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Harbans Singh v. The State Of Rajasthan
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 12, 1966, Harbans Singh was alleged to have been driving bus No. RJK 4157 from Karanpur to Ganganagar. Another bus, No. RJL 7723, was on the same route. After both buses were at Mirzawala bus-stand, Harbans Singh's bus left the stand and, while attempting to overtake the other bus, collided with it about two miles from Mirzawala where the other bus was standing on the roadside. Five persons were injured, including Chatruram (P.W.1); Ramlal sustained injuries and died 13 days after the incident. A first information report was lodged and the injured were medically examined (P.W.2 Dr. Lajpat Raj). The police mechanic Goverdhan Singh (P.W.3) inspected the buses. A challan was filed and, at trial, the prosecution examined three witnesses (P.W.1–P.W.3). In his statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., the accused said he drove only up to Mirzawala, that Kapur Singh then handled the bus, and that a tie-rod gave way causing the accident. The trial court (judgment dated 11 September 1967) convicted Harbans Singh under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A, I.P.C., sentencing him to three months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 337 and twelve months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 304-A (to run concurrently); no separate sentence was imposed for Section 279. The appellant's appeal was maintained by the appellate court (judgment dated 28 September 1968). The present revision petition to the High Court followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of a lay witness (Chatruram, P.W.1) regarding the speed of the bus.
- Whether the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the accused's explanation that the tie-rod of the vehicle gave way causing the accident.
- Whether adverse inference should have been drawn because the prosecution withheld important witnesses.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The court below improperly relied on the lay testimony of Chatruram (P.W.1) to determine that the bus was being driven at excessive speed.
- The courts failed to give proper weight to the accused's statement that the tie-rod suddenly gave way and caused loss of control of the vehicle.
- The prosecution withheld important witnesses (including injured witnesses and the driver of the other bus and the investigating officer), warranting an adverse inference against the prosecution.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raj Kishore v. State (1). | Law does not permit assumption without evidence on the material point of competence of a witness who offers opinion against an accused. | The court observed that P.W.3 (Goverdhan Singh) did not state his qualifications or training; thus the court could not assume his competence. His opinion could not be treated as conclusively negating the accused's explanation about the tie-rod. |
| State v. Chater Singh (2). | Where a defective part is of such a nature that it could not be detected except on meticulous examination, the driver cannot ordinarily be held criminally liable for its consequences. | The court applied this principle to hold that the tie-rod defect was of a nature unlikely to be discovered by the driver without meticulous examination, and there was no evidence the defect was within the accused's knowledge; hence criminal liability under Section 304-A could not be fastened on the petitioner. |
| Darya Singh v. State of Punjab (3) | A prosecutor should not keep back material witnesses; it is the duty of the prosecution to assist the court and non-production may attract adverse inference. | The court relied on this to hold that withholding material witnesses (including injured persons and the driver of the other bus) justified drawing an adverse inference and cast doubt on the fairness of the prosecution's case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On the question of speed: the court examined the testimony of Chatruram (P.W.1), who described the bus as moving "at a very fast speed" but admitted he was not an expert and could not state the exact speed or knowledge of bus mechanisms. The witness said the bus reached Mirzawala about 5 p.m., stopped 5–7 minutes, and the place of incident was about 2½ miles from the bus-stand; the opinion states this distance "was covered within about 15 miles" and, drawing from that record, the court calculated a speed of about 10 miles an hour. The High Court found that 10 miles an hour on a straight, clear road could not be described as excessive and that there was no other evidence supporting a finding of excessive speed. Accordingly the lower courts' finding on excessive speed was unsupported by the record.
On the tie-rod breakage defense: the accused's statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., asserted the tie-rod gave way and caused loss of control. The prosecution adduced no evidence that conclusively negated this explanation. The mechanic P.W.3 reported a broken tie-rod but did not state his qualifications or where he received training; he could not say whether the tie-rod broke before or after the incident and stated that if a tie-rod breaks, control of the vehicle becomes impossible. The court noted that it could not assume the witness's competence without evidence (citing Raj Kishore v. State) and held that the mechanic's evidence did not negate the accused's plausible explanation.
On culpable negligence under Section 304-A, I.P.C.: the court reiterated that prosecution must prove culpable negligence. It is not required that a driver undertake a meticulous mechanical examination before driving. Citing State v. Chater Singh, the court held that where a defect is such that it cannot be detected except by meticulous examination, the driver ordinarily should not be held liable. There was no evidence that the accused knew of the defect; therefore criminal liability could not be fastened on him.
On non-production of witnesses: the appellate court noted that although there were nine witnesses, the prosecution examined only three; several important witnesses (Firangilal, Sudesh Kumar—the driver of RJL 7723, Goppawar Singh, and the investigating officer Durgaram) were not produced. The High Court held that the prosecution should ordinarily examine material witnesses and that non-production, absent explanation, attracts an adverse inference under illustration (g) to Section 114, Evidence Act, as well as the principle in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab. This non-production cast serious doubt on the fairness of the trial and supported an adverse inference against the prosecution.
Holding and Implications
Holding: For the reasons stated, the revision petition is accepted. The convictions and sentences awarded to Harbans Singh under sections 279, 337, and 304A., I.P.C., are set aside and he is acquitted of these charges.
Implications: The direct effect is that the accused's convictions and sentences under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A are vacated and he is acquitted. He was on bail and need not surrender; his bail bonds are discharged. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying existing principles (as cited) to the facts of this case; the court confined its decision to the record and the consequences for the parties.
L.S Mehta, J.:— On December 12, 1966, it is alleged, the accused Harbans Singh was driving bus No. RJK 4157 and was proceeding from Karanpur to Ganganagar. Another bus No. RJL 7723 was also going towards the same direction and on the same route. Soonafter bus No. RJK 4157 reached the bus stand Mirzawala, the other bus started towards Ganganagar. Later on the accused Harbans Singh also left the Mirzawala bus-stand and began plying his vehicle with a fast speed so as to overtake the bus No. RJL 7723. After covering a distance of about two miles from Mirzawala bus-stand, Harbans Singh's bus collided against the other bus, which at the moment was standing on the road side. As a result of this collision five persons, including Chatruram, P.W 1, and the deceased Ramlal, were injured. Bodies of both the vehicles were also damaged. First information report of the occurrence was lodged soonafter with the police station, Ganganagar. All the injured persons were examined by P.W 2 Dr. Lajpat Raj, Medical Jurist, General Hospital, Ganganagar. The injured Ramlal succumbed to his injuries 13 days after the mishap. The two buses were inspected by the mechanic of the Police Department, Goverdhan Singh, P.W 3. After the investigation was concluded, the police put up a challan in the court of the Munsiff-Magistrate, Ganganagar, against the accused Harbans Singh. The accused denied to have committed any Page: 354offence before the trial court. In support of its case the prosecution examined 3 witnesses, namely; the injured Chatruram P.W 1, Dr. Lajpat Raj P.W 2, and the mechanic Goverdhan Singh P.W 3. In his statement, recorded under S. 342, Cr. P.C, the accused stated that he was driving the bus only upto Mirzawala bus-stand. Thereafter Kapur Singh handled it. The bus, according to him, moved slowly. All of a sudden the tie-rod of the bus gave way and that eventually resulted in the accident. The accused did not produce any evidence in his defence. The trial court, by its judgment, dated September 11, 1967, convicted the accused Harbans Singh under secs. 279, 337 and 304-A, I.P.C The accused was sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment under S. 337, I.P.C He was sentenced to 12 months' rigorous imprisonment under S. 304-A, I.P.C Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. No separate sentence was imposed for the offence under S. 279, I.P.C An appeal was preferred by the accused in the court of the Sessions Judge, Ganganagar. That appeal, it appears, was subsequently transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge, Ganganagar. The appellate court by its judgment, dated September 28, 1968, maintained both the conviction and the sentences awarded to the appellant by the court of the first instance. Hence this revision-petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted the following 3 contentions:—
(1) The court below fell in error in relying upon the testimony of a layman Chatruram, P.W 1, on the question of determining the speed of the bus;
(2) The lower court went wrong in not properly appreciating the fact that the tie rod of the vehicle, as stated by the accused Harbans Singh, suddenly gave way before the incident, as a result of which the vehicle went out of control.
(3) The court below did not properly appreciate the fact that important witnesses were withheld by the prosecution for which adverse inference could have been drawn.
3. I may now take up the first point first. Chatruram, P.W 1, has deposed that the bus being driven by Harbans Singh was moving at a very fast speed. The passengers asked the driver to slow down the bus speed but the accused paid no heed to it. After sometime the bus, driven by Harbans Singh, collided against the other bus lying on the road side. In the cross-examination the witness has said that the road on which the vehicle was being driven was a straight and a clear one. The bus, which was moving ahead, gave side to the bus, wherein he was seated. The witness admits that he is not expert in motor driving or its mechanism and that he could not say with what speed the vehicle moved. He further deposes that he has got no idea or knowledge about the various parts of a bus. The statement of Chatruram in the matter of speed is much too vague. He has not given any estimate of the exact speed at which the bus was moving. From the statement of this witness it is further clear that the bus reached Mirzawala bus stand at about 5 p.m, on the date of the incident. It stopped there for about 5 to 7 minutes and then it started towards Ganganagar. The place where the incident occurred is about 2-½ miles off from Mirzawala bus-stand. This distance was covered within about 15 miles. That shows that the bus was running at a speed of about 10 miles an hour. As has been stated above, the road was straight and clear. 10 miles' speed can, under no stretch of imagination, be said to be excessive. There is no other evidence to suggest that the bus was travelling at a fast speed. In this view of the matter, the finding of the court below about the excessive speed of the bus ostensibly appears to me to be unsupported by the evidence on the record.
4. I now switch over to the second point. In regard to the breakage of the tie rod, the accused has stated in his statement, recorded under S. 342, Cr. P.C, that the tie-rod of the bus No. RJK 4157 gave way before the actual incident and, therefore, the bus went out of control. There is no evidence, adduced on behalf of the prosecution, which negatives the plausible explanation furnished by the petitioner. The prosecution, no doubt, examined a motor mechanic P.W 3 Goverdhan Singh. Whether he is really an expert in motor mechanism is not known. The witness does not say in his statement whether and where he had received training Page: 355in the motor mechanism. He does not even mention his qualification and experience. The trial court and the appellate court have completely neglected the absence of evidence on this aspect of the matter. Law does not permit any assumption without evidence on the material point of competence of the witness, who offers opinion for consideration against an accused; vide Raj Kishore v. State (1). Goverdhan Singh has stated in his deposition that he found tie rod of the bus broken and that be could not say with certainty whether it gave way before or after the incident. He has again pointedly said that if the tie-rod breaks, it is impossible for the driver to control the vehicle. His evidence does not at all negative the explanation offered by the accused.
5. To bring a case within the purview of S. 304-A., I.P.C the prosecution has to prove that the accused was guilty of culpable negligence. It cannot be laid down that the driver of a vehicle should undertake meticulous examination of a bus before it is put on the road. There is no evidence on the record to establish that the defect in question could have been within the knowledge of the accused. In this connection, a reference is made to State v. Chater Singh (2). In that case a Division Bench of this Court has observed that where defective part is of such a nature that it could not be detected except on meticulous examination, the driver cannot ordinarily be held liable for its consequences. In the instant case the defect was such that it could not have been detected by the driver, nor is there any evidence to the effect that such a defect was within the knowledge of the accused. Under the circumstance, no criminal liability can be fastened on the petitioner.
6. Turning now to the last point, the appellate court has observed that in this case there were as many as 9 witnesses. Of these witnesses only 3 persons have been examined by the prosecution. The important witnesses, namely, Firangilal, Sudesh Kumar, and Goppawar Singh, who received injuries, have not been examined by the prosecution. Sudesh Kumar, who was driving the bus No. RJL 7723, as also the investigating Officer, Durgaram, have bean withheld. These witnesses could have thrown a flood of light on the details of the incident. It is not understood why they have been withheld. It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine material witnesses, particularly when no allegation has been made that if, produced, they would not speak the truth. Not only does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution from the non-production of material witnesses in view of illustration (g) to sec. 114, Evidence Act, but the circumstance of their being withheld from the court casts a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab (3), it has been observed that a prosecutor should not have adopted the device of keeping back material witnesses and that it is the duty of the prosecution to assist the court in arriving at the correct conclusion. It is no doubt true that the prosecutor need not examine witnesses, who, in his opinion, have not seen the occurrence. Normally he should examine all the material witnesses in support of his case. It may be correct that where there are a large number of witnesses, who witnessed the same incident, a selection may be made. But in the instant case not have adopted the witnesses are not many in number. Some of the witnesses sustained injuries and one of them was driving the bus No. RJL 7723. Why these witnesses have been deliberately kept back it not understood. An adverse inference, therefore, can be drawn from their non-production.
7. For the foregoing reasons, the revision-petition is accepted. The conviction and the sentences awarded to the accused Harbans Singh under sections 279, 337, and 304A., I.P.C, are set aside and he is acquitted of these charges. He is on bail and need not surrender to the bail bonds, which are hereby discharged.
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