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Azam Jung v. Mohd. Abdul Razzack Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act alleging dispossession from the suit property on 12-8-1953 and sought restoration of possession. The suit was initially filed on 28-12-1953 in the City Civil Court, which returned the plaint on 22-7-1954 for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the plaint in the Secunderabad Court on 31-8-1954, which also returned it for the same reason on 8-10-1954. Subsequently, the plaint was presented in the District Court, Hyderabad on 11-10-1954. The defendant raised a limitation plea, arguing the suit was filed beyond the six-month period prescribed for dispossession suits. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding the plaintiff was not diligent in prosecuting the case in the earlier courts. The petitioner filed this revision against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time spent prosecuting the suit in courts lacking territorial jurisdiction.
- Whether the plaintiff prosecuted the suit bona fide and with due diligence despite filing in courts without jurisdiction.
- Whether the High Court should interfere in revisional proceedings against an order passed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The plaintiff was initially uncertain about the correct territorial jurisdiction due to unclear municipal boundaries and government notifications.
- The plaintiff acted on the legal advice of his counsel in filing the suit first in the City Civil Court and subsequently in the Secunderabad Court.
- Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time spent prosecuting the suit in courts without jurisdiction should be excluded as the plaintiff acted bona fide with due diligence.
- The objection to jurisdiction was raised by the defendant at the earliest stage, but the delay in disposal was not attributable to the plaintiff.
Respondent's Arguments
- The suit was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond six months from the date of dispossession.
- The plaintiff was not diligent in prosecuting the suit, causing delay by filing in wrong courts.
- The High Court should not interfere in revisional proceedings since the petitioner has the right to file a regular suit for adjudication.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 | Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to cases involving mistaken legal advice; analogy to Section 14 for suits. | Supported the proposition that mistaken legal advice leading to filing in a wrong court can justify exclusion of limitation period under Section 14. |
| Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, 46 Ind App 15 (AIR 1918 PC 135) | Authority on bona fide mistakes of law and limitation. | Reinforced that bona fide mistakes of law do not bar relief under limitation statutes. |
| Brijmohan Das v. Mannu Bibi, 19 All 348 (C) | Rejected strict application of "Ignorantia legis neminem excusat" in cases of bona fide mistake of law. | Supported that bona fide legal mistakes can excuse delay in limitation context. |
| Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, 44 Ind App 218 (AIR 1917 PC 156) | Approval of the view that bona fide mistakes of law justify relief from limitation. | Confirmed the principle that reliance on mistaken legal advice can be grounds for relief under limitation laws. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which mandates exclusion of time spent prosecuting a suit with due diligence in a court lacking jurisdiction, provided the suit is prosecuted bona fide. The petitioner’s initial filing in the City Civil Court and later attempts in the Secunderabad Court were deemed bona fide mistakes based on legal advice. The Court emphasized that a bona fide mistake of jurisdiction arising from reliance on counsel’s advice is sufficient for exclusion of limitation period. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that delay was attributable to the plaintiff, noting the delay was due to the lower courts' pendency. The Court also found no evidence of negligence, bad faith, or deliberate misconduct by the petitioner. Citing precedents, the Court recognized that bona fide mistakes of law or fact justify relief under limitation statutes. Lastly, the Court considered the balance of convenience, concluding that forcing the plaintiff to file a fresh suit would be inequitable given the circumstances.
Holding and Implications
The revision is allowed.
The Court set aside the order of the lower Court dismissing the suit on limitation grounds and held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The suit will proceed to trial for decision on merits. Each party is directed to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established; the decision primarily affects the parties by permitting the suit to continue despite prior procedural delays caused by bona fide mistakes regarding jurisdiction.
1. This is a revision arising in proceedings started in the lower Court under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The petitioner before me filed the suit on the allegation that he was in possession of the suit property up to 12-8-1953 when the defendant dispossessed him. He, therefore, prayed for his being restored to possession. The suit was filed on 28-12-1953 in the City Civil Court.
2. The defendant contended that the Court had no territorial jurisdiction over the property and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. On 22-7-1954 the City Civil Court returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The plaint which was returned on the aforesaid date was filed in the Secunderabad Court on 31-8-1954. Here again the Court came to the conclusion that the property was not situated within its territorial jurisdiction and therefore returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court on 8-10-1954. The plaintiff represented the plaint on 11-10-1954 in the District Court, Hyderabad.
3. In this Court again the plea of limitation was raised stating that the suit should have been brought within six months from the date of dispossession; admittedly the plaintiff had been dispossessed on 12-8-1953 and the presentation of the plaint in the District Court at Hyderabad on 11-10-1954 was long after the period prescribed for filing the suit had expired. In answer to this the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act and under those circumstances the question of limitation did no arise.
4. The trial Court overruled this contention an held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as having been diligent in prosecuting the case in the City Civil Court and the Secunderabad Court, under those circumstances it dismissed the suit. Hence this revision. I heard the arguments of the leared counsel for the petitioner and the learned advocate for the respondent.
5. The short point to be determined in this case is as to whether the plaintiff could avail himself of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. To entitle the plaintiff to the benefit of the terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, it is sufficient to show that he prosecuted the suit bona fide with due diligence. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the was considerable doubt as to whether the suit ??? was within the municipal limits of Secunderabad Page: 5and the notifications issued by Government in this regard were not precise.
6. It was therefore urged that as it was not clear as to within what Municipality this particular area came the plaintiff on the legal advice tendered to him then filed the suit initially in the City Civil Court and later on when he was informed that the land was within the jurisdiction of the Secunderabad Court he presented it in the District Court at Secunderabad. In support of this contention the petitioner has filed an affidavit.
7. Section 14, sub-ss. (1) of the Limitation Act is as follows:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding……. against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon same cause of action and is prosecuting in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction…………. is unable to entertain it.”
8. It would appear from the wording of the section that the Court is not given any discretion but the litigant is entitled as of right, to exclude the period spent in infructuous proceedings where he satisfies the Court that he was prosecuting the suit bona fide with due diligence. In the instant case the mistake that has been made is the filing of the suit in the Court which had no territorial jurisdiction and this mistake had been occasioned by the advice tendered to the petitioner by his legal adviser.
9. It may be straightaway pointed out that a mistake made unintentionally would be taken as having been made in good faith. Where therefore from a bona fide mistake of fact the litigant has been misled into litigation in a wrong Court such party could avail himself of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The question would be, did the plaintiff sue in the wrong Court knowingly.
10. A person would be said to be suing in a wrong Court knowingly where for example he deliberately undervalues the subject-matter of the suit to save court-fee or for any other reason. This is not a case like that. The other ingredient necessary for relief under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the suit should have been prosecuted in good faith. A person cannot be said to be acting without good faith where he relies upon the advice of a person whose status entitled him to give advice to litigants. As has been observed above, in this case the petitioner wholly relied upon the advice of his legal adviser.
11. It was argued that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court was raised at the earliest stage in the City Civil Court where the plaint was presented for the first time. Although the objection was taken by the defendant the Court did not give any decision but the matter was pending in the lower Court for a long time and undoubtedly the plaintiff could not be held responsible for the delay in the Court disposing of the case. If a finding had been given early and the plaint returned immediately thereafter the plaintiff could have presented it in the proper Court early. This objection, my opinion, is of no avail.
12. There can be no doubt that in this case the party has strictly complied with the directions of his legal adviser, for, the matter as to which Court would have jurisdiction, must be presumed to be within the knowledge of the lawyer. If the legal adviser erred in advising the client, and the client acting upon such advice files the suit in a wrong Court, the period during which such suit was pending in the wrong Court or Courts could be deducted in computing the period of limitation.
13. Mistaken advice of a lawyer in any particular case could be regarded as a bona fide mistake. The Privy Council applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to a case where the appeal was filed beyond time and wrong advice of counsel was regarded in that case to be a sufficient ground for the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships observed:
“They are of opinion that in applying S. 5 to such a case at the present, the analogy of S. 14 (which applies only to suits) is an argument of considerable weight.” Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 (A).
14. These observations would show that in a proper case the provisions of S. 14 could be invoked where the proceedings have gone on in a wrong account on account of mistaken legal advice. According to their Lordships of the Privy Council the fact that a party had acted on mistaken advice as to the law in appealing in a wrong Court did not preclude the party from showing that it was owing to his reliance on that advice that the appeal was filed in the wrong Court. I might advert to the case of Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, 46 Ind App 15 : (AIR 1918 PC 135 (B)).
15. A case exactly in point is the case of Brijmohan Das v. Mannu Bibi, 19 All 348 (C), a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court where the learned Judges held that the application of the maxim—‘Ignorantia legis neminem excusat’ to a case where there was a bona fide mistake of law, was not warranted. This view of the law was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, 44 Ind App 218 at p. 223 : (AIR 1917 PC 156 at p. 158) (D).
16. The other argument advanced by the learned advocate for the respondent was that I should not interfere in revisional proceedings, the petitioner having a right to file a regular suit and get the matter adjudicated upon. No doubt ordinarily the High Court would not interfere in a revision against an order passed in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, but considering the circumstances of the case I think this is a fit case for interference in revision.
17. The result of my dismissing this revision would be that the defendant would get into possession of the property and it would take a long time for the plaintiff to get possession after going through the ordeal of the trial in the first Court and the appellate Court. Would it be equitable to drive the plaintiff to a suit who according to his allegation was in possession of the property just six months prior to the date of the suit or leave it to the defendant to get his right established in a Court of law leaving the possession of the property to the petitioner.
18. In my opinion the balance of convenience in this case is not in favour of driving the plaintiff to a regular suit. I am not expressing my opinion with regard to the merits of the case, for that matter would have to be decided by the lower Court as to whether the petitioner was really in possession of the property till 12-8-1953 and whether his suit is liable to be decreed. In my opinion there has been neither negligence, latches, inaction or bad faith established against the plaintiff in this case and, therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The result is that the order of the lower Court is set aside and this revision allowed.
19. The case will now go back to the trial Court for decision on the merits. Having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of this case, I direct that each party do bear his own costs.
20. Revision allowed.
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