Modi, J.:— This is a reference by a learned single Judge in a suit for refund of what was alleged to be an illegal recovery of the octroi tax, and, inter alia, raises an important and interesting question as to the interpretation of sub-sec. (1) and (2) of sec. 179 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (Act No. XXIII of 1951, hereinafer called the Act of 1951).

2. The appellant Municipal Board, Bhilwara, was the defendant in the suit, while the respondents were the plaintiffs. We may begin by stating the facts which have been found by both courts below to have been fully established. These are:

(1) The plaintiffs who are presumably dealers in cotton bales sent 716 such bales from their place of residence cum business namely Gangapur to Bombay and certain other places between the 11th May, 1952, to 15th Septmber, 1952;

(2) As Gangapur was not a rail-head, the goods had to be taken to the Bhilwara railway station for being railed to Bombay;

(3) Customs duty had been paid to the competent authorities of the State of Rajasthan at Gangapur, and there is no dispute as to that; and

(4) A further sum of Rs. 645/3/- as octroi was charged at Bhilwara by the customs staff while the goods were passing through that town, and this tax was so recovered on behalf of the Municipal Board at that place, and was in due course paid to it. The relevant dates during which this tax was paid are 15th May, 1952 to 4th September, 1952. So far there is no dispute between the parties at this stage, and, none indeed can be raised, for these are all matters of fact concluded by the concurrent findings of the two courts below. The plaintiffs' case then was and is that the recovery of this tax amounting to Rs. 645/3/- from them was unauthorised and illegal and therefore they represented their case to the customs authorities who admittedly upheld their plea, but the Municipal Board did not. Consequently the plaintiffs instituted this suit on the 16th July, 1955, for refund of the sum of Rs. 645/3/- plus a further sum of Rs. 122/- as interest at eight annas per cent per mensem in all amounting to Rs. 767/3/-.

3. The defendant Municipal Board resisted the suit. Its main defence were that the tax recovered by it was legal and valid having been duly sanctioned by the competent authorities of the covenanting State of Udaipur under their notifications dated the 21st October, 1937, and 23rd June, 1943, Exs. A-1 and A-2, and, therefore, it was within its authority in realising the same, and, further, that in any view of case, it was barred by limitation having been brought more than six months after the date of the recovery of the tax as provided under sec. 179 of the Act of 1951. Certain other pleas were also raised, but it is unnecessary to mention them for the present purpose. Both courts below have held that the recovery of the tax in question from the plaintiffs in the circumstances of the case was illegal and unauthorised. They have further held that sec. 179 was not attracted into application in the present case (though in coming to this conclusion they seem to have relied on different reasons) and that being so, the case was governed for purposes of limitation by the three years period provided by Art. 62 of the Limitation Act and but for two items amounting to Rs. 66/12/6 and 78/7/9 which were admittedly recovered more than three years before the institution of the suit, it was within time. Aggrieved by this decision, the defendant Municipal Board preferred a second appeal to this Court, which came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, and this has resulted in the present reference by which the entire appeal has been referred to us for decision.

4. A great deal of controversy seems to have been raised before the learned single Judge as to the true scope and meaning of sec. 179 of the Act of 1951, and it was argued that there was a serious divergence of judicial opinion in the High Courts in our country on analogous sections in various other Acts of a like nature. A number of cases have been cited before us, and although we do not consider it necessary to refer to them in detail, we wish to point out the broad line of cleavage between them. The one view is that the six months' period of limitation prescribed for suits under sec. 179(2) is intended, broadly speaking, to coverall suits or proceedings against a municipality or its members, officers and servants in respect of acts done or purporting to be done in their official capacity and is not limited to suits for recovery of compensation or damages, or, as it has been some times put, to suits of a tortious nature only. As representative of this view, reference may be made to Dargahilal v. Municipal Board, Cawnpore (1). Thus it was held in this case that a suit by a dismissed municipal servant for his arrears of pay was governed by the six months' period of limitation provided under sec. 326 of the U.P Municipalities Act of 1916, and was not governed by the Limitation Act, and the view was emphatically repelled that the section was enacted to govern actions in tort only and not actions in contract. The other view is that this provision is limited in its application to suits for damages or compensation or otherwise of a tortious nature only and has been adopted by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Panchayat Board v. W.I Matches Co. (2) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court has followed the same view in Chunilal v. State of Madras (3). The Patna High Court in Commissioner of Buxar Municipality v. Bhagwandas (4) also seems to have favored this view.

5. Faced with this conflict, we have thought it fit, with utmost respect, to focus out attention on the plain language of the provision which we are called upon to interpret and see what it means in the context in which it occurs.

6. Sec. 179, leaving its immaterial Dart, reads as follows:—

“179. Limitation of suits etc.—(1) No suit shall be instituted against any municipal board …………or any person acting under the direction of such municipal board………for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been…………… delivered or left at its office, and……………the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.

(2) Every such suit shall, unless it is a suit for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be dismissed if it is not instituted within six months after the accrual of the alleged cause of action.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any suit instituted for grant of perpetual injunction, of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice, or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding.”

7. The language of this section, in our respectful opinion, is perfectly clear and if we may say so, hardly calls for any interpretative effort. Sub-sec. (1) speaks of no suit being institutable until the expiration of two months next after a notice in writing staling the various matters specified in the section is delivered or left at the place mentioned therein. Then follow sub-secs. (2) and (3) which taken together on the question of limitation mean no more and no less than this that save for suits for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto or for grant of perpetual injunction, every suit against the municipal board must be dismissed if it is not instituted within six months after the accrual of the alleged cause of action. The legislative intent behind the scheme of the section, as we have analyzed it, seems to us to be clear beyond any reasonable doubt that suits against municipalities of whatever nature or description, be they contractual or of a tortious nature, except in so far as they have been otherwise provided for in the section itself, are intended to be governed by the special period of limitation provided in this section and not by the general law of limitation in force in the country. It may be permissible to point out that if that was not the intention of the Legislature, Sec. 179 could and should have been worded quite differently from how it has been and it should have been perfectly simple for the Legislature to say in no mistakable terms that the six months' period of limitation which was fixed under this provision would be applicable to suits for damages and compensation only, and to no others. That has not been done, and, instead, the section has been moulder in such a way that its language is all embracing so far as suits against the municipal board or any of its office bearers or servants are concerned, and that is why it became necessary for the Legislature to make special provision for the suits which it intended to except from the comprehensive ambit of the section. Any other interpretation, in our opinion, with every respect to the learned Judges who have taken the contrary view, would amount to this that we introduce some more words into the section to limit the meaning which it otherwise bears and it is a well established canon of interpretation that the courts have no business to do that except in rare circumstances where, literally interpreted, a provision would be reduced to absurdity, and we have no doubt that cannot possibly be predicated of the language of sec. 179 as it is.

8. There is, however, one more aspect of this matter, which, in our opinion, almost concludes this controversy, and that is that the word “suit” in the various sub-sections of sec. 179 must be given the same meaning; and it cannot possibly be that the meaning of this word in the second sub-section is narrow so that it is confined to “suits” in tort or suits for compensation or damages only, and it bears a wider meaning so far as the first sub-section in concerned. That would land us into obvious difficulties and if we were to hold by parity of reasoning that the narrow meaning which has to be given to the word “suit” in sub-sec. (2) is likewise applicable to sub-sec. (1) also in conformity with certain decisions which have taken the view which has not commended itself to us, then one would like to know which is the provision, which the Act contains, that lays down the requirements of law as to notice etc. which are normally laid down in all such Acts before a suit can be brought against a municipal board or any of its members or officers concerned. The result would be that we would be left without any such provision in the case of other classes of suits which may not be of a tortious nature or which may not be suits for damages Page: 507or compensation otherwise, and the position would then be that such suits could be brought without any notice being given to the Board or its members or the other persons concerned specified in the section. The correct rendering of the section, therefore, cannot be otherwise than this that the word “suit” as used in sec. 179 has been used in a most comprehensive sense, and there is no legal warrant for limiting its meaning to particular classes of suits except in so far as the subsequent sub-sections of this section themselves engraft such an exception.

9. On giving our most careful and anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter, therefore, we are inclined to the view that sec. 179 cannot be limited to govern suits for recovery of compensation or damages or suits in tort only, and a suit like the present would undoubtedly fall within its scope. We hold accordingly.

10. That, however, does not conclude the matter, for, a suit in order to fall within the ambit of sec. 179 must be a suit in respect of anything done or purporting to be done under the Act before the stringent provision of sec. 179 can be called in aid. The expression “for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act” clearly includes, in our opinion, not only acts which are done in compliance with the Act but also those which may not have been done in strict legal conformity with the provisions of the Act but about which, despite that failing, it could be reasonably said that the acts were intended or sought to be done under the Act. If we might express our meaning in a slightly different language, we should like to say that the distinction is between lawful acts and irregular acts on the one hand and illegal or ultra vires on the other. The first class of acts would be either acts done under the Act or they would be acts purported to be done thereunder, while the second class could not be so done or purported to be done for the simple reason that they are either opposed to the Act or for which the Act furnishes no authority or jurisdiction whatever. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Azimunnissa v. Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Properties (5).

“The word ‘purport’ has many shades of meaning. It means fictitious, what appears on the face of the instrument; the apparent and nor the legal import, and, therefore, any act which purports to be done in exercise of a power is to be deemed to be done within that power notwithstanding that the power is not exercisable.”

11. We might quote with advantage the observations made by Bhagwati, J. Of the Bombay High Court as he then was in Jalgaon Borough Municipality v. K.S & W. Mills (6) which were cited with approval in a later case of the same Court in Chopda Municipality v. Motilal (7):

“The acts which would fall within the category of those ‘done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act’ could only be those which were done under a vestige or semblance of authority, or with some show of a right. If an act was outrageous and extra-ordinary or could not be supported at all, not having been done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or some sort of a right invested in the party doing that act, it would certainly not be an act which is done or purports to have been done in pursuance of the Act.”

12. With respect, we are in full agreement with this view and hold accordingly.

13. The next question which then falls for determination is whether the act of the defendant Board falls within the scope of the expression discussed above. In other words, whether we would be justified in holding that what the Board did in this case was done with some semblance of authority or it was entirely outrageous or ultra vires. It is admitted before us in this connection that the sole authority for the imposition of this tax is to be found in the two notifications of the old Mewar State Exs. A-1 and A-2 to which we have referred above. We have, therefore, to see whether the levy or collection of the tax in question can be held with some semblance of justification under the said notifications. We have carefully read these more than once, and, put briefly, their gist is that the Bhilwara Municipality among certain other municipalities or notified areas was authorised to levy octroi duty at the time with which we are concerned at the rate of one anna per rupee on the customs duty payable by a person at the said places. It follows from this that if in respect of any goods no customs duty was payable at Bhilwara, no octroi would be chargeable at all. But if customs duty was so payable, then octroi could also be charged at the prescribed rate. From the facts which we have already set out, it is clear beyond any manner of doubt that the goods in question were being exported from Gangapur and as that was not a rail-head, they were brought to the railway station at Bhilwara, for being despatched outside the United State of Rajasthan to Bombay and certain other Page: 508places. It is further clear that customs duty thereon had been charged and paid at Gangapur, which, be it noted, was another town in the State of Rajasthan, and, therefore, there was no question of any further customs duty being payable at Bhilwara on the goods in question. In the circumstances, the conclusion seems to us to be irresistible that the notifications in question on which the defendant relies furnish no legal warrant whatever to it to levy octroi on these goods. In other words, this imposition was wholly ultra vires and illegal and that being so, we are entirely unable to hold that the act of the defendant could possibly fall within the scope of the expression “for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act” as interpreted by us above. It must further follow as a corollary that under the circumstances the plaintiffs' suit does not fall within the mischief of the six months' limitation provided under sec. 179 of the Act of 1951, and that being so, the only other article which properly applies to it is Art. 62 of the Limitation Act which provides for suits for money had and received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use and prescribes a three years' period of limitation from the date the money is received. It is admitted before us that on this view, the plaintiffs' suit for the tax paid by them on the 15th of May, 1952, is barred by time and for the rest, no question of limitation can arise and in this view of the matter, we hold that the suit has been rightly decreed in part by the courts below.

14. We answer the reference accordingly and dismiss the defendant's appeal with costs.