Bhanwaria saying that his father was having pain in his stomach, all that she said was that she had made that statement in the committing court by mistake. She also denied the statement made by her in the committing court that Roopsingh accused had throttled her father with his right hand and gagged his mouth with his left hand and what she stated at the trial was that she had never given that kind of statement. Again, she had stated before the committing court that first Asia and Naingir had come to their house and thereafter her father Jugtidan came but she denied at the trial that she had ever made such a statement before the committing court. According to this witness's statement before the committing court it was all darkness in the house when the accident took place during the course of which her father was killed; but she changed her statement at the trial on this point and would have us believe that there was a chimney burning therein.

22. Having regard to these contradictions and certain others on which the learned trial Judge has relied, it is difficult to find fault with him if he was not prepared to accept Mst. Chhagani as a traight forward witness.

23. There are certain infirmities generally surrounding the case for the prosecution and to these we shall have occasion to refer presently. But before we do so, we may also briefly deal with the evidence of the other eye-witness Asia.

24. As already stated, Asia had been engaged as a labourer by Naingir for the first time on the day of the incident and he is alleged to have accompained the latter to the house of the deceased. On arriving there, he had sat on the Chabutra outside the house and after he and Naingir had their evening meal the incident had happened, his statement is more or less similar to that of Chhagani and as we have already pointed out that like Chhagani he had stated in the trial court that after the deceased had been felled down by Roopsingh having caught him by the neck, Naingir caught hold of his hands and sat on his chest, Dhapu seated herself on the legs of her husband down the knees and pressed hard. Like Chhagani he had however earlier stated in the committing court that it was Mst. Dhapu who sat on the chest of the deceased and Naingir had seated himself on his legs. Again, in his statement before the committing court Ex. D-4 this witness had stated that when they had reached the house of the deceased, Chhagani though awake was lying down on a not but in his statement at the trial he denied that he had ever said that Chhagani was so lying down and he maintained that he was only arranging her bed at the time. According to this witness before they had their meal, Murardan's son Jasia had come to the house of the deceased and this Jasia is said to be a full-grown adult and further Jasia is stated to have stayed there for some time. On this point, however, he is not supported by Chhagani who has unequivocally stated that no outsider apart from two or the accused had come to their house. We further have it from this witness that when Roopsingh caught hold of the deceased from the back, there was no talk whatsoever between them. Earlier, however, in the course of his statement in the committing court this witness had deposed that at that time Jugtidan had asked who it was who had held him and Roopsingh replied that it was he. When confronted with these two contradictory statements, the witness replied that he had not made the statement before the committing court which is attributed to him. After the deceased had been killed and Roopsingh accused had left from the former's house, Dhapu is said to have raised a shout. Now at that time what this witness had stated at the trial was that having heard that outcry he did not go to the house of the deceased again though on this very point the version law the witness before the committing court was that having heard the outcry he and Naingir went back to the house of the deceased. On being confronted with both these contradictory statements, the witness replied that he had never said so before the committing court but again resiled from this statement and said that at that time the accused Naingir and Murardan had come there and that they tried to massage the body of the deceased and went to the length of suggesting that the latter was alive up to that time. This is completely contradictory to the case of the prosecution at the trial that by the time Jugtidan deceased had been carried out of the house and his body had been placed at the site where it was later found by Murardan and others he had already died.

25. From these contradictions one thing that is clear is that no unhesitating reliance can be placed upon these witnesses. For ourselves, we are inclined to think that both these child witnesses had perhaps been coached up to say certain things irrespective of whether they saw them or not. And it is on that account that they have been made to pose as eye-witnesses of the actual occurrence.

26. We are considerably fortified in the above conclusion by the contents of the first information report made by P.W 16 Rawatram to whose evidence we shall now pointedly refer. There is evidence on the record that P.W 12 Murardan who is a close neighbour of the deceased and is also a very near relation of his went to inform the Sarpanch of the village Panchayat at Umkali that Jugtidan had suddenly died although Murardan somehow has chosen to be completely silent on this point. His silence, however, seems to us to be not without significance. The Sarpanch then asked the Ward Panch Rawatram and the clerk of the Panchayat to go to the spot and find out things for themselves. Then came Rawatram on the spot and made the report, the gist whereof we have already given. It is, to our mind, extremely significant that this report talks of death of Jugtidan deceased having taken place Page: 388“last night”, whereas, if the prosecution story as disclosed in the court is correct, the death of Jugtidan was caused round about sunset. It is also very significant that this report does not mention any body as the murderer of the deceased Jugatidan. All that it does is to throw a suspicion on Roopsingh with whom it is said the deceased's wife was on terms of illicit intimacy. The third and the most important feature which is indisputable about this report is that it does not mention any person or persons as eye-witnesses of the murder of Jugatidan. As the prosecution would have us believe, Murardan and Zordan, the latter being the deceased's first cousin, and other members of their family had immediately come on the scene of occurrence and seen the dead body of the deceased Jugtidan shortly after he had been killed. It is impossible to accept that Murardan of all people should not have been told that the crime had been witnessed not by one but two eye-witnesses one of whom was the deceased's own daughter and the other was the Meena boy Asia who, be it noted, was also in their company at the time because the prosecution version is that after the crime had been committed Naingir and Asia had proceeded from the deceased's house to the house of Zordan his brother. And if Murardan knew all this, it is very strange that he should not have mentioned anything about it to the Sarpanch. Curiously enough, this Sarpanch has not been produced by the prosecution as a witness in this case and that has its own significance. But still more curious is the fact that when Rawatram reached the spot and according to him Murardan and Chhagani and others were all there, he should not have been told that the murder of Jugtidan had been witnessed by his own daughter. And if he was so told, then we are entirely unable to understand the terms in which the first information report was filed in the present case. As we have already pointed out, all that it says is that the deceased had died all of a sudden, that his wife was a person of extremely loose character and was carrying on an illicit intrigue with the accused Roopsingh and that the death of the deceased seemed to have been caused under very suspicious circumstances. We cannot help observing here, with all the emphasis at our disposal, that if there were any eye-witnesses to the crime, they need not and should not have been screened from the view of the first informant and if they were so screened, then the only conclusion to which we can come is that they were not eye-witnesses to the occurrence and were manufactured later.

27. There are certain other features of the prosecution case as it has been developed during the course of the investigation and at the trial and to which we now propose to refer.

28. There is no doubt that according to the prosecution, the murder of the deceased was a pre-planned one and if it was of such a type, it seems very strange to us that the culprits should have chosen a most inappropriate time for the purpose they wanted to achieve. It is said that the principal accused namely Roop Singh and Naingir went to the house of the deceased round about sunset time which is a time when most village people living in our rural areas come back to their homes. We may mention in paranthesis here that Jugtidan was not living in any isolated part of the village but he had just adjacent to his house two of his relations living—one on the north of his house and the other on the east and one of these was his own first cousin. These neighbours and relations were very likely to be at their homes at that time. The question is, would any murderer choose such a time for achieving his purpose? We are extremely doubtful that he would.

29. This is not the only difficulty which the prosecution is called upon to face in this case. There is yet another and that is the manner in which the whole plan is said to have been hatched. It is said that Roop Singh was ??? on his mission by Naingir who perhaps was previously known to him and one other person Asia. According to the story related by the prosecution, this Asia had been engaged by Naingir as a labourer for the first time on the day of the murder, and it is said that they were not previously known to each other. The further story in this connection is that Naingir and Asia were required obviously by Roopsingh to go to the house of the deceased for having their evening meal prepared by Mst. Dhapu wife of the deceased, and we are told that they had carried with them Bajra flour for the bread. Now, this necessarily meant or involved that Naingir and Roopsingh who immediately followed him to the house of the deceased were Page: 389likely to be seen by a number of persons who may be round about there. It hardly stands to reason that a murderer or murderers would like to be seen unnecessarily by a number of persons at or nor the house of the victim before the commission of the offence. In fact we are told that apart from the persons who were the inmates of the deceased's house and the two accused, one Jasdan had come to the house of the deceased while Naingir and Asia were having their meal and stayed there for spine time, and it is further said that Devidan son of Murardan also happened to Roopsingh getting out of the house of the deceased about the time of the murder. Curiously enough, both Jasdan and Devidan have not been produced by the prosecution. But whether these persons actually saw Roopsingh as alleged by them or not around the house of the deceased, one thing is clear and that is that the murderers in this case were, taking unnecessary risk of being seen by others which it could not be their intention while engaging themselves in such a nefarious purpose.

30. This is not all. We are asked to believe that the murderers in this case committed the crime in the presence of the deceased's own daughter and at least one other person who was an utter stranger to Roopsingh and also to Naingir, namely Asia. We are entirely unable to understand why Roopsingh and Naingir should have been so stupid as to take with them a young person like Asia who could be of no use to them and would perhaps be a witness to the crime as he turned out to be when they could have safely avoided the presence of such an outsider. We have it from Asia that he and Naingir after the murder had been committed left for the house of the deceased's own brother Gordhan. This again is extremely amazing. Would a murderer care to lounge about or around the house of his victim immediately after the murder? His normal inclination should be to run away from the place as soon as he can. But there we have the spectacles of one of the murderers boldly taking himself to the house of a very close relation of the deceased and he stayed there for some time. And not only that, Naingir is said to have come hack to the house of the deceased along with his relation at the outcry of his wife Mst. Dhapu. The entire, story, seems to us to be fantastic. As for Asia we have it from him that although he had seen this murder with his own eyes, he did not mention the incident to anyone whether it was Murardan or Gordhan at the Site or whether it was his own mother when he went back home. Such conduct to our mind is extremely difficult to understand.

31. This brings us to the presence of Mst. Chhangani at the time of the murder. There would have been another person possibly present then at the house and that was the son of the deceased, Bhanwaria P.W 13. We are told that Bhanwaria was nearly put out of the way by the mother asking him to go and take his lessor with one of the sons of Murardan P.W 12. And yet, we have it on the showing of the prosecution, itself that Bhanwaria never went before to Murardan's son for Being coached up in his studies and it was for the first time that evening that he did so. See the evidence of P.W Chhangani and P.W Murardan. We may as well quote Chhagani's statement in this connection Which is to this effect—

“That was for the first time that my brother was sent to Murardan's house for reading. Before that he was not going there.”

32. If, however, this part of the prosecution case were to be accepted as correct, we do not see why Chhagani was not sent on a similar end elsewhere. We should have thought that Mst. Dhapu should have been equally anxious to remove her daughter; from the scene of crime when she had chosen, to participate in the murder of her husband. But Ghhagani's presence seems to have been but forward because the Case against the accused, it was somewhat thought, would be greatly improved if it could be said that there was an eye-witness to the murder.

33. Now let us look at the conduct of Chhagani herself. She says that she was all the time by the side of her father and the mother and that when Roopsingh felled her father down and wanted to strangulate him, in which object he was helped by Naingir and her own mother Dhapu who are variously described as either having sat on his chest or on his feet, she raised a loud cry whereupon she was slapped by her mother, and threatened to keep quiet. The question is if she had raised an outcry as alleged by her and she was present there to raise it, would such a cry not Page: 390be heard by persons who were living next-door and who were close relations of the family. We should also like to point out that the deceased was not living in a pucca house having roofed rooms therein; but according to the prosecution itself, the parwa in which he was living was an entirely roofless one. In such circumstances it would be extremely easy for any cry if raised to reach any of their immediate neighbours, as indeed, the cry of Mst. Dhapu is said to have reached the neighbours after the deed had been done. Again, we are not able to understand that if the and of the witness was being man-handled by certain persons within her own view and she was most certainly moved against such an atrocious conduct, we should have expected her immediately to run to the house of her uncle or another relation which were just next-door and tell them of what had been done. She did nothing of the kind. Therefore we are extremely doubtful that she had witnessed the murder as she alleges to have. It is also noteworthy that she did not mention the fact of her father having been murdered in her view to her relations as soon as they came on the spot and later on to Rawatram when he came there at the bidding of the Sarpanch.

34. It seems to us, having regard to all that we have said above that the murder of the deceased Jugtidan was not really witnessed by any of the two eye-witnesses Chhagani and Asia, and therefore, their evidence is of very little use to the prosecution.

35. This brings us to the so-called, confessional statements made by the two accused Naingir and Dhapu. We have carefully perused these statements and do not consider it necessary to reproduce them in extenso here because it is conceded before us and rightly that both, the makers of these two statements implicate the other two accused excluding himself of herself, and, therefore, to the extent they themselves are concerned, their statements are self-exculpatory. The question in these circumstances is whether these can be taken into consideration as proof of the guilt of the accused other than the maker of the confession itself. This point arose for decision in State v. Mohanlal (5) to which one of us was a party and it was held there that the rule was firmly established that the confession of a co-accused Uncorroborated by any other evidence could not be alone sufficient to sustain a conviction and although is was not, a rule of law but of practice, it had acquired all the reverence of law particularly where the, confessing accused did not implicate himself as fully and substantially as he did his co-accused. Reliance was placed in coming to this conclusion on Dr. Jainand v. Rex (6) and In re Malayara Deethu (7). Again, while dealing with a case as regards the confession of a co-accused affecting himself and some other persons who were being tried jointly with him for the same offence, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Haricharan v. State of Bihar (8) have laid down the law as follows:

“In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the, other evidence against such an accused person and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inctined to draw from the other evidence is right.”

36. Reliance was then placed on the judgment of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. the King (9) where Sir John Beaumont speaking for the Board observed as follows:

“a confession of a co-accused is obviously, evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in sec. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Sec. 30 however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence.”

37. In these circumstances it was further laid down by the Supreme Court that:

“It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in sec. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the Court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of sec. 30, the fact Page: 391remains that it is not evidence as defined by sec. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of co-person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive ??? to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in sec. 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159) where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu's case, 76 Ind. App. 147 : AIR 1949 PC 257) has been cited with approval.”

38. This is the law which would apply to the confession of a co-accused properly so-called, in other words, where the confession made by him implicates not only the co-accused but also himself.

39. The case before us stands on a much weaker footing. Here it would be a mistake to call the statement made by the co-accused as a confession at all. The simple reason, to our mind, is that unless a statement unequivocally implicates the maker thereof in the crime with which he is charged as substantially as he implicates the co-accused, such a statement cannot be called a confession. And that being so, statements like this, such as we have in the present case, cannot but stand on a far inferior footing and it seems to us that they would be entirely inadmissible as evidence of the guilt of the other accused. See Emperor v. Chatterpal Singh (1) also in this connection.

40. In this state of the law, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the so-called confessions of the two accused Naingir and Mst. Dhapu Exs. P-12 and P-13 respectively are no evidence of the guilt of the co-accused, and so far as the makers of the statement themselves are concerned, they are exculpatory, and, therefore, they do not involve them in the crime at all. Before concluding our judgment, it may be permissible to mention that so far as we can consider, it appears to us that the murder of the deceased Jugtidan was committed at some time late in the night and the eye-witnesses who have been produced by the prosecution to prove it were not present to witness it; and the possibility is that both Bhanwaria and Chhagani were asleep at the crucial time and Asia had no need to be there at all. It may also be that there is a grave suspicion against Roopsingh and Mst. Dhapu that they might have had some hand in the under of the deceased; but it is well established that a suspicion howsoever grave it might be can hardly be accepted as a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused.

41. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. One of the accused Naingir is reported to be in jail and he shall be released forthwith if not required in any other connection. So far as the other accused are concerned. They are on bail and so their bail-bonds are discharged.