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Jujhar Singh v. State Of Rajasthan
Judgment Summary — Appeal by Jujhar Singh (Jain, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the Sessions Judge, Partabgarh judgment dated 13 September 1972 which convicted the appellant, Jujhar Singh, under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 500 (with six months' additional imprisonment in default of payment).
The prosecution case arose from the disappearance of Akram Khan after he left the Kuni bus stand on 11 October 1971 after appearing in the Munsif-Magistrate's court, Partabgarh. His brother Karam Khan filed a written report on 14 October 1971. A police investigation registered under section 302 IPC followed. Several accused persons (including Jujhar Singh, Nawal Singh, Madan Singh and Karam Khan) were taken into custody and, on 1 November 1971, each of the four accused gave information purporting to disclose how the dead body had been disposed into the river Sevna.
Investigating officers conducted searches and pointing-outs by the accused led to recovery operations (divers recovered skeletal remains on 1 November 1971). Medical evidence described a largely skeletonised body with antemortem injuries; the medical officer opined death due to injuries of chest and head by gunshot or blunt weapon. Various recoveries were recorded (weapons, blood-stained clothes, bag, turban, spectacles, footwear and other items). At trial, the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused of murder (section 302) but convicted Jujhar Singh for destroying evidence (section 201), relying in part on discovery evidence tied to the appellant's information.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the skeletal remains recovered from the river Sevna were those of Akram Khan and whether he was a victim of an offence.
- Whether, on the basis of the informations given by the accused and the subsequent discoveries, an offence under section 201 IPC could be proved against the appellant Jujhar Singh (including questions of admissibility of the informations and application of section 27 of the Evidence Act and Article 20(3) of the Constitution).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended the dead body (being much decomposed and skeletonised) was not capable of reliable identification; identification of clothing / personal articles was unreliable.
- It was argued that the informations recorded from the accused persons were obtained after prolonged interrogation (the record indicates interrogation from 8 a.m. on 31-10-71 to 8 a.m. on 1-11-71) and therefore were compelled statements within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution and inadmissible.
- The appellant further argued the informations were recorded in a mechanical, non-first-person form and not in the language of the accused, undermining their reliability; and that section 27 of the Evidence Act should only admit discovery evidence attributable to the person whose pointing led directly to recovery (i.e., Madan Singh was the initial pointer for the dead body).
- Authority was relied on (for identification and discovery/admissibility issues) including State of Gujarat v. Adam Fateh Mohammed, Shah Alam v. Emperor, the Division Bench decision in Aalam Khan v. State of Rajasthan, and authorities on Article 20(3) and recording procedure.
Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The prosecution relied on documentary proof of the deceased's earlier presence at the court, eyewitness accounts of his arrival at the Kuni bus stand, the recovery operations carried out after the accused's informations and pointing-outs, medical opinion on antemortem injuries, and identification of clothes and articles by the widow and son of the deceased.
- The prosecution relied on the voluntariness of the informations and on section 27 Evidence Act to justify admission of parts of those informations that led to discovery.
- Prosecution produced numerous witnesses (36 in all) and recovery memos and chemical reports (blood-stained clothes) to support both identification and the inference that the accused had knowledge of concealment of the body.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Gujarat v. Adam Fateh Mohammed | Reliability of identification of personal effects and the limited value of identification when distinguishing features are not provided; paragraph 20 spoke to discovery being when an object is found after search. | The appellant relied on it to challenge clothing identification; the court considered the authority but distinguished the instant facts and accepted the identification of clothes by the widow and son. |
| Shah Alam v. Emperor | Caution against accepting identification of clothing absent distinguishing features. | Relied upon by the appellant; the court acknowledged the principle but found the witnesses' testimony in the present case sufficient to identify the articles and therefore the body. |
| Aalam Khan v. The State of Rajasthan (Division Bench) | Instances where decomposed bodies and identification by articles were not accepted. | Appellant cited it. The court considered it but concluded the instant identification evidence (widow and son, plus other witnesses) was sufficient and that the trial judge's acceptance of clothing identification was sustainable on appeal. |
| Eradu v. The State of Hyderabad | On the limited value of recovery of an item known to the accused and the need for circumstantial evidence to be incompatible with innocence. | Cited by appellant in relation to circumstantial proof; the court acknowledged the principle but found the cumulative discoveries and conduct pointed to the accused's guilt for concealment under s.201 IPC. |
| State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad | Principle that mere questioning producing a voluntary statement is not compulsion within Article 20(3); compulsion is a physical objective act. | The court relied on this Supreme Court principle to hold that mere interrogation does not automatically render statements inadmissible unless extortion or coercion is shown. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Mohammed (Div. Bench) | Example where prolonged interrogation (30 hours) led the court to treat statements as compelled and inadmissible. | The appellant relied on it; the court observed that Supreme Court authority on the nature of compulsion was not considered in that Bench's decision and found that in the present record there was no proof the informations were extorted. |
| Ahmed Miyan v. State | Holds that mere questioning for an extended period is not per se barred by Article 20(3). | Referred to by the court in support of the position that prolonged questioning alone does not establish compulsion; used to reject appellant's Article 20(3) objection absent proof of coercion. |
| Kammu v. State | Advises that information leading to discovery should be recorded in the accused's language and in the first person to avoid doubts. | Cited by appellant; the court treated these requirements as procedural prudence rather than a legal necessity and found the informations admissible despite differences of form. |
| Public Prosecutor v. Pasala Venkata Reddy | Similar observations about best practice in recording informations and presence of witnesses. | Noted by the court; it reiterated that these are procedural safeguards rather than strict legal requirements and did not render the informations inadmissible here. |
| Lakshman Singh v. State | Addressed admissibility under section 27 Evidence Act where multiple accused gave information and which pointing should be treated as initial. | The court discussed this authority at length and concluded that the Supreme Court had expressed reservations about some High Court approaches; the matter was treated as not finally settled but the court nonetheless admitted each accused's relevant information where it distinctly related to facts discovered. |
| Kotayya v. Emperor | Structure and operation of section 27 of the Evidence Act: discovery normally involves (a) the object produced, (b) the place from which produced, and (c) the accused's knowledge of both. | The court relied on the exposition in Kotayya (para 9) to frame its approach to section 27 and to support admitting parts of informations that distinctly related to discovered facts. |
| Narain Pillai v. State of Kerala | Illustration that section 27 can operate even when the accused does not physically produce the object, provided the discovery is in consequence of information. | Used to support the proposition that discovery need not result solely from the accused physically producing an object; the information's causal relation to discovery suffices for admission of that part under s.27. |
| Naresh Chandra v. Emperor | Authority supporting admission against multiple informants where discovery follows plural informations. | The court expressed respectful agreement with the Calcutta High Court view and relied on it to hold that more than one accused's information may be attributed with the discovery in appropriate cases. |
| Ram Krishna v. State of Bombay | Observation that section 27 is founded on the idea that a discovery in consequence of information provides sufficient guarantee of truth to admit that part of the information. | Cited for the proposition that discovery gives evidentiary assurance warranting admission; supported the court's broader reading of s.27 in cases of multiple informations. |
| Motilal v. State (Patna High Court, Division Bench) | Held that where informations are not vague and they precede discovery, discovery may be attributed jointly and severally to all who gave the informations; parts of such informations leading to discovery are admissible against all informants. | The court relied on this decision to conclude that where multiple accused furnished specific informations preceding discovery, the relevant parts of each information could be proved against each informant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a sequence of factual and legal inquiries mirroring the issues framed in the appeal.
- Identification of the discovered remains: The court examined documentary proof (order-sheets showing Akram Khan's attendance at court) and eyewitness testimony (driver and others who saw him at the bus stand). Although the trial judge had doubted personal identification of the skeleton, the appellate court accepted the identification of articles (salwar, shirt, jacket, turban, bag, spectacles, rubber shoes) by the widow (Mst. Shahjan) and the deceased's son (Amir Khan PW. 1). The court emphasised that some articles retained sufficient appearance for those who regularly saw them to identify them even if distinguishing marks could not be specified. Other witnesses who saw the recovered body also deposed it was Akram Khan. On that basis, the appellate court concluded the body was that of Akram Khan.
- Cause of death and whether homicidal: The medical report described a largely skeletonised body with antemortem wounds (tears and fractures) and a rope with a stone tied to the body. Although the doctor expressed some uncertainty as to timing of some fractures and whether certain wounds were gunshot, the court reasoned that the presence of antemortem injuries and the concealment of the body by tying it with a stone and throwing it into a river, even after 21 days, permitted the inference of murder. The court accepted the trial court's finding that death resulted from chest and head injuries caused by gunshot or blunt weapon.
- Admissibility of informations and Article 20(3): The appellant argued that prolonged interrogation rendered the informations involuntary and hence inadmissible under Article 20(3). The court applied Supreme Court authority (State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad) and related decisions to hold that mere questioning, even over an extended period, is not per se compulsion; compulsion is a physical, objective act or conditioning that renders a statement involuntary. The court found no evidence that the informations were extorted and therefore rejected the Article 20(3) objection.
- Form and recording of informations: While recognising authorities that recommend recording informations in the accused's language and in the first person and recording before available motbir witnesses, the court treated these as procedural safeguards rather than absolute legal requirements. The court examined the contents of the information as recorded (e.g., Ex. P.50) and found it to have been made voluntarily and to contain specifics.
- Application of section 27 Evidence Act and multiple informants: The court undertook a detailed analysis of section 27 and relevant case law (Kotayya; Lakshman Singh; Kotayya's exposition of discovery; Naresh Chandra; Motilal; Ram Krishna) and concluded that when several accused give informations preceding a discovery, the portion of each accused's information that "relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" may be proved against the person who gave it. The court rejected a rigid rule that only the first informer can be attributed with the discovery where informations are clear and precede discovery. Applying this reasoning, the court found that although Madan Singh's pointing led to immediate recovery of the body at a particular spot, Jujhar Singh's information led to the recovery of the deceased's bag and turban (Ex. P.27) near the Jamun tree on the northern bank of the river. That recovery was proved to have been made in consequence of Jujhar Singh's pointing-out. Accordingly, those parts of Jujhar Singh's information were admissible under section 27 against him.
- Inference of guilt under section 201 IPC: The court reasoned that admissions and recoveries at the instance of Jujhar Singh showed he had knowledge and belief that Akram Khan had been murdered and that steps had been taken to conceal evidence (tying with stone and disposing in the river). On the cumulative evidence — the informations, the recoveries, the medical evidence, and identification of articles — the court concluded that Jujhar Singh was guilty of the offence of causing disappearance of evidence or giving false information with intent to screen the offender (section 201 IPC).
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The appeal is DISMISSED. The trial court's conviction of the appellant, Jujhar Singh, under section 201 IPC is affirmed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The appellant remains bound by the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge: rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 500 (with six months' additional rigorous imprisonment in default of payment).
- The appellant, who was on bail, was directed to surrender immediately to serve the sentence; failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate was directed to have him arrested and committed to jail.
Broader implications: The court applied extant authorities to clarify that (a) identification of articles may sustain identification of a decomposed body where witnesses familiar with the articles identify them, (b) mere prolonged questioning is not automatically compulsion under Article 20(3) absent evidence of coercion, and (c) section 27 of the Evidence Act can admit relevant parts of informations given by more than one accused where those informations preceded discovery and distinctly relate to the discovered facts. The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle or overrule existing precedent; rather it applies and synthesises prior authorities in resolving disputed questions of admissibility and attribution of discovery.
Jain, J.:— This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Partabgarh dated September 13, 1972, by which appellant Jujhar Singh has been convicted under sec. 201 I.P.O for which he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years and to a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, he was further directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2. I have heard arguments and examined the record. The story of the prosecution is that Akram Khan, who was resident of village Nanana of District Pratabgarh, appeared on 11-10-71 in the court of the Munsif-Magistrate, Partabgarh where he was one of the accused alongwith a few others in case No. 21/70, which was instituted by Baldeo Singh. It appears that in another criminal case No. 11/70 Balieo and the present accused Nawal Singh, Jujhar Singh and Madan Singh were also the accused persons. It is alleged that from Pratabgarh deceased Akram Khan reached at 7.30 p.m the bus stand of Kuni where he met Nawal Singh PW/4 and Govind Singh PW/3. From there Akram Khan started for his village but never reached the village. At last on 14-10-71 his brother Karam Khan Presented a written report Ex. P. 113 to the police station, Partabgarh that when his full and elder brother Shri Akram Khan left Kuni for Nanana then three gun fires were heard in the field of Shri Bhanwar Singhji which were heard by Bheruji Gayari of Kuni and he also heard the cries ‘OH, I am killed’. Upon this, they made a search in the nearby field and wells but he was no where to be found. Hakmi Ghand Bamhji and Bhawani Singhji Bapu etc. also went in search and last evening they saw some blood lying in the jowar field of Bhanwar Singhji of Kuni on the boundary of Kuni. He believed that his brother Akram Khan has been murdered by some body.
3. The police registered a case under sec. 302 I.P.C and launched investigation. The informer Karam Khan brother of the deceased and three other accused persons were arrested. On 1-11-71 the accused Jujhar Singh gave information Ex. P. 50 which was recorded thus—
“To me the Additional S.P Pratabgarh Shri Jujhar Singh s/o Man Singh Rajput resident of Kantbar at present in the custody of the police voluntarily gave the information that he along with his co-participants accused Madan Singh, Nawal Singh and Karam Khan murdered Akram Khan resident of village Nanana in the jo war field of Bhanwar Singh Rajput resident of Kuni and lifted the dead body of Akram Khan from the spot. They carried deceased Akram Khan Pathan resident of Nanana through the fields of Shri Lakshman Singh Rajput resident of Kuni, Shri Kishan Hajuri resident of Nanana, Shri Mehtab Singh Rajput resident of Nanana and brought it to the river Sevana where they tied a stone with a rope to the dead body and concealed Page: 292it therein. Before going, on the way, I took with me the bag of deceased Akram Khan which contained green lemons, a frame for preparing drops and white tutben of ‘MALAMAL’. I tieda stone at a corner of the turban and concealed it in the mud in the water near the Jamun tree on the northern bank of the river Sevana. I know all those places, can come and point to them.,”
4. This information was given at 8-15 a.m on 1-11-71 similar information in respect of the dead body was given by accused Nawal Singh also. It is Ex. P. 51 in which it was further disclosed that “on the way ‘BULDOG BIDIES’ were smoked and extinguished and thrown in the field of Mehtab Singh Rajput. I know all that place, can come and point to the same.” The time of this information is 9.10 a.m
5. Accused Karam Khan also gave similar information which is Ex. P. 53. In this information he further disclosed:
“The stick which was tied to the dead body was concealed in the mud of the northern bank of river of Sevana. One small knife with a brass handle was also found in the pocket of the waistcoat of Akram Khan, with which the abdomen of the dead body was incised and which was thrown some where in the water. I know all that place, can come and point to the same.”
6. This information was written at 9.20 a.m
7. Accused Karam Khan gave one more information Ex. P. 54 which was written at 5.30 p.m and relates to a gun.
8. The Investigation Officer then formed four parties:
(1) Accused Madan Singh:
In charge party— Sangram Singh S.I
Constable— Durga Shanker.
Motbirs— Narain Singh and Amrit Ram.
(2) Accused Jujhar Singh:
In charge party— Laxmi Shanker A.S.I
Constable— Sohan Lal.
Motbirs— Bheru Singh and Radha Kishan.
(3) Accused Nawal Singh:
In charge party— Murad Khan Head Constable.
Constable— Ghisa Lal.
Motbirs— Rama, Nawal Singh s/o Nahar Singh Rajput.
(4) Accused Karam Khan:
In charge party— Surendra Singh Head Constable.
Constable— Nanugiri.
Motbirs— Mangu and Abdul Hamid.
9. The parties left Kuni; first party at 10.25, second party at 10.45 third party at 11.15 and fourth party at 11.50 a.m respectively.
10. From Ex. P. 14 it further transpires that accused Jujhar Singh pointed the place of occurrence and from there the entire way through which the dead body was taken to river Sevna and he disclosed that they went through the fields of Lakshman Singh, Mehtab Singh and Akram Khan and reached the bank of river Sevna where he pointed by his hand the place where the dead body of Akram Khan was lying concealed tied with a stone. Similar memos of pointing are, Ex. P. 22 of Karam Khan, Ex. P. 33 of Nawal Singh and Ex. P. 39 of Madan Singh, which show that all the four accused persons had pointed to the place of occurrence, the way and that part of the river where the dead body was concealed.
11. But the investigation officer Virendra Bhartaria PW 36 has deposed that he started at 10.30 a.m, and reached river Sevna and at 10 35 a.m Before he reached, the party of accused Madan Singh had already reached river Sevna and accused Madan Singh had pointed to that place where the dead body was concealed. The remaining parties reached the river thereafter.
12. From the report under section 174 Cr. P.C (Ex. P. 3) it appears that in consequence of the pointing made by accused Karam Khan, Jujhar Singh, Nawal Page: 293Singh and Madan Singh and in the presence of motbirs, Virendra Bhartaria reached the middle of river Sevna where there is an anicut in the boundary of Kanthar in the middle of the river near the big black boulders towards the East, in front of a palm-tree and than the accused pointed that the dead body of Akram Khan was thrown in the water with a stone tied to it with a rope and a stone was also placed thereupon. Diver Chand Khan took out a rib bone from the middle of the river and shouted that the dead body wa? lying under the stone. Thereafter, the other divers went near Chand Khan and with the help of each other took out a human skeleton. On the dead body there was wrapped round its neck a shirt of white colour which had a knot in a long rope. The rope was tied in the right hand then in the right thigh. The rope was of the root of Khakra with several knots. There was a loop in that rope in its middle meant for tying something. On the left and right arms, there was the waistcoat of sky blue colour with a white lining. The dead body was also wearing a white ‘Salwar’ on the private parts and on the feet. The pieces of bones which were found near the place where the dead body was discovered, were also collected. Amir Khan son of Akram Khan saw the ‘Salwar’ waistcoat, and the skeleton and identified the dead body to be that of his father Akram Khan. Amir Khan was also shown a pair of spectacles wrapped in a black cloth placed in a black iron case, having white glass and brass frame, which was taken out of the water from near the dead body. Amir Khan said that the spectacles and the case belonged to his father. The discovery of the dead body took place at about 1 p.m on 1-11-71.
13. Dr. G.N Ray examined the dead body and stated that (he dead body was a skeleton which had no skin on the left leg. The entire skin bad saponified. There was a circular tear f” passing into chest cavity between the left scapula and the spine. Similarly there was found another circular tear of 1′ in the chest over the 8th right rib. There was another torn performation of ½′× 1′ in the left calf. All these wounds were antemortem. The skull was found fractured. 8th rib was also found fractured. The distal ends of the fingers of hinds and feet were missing. All the teeth except eight were missing. All the joints were broken. Right arm and hand were attached to the spine. A rope was tied round the dead body. At the end of the tope, a big stone was tied. The opinion of the medical officer was that death occured due to the injuries of the chest and the head with gun shots or with some blunt weapon.
14. On the information and at the instance of the accused Madan Singh one pun was recovered ftom his field. One more gun was also recovered from his house. In consequence of the information and the pointing by the accused Karam Khan, blood stained cloths were recovered from his house. The report of the Chemical Examiner in this respect was that the trousers were stained with human blood. From the scene of occurrence, burned wad pieces were also recovered.
15. Upon the pointing made by Karam Khan, the ‘Bidi’ ends were also recovered, vide memo Ex. P. 24. At the instance of the accused Madan Singh black rubber boots were recovered from the river by memo Ex. P. 25. At the pointing out by Karam Khan that stick on which the dead body was tied and carried was also recovered, vide recovery memo Ex. P. 26. Accused Karam Khan also led to the discovery of a gun from the field of Madan Singh. The recovery memo is Ex. P. 30. At the instance of jujhar Singh, the bag and the turban of the deceased were also recovered from the river, the memo whereof is Ex. P. 27.
16. The prosecution in all produced 36 witnesses. The accused in their statements pleaded ignorance of the occurrence and said that they were innocent. They also stated that the witnesses were false and were deposing out of malice. The accused told a lie an to the extent that Akram Khan did not attend the court of Munsif Magistrate, Pratabgarh on 11-10-71. The learned Sessions Judge after consideration of the entire evidence concluded that no case was made out against the accused under sec. 302 IPC and an offence under sec. 201 IPG too was proved only against the appellant Jujhar Singh. He held that it was Jujhar Singh whose information was the first in point of time. He also pointed out to the place where the dead body was thrown and the dead body was recovered at his instance from that very place. There-fore, the evidence of discovery can be read against him along.
17. Now the questions that arise in this case are:
(i) Whether the dead body that was recovered from the river Sevna was of deceased Akram Khan and was he a victim of any offence?
(ii) Whether upon the informations which the accused gave and the discoveries which took place in the aforesaid circumstances, no offence can be held to have been proved against Jujhar Singh.
18. Now, it cannot be disputed that deceased Akram Khan had appeared in the court of Munsif Magistrate, Partabgarh on 11-10-71. The best proof of his appearance are those order-sheets which have been produced by Shri Surendra Kumar PW. 25 reader of the Mnnsif Magistrate, Pratabgarh. The presence of the deceased has been recorded therein. That he alighted on the bus stand Kuni has also been very well proved by the statement of Roop Cband PW 23 driver of the roadways, Govid Singh PW. 3 and Nawal Singh PW. 4. It is no more in dispute that till today deceased Akram Khan has not reached home. In respect of the dead body which was discovered, the statement Ex P. 61 of Dr. G.N Ray is that the eyes, ears and nose of the deceased were missing. The cloths on the body of the deceased had rotted. There was flesh on left calf and skin was present on the back and the right hand. The remaining body was no more than a skeleton of bones. Some joints of the bones were disconnected, some were not available. Ribs, hipbones, arms and knee joints were attached with body along with the skull in a semi separated condition. There was no hole in the shirt. There was no flesh in the front portion of the chest, nor was there any skin.
19. Now, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be held that the dead body was capable of identification. The learned trial judge has also held that the dead body was un-identifiable. He had even held tbat the statement of Amir Mohd. son of the deeased that he was able to identify the dead body, cannot be believed. Yet the learned judge accepted that the identification of the clothes made by the widow and the son of the deceased has proved that the dead body (skeleton) that was recovered from the river Sevna was of deceased Akram Khan. The objection of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the clothes had become unidentifiable and the identification which the son of the deceased made of them is not believable for the reason that the clothes which were mixed with them at the time of the test identification weie not similar. Even in respece of the shoes of the deceased what his son had to say was that the shoes of his father had patches, while the shoes which were mixed were not similar. The conclusion of the learned trial judge was also that the identification of the trousers, shoes and the bag had no meaning. In this situation, the finding of the learned trial judge that the body was of Akrarn Khan is not appropriate. T he ruling which was cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection is the State of Gujarat v. Adam Fateh Mohammed (1) in which an identification of the watch, which the deceased used to wear, was also not considered reliable because the witness could not give any reason for identifying the watch. Another ruling that was cited was Shah Aalam v. Emperor (2). This was also a case of identification of the clothes of the deceased which were even embroidered. But the Lahore High Court did not accept this identification and held that in criminal cases the evidence of identification should not be believed in which the witness has failed to give any distinguishing feature.
20. In addition one judgement of this court was also produced before me which was delivered on January 14, 1970, by the Division Bench of this Court in D.B Cr. A. No. 141/67 Aalam Khan v. The State of Rajasthan. In this case also, the dead body which was recovered, was decomposed, moth-eaten and the limbs were not capable of identification. In short, it was incapable of identification. This court also did not consider as sufficient the identification of the turban and the ring which was found on the dead body. Similarly attention was also drawn to para 7 of Eradu v. The State of Hyderabad (3) in which a silver ‘Kardoda’ of the deceased was produced. But that was held, was only this that the accused was in the know of it that the silver ornament was recovered from the person of the deceased by some person.
21. The substance of all these arguments is that the dead body was not capable of identification and the clothes were so much damaged that no identification of any kind was possible. The identification of the shoes and the spectacles can also not to be accepted as the witnesses failed to specify and distinguishing features in respect of them. I am not inclined to accept this argument and I am further not inclined to agree with the finding of the lower court that the identification of the shoes and the spectacles of his father made by his son is also not reliable. In my view, there was skin on the dead body and out of the clotnes which were also exhibited before me in the court, the shirt is not so damaged and I am also unable to find any reason why the identification of the clothes made by the widow and the son should be disbelieved. The lower court gave no importance to the test identification, nor do I do so but if Mst. Shahjan widow of the deceased after seeing the ‘salwar’ shirt, jacket, turban, bag, trousers, spectacles and rubber shoes says taat those were the articles which were used by her husband and he was wearing them when he went to Partabgarh, then her testimony cannot be discarded solely on the ground that the poor woman could not give any distinguishing marks of identification. Amir Khan PW. 1 is a boy of 14 years and after seeing the articles of the use of his father stated that they belonged to his father, then his testimony too can not be rejected on the assumption that he being a child and having the suspicion that his father has been done to death, he formed belief that the dead body and the clothes must be of his father. Even otherwise, it is very difficult to mention any distinguishing features of such articles. It is only the persons who see these articles day by day that they can say to whom they belong. Besides, prosecution has produced some more witnesses who after seeing the dead body have deposed th?t the dead body was of deceased Akram Khan. In these circumstances, I agree with the findings of the learned lower court that the dead body which was identified by the witnesses was in fact that of deceased Akram Khan.
22. Now, the question that survives is whether the deceased was in fact murdered and wherther anybody who has concealed bis dead body in the river had the knowledge or had reason to believe that the deceased was done to death. In this connection much emphasis was laid on the fact that the evidence of the medical officer that Akram Khan was in Let killed by injuries of gun shot and of blunt weapon cannot be fully relied upon. As far as the fracture of skull is concerned, the statement of the doctor is that he himself was not sure whether the skull was broken before or after the death. Similarly in respect of the wounds that are alleged to have been found on the chest, the doctor could not say categorically whether these wounds were ante-mortem, and were caused by gun shot. In this respect I would say only that on the basis of the wounds that could be noticed on the dead body even after a lapse of 21 days, I have little hesitation in holding that Akram Khan was shot dead otherwise what reason was there for which, if he was not murdered, his dead body was tied with a stone and thrown into the river. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the lower court that Akram Khan was done to death by causing injuries by gun shot and some blunt weapon.
23. The next and important question that arises is whether the informations which the four accused persons made one after another could be read against any one of them and whether on the basis of these informations Jujhar singh appellant alone can not be convicted. In this respect the first contention that has been raised is that the infoimations were prohibited by Art. 2003) of the Constitution and cannot be used in evidence against the appellant. My attention in this regard was drawn first to the State of Hjmbay v. Kathikalu Ogadh (4) in which it was held that if the self incriminatory information has been given by an accused person without any threat that will not be hit by Art. 2003) of the constitution for the reason that there has been no compulsion on the accused to give any such information. When no compulsion has been used in obtaining the information, then such information is not within the prohibition of the Constitution.
24. In this respect the learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention also to a judgment of Divsion Bench of this Court delivered oa February 4, 1963, in Criminal Appeal No. 467/61 State of Rajasthan v. Mohammed. In this case 3 the accused Page: 296had given information about a dagger and a blood stained shirt. It was proved that such information was given after continuous interrogation for 30 hours. It was decided that such interrogation came within the mischief of compulsion which being in contravention of Art. 20 of the Constitution cannot be read against the accused person. My attention was further drawn to the statement of Virendra Bhartaria PW. 36 that interrogation of the accused went on from 8 a.m on 31-10-71 to 8 a.m on 1-11-71. In such circumstances, it should be held that the information which was collected from the accused was obtained as a result of compulsion and therefore, in violation of Art. 20 of the Constitution.
25. I would, like to say two things in this respect and would like to refer to Ahmed Miyan v. State (5). In this case interrogation of the accused continued for four days but the Gujarat High Court held that mere questioning is not barred by Art. 20 of the Constitution. It has been clearly laid down in sub para (2) of para 16 of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, namely the State Of Bombay . v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (4) that mere questioning of any person by a police officer resulting in voluntary statement which may ultimately turn out to be incriminatory is not compulsion within the meaning of Art. 20(3) It appears that these observations of the Supreme Court were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court. The Supreme Court has deary laid down (at para 15) that compulsion is a physical objective act and not the State of mind of the person making the statement except where the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process as to render the making of the statement involuntary and therefore, extorted. It is open to the accused person to show to the court that while he was in the custody of the police, he was subjected to treatment which would lend itself to the inference that compulsion in fact was exercised. In other words, it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it. In this situation, while admitting that Virendra Bhartaria deposed that the accused were put in the police lockup at 8-30 a.m and were taken out 9.30 a.m i.e the information was given by the accused in the lock up and af ter interrogation of 48 hours, it no where appears that the information was extorted. The accused in their statements even denied to have given any information. In this situation it is not proper to hold that the information which the accused, particularly accused Jujhar Singh gave, was barred by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
26. Now, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that this information was recorded in a uniform mechanical manner in respect of the accused persons and has not been written in the first person. In this connection, my attention were drawn to Kammu v. State (6) in which it has been laid down that when the accused proposes to give information leading to discovery, it should be recorded in the language spoken by the accused and in the first person, otherwise doubts are likely to be entertained as to the accuracy and correctness of the information. Moreover, although presence of motbir witnesses at the time of recording infoimation is not necessary, but as a matter of prudence, the police officer should record such information before the motbirs if such witness, s are available without much inconvenience. Similar observations were made in Public Prosecutor v. Pasala Venkata Reddy (7). Notwithstanding that the view of this High Court is that the information, as far as possible, should be recorded in the first person and in the presence of the witnesses, both the requirements relate merely to procedure. This is not a legal requirement. So far as he question of the recording of the informations in this case is concerned, I have already reproduced the information given by Jujhar Singh in which the police officer has noted that the information was given voluntatily. From this it further appears that it was written in the manner it was given by the accused, the difference being only that of direct or indirect form of speech. Therefore, the informations which have been proved against the accused, cannot be discarded on the ground that they suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities.
27. The last of the contentions upon which the fate of appellant rests is that it was accused Jujhar Singh who gave the information first of all at 8.45 a.m but the information which he gave was only this much that the dead Dody was concealed in Page: 297river Sevaa. River Sevna is a large long river and until the accused did not point to the exact place from where the dead body was taken out of the water, this information cannot be connected with the recovery of the dead body. From the statement of the Investigation Officer Virendra Bhartaria, it has also been proved that it was accused Madan Singh, whose pointing was first in time. The lower court has erred in saying that the dead body was discovered at the instance of Jujhar Singh or that he made any pointing If any disclosure has taken place under sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, then it shall ba deemed to be in consequence of the information given by accused Madan Singh and not in consequence of the information given by appellant Jujhar Singh Much arguments were addressed in this respect and reliance was mainly placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Gaurt which has been reported in Lakshman Singh v. State (8). In that case, one piece of the evidence which was adduced aganist the accused, was that all the three accused, had given the information upon interrogition of the police that the dead body of the deceased was thrown in the Saki Nala. The police party carried all the three accused to Saki Nala where each of them pointed out a place where different parts of the dead bodies were discovered. It was argued that the High Courts have interpreted sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act to mean that where many persons gave information, it is only the information which is first given that is admissible as once a fact has been discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence, it cannot be said to be rediscovered in const quence of information received from another accused person. The Supreme Court observed simply that the cases cited before them have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of sec. 27 and it may be that on a suitable occasion in future those cases may have to be reviewed. The argument put forward on behalf of the appellants was that the information given by the accused to the police was that the dead bodies could be recovered in the Saki Nala which is a stream running over several miles but such an indefinite information could not lead to any discovery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where parts of the bodies were recovered. Accused Swaran Singh led the police to a particular spot in Saki Nala and it was at his instance that the trunk of the body was recovered and therefore his shall be deemed to be the initial pointing. The result was that though it was not ascertained which of the accused first gave the information, the information was found admissible against Swaran Singh. Relying upon this very authority, it was also urged before me that river Sevna is a river running over several miles and the discovery took place at the instance of accused Madan Singh and therefore this discovery can be connected only with that person, namely, Madan Singh whose pointing was initial. This is a very important question and on this no final pronouncement of the Supreme Court is so far available. It would therefore, be better to embark upon a slightly long discussion on it. sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, runs like this:
“Sec. 27— Ho much of information received from accused may be proved: Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or sot, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”
28. In respect of this section, the discussion which is available in para 9 of the Kotayya v. Emperor (9) is as follows:
(1) Normally this section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object such as a dead body, a weapon or ornaments said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused and about which the accused has been given information.
(2) The fact of discovery includes (a) the object produced, (b) the place from which the object is produced, and (c) the knowledge of the accused in respect of both and
(3) The information given is distinctly related to the aforesaid facts.
29. In this case the Privy Council has used the word ‘normally which means that this section can be brought into operation even where the accused does not or cannot Page: 298himself produce the object. For instance let us take the instant case in which it were the divers who brought out the dead body. The accused simply kept watching. It also does not appear necessary that this section can be brought into operation only when some object is discovered because it mentions about the disclosure of any fact and not of any object.
30. The words of sec. 27 simply show that when evidence is led that any accused was in the custody of the police and he has given information in consequence whereof some fact is discovered, then that portion of the information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, can be proved. Therefore, what has to be seen is whether the disclosure is in consequence of the information. There is nothing in sec 27 that only that disclosure shall be admissible which is made at the instance (pointing) of the accused. It is just possible that the accused may give some information and the police officer thereafter may discover that object of which he has no previous knowledge, then though there has been no pointing by the accused, yet it shall be said that the disclosure took place in consequence of the infoimation given by the accused. If any authority is needed for the purpose, then reference may be made to Narain Pillai v. State of Kerala (10). Yes, of course, in para 20 of the State of Gujarat v. Adam Fateh Mohammed (1) it is laid down that discovery will be considered a discovery only when some object was found on making search for a thing which was secretly concealed.
31. In this respect I am in respectful agreement with the views of the Calcutta High Court which have been expressed in para 2, first column, page 603 of Naresh Chandra v. Emperor (11). It was laid down in this case that if any discovery has been made in consequence of information received from any source and if the information received before (and not after) the discovery were plural, then it shall not necessarily take any of these informations out of the ambit of sec. 27. In a suitable case, it is possible to ascribe to more than one accused the information which leads to the discovery. In para 22 of the case in Ram Krishna v. State of Bombay (12) it was observed that sec. 27 of the Evidence Act is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered inconsequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and can be safely allowed to be given in evidence.
32. One more important decision is of a division Bench of Patna High Court reported in Motilal v. State (13) which was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice Untwalia who now adorns the Supreme Court, relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Calcutta High Court. He held that unless the informations are vague and indefinite, if the information precedes the fact of discovery, the discovery must be attributed to the joint and several information by all and so much of the information as leads distinctly to the fact thereby discover must be admitted in evidence against all such persons who gave the information.
33. After codsidering all the aspects, I have come to the conclusion that where more than one accused person give information regarding discovery of a fact and thereafter the discovery is made by only one of those accused persons or the discovery takes place without any pointing by any of the accused persons the individual information given by the several accused preceding such discovery can be proved against the author thereof. Therefore, it is of no avail to the accused appellant, that in the instant case, the discovery took place actually at the instance of Madan Singh and not of Jujhar Singh.
34. Moreover, the information which was given by the appellant Jujhar Singh also contained that—
“On the way, before going the bag of deceased Akram Khan in which there were lemons, the lemon drops frame, one white ‘Malmal’ turban, which the accused took in his possession, was concealed with a stone tied in the corner of the turban, in the mud, in the water, towards the Jamun tree, on the northern bank of river Sevna. I know all that place, can come and point to the same.”
35. The recovery memo thereof is Ex. P. 27 which has been proved by the statements of Motibr Radha Krishan PW 21 and police officer Virendra Bhartaria This shows that accused Jujhar Singh pointed his hand towards the waters near the Jamun tree on the Page: 299northern bank of river Sevna and said that “bag and turban tied with a stone were thrown at this place.” The diver took out the bag with a stone tied thereto from that place. The bag contained one turban, 16 lemons, two Mosammies, 14 pieces of Brinjal of various sizes which had decomposed on account of action of water, a ‘Sadansi’ type frame. Now, there should be no doubt that the bag was discovered only at the instance of the accused Jujhar Singh. I have already stated above that this bag was of the deceased Akram Khan which he had carried with him when he left bis house for Pratabgarh. Therefore, inspite of the fact that the dead body was discovered at the initial pointing of accused Madan Singh, it cannot be held that the discovery was not made in consequence of the information given by accused Jujhar Singh, rather, it shall be said that the dead body was discovered in consequence of the information given by all the four accused p. rsons and it can be read against all the four of them, including appellant Jujhar Singh. There is no vagueness or indefinitieness in them which may make them otherwise inadmissible. Now it is indisputable that the accused Jujhar Singh did not only have the knowledge but he also believed that deceased Akram Khan was murdered and that his dead body was thrown into the water in order to screen himself and his colleagues from punishment and his bag wa salso concealed in the water of river Sevna in the aforesaid manner. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant again drew my attention to Eradu v. State of Hyderabad (3) that where the guilt of the accused depends upon the circumstances, than the court has to see that the circumstantial evidence should point inevitably to the conclusion that it was the accused and accused alone who was the perpetrator of the offence and such evidence should be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. This is an accepted principle regarding circumstantial evidence. From the evidence that has been adduced in this case, only one conclusion that could be drawn is that the accused was one those persons who sank the dead body and the bag etc. of the deceased Akramkhan in the river Sevana, knew that Akram Khan was a victim of murder and the proof of the murder was made to disappear with the intent that they may escape punishment. Though the remaining associates of accused Jujhar Singh appear to be guilty of the same offence, but it is their good luck that they have escaped punishment and even the Govt, has not filed any appeal against them, But on that account, the appellant cannot be absolved of his guilt.
36. Thus, there is no force in any of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant and this appeal is dismissed. The appellant is on bail. He shall surrender himself immediately to serve the sentence otherwise the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate shall have him arrested for the purpose and commit him to jail.
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